
Programme of the 2024 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design

Budapest, 8-12 2024 July



The 2024 Conference of the Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, organised and sponsored by



Venue: Corvinus University of Budapest, Building C.

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Péter Biró, Corvinus University of Budapest, KRTK

Programme overview

Monday 8 July:

13:00-13:50 Registration (lobby of building C)

13:50-14:00 Opening

Celebration of the 75th birthday of Vincent Crawford:

14:00-14:45 Plenary talk by Alex Teytelboym (University of Oxford)

14:45-15:30 Plenary talk by Kristof Madarasz (London School of Economics)

15:30-16:00 coffee break

16:00-16:45 Plenary talk by Nagore Iriberri (University of the Basque Country)

16:45-17:45 Plenary talk by Vincent Crawford (University of Oxford and UC San Diego)

17:45-18:00 short break

18:00-18:30 Surprise talks

18:30-22:00 Welcome reception and wine tasting (lobby of building C)

Tuesday 9 July:

9:00-11:00 Session 1 (4 talks in each parallel session)

11:00-11:30 coffee break

11:30-13:00 Session 2 (3 talks in each parallel session)

13:00-14:00 lunch break

14:00-15:00 Plenary talk by Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)

15:00-15:30 coffee break

15:30-17:30 Session 3 (4 talks in each parallel session)

17:30-18:30 Memorial gathering

Wednesday 10 July:

9:00-11:00 Session 4 (4 talks in each parallel session)

11:00-11:30 coffee break

11:30-13:00 Session 5 (3 talks in each parallel session)

13:00-14:00 lunch break

14:00-15:00 Plenary talk by Al Roth (Stanford University)

15:00-15:30 coffee break

15:30-17:30 Session 6 (4 talks in each parallel session)

18:30-22:00 Conference dinner on Európa boat

Thursday 11 July:

9:00-11:00 Session 7 (4 talks in each parallel session)

11:00-11:30 coffee break

11:30-13:00 Session 8 (3 talks in each parallel session)

13:00-14:00 lunch break

14:00-15:00 Plenary talk by Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

15:00-15:30 coffee break

15:30-17:00 Session 9 (3 talks in each parallel session)

17:00-18:00 Plenary talk by Roger Myerson (University of Chicago – Online talk)

Friday 12 July:

9:00-11:00 Session 10 (4 talks in each parallel session)

11:00-11:30 coffee break

11:30-13:00 Sesson 11 (3 talks in each parallel session)

13:00-14:00 closing and lunch

Schedule of the contributed sessions

9 July, Tuesday

	Session 1 (9:00-11:00)	Session 2 (11:30-13:00)	Session 3 (15:30-17:30)	
Plenary	On Vince Crawford's	Understanding	Narratives	
Room	contributions	Behavior in Games	Narratives	
Room V	Mechanism Design 1	Mechanism Design 2	Mechanism Design 3	
Room VI	Multilateral Bargaining and Experiments on Pricing and Norms	Information Design 1	Information Acquisition and Disclosure	
Room VII	Behavioral Economics	Experiments 1	Networks	
Room IX	Auction 1	Contest and IO	Auction Design and Multidimensional Screening	
Room X	Sequential Market Mechanisms	Allocation 1	Matching 1	
Room 103	Contract Design	Voting 1	Industrial Organisations 1	
Room 104	Fair Division	Learning	Social Choice 1	

10 July, Wednesday

	Session 4 (9:00-11:00)	Session 5 (11:30-13:00)	Session 6 (15:30-17:30)
Plenary	Mechanism Design and	Applied Matching	Fair Market Design
Room	Competition	Applied Matching	
Room V	Topics in Mechanism Design	Mechanism Design 4	Public Goods
Room VI	Theory and Experiment	Information Design 2	Financial Markets
Room VII	Game Theory 1	Behavioural and Experimental	Signalling
Room IX	Auction 2	Institution Design	Auction 3
Room X	School Choice	Market Design 1	Allocation 2
Do om 102	Contest 1	Voting 2	Industrial
Room 103		Voting 2	Organisations 2

11 July, Thursday

	Session 7 (9:00-11:00)	Session 8 (11:30-13:00)	Session 9 (15:30-17:00)
Plenary	Matching 2	New Directions in	Characterisation in Game
Room	Matching 2	Market Design	Theory
Room V	Implementation	Mechanism Design 5	Mechanism Design 6
Room VI	Digital Economy	Contest 2	Information Design 3
Room VII	Social Choice 2	Contest, Matching, and Experiments	Market Design 2
Room IX	Auction Theory Without Quasi-Linearity	Experiments 2	Assignment and Matching with Money
Room X	Bargaining	Allocation 3	Matching 3
Room 103	Industrial Organisations 3	Voting 3	Voting 4

12 July, Friday

	Session 10 (9:00-11:00)	Session 11 (11:30-13:00)
Plenary Room	Financial Networks	Matching Theory
Room V	Mechanism Design 7	Mechanism Design 8
Room VI	Advances in Mechanism Design and Information Economics	Information Design and IO
Room VII	Game Theory 2	Mechanism Design in Sports
Room IX	Auction 4	Cheap Talk
Room X	Matching 4	Allocation 4
Room 103	Search	Voting 5

Detailed programme

8 July, Monday

13:00-13:50 Registration (in the lobby of building C)

13:50-14:00 Opening (Plenary Room)

Plenary talks celebrating Vincent P. Crawford (Plenary Room)

14:00-14:45 Alex Teytelboym (University of Oxford): Putting Markets into Matching Markets

14:45-15:30 Kristof Madarasz (London School of Economics): Cheap(est) Talk

15:30-16:00 Coffee break

16:00-16:45 Nagore Iriberri (University of the Basque Country): Level-k thinking on games

16:45-17:45 Vincent P. Crawford (University of Oxford and UC San Diego): Meaningful Theorems: Nonparametric Analysis of Reference-dependent Preferences

17:45-18:00 Short break

18:00-18:30 Surprise talks

18:30-22:00 Welcome reception, wine tasting (in the lobby of building C)

9 July, Tuesday

9:00-11:00: Session 1

Session organised by Nagore Iriberri: Celebrating the work of Vincent Crawford / On Vince Crawford's contributions (Plenary Room)

Authors	Titles
Zeky Murra-Anton; ISO New England	Mediated (Anti)Persuasive Communication
Roberto Serrano; Brown University	
Joel Sobel; UCSD	Preserving Privacy
Alfred Galichon; New York University	Unified Gross Substitutes and Inverse Isotonicity for
Larry Samuelson; Yale University	Equilibrium Problems
Lucas Vernet; Banque de France	
Adam Sanjurjo, Universidad de Alicante	Complexity in Choice

Mechanism Design 1 (Room V)

