

## List of accepted papers for 2024 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design

### Sessions organised by Nagore Iriberry: Celebrating the work of Vincent Crawford

Authors	Titles
Antonio Cabrales, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid	Parenting styles with externalities
Adam Sanjurjo, Universidad de Alicante	Complexity in Choice
Marco Angrisani; University of Southern California Anya Samek; University of California, San Diego <u>Ricardo Serrano-Padial; Drexel University</u>	Competing Narratives in Action: An Empirical Analysis of Model Adoption Dynamics
Anna Bogomolnaia; University of Glasgow	Fair division under different entitlements: a quest for Round Robin
Amil Camilo Moore; Universitat Pompeu Fabra <u>Fabrizio Germano; Universitat Pompeu Fabra</u> Rosemarie Nagel; ICREA-UPF-BGSE	Toward a behavioral taxonomy of 2x2 games
Andreas Blume; University of Arizona	Language Games: Correlation through Non-Understanding, Dialogue, Inarticulateness, and Misunderstanding
<u>Herve Moulin; University of Glasgow</u> Anna Bogomolnaia; University of Glasgow	Designing welfare guarantees
<u>Daniel Marszalec; International Christian University</u> Alexander Teytelboym; University of Oxford Sanna Laksá; P/F Varđin	EPIC Fail: How Below-Bid Pricing Backfires in Multiunit Auctions
Alfred Galichon; New York University <u>Larry Samuelson; Yale University</u> Lucas Vernet; Banque de France	Unified Gross Substitutes and Inverse Isotonicity for Equilibrium Problems
Miguel Costa-Gomes; University of Edinburgh Alexander Coutts; York University	How Robust is Overconfidence
Joel Sobel; UCSD	Preserving Privacy
<u>Ines Moreno de Barreda; Oxford University</u> Evgenii Safonov; Queen Mary University of London	Socially Efficient Approval Mechanisms with Signaling Costs
Amil Camilo Moore; IPF-BSE <u>Rosemarie Nagel; ICREA-UPF-BGSE</u>	Fair and Efficient: Re-evaluating Normal-Form Games with Near-Equal Split
Klaus Zauner; City, University of London	Competition in Salop's Circular City Model: Shake-out and Price Discrimination
Anne Karing; University of Chicago	Optimal Policy in the Presence of Social Image Concerns: Experimental Evidence from Kenya

Zeky Murra-Anton; ISO New England Roberto Serrano; Brown University	Mediated (Anti)Persuasive Communication
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### Session organised by Peter Achim: Information Acquisition and Disclosure

Authors	Titles
Andreas Asseyer; Freie Universität Berlin	Information Design with Competing Receivers
Avi Lichtig; Bonn Helene Mass; University of Bonn	Optimal testing in disclosure games
Helene Mass; University of Bonn	Optimal Transparency in Task Design
Deniz Kattwinkel; UCL, <u>Justus Preusser; Bocconi University</u>	The Burden of Proof and the Division of Surplus

### Session organised by Xiaogang Che

Authors	Titles
Yuta Yasui; Kochi University of Technology <u>Hisayuki Yoshimoto; University of Glasgow</u>	Oligopoly Competition in Fake Reviews
Rabah Amir; Univ of Iowa <u>David Rietzke; Lancaster University</u>	Monotone comparative statics and bounds on strategic influence
<u>Xiaogang Che; City University of London</u> , Tong Li; Vanderbilt University, Jingfeng Lu; National University of Singapore, Xiaoyong Zheng; North Carolina State University	Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Endogenous Seller Outside Offers and Termination Fees
Zhuoqiong Chen; Harbin Institute of Technology, Shenzhen	Information Acquisition in Contests with Conditional Investments

### Session organised by Kim-Sau Chung: Digital Economy

Authors	Titles
<u>Melody Lo, National Taiwan University, Kim Sau Chung</u> Hong Kong Baptist University	Designing Open Source Licenses
<u>Kong-Pin Chen; Academia Sinica</u> , Chia-Hui Chen; Kyoto University, Junichiro Ishida; Osaka University	Social Learning and Strategic Pricing with Rating System
Jinglei Huang; Tsinghua University Guofu Tan; University of Southern California <u>Tat-How Teh; Nanyang Technological University</u> Junjie Zhou; Tsinghua University	Network interoperability in multi-sided markets
Leifu Zhang; HKUST(GZ)	Robust (Decentralized) Oracle Design

