

**MIGRANTS
AND THE HUNGARIAN SOCIETY**
DIGNITY, JUSTICE
AND CIVIC INTEGRATION

MIGRANTS AND THE HUNGARIAN SOCIETY DIGNITY, JUSTICE AND CIVIC INTEGRATION

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INTRODUCTION

The Centre for Empirical Social Research within the Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, Corvinus University of Budapest, has recently finished conducting research under the title of “Survey on the Civic Integration of Immigrants” with support from the European Integration Fund. The aim was to explore the integration and political and civic participation of “third country nationals residing in Hungary” (hereafter, “immigrants” or “migrants”). How immigrants and Hungarian society interpret political and civic activity was examined, along with how this is correlated to their material, cultural and social resources (using such concepts as “identity” and “potential for action”, as well as the existence of a sense of fairness and dignity). Having recognized the role of civic society in the process of integration of immigrants, the European Union – in its Zaragoza Declaration¹ – highlighted some indicators (such as civic participation) to be used in the evaluation of integration policies and asserted that the active participation of immigrants in the democratic process contributed to their integration. From among the indicators deemed important in the Zaragoza Declaration, researchers examined the effect of factors which affect the essence of “active citizenship” – such as trust in public institutions, electoral behaviour and a sense of attachment and identity.

People decide upon or are forced by their situations to opt for migration for a variety of reasons. Traditional theories claim that both push and pull factors influence the decision to migrate (Tóth 2001, Hárs 2001). Push factors cause migrants to leave a country; the direction of migration being determined by the attractive alternatives. These days, however, this paradigm of alienation from the country of origin and integration into the receiving country only partially contributes to international migration. Today, migration is more easily described using dynamic models, which use the concept of “migration chains” as a foundation (e.g. Boyd 1989, Kritz, Lim, and Zlotnik 1992, Melegh et al. 2009). Migration can occur periodically, be temporally limited and incomplete in a sociological sense, and attachment to the community of origin may survive in widely diverse forms.

Understanding the integration of immigrants and the road to naturalization can be approached from different viewpoints (Bijl et al. 2008). Integration, on the one hand, is a legal, political process in the course of which the immigrant becomes endowed with rights and obligations similar to the majority of society in the host country, and becomes incorporated into the host country’s political community. On the other hand, it is a socio-economic process, the key element of which is employment and taxation of the immigrant and participation in the host country’s economy. Thirdly, integration has a socio-cultural aspect which implies the building of a network of relations between the immigrant and the majority elements of society, as well as the immigrant’s accumulation of knowledge and potential acceptance of the language, customs and norms of the recipient country.

¹ Statement of the ministers’ conference held in Zaragoza on the theme of the integration of immigrants, 15/16 April 2010.

The success or failure of the integrative process depends to an extent on the host society's openness or level of prejudice. A recent opinion poll found that the evaluation of immigrants is the least positive in Hungary of all EU twenty-seven member countries.² This is all the more startling as, compared to the old EU members, the rate of immigration to Hungary is low. While immigrants from non-EU countries amount to nearly 4% of the total EU population, the corresponding figure is less than 1% for Hungary. Hungary has a special place in the international migration process: it is not exposed to significant migration, but in the 1990's it became the target country for certain groups that are significant in terms of the phenomenon of globalization. There are a considerable number of unqualified job-takers with temporary contracts; there are also quite a lot of well-qualified "transitional" migrants and there are a growing number of women involved in international migration. The territorial distribution and concentration of migrants in and around Budapest corresponds to the geographic pattern of capital investment in the center of the country, in and close to the capital (Melegh et al. 2004).

Unlike other aspects of migration, little is known about the consequences of migration upon civic and political activity in contemporary democracies. In the context of the EU it is of signal importance to know how immigrants (often from politically non-democratic countries) influence the democratic political life and norms of the host country. Traditionally, civic activity is gauged by citizens' electoral behavior, while the civic activity of immigrants awaiting naturalization has attracted little attention from researchers. In any case, it is not enough to examine civic activity in terms of electoral behavior, as non-electoral types of activity are gaining more prominence and power in modern societies. While the electoral behaviors of immigrants can only be examined for certain groups and in local affairs, non-electoral forms of activity must be interpreted in a broader context (Paskeviciute and Anderson 2007). This type of political activity is particularly important because our research, besides Hungarian society, addressed immigrants who have come from a third country and who have not yet become citizens and have limited voting rights: they cannot vote in general elections, although some of them can participate in local elections. In addition to many pieces of international research on the topic of the political integration of immigrants, two investigations have also been conducted into this theme in Hungary recently.³

With the present research we tried to examine the correlation of the issue of migration with topics such as action potential, fairness, a sense of dignity and subjective well-being. We laid stress on not treating immigrants and the host society separately; we did not want to speculate about the immigrants themselves, or to approach members of Hungarian society through their attitudes to immigration, but rather to examine these

² In spring of 2008 the "Eurobarometer 69" survey found that 10% of the Hungarian population agreed with the statement that "Immigrants contribute much to Hungary", compared to an average of 44% for the EU.

³ The "LOCALMULTIDEM" research effort was based on special policy analyses, media analyses and individual and institutional surveys (2006–2009, Institute for Minority Research, HAS). The EIF-financed research project "Immigrants in Hungary" examined the integration and strategies of six migrant groups in Hungary through questionnaire surveys (Örkény and Székelyi 2010). The individual survey part of both pieces of research was based on snowball sampling and same-size samples of migrant groups.

issues together, along the same lines, by mutually comparing them. This approach allowed us to see how migrants' political and civic activity is being shaped, and also, in what context this takes place (i.e. with what system, what values and what attitudes are immigrants becoming integrated).

ON THE RESEARCH

The research in this book therefore serves to highlight and compare the political and civic activity of immigrants versus Hungarian society. Though we also shed light on some causal connections, our research is primarily exploratory, with the following questions about migrants and – whenever relevant – Hungarian society – being investigated:

- How do the original social, cultural and material resources of immigrants influence how they are equipped with similar resources in Hungary?
- How do social, cultural and material resources influence the objective and subjective well-being of immigrants and of Hungarian society?
- What is the individual's sense of distributive and procedural justice; i.e. the perception of being fairly treated and receiving a fair redistribution of available resources - and how does this influence objective and subjective well-being?
- How do resources influence the inclination to exit (in Hirschman's sense of the term) and the sense of dignity of immigrants and of members of Hungarian society?
- How is political and civic participation correlated to objective and subjective well-being, to distributive and procedural justice (Klandermans et al. 2008) for migrants and the host community, and how does possession of resources influence this?




Figure 1 Research model on the immigrant-related issues and their inclination to political and civic participation

The research was conducted in 2011 in several subsequent phases which combined quantitative and qualitative research methods. The backbone of the research was a representative survey of 1500 individuals with a ca. 30 minute questionnaire comprised two sub-samples: one of immigrants (n = 500) and one of host country individuals (n = 1000).

The pool from which the immigrant sample was taken was comprised of people over the age of eighteen coming from a “third country” who possessed a residence permit, an immigration permit, or a (national/ EC) permanent residence permit in Hungary.

To make sure that the 500-member sub-sample of immigrants was representative, we first received from the Central Office for Administrative and Electronic Public Services a random list of immigrants with permanent residence which represented the population of immigrants adequately by age, gender, country of origin and place of residence. From this list, 156 persons were selected using a multistage sampling process by settlement type. The other part of the immigrant sample (344 people) was identified using the snowball method in the course of which composition by age, gender and country of origin was determined through the use of quotas. As a result, the final sample adequately represented the above-specified immigrant population of Hungary according to age, gender and country of origin).