Authors	Titles
Tom Rauber; University of Kaiserslautern	Detrimental Incentive Mechanisms in Dynamic
Philipp Weinschenk; University of	Principal-Agent Relationships
Kaiserslautern-Landau	
Noemie Cabau; QSMS Research Group BME	Signaling Effort: Information structures in a
Arseniy Samsonov; Ozyegin University	Principal-Agent model
Aloisio Araujo; FGV/EPGE and IMPA	Single crossing in multidimensional screening with
Victor Perez; IMPA	one-dimensional allocation space
Changhyun Kwak; Academia Sinica	Screening without Single Crossing: A General
	Approach

Session organised by Yuan Ju: Multilateral Bargaining and Experiments on Pricing and Norms (Room VI)

Authors	Titles
Jingru Wang; Waseda University	An experimental analysis of IPO pricing mechanism –
Yukihiko Funaki; Waseda University	The case of Book-building
Yoshiaki Ogura; Waseda University	
Ryuichiro Ishikawa; Waseda University	
Jiawen Li; Lancaster University	Trust and Trustworthiness Norm-conforming
	Behavior
David Wettstein; Ben-Gurion University	Bidding with Coalitional Externalities: a strategic
Yuan Yu, University of York	approach to partition function form games
Yuan Ju; University of York	Decentralized Multilateral Bargaining

Behavioral Economics (Room VII)

Authors	Titles
Ville Korpela; Turku School of Economics	Behavioral Implementation Without Unanimity
Michele Lombardi; University of Liverpool	
and University of Napoli Federico II	

Julius Zachariassen; Turku School of	
<u>Economics</u>	
Ivan Samoylenko; HSE Moscow	The model of two-level tug-of-war coopetition:
	uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and phase transition
	to instability with information spreading delays
Manachaya Uruyos; Chulalongkorn	Enhancing Retirement Savings Behavior: Leveraging
University	Psychological Biases and Nudging Strategies
Mehmet Barlo; Sabanci University	Robust Behavioral Implementation
Nuh Aygun Dalkiran; Bilkent University	

Auction 1 (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Simon Finster; CREST-ENSAE	Equitable Pricing in Auctions
Patrick Loiseau; Inria	
Simon Mauras; Inria	
Mathieu Molina; Inria	
Bary SR Pradelski; CNRS	
Kuo-chih Yuan; Soochow University,	Parallel auctions of objects within budget constraints
Bo Chen	Optimal Discrimination-free Auction
Dmitriy Knyazev; University of Vienna	
Thanh Nguyen; Purdue University	Approximate Combinatorial Auctions with Budgets
Alexander Teytelboym; University of Oxford	

Session organised by Ning Neil Yu: Sequential Market Mechanisms (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Ken Ho; Liaoning University	Matching Through Agents
Jinyong Jeong; Liaoning University	
Yajing Chen; East China University of Science and	The Machiavellian frontier of top
Technology	trading cycles
Zhenhua Jiao; Shanghai University of International Business	
and Economics	
Ning Yu; Nanjing Audit University	Something about Auction
Ziyang Shen; Columbia University	Sequential Solicitation

Contract Design (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Fahad Khalil; University of Washington	Rewarding success and failure: moral
Jacques Lawarree; University of Washington	hazard and adverse selection in strategic
Alexander Rodivilov; Stevens Institute of Technology	experimentation
Chang Liu; UNSW Business School	Robust Contracts with Exploration
Marc Claveria-Mayol, Stony Brook University	Incentive Contracts and Peer Effects in the
Pau Milán (UAB and BSE)	Workplace
Nicolás Oviedo-Dávila (UAB and BSE)	
Laurent Lamy; Ecole des Ponts, ParisTech	Robust Production Insuring Procurement
Clément Leblanc; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et	and their Pitfalls
Chaussées – ENPC	

Fair Division (Room 104)

Authors	Titles
Ruben Juarez; University of Hawaii	Sharing Profit by Ranking Partners
Chiu Yu Ko; Chinese University of Hong Kong	
Jung You; California State University East Bay	
Zsuzsanna Jankó; Corvinus University of Budapest	On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-
Attila Joó; University of Hamburg	Cutting
Erel Segal-Halevi; Arial University	
Sheung Man Yuen; National University of Singapore	
Mihir Bhattacharya; Ashoka University	Fair allocation with (semi-single-peaked)
Ojasvi Khare; Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi	preferences over location and quantity
Center	
Niccolò Urbinati; Università di Napoli "Federico II"	Fair allocation problems when agents have
	outside options

11:00-11:30: Coffee break

11:30-13:00: Session 2

Sessions organised by Nagore Iriberri: Celebrating the work of Vincent Crawford / Understanding Behavior in Games (Plenary Room)

Authors	Titles
Amil Camilo Moore; Universitat Pompeu Fabra	Toward a behavioral taxonomy of 2x2 games
Fabrizio Germano; Universitat Pompeu Fabra	
Rosemarie Nagel; ICREA-UPF-BGSE	
Amil Camilo Moore; IPF-BSE	Fair and Efficient: Re-evaluating Normal-Form
Rosemarie Nagel; ICREA-UPF-BGSE	Games with Near-Equal Split
Anna Bogomolnaia; University of Glasgow	Fair division under different entitlements: a quest
	for Round Robin

Mechanism Design 2 (Room V)

Authors	Titles
Krisztina Antal-Pomázi; Center for Economic and	Expert Evidence in Court: A New Method for
Regional Studies	Choosing a Court-Appointed Neutral Expert
Martin Hagen; CUNEF Universidad	Optimal refugee status determination
Alessandro Ispano; CY Cergy Paris Universite	Good cop-bad cop: delegating interrogations
Peter Vida; CY Cergy Paris Universite and	
Corvinus University of Budapest	

Information Design 1 (Room VI)

Authors	Titles
Naoki Watanabe; Keio University	Resale and Sequential Trades of Information
Pia Ennuschat; UPF	Information Discrimination Shaping Markets Through Tailored Algorithms

Claudia Herresthal; University of Bonn	Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence
Tatiana Mayskaya; NRU Higher School of	of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm?
<u>Economics</u>	
Arina Nikandrova; City, University of	
London	

Experiments 1 (Room VII)

Authors	Titles
Hubert Kiss; KRTK & Corvinus University of Budapest	Risk of imminent collective failure
Jaromir Kovarik; University of the Basque Country	alleviates but does not prevent the tragedy
Agnes Pinter; Universidad Autónoma de Madrid	of the commons
Yohanes Riyanto; Nanyang Technological University	Action Revisions in Coordination Games
Nilanjan Roy; City University of Hong Kong	with Conflicting Interests: An Experiment
Lirong Yang; Nanyang Technological University	
Carmen Arguedas; Universidad Autónoma de Madrid	Final Countdown? An Experimental
Hubert Kiss; KRTK & BCE	Collective Risk Dilemma with Horizon
Agnes Pinter; Universidad Autónoma de Madrid	Uncertainty

