Research Seminar with Kemal Yildiz, researcher at the Bilkent University 

Abstract of the Choice with Affirmative Action presentation: 

A choice rule with affirmative action decides on the recipients of a limited number of identical objects by reconciling two objectives: respecting a priority ordering over the applicants and supporting a minority group. We extend the standard formulation of a choice problem by incorporating a type function and a priority ordering, and introduce monotonicity axioms on how a choice rule should respond to variations in these parameters. We show that monotonic and substitutable affirmative action rules are the ones that admit a bounded reserve representation. As a prominent class of choice rules that satisfy the monotonicity axioms, we characterize lexicographic affirmative action rules that are prevalent both in the literature and in practice. Our axiomatic approach provides a novel way to think about reserve systems and uncovers choice rules that go beyond lexicographic affirmative action rules. JEL Classification Numbers: C78, D47, D71, D78. 

You can find the research here. 

The event is financed by the Research Management Office and is held completely in English. The event is open to any university member. For online participation, send an email to major@uni-corvinus.hu.