The sampling of the Hungarian adult population was done by using stratified multistage sampling. After defining the number of people from a stratum, the sample was created using the random walk method. First households, then individuals were selected. One thousand is the standard number of people for a research sample using the whole Hungarian population.

Interviewers visited an address at least three times for both sub-samples. To supplement unusable addresses, a supplementary and identically stratified sub-sample was created in the same way as the sample for the Hungarian population. After sampling, any distortions in data were corrected by weighting. Detailed information on the design and data collection method of the survey is available in the Appendix, together with a copy of the questionnaire itself.

A general question concerning surveys (with particular relevance when using a culturally diverse target group) is how the questions will be interpreted and how comparable the answers will be. Therefore, before the research commenced, we piloted the questions on the survey in cognitive interviews with five immigrants and five Hungarians to explore possibly culture-dependent influences. This was done using the so-called “think aloud” method, which reveals the cognitive path that leads to the final answer. Using the findings from the in-depth interviews we created the final questionnaire. In addition, we also tested details on the survey through four interviews with experts.

To come closer to understanding the themes of “sense of fairness and justice” we utilized a qualitative approach to allow for a deeper understanding than would be possible from answers given to a questionnaire. We held focus group discussions

with immigrants and Hungarian citizens. This research phase was complementary and aimed to support the interpretation of the survey.

The chapters of this book include descriptive analyses and causal or regression models suitable for digging into the more complex connections, as well as explorative factor analyses, which uncover the underlying structure of opinions. This raises two technical questions: first, how to compare two sub-samples of different sizes created with different sampling methods; and second, how to handle the differences caused by the different socio-demographic structures. To what extent does the difference between the two samples mean real divergence, and to what extent can this be attributed to structural differences?

As for the first question, choosing the statistical test to be used for the descriptive analyses was problematic. Chi square-based indicators (suitable for the examination of the association of categorical variables) are chiefly used to compare groups taken from a single population with the same probability sampling method. T-test indicator (used for measuring differences of at least interval-level variables) was utilized because, once each category is made dichotomous, it is then suited for comparison using two independent sub-samples. The problem with this test is that it presupposes a normal distribution of variables (Hunyadi and Vita 2002) and is less reliable for samples of more than 30 members (Sajtos and Mitev 2006). Neither statistical test is thus perfect for comparing the results in the two sub-samples. However, it turned out in practice that the two tests produced similar results. When the two samples are directly compared (as described in the following chapters), these two statistical tests were primarily used; readers should take note of the above-described caveats⁴.

Additionally, regression and factor models were run separately for the two groups. To control the structural deviations between the two sub-samples, a shared model would have been suitable, but it was used only with limitations in our research. Another method for solving this problem is that used by Endre Sik in the ENRI-East⁵ research project; it is based on an “adjustment” of the majority sample to the composition of the immigrant sample (Sik 2012). As a result of this process, two samples of similar composition can be compared along the factors. This adjustment – namely, the re-weighting of the majority sample – was done according to the composition of the immigrant sample by age, gender and residence (Budapest/not Budapest). However, the comparison between the re-weighted majority sample and the immigrant sample did not provide significantly different results from the results of the original majority vs. immigrant samples. Therefore the results of the original samples are later presented.

In the authors’ view, the samples presented in the following research do represent Hungarian society and those people staying in Hungary with immigration or residence

⁴ Significance level (p-values) of the statistical tests in the studies are indicated as follows: ****<0.001, ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1.

⁵ FP7-SSH collaborative research project (2008–2011); “Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities. Nations between States along the New Eastern Borders of the European Union”.

permits/permanent residence (collectively labeled “immigrants”). It should be stressed that the immigrants we studied are not refugee camp dwellers or foreigners employed illegally in Hungary. Though themselves faced with a lot of problems, the immigrants we interviewed are in a far more favorable position than immigrants in typical refugee camps or migrants employed in the grey economy. This is an important fact to be remembered when reading about the research.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The book is divided into three main parts. First it introduces the context of immigration and the factors determining the details of this phenomenon through the socio-demographic and welfare characteristics of immigrants. Next, immigration and civic integration, civic activity are discussed using a qualitative approach. Finally the concepts of justice, dignity and action potential are examined on the basis of the survey results, along with an analysis of political and civic participation using the formerly-analyzed concepts. Thus, the research described in the book is complementary; most quantitative analyses being a comparison of the status of Hungarian society compared to the immigrants.

In Part One, Dorottya Kisfalusi first describes the sample of immigrants in terms of their socio-demographic features, social and cultural resources and motivation for migration. The most important statement about motivation for migration is that five primary causes for leaving one’s native land can be identified: the most frequently mentioned driver is family issues, followed by job-seeking, hopes for a higher standard of living, resumption of studies, and finally political, religious reason or war. Eleonóra Szanyi-F. meanwhile looks at material resources and their perception; i.e. the theme of objective and subjective well-being, when comparing Hungarian society and immigrants.

In Part Two, the partial results of two pieces of research done using qualitative methodology are presented. First, the findings of earlier research – the results of “civic discussions” – are presented. This research (from 2009) touched on several questions concerning the integration of immigrants so we thought that it had a place in this volume on account of the methodology it used, which involves the direct participation of both immigrants and members of Hungarian society. The findings of the expert evaluations of the civic discussions from two years later are also briefly analyzed.

Next, Éva Vépy-Schlemmer presents the results of an analysis of two confirmative focus group surveys on the themes of fairness, justice, political and civic participation and action potential. An important conclusion of the analysis is that both Hungarian society and the immigrants have very similar opinions about distributive justice. Both groups report to suffering grave and lasting procedural injustice. This finding may contribute significantly to the shaping of the political thinking of migrants.

In Part Three, György Lengyel’s study explores how exit inclination and a sense of dignity correlate to economic, cultural and social resources across the whole of society

and for immigrants, and examines how these factors influence civic participation and subjective well-being. His findings suggest that, owing to composition effects, for immigrants there is a higher rate of exit inclination and sense of dignity than for the host society, and there is less voice potential for them. Across the whole of society, it is not those whose dignity has suffered but those who have a deeper sense of dignity that represent a greater voice potential.

Lilla Tóth examines the preconditions necessary for collective action and political participation, also building on the social psychological approach to the issue. She takes a close look at concepts such as grievances, the perception of procedural injustice, the chosen principles of distributive justice, perceptions about efficiency, the subjective aspect of double identity, fear and social embeddedness. She has found that, in terms of grievances, perceived injustice and unfairness, the majority of Hungarian society have a more negative view of the situation, and hence their political participation is more highly motivated and more probable. As regards perceived efficiency, immigrants are overrepresented in the variable of "control over one's own individual life", while host county members perceive they have greater efficiency in protesting against government decisions. In social terms, both groups are little embedded, but taking the subjective aspect of embeddedness gauged by general trust and trust in institutions, immigrants seems to be better embedded.

In Pál Juhász' research, he scrutinizes the differences in political opinions and judgments (more broadly speaking, the value systems) of the Hungarian population and the immigrants. He explores questions such as how the degree of responsibility taken for one's own life and the determinant factors of "fatalism" correlate with perceptions about justice and fairness. One of the conclusions of this piece of analysis is that immigrants are less characterized by fatalist attitudes than the host society. In the last piece of research described, Borbála Göncz examines the civic or political integration of immigrants and the factors that determine it. The indicators discussed in various chapters of the book are analyzed again. There is discussion of electoral vs. non-electoral kinds of political activity, the degree to which economic, social and cultural factors, subjective well-being, perceived justice or injustice and several other variants which measure individual integration and earlier socialization influence civic or political activity.

