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Marina Núñez (Univ. de Barcelona): Stable cores in information graph games

Marina Núñez (Univ. de Barcelona) presents Stable cores in information graph games at the Corvinus Game Theory Seminar
2020.11.06. 14:00
1093. Budapest, Fővám tér
Entry fee: pl. 4000/fő
Information: +36 1 234-56-78 / tamas.solymosi@uni-corvinus.hu

Szervezők elérhetősége

Dr. Solymosi István Tamás tamas.solymosi@uni-corvinus.hu Rektori Szervezet / Operáció és Döntés Intézet / Operációkutatás és Aktuáriustudományok Tanszék
Egyetemi Tanár / Professor
C épület, 708

In an information graph situation, some agents that are connected by an undirected graph can share with no cost some information or technology that can also be obtained from a source. If an agent is not connected to an informed player, this agent pays a unitary cost to obtain this technology. A coalitional cost game can be defined from this situation, and the core of this game is known to be non- empty. We prove that the core of an information graph game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if the graph is cycle- complete, or equivalently if the information graph game is concave. When the graph is not cycle-complete, whether there always exists a stable set is an open question. In this regard, we show that if the information graph consists of a ring that contains the source, then a stable set always exists and it is the core of a related information graph situation where one edge has been deleted.

If you wish to receive a link for the zoom meeting on the day of the event, please send an email to Tamás Solymosi (tamas dot solymosi at uni dash corvinus dot hu)

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