### Session organised by Lars Ehlers : Fair Market Design

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<a href="#">Vikram Manjunath</a> ; University of Ottawa <a href="#">Alexander Westkamp</a> ; University of Cologne	Marginal mechanisms for balanced exchange
<a href="#">Sean Horan</a> ; Université de Montréal <a href="#">Vikram Manjunath</a> ; University of Ottawa	Sequential Composition of Choice Functions
<a href="#">Christian Basteck</a> ; WZB Berlin Social Science Center <a href="#">Lars Ehlers</a> ; Université de Montréal	On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
<a href="#">Christian Basteck</a> ; WZB Berlin Social Science Center	An Axiomatization of the Random Priority Rule

### Session organised by Lars Ehlers : New Directions in Market Design

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<a href="#">Julien Combe</a> ; CREST - Ecole polytechnique <a href="#">Umut Dur</a> ; North Carolina State University <a href="#">Olivier Tercieux</a> ; Paris School of Economics <a href="#">Camille Terrier</a> ; Queen Mary University London <a href="#">Utku Unver</a> ; Boston College	Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools
<a href="#">Florian Brandl</a> ; University of Bonn <a href="#">Andrew Mackenzie</a> ; Maastricht University	Patience Ensures Fairness
<a href="#">Tommy Andersson</a> ; Lund University <a href="#">Lars Ehlers</a> ; Université de Montréal <a href="#">Lars-Gunnar Svensson</a> ; Lund University <a href="#">Ryan Tierney</a> ; University of Southern Denmark	A General Non-Manipulable Matching Mechanism for Markets with One-Sided Preferences
<a href="#">Yi Han</a> ; University of Pittsburgh <a href="#">Dorothea Kuebler</a> ; WZB Berlin <a href="#">Yiming Liu</a> ; Humboldt University of Berlin	The Gender Gap in Gender-Blind College Admissions

### Session organised by Claus Jochen Haake: Bargaining

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<a href="#">Claus-Jochen Haake</a> ; Paderborn University <a href="#">Thomas Streck</a> ; University Paderborn	A measure for contestedness of a two-person bargaining problem
<a href="#">Walter Trockel</a> ; Bielefeld University, Papatya Duman; Paderborn University	Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: Ha-Essential Equilibria
<a href="#">Bas Dietzenbacher</a> ; Maastricht University <a href="#">William Thomson</a> ; University of Rochester	Utility distortion in claims problems
<a href="#">Kemal Kivanc Akoz</a> ; HSE University <a href="#">Arseniy Samsonov</a> ; Ozyegin University	Information Agreements

### Session organised by Wei He: Topics in Mechanism Design

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
<a href="#">Tangren Feng</a> ; Bocconi University <a href="#">Qinggong Wu</a> ; Hong Kong University of Science and Technology	Ex Post Strategy-proofness

Wei He; The Chinese University of Hong Kong Jiangtao Li; Singapore Management University Kexin Wang; Singapore Management University	Interim Regret Minimization
Wei He; The Chinese University of Hong Kong	The limit of ambiguous mechanisms
Alex Suzdaltsev; Higher School of Economics	Minimax-regret contracts and Optimal Innovation Prizes

### Session organised by Jean-Jacques Herings: Financial Networks

Authors	Titles
<u>Péter Csóka</u> ; Corvinus University of Budapest P. Jean-Jacques Herings; Tilburg University	An Axiomatization of the Pairwise Netting Proportional Rule in Financial Networks
Lorenzo Zino; Politecnico di Torino Giulia Fracastoro; Politecnico di Torino Anton Proskurnikov; Politecnico di Torino <u>Giuseppe Carlo Calafiore</u>	On the Influence of Network Structure on the Resilience and Losses of Financial Systems
Zafer Kanik; University of Glasgow	Optimal Capital Structure under Risk-Sharing
<u>Luitgard Veraart</u> ; London School of Economics and Political Science Iñaki Aldasoro; Bank for International Settlements	Systemic Risk in Markets with Multiple Central Counterparties

### Session organised by Yuan Ju

Authors	Titles
<u>Jingru Wang</u> ; Waseda University Yukihiko Funaki; Waseda University Yoshiaki Ogura; Waseda University Ryuichiro Ishikawa; Waseda University	An experimental analysis of IPO pricing mechanism –The case of Book-building
David Wettstein; Ben-Gurion University	Bidding with Coalitional Externalities: a strategic approach to partition function form games
Yuan Ju; University of York	Decentralized Multilateral Bargaining
Jiawen Li; Lancaster University	Trust and Trustworthiness Norm-conforming Behavior