Who is this book written for? Particularly for policy-makers in charge of the integration of immigrants and for politicians in general who are interested in understanding the political participation (or lack of participation) activities of Hungarian society, including foreigners residing in the country. Additionally, Hungarian and non-Hungarian researchers and students might also find this book interesting, in addition to civil society organizations and non-profit institutions interested in political participation in general. Since interpretation of the findings and understanding the majority of the research requires no deep preliminary scientific expertise, the book may serve as useful reading for all those interested in the theme.

Finally, let us express our gratitude to specialists and colleagues who participated in the workshop at which the first version of this volume of studies was presented.

We thank them for reading the work and expressing their opinions that contributed valuable material to the final version of the book.

The editors

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PART I

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES AND WELL-BEING OF IMMIGRANTS IN HUNGARY

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES, THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL RESOURCES OF IMMIGRANTS AND DRIVERS OF MIGRATION

Dorottya Kisfalusi

INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on a comparison of the two populations studied in the research – third-country nationals, or immigrants, and Hungarian society – as regards their socio-demographic characteristics and cultural and social resources. Also explored are what the migrants' aims and motivations are, what made them leave their native countries and why they chose Hungary as a target country.

It is in the central interest of the research objective – to better understand civic and political integration – to explore the composition of the immigrant group in Hungary through examining socio-demographic factors and cultural and social resources. Earlier research findings (Örkény and Székelyi 2009a) have suggested that immigrants are younger, more highly educated and more economically active than members of Hungarian society, on average. The question of how this influences their political and civic activity then arises. The research also investigated if there were differences in the political and civic participation of migrant groups in Hungary and their home countries according to differences in the length of their stay and their legal status. The main objective of this paper is to present results from the research which are related to socio-demographic background variables and resource indicators – which are used in subsequent chapters as explanatory variables. Additionally, the authors introduce how these variables correlate with the drivers of migration and with the length of the immigrants' stay in Hungary and their legal status.

In the first part of this section, official statistical data on the number of immigrants and their socio-demographic composition and the relevant findings of earlier research on the theme are presented. In terms of the goals and motives behind the decision to migrate, a brief review of theories about migration, highlighting “push and pull” effects is also offered. In the second part, the descriptors of length and immigrant' legal status and country of origin, together with the goals and motivations behind migration are used to describe migrants. In part three, a comparison of socio-demographic differences between Hungarian society and the immigrants is in focus, with a view to

identifying differences between groups of immigrants. In the last part, the cultural and social resources possessed by the host society and the immigrants are explored.

MIGRANTS IN HUNGARY: STATISTICAL DATA, EMPIRICAL RESULTS, THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The target group of our research comprises third country nationals who are staying in Hungary with legal rights granted through any of the following legal documents¹:

- a) a residence permit;
- b) an immigration permit;
- c) a permanent residence permit;
- d) an interim permanent residence permit;
- e) a national permanent residence permit;
- f) an EC permanent residence permit.

It is hard to know (even using diverse statistical sources) how many third country nationals live in Hungary, and by what right they are resident. Firstly, the legal context of immigration has constantly changed over the past decade, and secondly, with the changing of the borders of the European Union the geographical pool from which third country nationals could come has also changed. For example, while immigrants from Romania were “third country nationals” prior to 1 January 2007, after the accession of Romania to the EU the (significant) number of immigrants from Romania are now registered as being immigrants “from EU countries”. However, these changes are not automatically reflected in databases; for example, according to the statistical summary on 31 December 2011 of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN)² a great number of migrants residing in Hungary were Romanian citizens who would no longer qualify as “third country nationals” today and thus would fall outside the scope of our research³.

Ágnes Hárs (2009) has made an attempt to estimate the number of third country nationals in Hungary on the basis of accessible statistical databases. She puts the figure at being between 51 000 and 72000; the Central Statistical Office (CSO) figure on 1 January 2008 estimate was 71,337 and that of OIN on 31 December 2008 was 51,422.

¹ The following legal statutes provide for the regulation of residence permits valid for a definite length (5 years) of time and of permanent residence and immigration permits valid for indefinite lengths of time: Act LXXXVI of 1993 on the Admission, Right of Residence and Immigration of Foreigners (immigration permit), Act XXXIX of 2001 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Foreigners (permanent residence permit), and Act II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third Country Nationals, section 64 (interim permanent residence permit), section 35 (national permanent residence permit) and section 38 (EC permanent residence permit). A simple residence permit is valid for a definite duration of time.

² Source: <http://www.bmbah.hu/statisztikak.php>

³ On questions of definition and more on the difficulties of statistical data collection on this topic, see Hárs 2009.

These two databases reveal that the majority of this population – 55-60% – come from European countries and the high proportion – one-third – of Asian immigrants are also significant in number. Immigrants from neighboring countries – Ukraine, Serbia and Croatia – make up a large proportion of third country nationals at 41% (OIN figure) or 50% (CSO).

Socio-demographic features

As the figures for 1 January 2008 reveal, men are slightly overrepresented from the pool of migrants who originate from a third country (53%). The gender composition of migrants from European countries is balanced, while males make up 55% of all Asian immigrants (Hárs 2009). Examination of six migrant groups by Antal Örkény and Mária Székelyi (2009a)⁴ reveals that the gender balance is different from migrant group to migrant group, with a predominance of males primarily characterizing Turkish and Arab immigrants (at over 75%). For Hungarian immigrants from outside the country, as well as Ukrainians, Chinese and Vietnamese, the male/female ratio was more or less equal. Compared to the host country, the number of elderly immigrants is lower. CSO figures show circa 10% of immigrants below 14 years of age and another circa 10% above 60 years of age. 15-39 year-olds amount to 38% of all immigrants while the age group of 40-49 years amounts to 31% (Hárs 2009).

CSO statistics show that there is a great regional concentration of immigrants. 57% live in the Central Hungarian region, nearly half of them in Budapest. A little more than 10% of all migrants live both North and South of the Great Plain. The degree of concentration is considerably higher for those with a fixed term residence permit and for non-European migrants, and is considerably lower for those with permanent residence or immigration permits and for those immigrants who come from European countries (Hárs 2009).

The economic activity of third country nationals is high compared to the local population. Over 70% are active, as against 40% of the Hungarian population (National Health Insurance figures)⁵. Work activity rates slightly differ among migrant groups according to age (Hárs 2009). Similarly to official statistics, Örkény and Székelyi (2009a) also found that over two thirds of all the six studied groups of migrants were active workers.

As regards employment status, there are greater divergences among immigrant groups. Most of the migrants with work permits from developed countries⁶ undertake

⁴ The research was conducted with the “Immigrants in Hungary” research project conducted by the Institute for Ethnic and National Minority Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the ICCR Budapest Foundation. For the survey, the researchers interviewed six samples of 200 each of six immigrant groups (Hungarians from outside Hungary, Ukrainians, Chinese, Vietnamese, Turks, Arabs) using the snowball method of recruitment.

⁵ The number of minors from all migrants from outside the EU is 12.1%, as compared to 19.2% for Hungarian society.

⁶ At the end of 2008 15,435 immigrants from third countries were active, with work permits (Hárs 2009).

qualified work, and this applies to a part of the African immigrant group as well. A considerable number of Asian immigrants render services while the overwhelming majority of Europeans are employed as unskilled laborers (Hárs 2009). The “Immigrants in Hungary” research effort found that a great number of Vietnamese, Chinese and Turkish migrants are entrepreneurs, while for Ukrainians and Hungarians from beyond the Hungarian borders the proportion of manual workers is high and self-employment is low (Örkény and Székelyi 2009a; for Chinese and Vietnamese entrepreneurs, see also Nyíri’s (2010) and Várhalmi’s (2010) studies within the IDEA research⁷).