Session organised by Xiaogang Che: Contest and IO (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Yuta Yasui; Kochi University of Technology	Oligopoly Competition in Fake Reviews
Hisayuki Yoshimoto; University of Glasgow	
Rabah Amir; Univ of Iowa	Monotone comparative statics and
David Rietzke; Lancaster University	bounds on strategic influence
Zhuoqiong Chen; Harbin Institute of Technology,	Information Acquisition in Contests with
Shenzhen	Conditional Investments

Allocation 1 (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Yao Cheng; Southwestern University of Finance	Proper Exclusion Right, Priority and Allocation of
and Economics	Positions
Zaifu Yang; University of York	
Jingsheng Yu; Wuhan University	
Tsuyoshi Adachi; Waseda University	Fair and Strategy-proof Probabilistic Allocation
Zheng Lin; Waseda University	with Payment
Marek Pycia; University of Zurich,	The Random Priority Mechanism is Uniquely
Peter Troyan; University of Virginia	Simple, Efficient, and Fair

Voting 1 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Bernardo Moreno; Universidad de Málaga,	Strategy-Proofness in Domains of
Pietro Salmaso; Universita degli Studi di Napoli	Lexicographical Preferences: A Characterization
Federico II	

Dezso Bednay; Corvinus University of Budapest Balázs Fleiner; Budapest Business University Attila Tasnadi; Corvinus University of Budapest	An indifference result for voting rules in large societies
David Piazolo; University of Heidelberg	The "German Vote" and its consequences:
	(Un)reliable parties in multilateral bargaining under private information

Learning (Room 104)

Authors	Titles
Yangbo Song; Chinese University of Hong	Social Learning among Opinion Leaders
Kong, Shenzhe	
Lukasz Sliwinski; University of Edinburgh	Pseudo-collusion due to algorithmic pricing with
David Siska	transient demand response
Audrey Hu; City University of Hong Kong	Optimal Allocation Strategies in a Discrete-Time
Liang Zou; University of Amsterdam	Exponential Bandit Problem

13:00-14:00: Lunch break

14:00-15:00: Plenary talk by Paul Milgrom (Stanford University):

Transforming Rights: Applications from Radio Spectrum to Water (Plenary

Room)

15:00-15:30: Coffee Break

15:30-17:30: Session 3

Sessions organised by Nagore Iriberri: Celebrating the work of Vincent Crawford / Narratives (Plenary Room)

Authors	Titles
Andreas Blume; University of Arizona	Language Games: Correlation through Non- Understanding, Dialogue, Inarticulateness,
	and Misunderstanding
Marco Angrisani; University of Southern	Competing Narratives in Action: An Empirical
California	Analysis of Model Adoption Dynamics
Anya Samek; University of California, San	
Diego	
Ricardo Serrano-Padial; Drexel University	
Klaus Zauner; City, University of London	Competition in Salop's Circular City Model:
	Shake-out and Price Discrimination
Antonio Cabrales, Universidad Carlos III de	Parenting styles with externalities
Madrid	

Mechanism Design 3 (Room V)

Authors	Titles
Junrok Park; National Taiwan University	Informationally robust mechanism design

Sushil Bikhchandani; UCLA	Rank-preserving Multidimensional	
Debasis Mishra; Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi	Mechanisms	
Francesco Giovannoni; University of Bristol	Pricing Novel Goods	
Toomas Hinnosaar; University of Nottingham		
Wanchang Zhang; The Chinese University of Hong	Robustly Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral	
Kong, Shenzhen	Trading	

Session organised by Peter Achim: Information Acquisition and Disclosure (Room VI)

Authors	Titles
Andreas Asseyer; Freie Universität Berlin	Information Design with Competing
	Receivers
Avi Lichtig; Bonn	Optimal testing in disclosure games
Helene Mass; University of Bonn	
Helene Mass; University of Bonn	Optimal Transparency in Task Design
Deniz Kattwinkel; UCL, <u>Justus Preusser; Bocconi</u>	The Burden of Proof and the Division of
<u>University</u>	Surplus

Networks (Room VII)

Authors	Titles
Vincent Meisner; HU Berlin	Monetizing digital content with network
	effects: A mechanism-design approach
Yanlin Chen; Nanjing Audit University	Influencer Networks
Xueheng Li; Nanjing Audit University	
Tianle Song; Nanjing Audit University	
Arup Daripa; Birkbeck University of London	Incentive Design on Networks
Sandeep Kapur; Birkbeck College, University of	
London	
Marco Pelliccia; Heriot-Watt University	
Anastas Tenev; Corvinus University of Budapest	Pitfalls of Information Spillovers in Persuasion

Session organised by Marek Pycia: Auction Design and Multidimensional Screening (Room IX)

Authors	Titles	
Haoyuan Zeng; University of Zurich	Identity-Proof Auctions	
Byeong-Hyeon Jeong; University of Zurich	The First-Price Principle of Maximizing Economic	
Marek Pycia; U Zurich	Objectives	
Kyle Woodward; UNC Chapel Hill	Self-Auditable Auctions	
Alexey Kushnir; Carnegie Mellon University	Selling with network flows: a new approach to	
Ali Shourideh; Carnegie Mellon University	optimal multi-dimensional mechanisms	

Matching 1 (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Gregory Gutin; Royal Holloway University of London	Finding all stable matchings with
Philip Neary; Royal Holloway University of London	assignment constraints
Anders Yeo; University of Southern Denmark	

Fatma Aslan; Budapest University of Technology and	Job Exchange in Markets with Couples
Economics	
Bojia Li; University of York, Zaifu Yang; University of	Matching with Endogenous Constraints
York	
Umut Dur; North Carolina State University	Rematching with Contracts under Labor
Robert Hammond; University of Alabama	Mobility Restrictions: Theory and
Utku Unver; Boston College	Application

Industrial Organisations 1 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Hsiao-Chi Chen; National Taipei University	Dynamics of Cournot and Bertrand Firms:
Yunshyong Chow; Academia Sinica	Exploring Imitation and Replicator Processes
Shi-Miin Liu; National Taipei University	
Jihwan Do; Yonsei University	Vertical contracting and information spillover
Nicolás Riquelme; Universidad de los Andes	in Cournot competition
Tahmina Faizi; University of Paderborn	Effects of Artificial Intelligence on Price
	Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
Kolos Ágoston; Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem	Sequential Bertrand price competition with
Manuel Mago; Corvinus University of Budapest	substance averse preferences in insurance
Veronika Varga; Corvinus University of Budapest	markets

Social Choice 1 (Room 104)