### Session organised by Zhen Lei

Authors	Titles
<u>Qichao Shi</u> ; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics Zhan Wang Jingsheng Yu; Wuhan University	Shirk Responsibility: An Experimental Study of Accountability System
Zhen Lei; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics	Motivated by Karma
<u>Yao Cheng</u> ; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics Dazhong Wang; Nanjing University Jingsheng Yu; Wuhan University	Games of priority-based allocation problem under the efficient-adjustment deferred acceptance mechanism

**Session organised by Yunan Li**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Mengxi Zhang, University of Bonn	Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors
Tilman Borgers; University of Michigan Jiangtao Li; Singapore Management University Kexin Wang; Singapore Management University	Undominated Mechanisms
Mariann Ollar Antonio Penta; Universitat Pompeu Fabra	Incentive Compatibility and Belief Restrictions
Carl Heese; University of Hong Kong	Citizens with Skin in the Game

**Session organised by Jaimie Lien: Behavioral and Experimental**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Yihong Huang; Harvard University Juanjuan Meng; Peking University Xi Weng; Peking University	How Awareness of Media Bias Affects Reaction to News: Evidence from Chinese Microblog Users
Jaimie Lien; Shandong University Anning XIE; The Chinese University of Hong Kong Jie Zheng; Shandong University	Club Dynamics and Non-Rival Resources
Huanhuan Zheng; NUS	Corporate green identity
Yunwen He; Central University of Finance and Economics Jaimie Lien; Shandong University Yang Yang; Sun Yat-Sen University Jie Zheng; Shandong University	A Goose Feather from a Thousand Miles Away: A Theory and Experiment on Reciprocity

**Session organised by Jaimie Lien: Theory and Experiment**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Di Feng; Dongbei University of Finance and Economics Yun Liu; Shandong University	Informative Simplicity in Matching
Luke Garrod; Loughborough University Ruo Chen Li; Shandong University Antonio Russo; University of Sheffield Chris Wilson; Loughborough University	Understanding Cost Pass-Through when Prices are Dispersed
Yeran Dong; Capital University of Economics and Business Haipeng Han; Tsinghua University Jie Zheng; Shandong University	Duopoly Competition through Information Design

**Session organised by Szilvia Papai: Market Design**

<b>Authors</b>	<b>Titles</b>
Ozgun Ekici; Ozyegin University	How to allocate kidneys across multi-center queues: An axiomatic analysis
Jorgen Kratz; University of York	Weak misrepresentations in school choice

<u>William Phan; North Carolina State University</u> Ryan Tierney; University of Southern Denmark Yu ZHOU; Nagoya University	School Finance, Peers, and Choice
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### Session organised by Szilvia Papai: Matching Theory

Authors	Titles
Pinaki Mandal, Arizona State University	Equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability
Md. Shahidul Islam; Concordia University Szilvia Papai; Concordia University	Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
Aram Grigoryan; University of California, San Diego Markus Möller; University of Bonn	A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms

### Session organised by Marek Pycia

Authors	Titles
Samuel Häfner; University of St. Gallen Marek Pycia; U Zurich Haoyuan Zeng; University of Zurich	Mechanism Design with Information Leakage
Byeong-Hyeon Jeong; University of Zurich Marek Pycia; U Zurich	The First-Price Principle of Maximizing Economic Objectives
Alexey Kushnir; Carnegie Mellon University Ali Shourideh; Carnegie Mellon University	Selling with network flows: a new approach to optimal multi-dimensional mechanisms
Kyle Woodward; UNC Chapel Hill	Self-Auditable Auctions

### Session organised by Shigehiro Serizawa

Authors	Titles
Shigehiro Serizawa; Osaka University of Economics	Efficiency, fairness, and strategy-proofness in constrained package assignment problems with money
Tomoya Kazumura; Kyoto University Debasis Mishra; Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Shigehiro Serizawa; Osaka University of Economics	Equal treatment of equals and strategy-proofness in object allocation with non-quasi-linear preferences
Ryosuke Sakai; Tokyo Institute of Technology	Fair and efficient object allocation rules under constraints of discrete payments
Yuya Wakabayashi; Osaka University Ryosuke Sakai; Tokyo Institute of Technology Shigehiro Serizawa; Osaka University of Economics	A General Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices

### Session organised by Ning Neil Yu

Authors	Titles
Ken Ho; Liaoning University Jinyong Jeong; Liaoning University	Matching Through Agents

<u>Yajing Chen; East China University of Science and Technology</u> Zhenhua Jiao; Shanghai University of International Business and Economics	The Machiavellian frontier of top trading cycles
Ning Yu; Nanjing Audit University	Something about Auction
Ziyang Shen; Columbia University	Sequential Solicitation