Örkény and Székelyi’s findings (2009a) disprove the hypothesis for each studied group that migration entails a loss of status. They found that over half of all migrants preserved their former occupational positions, for two-fifths occupational mobility was maintained horizontally, another two-fifths occupied a better job position than earlier, and a mere 7% suffered a loss of status due to migration (below 10% for each migrant group). Hárs (2010) draws similar conclusions when she finds similar features of migration in the new EU member countries to those in the new target countries of migration (South European Mediterranean countries, Ireland) where the labor market position of migrants is favorable and the likelihood of their being employed is equal to or higher than the employment rate of the host country. By contrast, in the “old” target countries for migration in Western Europe the labor market position of immigrants is less favorable than that of the host society; their unemployment rate is higher and the employment rate is lower.

Cultural and social resources

Cultural and social resources play an important role for migrants in their new country. Since material resources can only partially be mobilized during migration, and qualifications, schooling and vocational training may only with difficulty be accepted by the host country, the migrant’s earlier-acquired embodied cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986) – such as skills and language knowledge – and a mobilizable network of relations become particularly significant.

There is information about the cultural resources of immigrants in Hungary in Örkény and Székelyi (2009a). The members of the six migrant groups they examined are typically highly educated, over half of them having tertiary education diplomas. Two-fifths have completed secondary school education, but half of this group was staying in Hungary for the purpose of further education, so they were due to obtain diplomas, too. The level of schooling of the Ukrainians and Arabs is the highest; the proportion of this group with tertiary education diplomas being at over 80% and nearly 70%, respectively. The less well educated are the Turkish and the Chinese, but diploma holders amount to nearly one third, even for these groups. Research has found that

⁷ The IDEA project – Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries as New Immigration Destinations in the European Union – was coordinated by the Institute for Ethnic and National Minority Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

over half of the Ukrainians, nearly one third of the Vietnamese, Turks and Arabs and a quarter of the Chinese speak Hungarian quite well.

Success in migrating can be significantly influenced by interpersonal relations. Contacts in the target country may help with administrative procedures, job hunting and generally getting along in the new environment. However, ethnically closed networks may also have negative effects on an individual. There are several examples in the literature which show how resources provided by ethnic groups may promote the economic success and social mobility of immigrants (see e.g. Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993, and the examples provided by Portes 1998), while there is a recognition that being embedded too deeply in one's ethnic community may also hinder individual mobility and successful integration (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).

Örkény and Székelyi (2009a) have found that immigrant groups typically have an extended network of relations and can count on the help of many people, especially for solving personal problems. In seeking work and financial support they named fewer people on whom they could rely, a statement which is particularly applicable to Turkish and Chinese groups. These networks comprise family members and relatives in proportions of approximately 40-60%, and the overwhelming majority of the friends of these groups are of the same ethnicity; immigrant rarely make friends with Hungarians (with the exception of Hungarians from outside Hungary).

The social network of migrants influences not only the success of migration but also the target country. It was found by Örkény and Székelyi (2009s) that nearly two thirds of the sample they investigated had come to Hungary because relatives or friends were already living there. When looking at migrants from neighboring countries, Gödri (2010) arrived at similar conclusions: immigrants had considerable relational capital in Hungary before they migrated and these relations were converted into real resources during their relocation. For both Chinese and Vietnamese businessmen, Várhalmi (2010) found that after these entrepreneurs become established, they invite friends and relatives from their countries of origin, offering them employment, and, after a time, support for them to set up on their own.

Besides a network of relations, another important component of social resource is trust. Trust is a form of social capital that helps the individual mobilize the resources possessed by his/her contacts on the one hand, and at a macro level it contributes to the functioning of the whole system (Esser 2008). Örkény and Székelyi (2009a) find that migrant groups in Hungary are characterized by high levels of trust; most trusting are the Arabs and Turks while the least trustful are the Chinese and the Hungarians from outside Hungary. Compared to migrant groups in other large European cities, immigrants in Budapest have higher levels of trust than Hungarian individuals do in general, and they trust more the institutions of their new country than the natives do (a

finding that also holds true of migrants in other big cities) (Örkény and Székelyi 2009b)⁸. However, they make a point of stressing that the trust of the studied migrants is not a sort of resource that promotes successful integration, but conversely that a subjective feeling of the success of integration influences the degree of trust (Örkény and Székelyi 2009b).

Push and pull effects

Migrants are encouraged by different causes, goals and motivations to leave their native countries. Both push and pull factors may underlie decisions to migrate: the former comprise the factors that drive the individual to leave his/her homeland, the latter determine the direction of migration. “Push and pull” factors have had a particularly significant role in explaining migration according to the classic theories of migration.

Classic migration theory, based on the model of push and pull factors, stresses the role of economic factors as justifications for migration. It claims that underlying migration is the intention to improve one's economic situation. In this process the unfavorable economic and political conditions of the country of origin exert a push effect while the receiving country's better economic and social conditions exert a pulling effect on the individual (Gödri and Tóth 2005). “Push-pull” models identify different economic, environmental and demographic factors which are presumed to cause people to leave their homeland in order to migrate to other areas (de Haas 2010).

The push and pull model belongs to the family of equilibrium theories, the essence of which is the postulation that the rate of migration will be in inverse ratio to income (and other) inequalities. This view can be traced back to the work of Ravenstein who described his theories of migration in the 1880s. “Push-pull” models are rooted in Ravenstein's statement that migration is a function of spatial inequalities (de Haas 2010).

In Lee's view (1996), the migration processes and decisions about migration are determined by the following factors: positive and negative (as well as neutral) factors of both the country of origin and the target countries, the obstacles the migrant is faced with – such as distance, physical hindrances, immigration regulations, etc. – and personal factors. Although Lee never used the push-pull terminology, the differentiation of pull and push factors is usually attributed to him (de Haas 2010).

In the opinion of de Haas (2010) the analytical value of the push-pull models is limited for various reasons. Firstly, it is a static model that does not define more accurately what interactions exist between migration and the initial conditions which lead to migration. Secondly, these models give a descriptive, *post hoc* explanation of the causes of migration by taking into account – fairly arbitrarily – a variety of influencing factors aggregated at different levels, without defining the relative weight of each factor. Thirdly, these models often fall into the trap of “ecological fallacy” by mixing up

⁸ The paper was part of the “LOCALMULTIDEM” research which compared immigrant groups in eight large cities in Europe (Barcelona, Madrid, Lyon, Geneva, Zurich, Milan, Budapest and London). The Budapest sample included Hungarians from outside Hungary, Chinese and Turkish people.

the macro-level determinants of migration (e.g. population growth, deterioration of environment, climate change or diversity) with micro-level, individual motives. The risk is that it may be implied that certain concrete basic causes may directly “cause” migration, ignoring the fact that these causes interact with other factors which influence the migrant’s decisions, and life.

De Haas suggests that the equilibrium theories of migration are handicapped in explaining the migration patterns that actually occur in reality because the concepts of structure and agency are not adequately specified. These theories regard the decision to migrate as being an aggregate of individual decisions taken in an environment when all information can be accessed and when market conditions are perfect. If they ascribe some role to structure, they regard it as an aggregate of individual behaviors. In equilibrium theories, structure is at most the sum total of the parts instead of being a pattern of social relations which acts with a driving force upon the behavior of individuals. These theories also lack a meaningful concept of agency which recognizes the capacity of social actors to take independent decisions that can force the surrounding structural conditions to change, too. In this way, the theory reduces the individual into a mere puppet; a subject propelled by macro-level push and pull forces; an individual who is able to (indeed, must) take perfectly rational and predictable decisions in accordance with the rules of individual maximization of utility. This is why equilibrium theories are incapable of explaining transformations in migration patterns.

