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Back to the event list02/10/2026

Thesis proposal defence of Krisztián Németh – the coherence of Hungarian monetary policy

12 Nov. 2026, 3:30 PM
On Thursday, 12 November 2026 at 15:30, PhD candidate Krisztián Németh defends his thesis proposal on the coherence of Hungarian monetary policy since 2013. The defence is held in hybrid form, in English, and everyone is welcome to attend.
2026.11.12. 15:30
Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem

The Doctoral School of International Relations and Political Science of Corvinus University of Budapest cordially invites all those interested to the public defence of the thesis proposal of PhD candidate Krisztián Németh. Title: The Coherence of the Hungarian Monetary Policy Between 2013 and 2025. 

Date: Thursday, 12 November 2026, 15:30—17:00 

Venue: Corvinus University of Budapest, Building C, Room C.5.510 

Format: hybrid – you are welcome to attend either in person or online 

Language: English 

Supervisor: Gergő Medve-Bálint 

Chair of the committee: Ágnes Szunomár 

Opponents: Gábor Tamás Molnár (CUB), Dóra Piroska (CEU) 

Secretary: Imre Gergely Szabó 

About the research 

In a fragmenting global order where central bank independence faces multiple challenges, this dissertation examines the coherence of monetary policy in small, open and transnationally integrated economies. Post-2013 Hungary is selected as the empirical case for its durability, continuity and first-mover status. 

The article-based dissertation first maps the economic policy models of East-Central Europe and develops an analytical framework for assessing policy coherence. It then identifies which theoretical model best describes Hungarian monetary policy (internal coherence) and examines the alignment between monetary and fiscal policy (external coherence). 

Analysis of the MNB’s three flagship programmes – the Funding for Growth Scheme, the Self-Financing Programme and the Bond Funding for Growth Scheme – shows that Hungarian monetary policy followed an economic-nationalist logic: central bank independence declined, developmental banking functions expanded, and the economy was systematically overheated. The dissertation also proposes a theory to explain the volatility of fiscal-monetary cooperation in countries with high political centralisation but formally preserved de jure independence.  

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