### Session organised by Yu Zhou

Authors	Titles
Ryan Tierney; University of Southern Denmark <u>Yu Zhou; Nagoya University</u>	Discrete Pricing in Multi-object Auctions
<u>Keisuke Bando; Keio University</u> Kenzo Imamura; University of Tokyo Tomoya Kazumura; Kyoto University	Strategy-Proofness and Competitive Equilibrium with Transferable Utility: Gross Substitutes Revisited
<u>Masahiro Kawasaki; Accenture Japan Ltd,</u> Ryosuke Sakai; Tokyo Institute of Technology,	Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money

### Further accepted papers (not yet assigned to sessions)

Authors	Titles
<u>Peter Biro; HUN-REN KRTK and Corvinus University of Budapest</u> Kristof Druzsins; HUN-REN KRTK Rita Fleiner; Obuda University Xenia Klimentova; INESC Technology and Science	Multi-criteria optimisation in the Spanish kidney exchange programme
Yao Cheng; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics <u>Zaifu Yang; University of York</u> Jingsheng Yu; Wuhan University	Proper Exclusion Right, Priority and Allocation of Positions
Daniel Rehsman; University of Vienna Beatrice Roussillon; Université Grenoble Alpes <u>Paul Schweinzer; Alpen-Adria-University Klagenfurt</u>	Contesting fake news
Gregory Gutin; Royal Holloway University of London <u>Philip Neary; Royal Holloway University of London</u> Anders Yeo; University of Southern Denmark	Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints
Fahad Khalil; University of Washington Jacques Lawarree; University of Washington <u>Alexander Rodivilov; Stevens Institute of Technology</u>	Rewarding success and failure: moral hazard and adverse selection in strategic experimentation
Binglin Gong; East China Normal University <u>Yingzhi Liang; Chinese University of Hong Kong</u>	A Dynamic Matching Mechanism for College Admissions: Theory and Experiment
Gustavo Quindere Saraiva, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile	An Upper Bound to the Benefits of Implementing Positive Assortative Matching in Pooled Testing

Li Nie, Nanjing Audit University	Knowledge-labor access network formation with single-peaked net productions
Lijian Qin, Anhui University of Finance and Economics	The Impact of Human Capital on Health Entitlement Acquisition among Migrant Workers in China
Umutcan Salman; University of Padova	Object Allocation Problem with Maximum and Minimum Number of Changes
Jinglei Huang; Tsinghua University Danxia Xie; Tsinghua University	The Shapley Value and the Nucleolus of a Two-Sided Platform Game
Ville Korpela; Turku School of Economics Michele Lombardi; University of Liverpool Julius Zachariassen; Turku School of Economics	Behavioral Implementation Without Unanimity
Diana MacDonald; Banco de México, Ahmet Altınok; Nazarbayev University	Designing the Menu of Licenses for Foster Care
Wei Bi; European University Institute, Zhao Wenbo; National University of Singapore	Selling Incremental Products Optimally
Sungjin Cho; Seoul National University Harry Paarsch; University of Central Florida John Rust; Georgetown University	Explaining Early Bidding in Informationally-Restricted, Ascending-Bid Auctions
Ruben Juarez; University of Hawaii Chiu Yu Ko; Chinese University of Hong Kong Jung You; California State University East Bay	Sharing Profit by Ranking Partners
Arseniy Samsonov; Ozyegin University Albert Sole Olle; University of Barcelona, IEB Dimitrios Xeferis; University of Cyprus	Logrolling and the power of single-mindedness
Salah Salimian, Urmia University	Modeling the Exploitation of the South Pars-North Dome between Iran and Qatar
Jihwan Do; Yonsei University Nicolás Riquelme; Universidad de los Andes	Vertical contracting and information spillover in Cournot competition
Andrew Mackenzie; Maastricht University Christian Trudeau; University of Windsor	Auctions for a regulated monopolist
Harshika Dalakoti, Indian Statistical Institute	Optimal Dissolution Mechanism
Chen Cohen, Ishay Rabi, Aner Sela; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev	An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests
Xin Gao, University of Birmingham	Reputational Cheap Talk vs. Reputational Delegation
Hsiao-Chi Chen; National Taipei University Yunshyong Chow; Academia Sinica Shi-Miin Liu; National Taipei University	Dynamics of Cournot and Bertrand Firms: Exploring Imitation and Replicator Processes
Xihao Song, University of Glasgow	Property of Flow Algorithm and characterization
Mehmet Barlo; Sabanci University Nuh Aygun Dalkiran; Bilkent University	Robust Behavioral Implementation
Ville Korpela; Turku School of Economics Michele Lombardi; University of Liverpool Riccardo Saulle	Implementation in vNM stable set
Asefeh Salarinezhad, Concordia University	Dynamic Marriage Markets
Lining Han; Wuhan University Ruben Juarez; University of Hawaii	Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Punishment