Irén Gödri (2005) emphasizes that migration research requires an approach that combines diverse analytical methods. Micro-level personal decisions, life situations and motivations are embedded in local social and economic relations, thus factors acting at the level of the individual and those acting at societal level must equally be considered if the migration process is to be understood. In addition to macro-level analyses of structural causes and micro-level approaches to individual decisions, there are intermediate-level theories that place the networks of relations into the focus of attention.

These days, migration can often be described using dynamic models. Migrations are often unfinished or periodic in a sociological sense, and attachment to the country of origin can live on in a variety of forms. Also, a migrant may foster close connections with more than one country at the same time.

MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IMMIGRANT RESPONDENTS

Let us begin with a review of the main characteristics of the immigrants in the sample⁹. A greater part of the sample, a little more than half of the respondents, are staying in Hungary with fixed term residence permits. Another 48% have some sort of a permanent

⁹ The immigrant sample was created to represent by age, gender and country of origin the entire population of immigrants staying in Hungary (according to any of the aforementioned status descriptors). For a detailed description of sampling see the Introduction and the Appendix on data collection.

residence permit: nearly a quarter have a permanent residency permit (issued prior to 1 July 2007), one in eight have a national permanent residence permit and 6.4% of the respondents have an immigration permit. The proportion of immigrants from our respondent sample with a permanent EC or temporary residence permit is low. For simplicity's sake, the six legal categories are grouped into two broad categories: one group is defined as having a residence permit for a fixed period while members of the other group have permanent residence or immigration permits.

As for the date of entry into Hungary, half of all respondents have arrived in the past eight years, the other half have been living in Hungary longer than this. Members of the latter group may apply for Hungarian citizenship by right of the length of their residence in Hungary (assuming the rest of the preconditions are met). The number of those who arrived before the political changes of 1989 is 8%.

Table 1 Distribution of immigrants by status, length of stay and country of origin (%)

IMMIGRANT STATUS	
Has	
Residence permit	52.0
Immigration permit	6.4
Permanent residence permit	22.8
Temporary permanent residence permit	2.0
National permanent residence permit	12.6
EC permanent residence permit	4.3
HOW MANY YEARS AGO DID YOU ARRIVE IN HUNGARY?	
0–4	28.1
5–8	22.4
9–15	24.2
16–	25.3
FROM WHICH COUNTRY DID YOU COME TO HUNGARY?	
Countries of former Soviet Union	30.8
Balkans	19.2
China	17.5
USA/Canada/Australia/New Zealand	5.4
Other Asian	14.9
Other (Africa/Near East/South America)	12.3
N=500	

As regards the country of origin, a large portion – exactly two fifths – of immigrants come from countries neighboring Hungary, which is also reflected in the sample: 22.9% came from Ukraine, 14.5% from Serbia and 3.5% from Croatia. Grouping the countries of origin into larger geographic units, we find that most immigrants came from the successor states of the former Soviet Union¹⁰ (nearly one-third

10 Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Belarus.

of respondents were born there). Every fifth respondent named a country in the Balkans¹¹ as their place of birth, and a similar number originated from China. 14.5% named other East and South East Asian countries as their native lands.¹² A mere 5.4% of the respondents came from Anglo-Saxon areas,¹³ and a little over a quarter of the sample originated from the rest of the world (Africa, South America, Near East). Broken down by continent of immigrant origin, the largest proportion of immigrants arrived from two main areas, Europe and Asia, the former being represented by half the respondents, the latter with two-fifths.

Two-thirds of the immigrants from the countries of the former USSR are living in Hungary with permanent residency or immigration permits. This group has the longest average stay of 14 years. Nearly two thirds of those who come from the Balkans and over two-thirds of respondents from Anglo-Saxon areas and from the "other" category have residence permits of limited duration. For the Chinese and other Asian immigrants, the two permit types are equally distributed. People from the Balkans have been in Hungary for 12 years, the Chinese for 11 and the other Asians for 9 years, on average. Anglo-Saxons and "other" respondents have lived here for the shortest time; the former being here for 6.5, the latter for 8.5 years, on average. There is, logically, a strong correlation between the length of stay and immigrant status, for legislation makes a permanent residence permit conditional upon a long stay in the country. This is also an explanation for why those with permanent residence permits have already lived in Hungary an average of four years longer than those with fixed term residence permits.




Figure 1 Distribution of immigrants by status and country of origin (%)

11 Serbia, Croatia, the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo.

12 Other Asian: Vietnam, Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan.

13 USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand.

The current citizenship of respondents corresponds to the distribution by country of origin. Nearly a quarter are Ukrainian citizens, nearly a fifth Chinese, and every seventh a Serbian citizen. Vietnamese, Russian and American citizens make up over 5% each, and citizens of neighboring Croatia amount to 4%.




Figure 2 Distribution of immigrants by citizenship (%)

Note: People with dual or multiple citizenship could give multiple answers.

The distribution of the immigrant sample by mother tongue clearly reveals that a considerable portion – 15.2% – of those migrating to Hungary are Hungarians born outside the borders of the country. Comparing the figures for “mother tongue” and “country of origin”, we find that half of those who have Hungarian as their mother tongue come from Serbia and the other half come from Ukraine. Only Chinese is spoken by a greater proportion of respondents. Ukrainian is the mother tongue of every eighth respondent, followed in frequency by Russian, Serbian, Vietnamese and English.




Figure 3 Distribution of immigrants by mother tongue (%)

In sum, it can be concluded that, from our sample, most third-country migrants staying in Hungary with some form of legal status come from neighboring or other European countries. A considerable number of respondents come from Asian countries, particularly China. As regards status of residence, approximately half are here with fixed term residence permits and the other half have with permanent residence or immigration permits. There is a significant correlation between the country of origin and the legal status of the immigrant, as well as the length of residence.

Goals and motivations for migration

Although newer migration theories have long superseded the models based exclusively on push-pull effects, examination of the causes and aims of migration is indispensable in any research on the integration of migrants. Motivation may largely be influenced by the former social, cultural and material resources of the migrant and the political and economic state of the country of origin. Moreover, groups who emigrate for diverse reasons may display different patterns of integration into the host country. Individual aims and motivations of the immigrants for migration are highlighted below.

An open question was asked about the reason for leaving the country of origin. Responses can be distributed into six main categories. Multiple answers could be given to the question. The largest group of respondents – nearly one third – named some family reason (marriage/companionship, family reunion, following other family member) as being the motive for leaving the native country. A little over one quarter left to find work and nearly another quarter hoped for a higher standard of living/“a better life”. Presumably the motives of finding work and finding a better life are closely interrelated; someone looking for a better job probably longs for a higher standard of living. Conversely, higher living standards are often the desired end for those who “seek better work opportunities”. Every sixth respondent named education as the reason for relocation, while 6.3% left their motherland for political or religious reasons or due to warfare.




Figure 4 Reasons for leaving the country of origin (%)

Note: The question was: “Why did you decide to leave your native country?”

There are statistically significant differences in motivation by country of origin. A significant number of those who come from Soviet successor states, Anglo-Saxon countries and China left for family reasons. Work was named in the largest proportion by those from other Asian countries (half of them left in the hope of finding work, the other half had already had found a job). Nearly a third of immigrants from Anglo-Saxon areas also came to work. Studying was mentioned most frequently by the other Asians and by migrants from "other" areas (Africa, South America, the Near East) as well as the Balkans. The largest number of immigrants who were motivated to leave their countries for political, religious or conflict-related reasons came from the Balkans. There is no significant difference among respondents as to their desire for higher living standards, with the exception that those from Anglo-Saxon countries hardly ever mentioned this factor as being a motive.