Authors	Titles
Guilherme Carmona; University of Surrey	Large Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Konrad Podczeck; University of Vienna	
Linus Thierry Nana Noumi; CY CERGY Paris	Expected utility theory on hyperpreference
University	rules
Tom Demeulemeester; KU Leuven	Fair integer programming under
Dries Goossens	dichotomous and cardinal preferences
Ben Hermans; ORTEC	
Roel Leus; KU Leuven	

17:30-18:30: Memorial gathering

Remembering Makoto Shimoji (Plenary Room) and YingHua He (Room X)

10 July, Wednesday

9:00-11:00: Session 4

Sessions organised by Nagore Iriberri: Celebrating the work of Vincent Crawford / Mechanism Design and Competition (Plenary Room)

Authors	Titles
Herve Moulin; University of Glasgow	Designing welfare guarantees
Anna Bogomolnaia; University of Glasgow	
Ines Moreno de Barreda; Oxford University	Socially Efficient Approval Mechanisms with
Evgenii Safonov; Queen Mary University of	Signaling Costs
London	
Daniel Marszalec; International Christian	EPIC Fail: How Below-Bid Pricing Backfires in
<u>University</u>	Multiunit Auctions
Alexander Teytelboym; University of Oxford	
Sanna Laksá; P/F Varðin	
Miguel Costa-Gomes; University of	How Robust is Overconfidence
<u>Edinburgh</u>	
Alexander Coutts; York University	

Session organised by Wei He: Topics in Mechanism Design (Room V)

Authors	Titles
Tangren Feng; Bocconi University	Ex Post Strategy-proofness
Qinggong Wu; Hong Kong University of Science and	
Technology	
Wei He; The Chinese University of Hong Kong	Interim Regret Minimization
Jiangtao Li; Singapore Management Univeristy	
Kexin Wang; Singapore Management University	
Wei He; The Chinese University of Hong Kong	The limit of ambiguous mechanisms
Alex Suzdaltsev; Higher School of Economics	Minimax-regret contracts and Optimal
	Innovation Prizes

Session organised by Jaimie Lien: Theory and Experiment (Room VI)

Authors	Titles
Di Feng; Dongbei University of Finance and Economics	Informative Simplicity in Matching
Yun Liu; Shandong University	
Luke Garrod; Loughborough University	Understanding Cost Pass-Through
Ruochen Li; Shandong University	when Prices are Dispersed
Antonio Russo; University of Sheffield	
Chris Wilson; Loughborough University	
Wendy Ye Jin; NYU Shanghai, Zhen Zhou; Tsinghua	Strategic Understatement
University	
Yunwen He; Central University of Finance and Economics	A Goose Feather from a Thousand
Jaimie Lien; Shandong University	Miles Away: A Theory and Experiment
Yang Yang; Sun Yat-Sen University	on Reciprocity
Jie Zheng; Shandong University	

Game Theory 1 (Room VII)

Authors	Titles
Andrés Salamanca; Ca' Foscari University of Venice	Conditional Random Dictatorship and the
	Value of a Bayesian Cooperative Game
Pedro Calleja; University of Barcelona	Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy
Francesc llerena; Universitat Rovira i Virgili	problems
Evgeny Zalyubovsky; HSE University	Extended backward induction and sequential
	equilibria
Pedro Calleja; University of Barcelona	Self–consistency for multi-valued solutions
Francesc llerena; Universitat Rovira i Virgili	and the core
Peter Sudhölter; University of Southern Denmark	

Auction 2 (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Dmitriy Knyazev; University of Vienna	Choose your auction: Mechanism design for
Daniel Rehsmann; University of Vienna	a bidder
Sergei Severinov; University of British Columbia	Who Wants to be an Auctioneer?
Gabor Virag; University of Toronto	
Bing Liu; Stanford University	Efficient auction design with externalities
Simon Loertscher; University of Melbourne	
Federica Carannante; Princeton University	Adaptive Reserve Prices in Repeated
Marco Pagnozzi; Universita' di Napoli Federico II	Auctions
Elia Sartori; Universita degli Studi di Napoli Federic	

School Choice (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Maximilian Bach; ZEW Mannheim	The Effects of Attending High Track Schools:
Thilo Klein; ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European	Evidence from Hungarian Centralized
Economic Research	School Assignments
Sarah McNamara; ZEW Mannheim	
Emil Temnyalov, University of Technology Sydney	Capacity Design, Organizational Structure
	and Differential Treatment
Benoit Decerf; The World Bank	Incontestable assignments
Guillaume Haeringer; Baruch College	
Martin Van der Linden; Independent scholar	
Georgy Artemov; The University of Melbourne	School Choice, Housing, and Inequality
Kentaro Tomoeda; University of Technology Sydney	

Contest 1 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Daniel Rehsmann; University of Vienna	Contesting fake news
Beatrice Roussillon; Université Grenoble Alpes	
Paul Schweinzer; Alpen-Adria-University Klagenfurt	
Chen Cohen, Ishay Rabi, <u>Aner Sela; Ben-Gurion</u>	An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests
University of the Negev	

Constantine Sorokin; University of Glasgow, A.	A New Approach to Contests with
Matros	Complete and Incomplete Information
Bo Chen; Shenzhen University	(Non-)Disclosure in Competitions with
Jingfeng Lu; National University of Singapore	Type-dependent Favoritism
Lianmin Zhang; Nanjing University	

11:00-11:30: Coffee break

11:30-13:00: Session 5

Applied Matching (Plenary Room)

Authors	Titles
Peter Biro; HUN-REN KRTK and Corvinus University	Multi-criteria optimisation in the Spanish
of Budapest	kidney exchange programme
Kristof Druzsin; HUN-REN KRTK	
Rita Fleiner; Obuda University	
Xenia Klimentova; INESC Technology and Science	
Ashwin Kambhampati; United States Naval Academy	Service Assignment at the United States
Chad Redmer; U.S. Naval Academy	Naval Academy
Naomi Utgoff; United States Naval Academy	
Jonah Peranson; National Matching Services	Beyond Algorithms: Strategic Insights into
	Implementing Effective Matching Programs

Mechanism Design 4 (Room V)

Authors	Titles
Gustavo Quindere Saraiva, Pontificia	An Upper Bound to the Benefits of Implementing
Universidad Catolica de Chile	Positive Assortative Matching in Pooled Testing
Svetlana Boyarchenko; University of Texas-	On dangers of large scale experimentation and
Austin	product competition
Andrea Attar; Toulouse School of	Mediated Renegotiation
Economics and Tor Vergata University	
Lorenzo Bozzoli; Università degli studi di	
Roma "Tor Vergata"	
Roland Strausz; Humboldt Universitaet	
Berlin	

Information Design 2 (Room VI)