<u>Yong Chao; University of Louisville</u> Mingjun Xiao; Hubei University of Economics	The Limit of Market-share Contracts
Kim-Sau Chung, Hong Kong Baptist University	Differentiated Public Goods
Zhongmin Wu, Nottingham Trent University	Productivity growth, State ownership and the Role of Government: Evidence from World Bank Enterprise Survey
<u>Malachy James Gavan; University of Liverpool</u> Antonio Penta; Universitat Pompeu Fabra	Safe Implementation
<u>Thomas Jungbauer; Cornell University</u> Michael Waldman; Cornell University	Actions and Signals
Emil Temnyalov, University of Technology Sydney	Capacity Design, Organizational Structure and Differential Treatment
Zeming Ma; University of Rochester	On Fairness in Order-Augmented Revenue-Sharing Problems
Goonj Mohan, University of Barcelona	Regulating a Social Media Platform in the Data Economy
Sreoshi Banerjee, Budapest University of Technology and Economics	On identifying efficient, fair and stable allocations in "generalized" sequencing games.
<u>Dora Greta Petroczy; John von Neumann University</u> Laszlo Csato; Institute for Computer Science and Contr	Voting power in the Council of the European Union: A comprehensive sensitivity analysis
Marcelo de C. Griebeler, Federal University of Rio Grande do Su	Fear of communism: a political theory of land reform in democracies
Duygu Sili; Koç University, Özgür Yılmaz; Koç University	How to incentivize hospitals in Dynamic Kidney Exchange
<u>Ritesh Jain; Academia Sinica, Taiwan, V Korpela; Turku School of Economics, M Lombardi; University of Liverpool</u>	An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation
Ryoji Jinushi, Seikei University	Costly Advertising and Information Congestion: Insights from Pigou's Successors
Chuan Yu, Stanford University	The Welfare Effects of Sponsored Product Advertising
Laszlo Csato, Institute for Computer Science and Control	Random matching in balanced bipartite graphs: The (un)fairness of draw mechanisms used in sports
<u>Evangelos Rouskas; University of the Aegean, Stylianos Xanthopoulos; University of the Aegean</u>	Exogenous vs Endogenous Consumer Time Preferences: Oligopoly
Heng Liu, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute	The Limits of Repeated Nonlinear Pricing
Marc Claveria-Mayol, Stony Brook University	Moral Hazard with Network Effects
Wonki Cho; Korea University Biung-Ghi Ju; Seoul National University	Arrovian Social Choice and Decentralizability: An Integrated Approach
<u>Sumit Goel; NYU Abu Dhabi</u> Wade Hann-Caruthers; Caltech	Optimality of weighted contracts for multi-agent contract design with a budget
<u>Tom Rauber; University of Kaiserslautern</u> Philipp Weinschenk; University of Kaiserslautern-Landau	Detrimental Incentive Mechanisms in Dynamic Principal-Agent Relationships