Figure 5 Reasons for leaving the motherland by country of origin (%)

When the immigrants from neighboring countries (Ukraine, Serbia, Croatia) are examined, several important differences can be found. Nearly half of those from the Ukraine left for family reasons, while the corresponding figure for Serbia and Croatia is lower; around one fifth. A third of the respondents from Croatia named finding employment as being their goal for migration (this proportion was less than one fifth for migrants from the other two countries). By contrast, Serbians mentioned education as being their main goal far more often. The hope of a better way of living motivated most Ukrainians and the least Croatians. Political, religious causes or war were mentioned most frequently by former inhabitants of Southern Slavic areas: over one third of those from Croatia and 15.1% of those from Serbia specified these reasons as being a motivation.




Figure 6 Reasons for leaving the motherland (for immigrants from neighboring countries (%))

Between the two large groups divided by their legal residence status, the only significant differences are found with the variable of those who had left for family reasons: a far larger portion – two fifths – of those with a permanent residence permit had left their countries for family reasons compared to one quarter of those who had fixed term residence permits. From the perspective of length of stay, those who had arrived earlier were overrepresented in the group of family-motivated migrants. Migrants living in Hungary for at least 16 years all named political, religious or war-related reasons in above-average proportions. A quarter of those who arrived 0–4 years ago, 16-17% of those who came 5–8 or 16– years ago, and a mere 7.5% of those who arrived 9–15 years ago mentioned study as being the motivation for their migration. For the rest of the named reasons there were no significant differences between the groups differentiated by the length of stay in Hungary.




Figure 7 Reason for leaving the country of origin by date of entry to Hungary (%)

Differences can be found when the socio-demographic features of the migrants are collated with the motives for leaving the country. Nearly twice as many women as men specified family reasons for leaving their homeland, while over twice as many men named studying as a driver. As regards age, those above 60 were overrepresented from the migrants who reported leaving for family reasons and this group did not identify employment prospects as a motive at all. Most prospective students were below 30 years of age, while the age group between 40 and 49 mentioned hope for a better standard of living most frequently.

School qualifications were a significant differentiation factor for the two large groups: 23.3% of those with a secondary education and 18.2% of those with a college diploma said they had left their native countries to study, while this reason was rarely mentioned by those who did not finish secondary education with a certificate. By contrast, the hope of higher living standards was mentioned by one third of the latter group (this proportion being merely 17-20% of the higher educated). So the less educated were more motivated by their hopes of attaining a better standard of living, which may have two explanations. On the one hand, those with higher qualifications and better living standards in their countries of origin would probably find their way more easily in their own country and are less motivated to leave their homes to make a living. On the other hand, it is possible that migration for the purpose of studying might be latently motivated by hopes of better living standards and working opportunities abroad.

A close ended question asked why (for what main purposes) the respondents chose Hungary as their destination. Nearly two fifths specified work, 17.8% chose study and nearly one third identified family reasons (marriage, family reunion, migrating as a minor with parents). Every tenth person arrived for the purpose of settling in the country permanently for reasons other than family.

We surveyed the pull factors using the open ended question "Why did you choose Hungary as your destination?" The majority referred to relations: a third came because they had relatives or friends, or came with them. Every tenth mentioned marriage or companionship. One tenth of the respondents came for pre-existing jobs they had identified, 7.7% for better living conditions and 7.1% to study. In connection with the former closed-format question, it should be noted that about a third or quarter of those who came for work or study or permanent settlement chose Hungary because of family relations or acquaintances. Several of them also mentioned the desire for better living conditions and a higher standard of living, and a few referred to geographic proximity, Hungarian lineage, knowledge of the Hungarian language and former good experiences with the country.



Figure 8 Reasons for choosing Hungary (%)

Note: The question was: "Why did you choose Hungary as your destination?"

When comparing different groups' choice of Hungary by geographic area, significant differences can be discerned. Nearly a third of the respondents from Anglo-Saxon countries came to marry or live with someone while nearly one fifth came for other family related reasons. Over half of the Chinese stressed the alluring effect of their family relations (which confirms research indicating that the Chinese tend to employ labor from their native country). Obviously, knowledge of Hungarian, Hungarian extraction and geographic proximity were stressed by those coming from neighboring countries. Respondents from other Asian as well as African/South American/Near Eastern countries were overrepresented among those who identified concrete work opportunities as their motivation. Nearly a quarter of all respondents from other Asian countries identified a desire for higher living standards; this group having the highest proportion of all who answered this way.

Table 2 Pull effects by country of origin (%)

	Countries of former USSR	Balkans	China	USA/Canada/ Australia/ New Zealand	Other Asian	Other (Africa/ South-America/ Near East)	Total	Cramer's V	p
companionship, marriage	11.7	9.4	4.6	30.8	4.0	8.2	9.4	0.200	0.100
family, kindred, friends lived here or came with them	33.8	32.3	51.1	18.5	30.7	27.4	34.5	0.178	0.700
heard good things about it	2.6	3.1	9.1	7.4	8.1	9.7	5.8	0.130	n.s.
had former good experience	2.6	1.0	3.4	3.7	4.1	3.2	2.8	0.060	n.s.
Hungarian lineage	7.1	6.3	0.0	3.7	0.0	1.6	3.8	0.164	0.900
knowledge of the language	2.6	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.266	0.000
geographic proximity	5.2	22.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	0.360	0.000
concrete job possibility	5.8	9.5	5.7	7.7	18.9	14.5	9.6	0.163	0.021
better working or business opportunities	2.6	2.1	4.6	7.7	2.7	1.6	3.0	0.084	n.s.
opportunities to study	7.8	7.4	2.3	3.7	8.0	11.5	7.0	0.106	n.s.
for the country, the Hungarian people	5.2	3.1	6.9	3.7	2.7	1.6	4.2	0.086	n.s.
better living conditions, higher standard of living	4.5	2.1	8.0	3.7	23.0	6.6	7.6	0.252	0.000
other reasons	7.8	4.2	4.6	7.7	4.0	9.8	6.2	0.088	n.s.

Note: The question was: "Why did you choose Hungary as your destination?"

There are few cases in which the connection between the date of entry into Hungary, the immigrant's legal status, and the motivation for migration is statistically significant. Those with a permanent residence permit are overrepresented in the group of immigrants who came for marriage or for reasons of Hungarian lineage. Residents who have lived here for 0–4 years mentioned studying as a reason for their staying more often than others, while those who came 5–8 years ago hoped for better living conditions in greater proportions than others.

Correlations between socio-demographic factors and schooling are significant only in a few cases but the pattern they outline coincides with what the answers given to the question "Why did you leave your native country?" suggested. Women were overrepresented among those who mentioned family reasons (marriage/companionship, family relations, Hungarian origin), while a higher proportion of men emphasized higher living standards and better living conditions. "Study" was more frequently mentioned by younger respondents and "earlier good experiences" by the older generations. Work opportunities were more often referred to by the age group of 30–59 years than by younger or older respondents, while the youngest were underrepresented among those who mentioned marriage or partnership as being the reason for coming to Hungary. The highest educated were well overrepresented from those who mentioned concrete job opportunities or "study" as reasons for bringing them here. The latter reason was more often mentioned by those with, than those without secondary school certificates. The role of family relations was most frequently mentioned by those who only had a maximum of eight years of education, and least frequently by those with tertiary diplomas.