Authors	Titles
Audrey Hu; City University of Hong Kong	Path-Dependent Equilibrium and Polarization
Yating Yuan; University of Warwick	in Public Responses to a Pandemic
Philipp Denter; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid	Troll Farms
Boris Ginzburg; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid	
Luca Sandrini; ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European	News Media Bargaining Codes
Economic Research	
Robert Somogyi; Budapest University of	
Technology and Economics; Centre for Economic	
and Regional Studies	

Session organised by Jaimie Lien: Behavioral and Experimental (Room VII)

Authors	Titles
Yihong Huang; Harvard University	How Awareness of Media Bias Affects
Juanjuan Meng; Peking University	Reaction to News: Evidence from Chinese
Xi Weng; Peking University	Microblog Users
Jaimie Lien; Shandong University	Club Dynamics and Non-Rival Resources
Anning XIE; The Chinese University of Hong Kong	
Jie Zheng; Shandong University	
Huanhuan Zheng; NUS	Corporate green identity

Institution Design (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Yidi Xu; Hefei University of Technology	Wealth Inequality, Stability and Optimal Wealth
Zaifu Yang; University of York	Redistributive Policies
Guadalupe Correa-Lopera; Universidad	Voting Equilibria and Public Funding of Political
<u>Pública de Navarra</u>	Parties
Bernardo Moreno; Universidad de Málaga	
David Rodriguez; CUNEF University	Life Pension and Parliamentarian Effort

Session organised by Szilvia Papai: Market Design (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Ozgun Ekici; Ozyegin University	How to allocate kidneys across multi-center
	queues: An axiomatic analysis
Jorgen Kratz; University of York	Weak misrepresentations in school choice
Makoto Shimoji; University of York	
William Phan; North Carolina State University	School Finance, Peers, and Choice
Ryan Tierney; University of Southern Denmark	
Yu Zhou; Nagoya University	

Voting 2 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Dora Greta Petroczy; John von Neumann University	Voting power in the Council of the
Laszlo Csato; Institute for Computer Science and Control	European Union: A comprehensive
	sensitivity analysis
László Kóczy; Centre for Economic and Regional Studies	One Man, One Vote, One Price
Balazs Sziklai; Centre for Economic and Regional Studies	
Yolanda F. Rebollo-Sanz; Universidad Pablo de Olavide	Political opportunism behind changes
	in party affiliation: Evidence from
	Spanish municipal elections

13:00-14:00: Lunch Break

<u>14:00-15:00: Plenary talk by Alvin E. Roth (Stanford University): Ethical issues in market design (Plenary Room)</u>

Coffee Break: 15:00-15:30

15:30-17:30: Session 6

Session organised by Lars Ehlers: Fair Market Design (Plenary Room)

Authors	Titles
Vikram Manjunath; University of Ottawa	Marginal mechanisms for balanced exchange
Alexander Westkamp; University of Cologne	
Sean Horan; Université de Montréal	Sequential Composition of Choice Functions
Vikram Manjunath; University of Ottawa	
Christian Basteck; WZB Berlin Social Science	On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof
Center	random assignment
Lars Ehlers; Université de Montréal	
Christian Basteck; WZB Berlin Social Science	An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule
Center	

Public Goods (Room V)

Authors	Titles
Kim-Sau Chung, Hong Kong Baptist	Differentiated Public Goods
University	
Ying Chen; Johns Hopkins University	Irreversibility, Complementarity, and the Dynamics
Liuchun Deng; National University of	of Public Good Provision
Singapore/Yale-NUS College	
Minako Fujio; Yokohama National University	
M. Ali Khan; The Johns Hopkins University	
Lijian Qin, Anhui University of Finance and	The Impact of Human Capital on Health
Economics	Entitlement Acquisition among Migrant Workers in
	China
Giovanni Valvassori Bolgè; ETH Zürich	Mechanism Design by a Politician

Financial Markets (Room VI)

Authors	Titles
Oleg Telegin; Higher School of Economics	Always Silent? Endogenous Central Bank
	Communication During the Quiet Period
Angel Hernando-Veciana; Universidad	Designing Price Benchmarks Robust to Manipulation
Carlos III de Madrid	
Ondrej Cernik; University of Finance and	Position investing mechanism
Administration	
Te-Tsun Chang; National Chi-Nan University	Liquidity, Unemployment and Investment

Signalling (Room VII)

Authors	Titles

Carl Heese; University of Hong Kong	Persuasion versus Presentation
Shuo Liu; Peking University	
Peter Vida; CY Cergy Paris University	Simple Forward Induction in Monotonic Multi-
Takakazu Honryo; Doshisha University	Sender Signaling Games
Helmuts Azacis; Cardiff University	
Qianjun Lyu; University of Bonn	Coarse Information Design
Wing Suen; The University of Hong Kong	
Yimeng Zhang; The University of Hong Kong	
Papatya Duman; Paderborn University	Does the blockchain technology help to reduce
Claus-Jochen Haake; Paderborn University	information asymmetries?
Sarah Kühn; University Paderborn	

Auction 3 (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Thanh Nguyen; Purdue University	Efficient Combinatorial Assignment
Alexander Teytelboym; University of Oxford	
Shai Vardi	
Karl-Martin Ehrhart; Karlsruhe Institute of	Bidder heterogeneity and winner's curse in multi-
Technology	unit auctions
Jan Kreiss; KIT	
Marion Ott; ZEW Mannheim	
Min Zhang; University of St Andrews	A Simple Model of Trading Artworks
Yu Ching Lam; Bocconi University	Concurrent Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects

Allocation 2 (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Umutcan Salman; University of Padova	Object Allocation Problem with Maximum and
	Minimum Number of Changes
Xihao Song, University of Glasgow	Property of Flow Algorithm and characterization
Gergely Csáji; HUN-REN KRTK KTI	Popularity and Perfectness in One-sided Matching
	Markets with Capacities
Francesco Conti; The University of Texas at	Allocation Design with Strictly Convex Preferences
Austin	

Industrial Organisations 2 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Jim Dearden; Lehigh University	Competitive Disclosure of
David Goldbaum; University of Technology Sydney	Multiple Product Attributes
Ernest Lai; Lehigh University	
Qichao Shi; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics	
Abdul Quadir; XLRI-Xavier School of Management	Supplier Encroachment with a
	Dominant Retailer
Yong Chao; University of Louisville	The Limit of Market-share
Mingjun Xiao; Hubei University of Economics	Contracts
Nima Haghpanah; Penn State University	A Theory of Stable Market
Ron Siegel; Penn State	Segmentations

18:30-22:00: Conference Dinner on Európa boat (cruise on the Danube)

The boat will leave and arrive back to the following location: Jégverem utca (Buda side, near Clark Ádám tér, at the Chain Bridge)



Please arrive by 19:00 the latest, since the boat will leave at that time!