<a href="#">Yanlin Chen</a> ; Nanjing Audit University <a href="#">Xueheng Li</a> ; Nanjing Audit University <a href="#">Tianle Song</a> ; Nanjing Audit University	Influencer Networks
<a href="#">Darong Dai</a> , Shanghai University of Finance and Economics	Voting on Redistribution with Retaining Top Talent
<a href="#">Ying Chen</a> ; Johns Hopkins University <a href="#">Liuchun Deng</a> ; National University of Singapore/Yale-NUS College <a href="#">Minako Fujio</a> ; Yokohama National University <a href="#">M. Ali Khan</a> ; The Johns Hopkins University	Irreversibility, Complementarity, and the Dynamics of Public Good Provision
<a href="#">Omar de la Cruz Vicente</a> ; Universidad de Alcalá	Hamilton and D´Hondt differences in the Spanish parliament context
<a href="#">Yolanda F. Rebollo-Sanz</a> ; Universidad Pablo de Olavide	Political opportunism behind changes in party affiliation: Evidence from Spanish municipal elections
<a href="#">Tayfun Sonmez</a> ; Boston College <a href="#">Utku Unver</a> ; Boston College	Market Design for Social Justice: A Case Study on a Constitutional Crisis in India
<a href="#">Umut Dur</a> ; North Carolina State University <a href="#">Robert Hammond</a> ; University of Alabama <a href="#">Utku Unver</a> ; Boston College	Rematching with Contracts under Labor Mobility Restrictions: Theory and Application
<a href="#">Amirreza Ahmadzadeh</a> ; Toulouse School of Economics	Mechanism Design with Costly State Verification
<a href="#">Martin Hagen</a> ; CUNEF Universidad	Optimal refugee status determination
<a href="#">Svetlana Boyarchenko</a> ; University of Texas-Austin	On dangers of large scale experimentation and product competition
<a href="#">Benoit Decerf</a> ; The World Bank <a href="#">Guillaume Haeringer</a> ; Baruch College <a href="#">Martin Van der Linden</a> ; Independent scholar	Incontestable assignments
<a href="#">Noemie Cabau</a> ; QSMS Research Group BME <a href="#">Arseniy Samsonov</a> ; Ozyegin University	Signaling Effort: Information structures in a Principal-Agent model
<a href="#">Sushil Bikhchandani</a> ; UCLA <a href="#">Debasis Mishra</a> ; Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi	Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms
<a href="#">Juan Carlos Gonçalves-Dosantos</a> ; Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche <a href="#">Ricardo Martinez</a> ; Universidad de Granada <a href="#">Joaquin Sánchez-Soriano</a> ; Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche	Measures of relevance of the success of streaming platforms
<a href="#">Ville Korpela</a> ; Turku School of Economics <a href="#">Michele Lombardi</a> ; University of Liverpool <a href="#">Foivos Savva</a> ; University of Southampton	The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view
<a href="#">Michele Lombardi</a> ; University of Liverpool, R. Jain; Academia Sinica	Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions: A Full Characterization
<a href="#">Georgios Gerasimou</a> ; University of Glasgow	Ordinal intensity-efficient allocations
<a href="#">Joosung Lee</a> ; Pennsylvania State University <a href="#">Daniel Z. Li</a> ; Durham University Business School	Optimal Search Auction with a Deadline
<a href="#">Gergely Csáji</a> ; HUN-REN KRTK KTI	Popularity and Perfectness in One-sided Matching Markets with Capacities
<a href="#">Shangen Li</a> ; University of Zurich	Optimal Design of Climate Disclosure Policies: Transparency versus Externality

<u>Bernardo Moreno</u> ; Universidad de Málaga, Pietro Salmaso; Universita degli Studi di Napoli Federico II	Strategy-Proofness in Domains of Lexicographical Preferences: A Characterization
Rui Gao; Shandong University Jingfeng Lu; National University of Singapore <u>Zhewei Wang</u> ; Shandong University	Multi-dimensional All-pay Contests
Arthur Fishman; Bar Ilan University	Advertising for Dropout Consumers
<u>Guilherme Carmona</u> ; University of Surrey Konrad Podczeck; University of Vienna	Large Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Itzel Rocio Osorio Rosas; El Colegio de Mexico	Driving Change: Green Certificates and the Path to Clean Energy Investment
Julius Goedde; Columbia University	Pricing in Markets without Money: Theory and Evidence from Home Exchanges
Onur Kesten; School of Economics	Who gets the bonus? Affirmative Action Reforms in High School Admissions in China
Aloisio Araujo; FGV/EPGE and IMPA <u>Victor Perez</u> ; IMPA	Single crossing in multidimensional screening with one-dimensional allocation space
Di Feng; Dongbei University of Finance and Economics Bettina Klaus; University of Lausanne <u>Flip Klijn</u> ; CSIC	Characterizing the Typewise Top-Trading- Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets
Wenji Xu; City University of Hong Kong	Social Learning through Action-Signals
David Rodriguez; CUNEF University	Life Pension and Parliamentarian Effort
Yi-You Yang; Aletheia University	Vacancy chains in matching markets with contracts
Federica Carannante; Princeton University <u>Marco Pagnozzi</u> ; Universita' di Napoli Federico II Elia Sartori; Universita degli Studi di Napoli Federic	Adaptive Reserve Prices in Repeated Auctions
Steven Kivinen; University of Graz	Equitable Voting with Many Alternatives
<u>Simon Finster</u> ; CREST-ENSAE Patrick Loiseau; Inria Simon Mauras; Inria Mathieu Molina; Inria Bary SR Pradelski; CNRS	Equitable Pricing in Auctions
Francesco Giovannoni; University of Bristol <u>Toomas Hinnosaar</u> ; University of Nottingham	Pricing Novel Goods
Marieke Pahlke; Corvinus University of Budapest	Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Dutch Auctions
<u>Matthias Lang</u> ; LMU Munich Cédric Wasser; University of Basel	Benefits and Challenges of Ambiguous Product Information
Tiberiu Dragu; New York University <u>Xiaochen Fan</u> ; New York University	Polarization and Issue Selection in Elections
Dezso Bednay; Corvinus university of Budapest Balázs Fleiner; Budapest Business University <u>Attila Tasnadi</u> ; Corvinus University of Budapest	An indifference result for voting rules in large societies
<u>Jim Dearden</u> ; Lehigh University David Goldbaum; University of Technology	Competitive Disclosure of Multiple Product Attributes