To conclude, it can be stated that the motivation for migration considerably (and statistically significantly) differs by country of origin and by various socio-demographic variables. The highest proportion of respondents left their countries and chose Hungary for some family reasons. At the same time, many of those who mentioned other causes of emigration chose Hungary because of family or friendship relations as well. For areas close to Hungary, people chose Hungary for its proximity and for their knowledge of Hungarian, while those from more remote areas opted for Hungary on account of their connections or prospective employment opportunities. Women were overrepresented among those who named family reasons for migration, while men stressed study and a change in living standards more frequently. Younger respondents came to study in greater proportions, while the motivation of elderly people to migrate was more frequently motivated by family reasons. The middle-aged hoped for higher living standards and chose Hungary as a workplace to a greater extent than the rest of the groups. Those who had at least a secondary school education were overrepresented from study-motivated migrants when compared to the lower educated, who hoped to better their lives.

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF MIGRANTS AND HUNGARIAN SOCIETY

Gender, age groups

There is a difference between the age composition of the sample of Hungarian society and that of the immigrants; the latter being considerably younger on average. 76.9% of migrants (compared to 56% of Hungarians) were below 50. The most marked difference between the two samples was found with the youngest and oldest age groups: while slightly over 30% of migrants were younger than 30, 13.7 percentage points fewer Hungarians were, and as for the groups of 60-year-olds and older, their proportion was over a quarter in the Hungarian sample but 15.5 percentage points lower for immigrants.

Table 3 Distribution of respondents by gender and age group (%)

	Hungarian society	Immigrants
GENDER		
Male	46.6	53.6
Female	53.4	46.4
AGE		
–29	21.8	35.5
30–39	17.8	22.4
40–49	16.4	19.0
50–59	17.5	12.2
60–	26.5	11.0
N=1500		

The host society and the immigrants also differ in terms of gender distribution. From the immigrant sample, 53.6% were male and 46.4% were female while 46.6% and 53.4% were the corresponding Hungarian figures. The connection between gender and age group reveals that the above difference derives partly from the different age structure of the Hungarian and the migrant groups: among the latter, people of 60 and above are considerably underrepresented whereas women in this age group have a far greater share than men. The other source of the different gender distribution in the two samples derives from the actual on-the-ground gender situation: in Hungary, there is a balance between genders across age groups below 50, and an “excess” of older women, while men are considerably overrepresented in all migrant age groups below 60 years of age.

Compared to the rest of the geographic areas, there is a high proportion of elderly people and women among those who came from the countries of the former USSR. Among the Chinese and the migrants from the “other” (African, South American, Near

Eastern) countries there was no one above 60. The highest proportion of migrants under 29 years came from other Asian countries (51.4%). Men from the "other" (African, South American, Near Eastern) countries are noticeably overrepresented.




Figure 9 Gender distribution of migrants by country of origin (%)




Figure 10 Age distribution of migrants by country of origin (%)

Settlement type, region

In Hungary, opportunities for work and education, and generally speaking, the standard of living largely depends on where one lives, owing to massive regional inequalities. Just as the social well-being and cultural and material resources of Hungarians are influenced by their place of residence, where immigrants choose to live has a significant influence on their prospects.

All the immigrants we interviewed lived in towns or cities, nearly two thirds in the Central Hungarian region (including Budapest). 22% lived in county centers, 5.8% in other towns. Compared to this, a mere 17.7% of the Hungarian sample lived in Budapest, about the same proportion in county centers, one third in other towns and about one

third in villages. Less than one third of all Hungarian respondents lived in the Central Hungarian region, while the majority is distributed more or less evenly across the rest of the six regions.

Table 4 Distribution of respondents by settlement type and region (%)

	Hungarian society	Immigrants
TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		
Budapest	17.7	71.2
County centre	18.1	22.0
Town	33.2	6.8
Village	31.1	0.0
REGION		
Central Hungary	29.9	73.6
Central Transdanubia	11.0	1.0
Western Transdanubia	9.5	1.0
Southern Transdanubia	10.3	3.6
Northern Hungary	12.9	2.8
Northern part of Great Plain	13.9	7.0
Southern part of Great Plain	12.6	11.0
<i>N=1500</i>		




Figure 11 Distribution of migrants' place of residence by country of origin (%)

Looking at the correlation between place of residence and immigrant legal status, we find significant differences between those staying for an indefinite length of time and those staying for definite periods. As compared to less than two fifths of respondents with permanent residence or immigration permits, over three fourths of those with fixed term residence permits live in the Central Hungarian region, i.e. Budapest and Pest

County. One can find even greater differences between the two groups concerning the types of settlement. Those who have already been in Hungary for at least 16 years are not as concentrated around the capital and the Central Hungarian region as those who arrived after them. Looking at the country of origin as an influential factor, we find that the fewest migrants settled in the Budapest agglomeration from the Balkans, followed by those from the successor states of the Soviet Union, while about 90% of those from Anglo-Saxon countries and from other Asian, as well as “other” (African, South American, Near eastern) countries live in and around Budapest. A smaller proportion of the Chinese, about 77%, live in this area.




Figure 12 Distribution of migrants' place of residence by date of arrival in Hungary (%)

The survey data thus reveals that the distribution of migrants according to area of settlement and type widely differs from the distribution of the Hungarian population. Third country nationals live to a far greater extent in the towns and regions that offer better labor market and income opportunities, better education and health care. This particularly applies to those with fixed term residence permits. Immigrants who are closest to the pattern of the distribution of Hungarians by settlement type and region are those who come from neighboring countries (the Balkans and the former Soviet Union), who have lived here for at least 16 years and who have permanent residence permits.¹⁴

¹⁴ There is a strong correlation between these factors. A relatively high number of those who originate from the Balkans and the areas of the former USSR have lived in Hungary for at least 16 years and have permanent residence permits.

Family status, size of household

In two categories does the family status of Hungarian and immigrant respondents significantly differ. First, a little over one third of migrants are single, the same figure being just over one quarter of Hungarian society. Second, there are a far larger number of widows – 14.5% – in the Hungarian sample; this proportion is merely 6.5% for migrants. For migrants who arrived in Hungary a longer time ago, the proportion of those who are married is higher and the number of singles is lower than that for more recent migrants. Singles are underrepresented from the successor states of the USSR and from China, and there are more married migrants who come from Asian countries than from other migrant groups. The proportion of widows from those who came from the countries of the former Soviet Union is noticeably high, which is at least partly explained by the age structure of that group.

As regards the size of households, the major difference between the two samples is that 7 percentage points more Hungarian respondents live in two-member families and 6 percentage points fewer live in three- or four-member families than the migrant sample. A somewhat higher proportion of migrants lived alone and a slightly smaller number lived in five-member or larger households than Hungarians. Examining household size by country of origin, one finds that proportionately far fewer Asians live in one or two-member households and far more of them live in three-member or larger households. There are more singles from those who arrived a maximum of four years ago, and those who came to Hungary earlier are proportionally more likely to live in three-member or larger households.

The majority of respondents do not live together with a child less than 18 years of age. Compared to members of Hungarian society, the proportion of households with one child under 18 is higher for migrants, while households with two children have about the same proportions in the two samples. Regarding age groups, in the 18-39 years-of-age category there are more households with at least one child under 18 years of age, while in the group aged 40 and above more migrants live in households with children. The correlation between the country of origin and number of children under 18 years of age in the household is not significant for migrants, but those who arrived in Hungary earlier are more likely to live with children than newcomers.

The most typical family structure for respondents is a conjugal family of a married or co-habitant couple and their children. Nearly half of the Hungarian respondents and half the immigrants live in families such as this. The next most frequent family type is that of the childless married or co-resident couple: the frequency is somewhat over one quarter for Hungarians and one fifth for migrants. It is slightly more likely that a single parent Hungarian will be rearing a child/children by themselves, and that Hungarian grandparents will be tending to grandchildren than for migrants. For the latter, the three-generation family and other structures (not specified in the questionnaire) are more frequently encountered family units.