11 July, Thursday

9:00-11:00: Session 7

Matching 2 (Plenary Room)

Authors	Titles
Ata Atay; University of Barcelona	Complementarities in childcare allocation under
Antonio Romero-Medina; Universidad	priorities
Carlos III de Madrid	
Denis Sokolov; Inria	College Admissions in France: Affirmative Action,
	Overlapping Reserves, and Housing Quotas
Ákos Balázs; HUN-REN Centre for Economic	Comparing mechanisms for course allocation with
and Regional Studies	contracts
Peter Biro; Centre for Economic and	
Regional Studies (KRTK)	
Tayfun Sonmez; Boston College	Market Design for Social Justice: A Case Study on a
Utku Unver; Boston College	Constitutional Crisis in India

Implementation (Room V)

Authors	Titles
Ville Korpela; Turku School of Economics	Implementation in vNM stable set
Michele Lombardi; University of Liverpool	
and University of Napoli Federico II	
Riccardo Saulle	
Malachy James Gavan; University of	Safe Implementation
<u>Liverpool</u>	
Antonio Penta; Universitat Pompeu Fabra	
Michele Lombardi; University of Liverpool	Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions:
and University of Napoli Federico II,	A Full Characterization
R. Jain; Academia Sinica	
Takashi Hayashi; University of Glasgow	Implementation in Stationary Markov-Perfect
Michele Lombardi; University of Liverpool	Equilibrium
and University of Napoli Federico II	

Session organised by Kim-Sau Chung: Digital Economy (Room VI)

Authors	Titles
Melody Lo, National Taiwan University, Kim Sau Chung Hong	Designing Open Source Licenses
Kong Baptist University	
Kong-Pin Chen; Academia Sinica, Chia-Hui Chen; Kyoto	Social Learning and Strategic
University, Junichiro Ishida; Osaka University	Pricing with Rating System
Jinglei Huang; Tsinghua University	Network interoperability in multi-
Guofu Tan; University of Southern California	sided markets
Tat-How Teh; Nanyang Technological University	
Junjie Zhou; Tsinghua University	
Leifu Zhang; HKUST(GZ)	Robust (Decentralized) Oracle
	Design

Social Choice 2 (Room VII)

Authors	Titles
Wonki Cho; Korea University	Arrovian Social Choice and Decentralizability: An
Biung-Ghi Ju; Seoul National University	Integrated Approach
María Gómez-Rúa; Universidade de Vigo	Group threshold when making a decision
Elena Molis; Universidad de Granada	
Bernardo Moreno; Universidad de Málaga	
Oihane Gallo; Université de Lausanne	Anonymity and strategy-proofness on a domain
	of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
Thayer Morrill; North Carolina State University	Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking
Peter Troyan; University of Virginia	Outcomes of a Competitive Process

Session organised by Shigehiro Serizawa: Auction Theory Without Quasi-Linearity (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Yuya Wakabayashi; Osaka University	A General Characterization of the Minimum
Ryosuke Sakai; Tokyo Institute of Technology	Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices
Shigehiro Serizawa; Osaka University of Economics	
Ryosuke Sakai; Tokyo Institute of Technology	Fair and efficient object allocation rules
Shigehiro Serizawa, Osaka University of Economics	under constraints of discrete payments
Tomoya Kazumura; Kyoto University	Equal treatment of equals and strategy-
Debasis Mishra; Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi	proofness in object allocation with non-
Shigehiro Serizawa; Osaka University of Economics	quasi-linear preferences
Shigehiro Serizawa; Osaka University of Economics	Efficiency, fairness, and strategy-proofness in
Hiroki Shinozaki; Hitotsubashi University	constrained package assignment problems
	with money

Session organised by Claus Johen Haake: Bargaining (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Claus-Jochen Haake; Paderborn University	A measure for contestedness of a two-
Thomas Streck; University Paderborn	person bargaining problem
Walter Trockel; Bielefeld University, Papatya	Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: Hα-
Duman; Paderborn University	Essential Equilibria
Bas Dietzenbacher; Maastricht University	Utility distortion in claims problems
William Thomson; University of Rochester	
Kemal Kivanc Akoz; HSE University	Information Agreements
Arseniy Samsonov; Ozyegin University	

Industrial Organisations 3 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Kyungmin Kim; Emory University	Pricing and Consumer Surplus in Monopoly with
Nenad Kos; Bocconi University	Product Design
Debasis Mishra; Indian Statistical Institute	Undominated monopoly regulation
Sanket Patil; IIM Bangalore	
Attila Tasnadi; Corvinus University of Budapest	Cournot mechanisms and consumer search
Gabor Virag; University of Toronto	

Leopold Monjoie; University PSL - Paris	Designing Markets for Reliability with Incomplete
Dauphine	Information

11:00-11:30: Coffee Break

11:30-13:00: Session 8

Session organised by Lars Ehlers: New Directions in Market Design (Plenary Room)

Authors	Titles
Julien Combe; CREST - Ecole polytechnique	Market Design for Distributional Objectives
Umut Dur; North Carolina State University	in (Re)assignment: An Application to
Olivier Tercieux; Paris School of Economics	Improve the Distribution of Teachers in
Camille Terrier; Queen Mary University London	Schools
Utku Unver; Boston College	
Florian Brandl; University of Bonn	Patience Ensures Fairness
Andrew Mackenzie; Maastricht University	
Tommy Andersson; Lund University	A General Non-Manipulable Matching
Lars Ehlers; Université de Montréal	Mechanism for Markets with One-Sided
Lars-Gunnar Svensson; Lund University	Preferences
Ryan Tierney; University of Southern Denmark	

Mechanism Design 5 (Room V)

Authors	Titles
Andrea Attar; Toulouse School of Economics and	Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private
Tor Vergata University	Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms
Eloisa Campioni; Università degli Studi di Roma Tor	
<u>Vergata</u>	
Thomas Mariotti; Toulouse School of Economics	
Alessandro Pavan; Northwestern University	
Roberto Rozzi; University of Siena	Endogenous peer based discrimination
Luca Sandrini; ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European	
Economic Research	
Aditya Aradhye; Tel Aviv University	Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents

Contest 2 (Room VI)

Authors	Titles
Yuxi Chen; University of Lausanne	Overconfidence in Elimination Contests
Luis Santos-Pinto; University of Lausanne	
Kaiqi Liu; Maastricht University	Competition in Higher Education: Sorting,
Hannes Rusch; Max Planck Institute	Ranking and Fees
Christian Seel; Maastricht University	
Stefan Terstiege; Maastricht University	
Jingfeng Lu; National University of Singapore	Prize Allocation Equilibrium in Team Contests
Yiyao Zhu; National University of Singapore	

Session organised by Zhen Lei: Contest, Matching, and Experiments (Room VII)