Sydney Ernest Lai; Lehigh University Qichao Shi; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics	
<u>Gabriel Bayle; University of Montpellier</u> Marc Willinger; Université de Montpellier	Efficiency of the Minimum Approval Mechanism with heterogeneous players
<u>Tom Demeulemeester; KU Leuven</u> Dries Goossens Ben Hermans; ORTEC Roel Leus; KU Leuven	Fair integer programming under dichotomous and cardinal preferences
<u>Andrew Kloosterman; University of Virginia</u> Peter Troyan; University of Virginia	Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process
Andrés Salamanca; Ca' Foscari University of Venice	Conditional Random Dictatorship and the Value of a Bayesian Cooperative Game
Zaifu Yang; University of York <u>Rong Zhang; Chongqing University</u>	Optimal Taxation with Complete Bunching
Rogério Mazali; University of Brasilia Fernando Siqueira; University of Brasília	Sanctions in Telecommunications: an Inquiry into the Strategic Interaction between Regulator and Regulated
<u>Donglai Luo; UTS</u> Benjamin Balzer; UTS	Smooth Ambiguity Aversion in k-Double Auction
Te-Tsun Chang; National Chi-Nan University	Liquidity, Unemployment and Investment
María Gómez-Rúa; Universidade de Vigo Elena Molis; Universidad de Granada Bernardo Moreno; Universidad de Málaga	Group threshold when making a decision
Hiroki Shinozaki; Hitotsubashi University	Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object allocation problems with payments: Externalities with income effect
<u>Qinggong Wu; Hong Kong University of Science and Technology</u> , Xingye Wu; Tsinghua University	Modeling Political Spectra
Dazhong Wang; Nanjing University Ruqu Wang; Queen's University <u>Xinyi Xu; Sun Yat-Sen University</u>	Optimal design of auction with linear contract under double moral hazard
Hector Hermida-Rivera; Budapest University of Technology and Economics	Minimal Stable Voting Rules
Humaira Kamal Pasha; Paris School of Business	Does Income Equality Support Environmental Sustainability? A Gender Based Analysis.
Dmitriy Knyazev; University of Vienna <u>Daniel Rehsmann; University of Vienna</u>	Choose your auction: Mechanism design for a bidder
Anindya Bhattacharya; University of York <u>Francesco Ciardiello; University of Salerno</u>	How sensitive are the results in voting theory when just one other voter joins in? Some instances with spatial majority voting
<u>Juan Escobar; University of Chile</u> , Alfonso Monte; University of Chile	Search and Information in Centralized School Choice Systems
<u>Rajarshi Ghosh; ESSEC</u> Marcus Pivato; THEMA, CY Cergy Paris Université	Quadratically Normalized Utilitarian Voting

Keisuke Bando; Keio university <u>Toshiyuki Hirai; Hosei University</u>	Substitutes for Nonunitary Many-to-Many Matching with Contracts
Elena Molis; Universidad de Granada <u>Robert Veszteg; Waseda University</u>	Experimental results on the roommate problem
Arup Daripa; Birkbeck University of London Sandeep Kapur; Birkbeck College, University of London <u>Marco Pelliccia; Heriot-Watt University</u>	Incentive Design on Networks
Francesco Conti; The University of Texas at Austin	Allocation Design with Strictly Convex Preferences
Kuo-chih Yuan; Soochow University,	Parallel auctions of objects within budget constraints
Ye Jin; NYU Shanghai, Zhen Zhou; Tsinghua University	Strategic Understatement
<u>Papatya Duman; Paderborn University</u> Claus-Jochen Haake; Paderborn University Sarah Kühn; University Paderborn	Does the blockchain technology help to reduce information asymmetries?
Oihane Gallo; Université de Lausanne	Anonymity and strategy-proofness on a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
<u>Zsuzsanna Jankó; Corvinus University of Budapest</u> Attila Joó; University of Hamburg Erel Segal-Halevi; Bar Ilan University Sheung Man Yuen; School of Professional Education and Executive Development	On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-Cutting
Carmen Arguedas; Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Hubert Kiss; KRTK & BCE <u>Agnes Pinter; Universidad Autónoma de Madrid</u>	Final Countdown? An Experimental Collective Risk Dilemma with Horizon Uncertainty
Yangbo Song; Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhe	Social Learning among Opinion Leaders
<u>Guadalupe Correa-Lopera; Universidad Pública de Navarra</u> Bernardo Moreno; Universidad de Málaga	Voting Equilibria and Public Funding of Political Parties
<u>Laurent Lamy; Ecole des Ponts, ParisTech</u> Clément Leblanc; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées – ENPC	Robust Production Insuring Procurement and their Pitfalls
<u>Paolo Delle Site; Università Niccolò Cusano</u> André de Palma; CY Cergy Paris Université Samarth Ghoslya; Sapienza University	Matching and fair pricing of socially optimal, stable and financially sustainable ride-sharing in congestible networks
Yuxi Chen; University of Lausanne <u>Luis Santos-Pinto; University of Lausanne</u>	Overconfidence in Elimination Contests
Papatya Duman; Paderborn University Britta Hoyer; Paderborn University <u>Sarah Kühn; University Paderborn</u> Nadja Stroh-Maraun; Paderborn University	Non-induced preferences in matching experiments
Bo Chen <u>Dmitriy Knyazev; University of Vienna</u>	Optimal Discrimination-free Auction
Maxim Senkov; European Research University	Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade

