Mixed extensions and equilibria
Miklós Pintér (Budapest University of Technology and Economics; Corvinus) presenting "Mixed extensions and equilibria" at the Corvinus Game Theory SeminarSzervezők elérhetősége
Dr. Solymosi István Tamás
tamas.solymosi@uni-corvinus.hu
Rektori Szervezet / Operáció és Döntés Intézet / Operációkutatás és Aktuáriustudományok Tanszék
Egyetemi Tanár / Professor
C épület, 708
C épület, 708
Various mixed extensions of strategic games with finitely many players are considered. We show that the existence of approximate Nash equilibrium in a mixed extension implies the existence of approximate Nash equilibrium in every less mixed extension. This result means that for strategic games with finitely many players it is enough to consider the case when each mixed strategy has finite support to exclude the existence of approximate Nash equilibrium in any other types of mixed extensions.