Authors	Titles
Qichao Shi; Southwestern University of	Shirk Responsibility: An Experimental Study of
Finance and Economics	Accountability System
Zhan Wang	
Jingsheng Yu; Wuhan University	
Yun Liu; Shandong University	Chasing Contests
Zhuo Chen; Shandong University	
Yao Cheng; Southwestern University of	Games of priority-based allocation problem under
Finance and Economics	the efficient-adjustment deferred acceptance
Dazhong Wang; Nanjing University	mechanism
Jingsheng Yu; Wuhan University	

Experiments 2 (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Andrej Woerner; Ludwig Maximlian	Overcoming Time Inconsistency with a Matched Bet:
University of Munich	Theory and Evidence from Exercising
Papatya Duman; Paderborn University	Non-induced preferences in matching experiments
Britta Hoyer; Paderborn University	
Sarah Kühn; University Paderborn	
Nadja Stroh-Maraun; Paderborn University	
Elena Molis; Universidad de Granada	Experimental results on the roommate problem
Robert Veszteg; Waseda University	

Allocation 3 (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Georgios Gerasimou; University of Glasgow	Ordinal intensity-efficient allocations
Emre Dogan; Higher School of Economics,	Achieving Efficiency and Fairness in a Congested
Moscow	Lawyer Assignment Problem
Onur Kesten; School of Economics	
Danisz Okulicz; Karlsruhe Institute of	
Technology	
Manshu Khanna; Peking University	Affirmative Action's Cumulative Fractional
	Assignments

Voting 3 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Anindya Bhattacharya; University of York	How sensitive are the results in voting theory when
Francesco Ciardiello; University of Salerno	just one other voter joins in? Some instances with
	spatial majority voting
Tiberiu Dragu; New York University	Polarization and Issue Selection in Elections
Xiaochen Fan; New York University	
Junze Sun; Wuhan University	Public Persuasion in Elections: Single-Crossing
Arthur Schram; University of Amsterdam	Property and the Optimality of Interval Revelation
Randolph Sloof; University of Amsterdam	

13:00-14:00: Lunch break

<u>14:00-15:00: Plenary talk by Éva Tardos (Cornell University): Stability and Learning in Strategic Games (Plenary Room)</u>

15:00-15:30: Coffee Break

15:30-17:00: Session 9

Characterisation in Game Theory (Plenary Room)

Authors	Titles
Di Feng; Dongbei University of Finance and	Characterizing no-trade-bundled top trading cycles
Economics	mechanisms for multiple-type housing markets
Bettina Klaus; University of Lausanne	
Flip Klijn; CSIC	
Abhigyan Bose; Indian Statistical Institute	Matching under multiple single-peaked domains
Souvik Roy; Indian Statistical Institute	
Tsuyoshi Adachi; Waseda University	Sincle-peaked, or Enforceable: A Necessary and
Shin Sato; Fukuoka University	Sufficient Condition for Strategy-proofness and
	Unanimity

Mechanism Design 6 (Room V)

Authors	Titles
Lorenzo Bozzoli; Università degli studi di Roma "Tor	Moral hazard and mediated contracts with
Vergata"	limited commitment
Endre Csóka; Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics	A Collusion-Proof Efficient Dynamic
Heng Liu; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute	Mechanism
Alexander Rodivilov; Stevens Institute of Technology	
Alexander Teytelboym; University of Oxford	
Endre Csóka; Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics	Efficient Teamwork

Information Design 3 (Room VI)

Authors	Titles
Erika Domotor; University of Cyprus	Bringing Rational Inattention to the Market for
	Lemons
Ryoji Jinushi, Seikei University	Costly Advertising and Information Congestion:
	Insights from Pigou's Successors
Matthias Lang; LMU Munich	Benefits and Challenges of Ambiguous Product
Cédric Wasser; University of Basel	Information

Market Design 2 (Room VII)

Authors	Titles
Tetsutaro Hatakeyama; Keio University	Who makes the cut? Priority design for
Onur Kesten; School of Economics	heterogeneous groups of agents
Morimitsu Kurino; Keio University	
Thilo Klein; ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European	Matching for Credit: Identifying Information
Economic Research	Asymmetries in Joint-Liability Lending

Ben Balmford; LEEP Institute	Designing markets for bundled
Brett Day; University of Exeter	environmental goods
Luke Lindsay; University of Exeter Business School	

Session organised by Yu Zhou: Assignment and Matching with Money (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Ryan Tierney; University of Southern Denmark	Discrete Pricing in Multi-object Auctions
Yu Zhou; Nagoya University	
Keisuke Bando; Keio University	Strategy-Proofness and Competitive
Kenzo Imamura; University of Tokyo	Equilibrium with Transferable Utility: Gross
Tomoya Kazumura; Kyoto University	Substitutes Revisited
Masahiro Kawasaki; Independent Researcher,	Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit
Ryosuke Sakai; Tokyo Institute of Technology,	object assignment problems with money

Matching 3 (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Li Nie; Nanjing Audit University	Hierarchic matching with single peaked preferences
	and the formation of pyramidal organizations
Yi-You Yang; Aletheia University	Vacancy chains in matching markets with contracts
Keisuke Bando; Keio university	Substitutes for Nonunitary Many-to-Many Matching
Toshiyuki Hirai; Hosei University	with Contracts

Voting 4 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Hector Hermida-Rivera; Budapest University of	Minimal Stable Voting Rules
Technology and Economics	
Federico Fioravanti; University of Amsterdam	Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-
Ulle Endriss; University of Amsterdam	Plurality Classes
Yuliya Veselova; National Research University	On the safety of group manipulation
Higher School of Economics	

<u>17:00-18:00: Plenary talk by Roger Myerson (University of Chicago): Dual</u> reduction and elementary games with senders and receivers (Online – on screen at Plenary Room)

12 July, Friday

9:00-11:00: Session 10

Session organised by Jean-Jacques Herings: Financial Networks (Plenary Room)

Authors	Titles
Péter Csóka; Corvinus University of Budapest	An Axiomatization of the Pairwise Netting
P. Jean-Jacques Herings; Tilburg University	Proportional Rule in Financial Networks
Lorenzo Zino; Politecnico di Torino	On the Influence of Network Structure on the
Giulia Fracastoro; Politecnico di Torino	Resilience and Losses of Financial Systems
Anton Proskurnikov; Politecnico di Torino	
Giuseppe Carlo Calafiore	
Zafer Kanik; University of Glasgow	Optimal Capital Structure under Risk-Sharing
Luitgard Veraart; London School of Economics	Systemic Risk in Markets with Multiple Central
and Political Science	Counterparties
Iñaki Aldasoro; Bank for International Settlements	

Mechanism Design 7 (Room V)