Tsuyoshi Adachi; Waseda University <u>Zheng Lin; Waseda University</u>	Fair and Strategy-proof Probabilistic Allocation with Payment
<u>Julian Matthes; Heidelberg University</u> David Piazzolo; University of Heidelberg	The Strategic Benefits of Sending Your Friends Away: Evidence from Cooperation Behavior in Professional Road Cycling
Isaac Swift; Hong Kong Baptist University	A Recommendation Game
Ethem Akyol; TOBB Economics and Technology University Isa Hafalir; University of Technology Sydney <u>Antonio Miralles Asensio; Università degli Studi di Messina</u>	Bayesian School Choice: Welfare Comparison of Immediate Acceptance and Deferred Acceptance Mechanisms
Krisztina Antal-Pomázi; Center for Economic and Regional Studies	Expert Evidence in Court: A New Method for Choosing a Court-Appointed Neutral Expert
<u>Federico Fioravanti; University of Amsterdam</u> Ulle Endriss; University of Amsterdam	Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-Plurality Classes
Luca Sandrini; ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research <u>Robert Somogyi; Budapest University of Technology and Economics; Centre for Economic and Regional Studies</u>	News Media Bargaining Codes
Min Zhang; University of St Andrews	A Simple Model of Trading Artworks
Anna Abate Bessomo; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam	Inefficient Full Surplus Extraction
Thilo Klein; ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research	Matching for Credit: Identifying Information Asymmetries in Joint-Liability Lending
Tamás Solymosi; Corvinus University of Budapest	Computing the per-capita nucleolus in assignment games
Fatma Aslan; Budapest University of Technology and Economics	Job Exchange in Markets with Couples
<u>Pedro Calleja; University of Barcelona</u> Francesc Llerena; Universitat Rovira i Virgili	Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems
Byung-Cheol Kim; University of Alabama Jin Yeub Kim; Yonsei University <u>Hyunjun Cho; Yonsei University</u>	Profit Sharing in Partnerships: Complementarity, Productivity, and Commitment
<u>Takashi Hayashi; University of Glasgow</u> Michele Lombardi; University of Liverpool	Implementation in Stationary Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
<u>Hubert Kiss; KRTK &amp; Corvinus University of Budapest</u> Jaromir Kovarik; University of the Basque Country Agnes Pinter; Universidad Autónoma de Madrid	Risk of imminent collective failure alleviates but does not prevent the tragedy of the commons
Andrew Clausen; University of Edinburgh <u>Christopher Stapenhurst; Budapest University of Technology and Economics</u>	Deterring Bribery with Scotch Hold 'em Poker
Ben Balmford; LEEP Institute Brett Day; University of Exeter <u>Luke Lindsay; University of Exeter Business School</u>	Designing markets for bundled environmental goods
Natalie Kessler; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam	Mandatory Central Clearing and Financial Risk Exposure
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Tetsutaro Hatakeyama; Keio University Onur Kesten; School of Economics Morimitsu Kurino; Keio University	Who makes the cut? Priority design for heterogeneous groups of agents
Mihir Bhattacharya; Ashoka University <u>Ojasvi Khare; Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Center</u>	Fair allocation with (semi-single-peaked) preferences over location and quantity
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Kohmei Makihara; Aix-Marseille University, Aix-Marseille School of Economics	Peer-review mechanism design to allocate goods with externality
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