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Nihat Aktas

holds the Chair of Mergers and Acquisitions at WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management since September 2013. His research and teaching interest is in the broad area of finance with a focus on mergers and acquisitions, corporate valuation, and cash management. He previously worked at Skema Business School (France), EMLYON Business School (France), and Louvain School of Management (Université catholique de Louvain). Being interested in empirical corporate finance in general, Professor Aktas is the coauthor of several research articles published in peer-reviewed international journals including the Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Economic Journal, Journal of Corporate Finance, and Journal of Banking & Finance. His research has been featured on the programs of various international conferences, such as the American Finance Association and European Finance Association, and quoted in widely read international media, such as the Financial Times and The New York Times. He was a visiting researcher at the Anderson School of Management (UCLA, Los Angeles) in 2001–2002.

https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=qEvLA48AAAAJ

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Nihat Aktas; Christodoulos Louca; Dimitris Petmezas: CEO Overconfidence and the Value of Corporate Cash Holdings

Cash holding is more valuable when firms are managed by overconfident CEOs. Economically, having an overconfident CEO on board is associated with an increase of $0.36 in the value of $1.00 cash holding. The positive effect of CEO overconfidence on the value of cash concentrates among firms that are financially constrained and exhibit high growth opportunities. These results are consistent with the costly external finance hypothesis. In particular, cash saving is value-increasing for firms with overconfident CEOs because it alleviates underinvestment problems that the firms with overconfident CEOs face due to perceived costly external financing.

Last modified: 2018.11.30.