Authors	Titles
Jin Yeub Kim; Yonsei University	Toward an Understanding of Optimal
Wooyoung Lim; HKUST	Mediation Choice
Zaifu Yang; University of York	Optimal Taxation with Complete Bunching
Rong Zhang; Chongqing University	
Gerrit Bauch; Bielefeld University	The Texas Shoot-Out under Knightian
Frank Riedel; Bielefeld University	Uncertainty
Burak Can; Maastricht University School of Business	Social Perception on Al-supported
Bart Kleibrink; Maastricht University School of	decision systems
Business and Economics	
Ingrid Rohde; Bilgi University	

Session organised by Yunan Li: Advances in Mechanism Design and Information Economics (Room VI)

Authors	Titles
Mengxi Zhang, University of Bonn	Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse
	Investors
Tilman Borgers; University of Michigan	Undominated Mechanisms
Jiangtao Li; Singapore Management University	
Kexin Wang; Singapore Management University	
Mariann Ollar	Incentive Compatibility and Belief
Antonio Penta; Universitat Pompeu Fabra	Restrictions

Game Theory 2 (Room VII)

Authors	Titles
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Tamás Solymosi; Corvinus University of	Computing the per-capita nucleolus in assignment
Budapest	games
Xiangliang Li; Nankai University	The Cooperation Problem
Ville Korpela; Turku School of Economics	The difference between the weak core and the
Michele Lombardi; University of Liverpool	strong core from the design point of view
and University of Napoli Federico II	
Foivos Savva; University of Southampton	
Jinglei Huang; Tsinghua University	The Shapley Value and the Nucleolus of a Two-Sided
Danxia Xie; Tsinghua University	Platform Game

Auction 4 (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Marieke Pahlke; Corvinus University of Budapest	Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Dutch
	Auctions
Donglai luo; UTS	Smooth Ambiguity Aversion in k-Double
Benjamin Balzer; UTS	Auction
Federica Carannante; Princeton University	Interim Information and Seller's Revenue in
Marco Pagnozzi; Universita' di Napoli Federico II	Standard Auctions
Elia Sartori; Universita degli Studi di Napoli Federic	
Sungjin Cho; Seoul National University	Explaining Early Bidding in Informationally-
Harry Paarsch; University of Central Florida	Restricted, Ascending-Bid Auctions
John Rust; Georgetown University	

Matching 4 (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Duygu Sili; Koç University, Özgür Yılmaz; Koç	How to incentivize hospitals in Dynamic
University	Kidney Exchange
Márton Benedek; Corvinus University of Budapest	Partitioned Matching Games for
Peter Biro; Centre for Economic and Regional Studies	International Kidney Exchange
(KRTK)	
Walter Kern; University of Twente	
Dömötör Pálvölgyi; MTA-ELTE Lendület	
Daniel Paulusma; Durham University	
Hyunjun Cho; Yonsei University	When Same-Sex Marriages are Unstable
Jin Yeub Kim; Yonsei University	
Jaeok Park; Yonsei University	
Diana MacDonald; Banco de México, Ahmet Altınok;	Designing the Menu of Licenses for Foster
Nazarbayev University	Care

Search (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Kemal Kivanc Akoz; NRU-Higher School of Economics	Search in a Non-exclusive Online
Levent Celik; City, University of London	Matching Platform
Emre Dogan; Higher School of Economics, Moscow	
Isaac Swift; Hong Kong Baptist University	A Recommendation Game

Xin Feng; Nanjing University	Monopoly Pricing, Bayesian Persuasion, and Costly Information Acquisition

11:00-11:30: Coffee break

11:30-13:00: Session 11

Session organised by Szilvia Papai: Matching Theory (Plenary Room)

Authors	Titles
Pinaki Mandal, Arizona State University	Equivalence between individual and group
	strategy-proofness under stability
Md. Shahidul Islam; Concordia University	Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous
Szilvia Papai; Concordia University	Preferences
Aram Grigoryan; University of California, San	A Theory of Auditability for Allocation
Diego	Mechanisms
Markus Möller; University of Bonn	

Mechanism Design 8 (Room V)

Authors	Titles
Gian Caspari; ZEW	Bidding for Subsidies with ones Patience
Justin Burkett; Georgia Tech	Intertemporal Allocation with Unknown Discounting
Kyle Woodward; Assign Group	
Kohmei Makihara; Aix-Marseille University,	Peer-review mechanism design to allocate goods
Aix-Marseille School of Economics	with externality

Information Design and IO (Room VI)

Authors	Titles
Ming Li; Concordia University	Mandatory disclosure of conflicts of interest:
Ting Liu; Stony Brook University	Good news or bad news?
Yeran Dong; Capital University of Economics and	Duopoly Competition through Information
Business	Design
Haipeng Han; Tsinghua University	
Jie Zheng; Shandong University	
Guillaume Pommey; Tor Vergata University of	Asymmetric information, liquidity constraints,
Rome	and efficient trade

Mechanism Design in Sports (Room VII)

Authors	Titles
Julian Matthes; Heidelberg University	The Strategic Benefits of Sending Your Friends Away:
David Piazolo; University of Heidelberg	Evidence from Coopetition Behavior in Professional
	Road Cycling
Andrew Clausen; University of Edinburgh	Deterring Bribery with Scotch Hold 'em Poker
Christopher Stapenhurst; Budapest	
University of Technology and Economics	

Laszlo Csato, Institute for Computer	Random matching in balanced bipartite graphs: The
Science and Control	(un)fairness of draw mechanisms used in sports

Cheap Talk (Room IX)

Authors	Titles
Changyeop Lee; The Ohio State University	Delegated Cheap Talk: A Theory of Investment
Sungmin Park; The Ohio State University	Banking
Qianjun Lyu; University of Bonn	Information design in cheap talk
Wing Suen; The University of Hong Kong	
Peter Wagner; University of York	Hidden Cost of Cheap Advice

Allocation 4 (Room X)

Authors	Titles
Antonio Nicolò; University of Padova, Italy	Coherent Dynamic Matching
Pietro Salmaso; University of Naples	
Federico II	
Riccardo Saulle	
Sreoshi Banerjee, Budapest University of	On identifying efficient, fair and stable allocations in
Technology and Economics	"generalized" sequencing games
Leanne Streekstra; Feruniversität Hagen	Core constraints when scheduling with deadlines

Voting 5 (Room 103)

Authors	Titles
Tsuyoshi Adachi; Waseda University	Legitimate Ranking by Tournament
Leo Kurata; Waseda University	
Steven Kivinen; University of Graz	Equitable Voting with Many Alternatives
Qinggong Wu; Hong Kong University of Science	Modeling Political Spectra
and Technology, Xingye Wu; Tsinghua University	

13:00-14:00: Closing and lunch break