Table 5 Family status, family structure, household size of respondents (%)

	Hungarian society	Immigrants
FAMILY STATUS		
Single	26.5	36.2
Married	48.9	49.0
Divorced	10.1	8.3
Widowed	14.5	6.5
N	1488	
SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD		
lives alone	20.4	23.3
2 people	29.6	22.7
3–4 people	37.3	43.2
5 or more people	12.7	10.8
N	1490	
NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER 18 IN THE HOUSEHOLD		
0	60.6	52.8
1	19.3	26.7
2 or more	20.1	20.5
N	1171	
COMPOSITION OF RESPONDENTS' FAMILIES		
Married/unmarried couple	27.6	21.4
Married/unmarried couple + child(ren)	47.9	50.7
Single parent + child(ren)	11.1	7.6
Grandparent(s) + grandchild(ren)	1.3	0.5
Grandparent(s) + Parent(s) + child(ren)	4.0	8.9
Other composition	7.4	10.8
N	1162	

Religiosity and religious affiliation


Hungarian respondents claimed to be somewhat more religious than the third-country migrants; 59.6% of Hungarians (as against 48.9% of migrants) said they had some religious beliefs. 45.1% of migrants claimed they were not, or definitely not, religious while this proportion for Hungarians was 10 percentage points lower.

Those who claimed to be religious and those who were hesitant about their answers were also asked which religion or denomination they felt they belonged to. A little more than two thirds of the Hungarians named the Roman Catholic Church and 17.2% said they were Calvinists. The proportions for the rest of the named denominations were below 8% (while 5.6% said they belonged to no denomination).

The religious beliefs of the migrants are far more heterogeneous than those of the Hungarians. The greatest proportion are Roman Catholics, but the share is far lower at 19%. Over 10% are Greek Catholics, those without denomination, Buddhists and other religions and less than 10% are Calvinists and Muslims. Those who are Jewish as well as Baptists, Adventists and other smaller denominations amounted to nearly 5%.

Table 6 Religiosity, religious affiliation of respondents (%)

	Hungarian society	Immigrants
RELIGIOSITY		
I am religious, I follow the teachings of the church	15.8	12.1
I am religious in my own way	43.8	36.8
I can't say if I am religious or not	4.9	5.8
I am not religious	32.4	42.4
I have a different conviction, I am definitely not religious	2.8	2.7
Other	0.3	0.2
N	1456	
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION		
Roman Catholic	69.8	19.0
Calvinist	17.2	9.3
Lutheran	3.6	0.8
Greek Catholic	2.5	14.3
Jewish	0.0	4.6
Baptist, Adventist, other minor denominations	0.5	4.6
Muslim	0.2	8.0
Buddhist	0.0	13.1
Other religion	0.8	12.2
Belongs to no denomination	5.6	13.9
N =	849	

**Figure 13** Distribution of migrants by religion (%)

Examining the migrants' religious affiliations by country of origin, significant differences can be found in accord with the cultural differences. A higher proportion of Greek Catholics came from the former Soviet Union areas, but Roman Catholics and Calvinists are also quite numerous. Over two fifths of those from the Balkans are Roman Catholics but Greek Catholics are overrepresented compared to the rest of the denominations.

The majority of Chinese and other Asians are Buddhists, while nearly half of those who come from African, South American and Near Eastern countries are Muslims and 17.6% are Jewish. The distribution of migrants from Anglo-Saxon areas is the following: nearly one third are Roman Catholics, nearly one third are Baptists, Adventists and other lesser denominations, and 15.5% are Lutherans.


Employment, labor market position

In line with the statistical data on the economic activity of immigrants, the research uncovered significant differences between the Hungarian and migrant sub-samples as regards their employment and labor market positions. Compared to over two thirds of migrants, a mere 45.9% of Hungarians regularly work. This difference cannot be ascribed to the different demographic composition of the two groups; the economic activity of the migrants is higher for all age and gender categories than for Hungarians. There are 18.2 percentage points fewer old-age pensioners and 7.3 percentage points fewer unemployed migrants than Hungarians, while the proportion of students is 8.1 percentage points higher (or twice as many as in the Hungarian sample). When the variable of country of origin is also looked at, the result is that the situation of those who come from the successor states of the former USSR is considerably different from the rest of the migrants: due to their age composition the proportion of those who are economically active is lower and the proportions of old-age pensioners and the jobless are higher. Compared to the rest of the migrant groups, there is a higher proportion of family members among those from Anglo-Saxon countries, while for Asians the proportion of students is higher than for the rest of the groups. As regards the date of entry into Hungary, there are more old-age pensioners in the groups who arrived earlier, while for the latter the proportion of students is higher.

Analyzing the occupation and place of work of respondents, one finds that across the entire sample more people work in the competitive sphere than in government, local government or budgetary organ/institutions. The overwhelming majority are employees (there is, however, a thin layer of entrepreneurs/owners). Comparing the two sub-samples, we find that a far larger proportion of migrants are working in the competitive sphere and as entrepreneurs/owners. Over half the Chinese, nearly half the other Asians and nearly two fifths of "other" (African, South American, Near Eastern) migrants are working as entrepreneurs, but for the rest of the groups by country of origin the proportion of entrepreneurs is more than double that in Hungary. Above average proportions of migrants from the former Soviet territories (a quarter) and from Anglo-Saxon countries (15%) are working for government, local government or budgetary organs, and a relatively high proportion – 11.1% – of migrants from Anglo-Saxon areas are working for civil organizations.

Table 7 Distribution of respondents by nature of employment and labor market status (%)

	Hungarian society	immigrants
DO YOU WORK? DO YOU UNDERTAKE REGULAR-INCOME EARNING ACTIVITY?		
Yes	45.9	68.3
No	54.1	31.7
N =	1497	
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY		
Active earner	44.8	67.3
Receives (various) child-care allowance	3.2	2.6
Receives old-age pension (by own right), widow's pension	26.0	7.8
Receives disability pension (before retirement age)	5.4	0.6
Unemployed	10.3	3.0
Student	8.2	16.3
Family member, other inactive earner	2.0	2.4
N =	1493	
(LAST) PLACE OF WORK		
In the private sector	54.7	72.6
Government, local government, budgetary organ, institution	32.1	11.9
Civil organization	2.1	2.5
Never had a job	11.1	13.0
N =	1472	
WORKS (MAINLY) AS AN		
Employee	92.3	69.9
Entrepreneur, owner	7.7	30.1
N =	1261	

**Figure 14** Occupation, employment position of respondents (%)

Note: The question was: "What is (was) your (last) job, position?"

Examining the occupation and positions of respondents also reveals important correlations. One of the greatest gaps between Hungarians and migrants is with entrepreneurial status: 20 percentage points more migrants than Hungarians are entrepreneurs. Another major difference appears with the proportion of those engaged in semi-skilled and unskilled labor, auxiliary manual work or household help: nearly one third of Hungarian respondents (versus 8.3% of migrants) pursue such work. When the distribution of respondents is examined by sector; three categories in which there is considerable difference (10-15 percentage points) can be identified between the two sub-samples: far more Hungarians are active in agriculture/forestry and industry, while migrants are more active in the sector of trade.

As mentioned above, the proportion of entrepreneurs is highest for Asian immigrants, but the proportion of Asian workers employed in the lowest occupational category (semi-skilled and unskilled labor, auxiliary manual work and household help) is also the highest. Manual workers are also overrepresented among migrants from the Balkans and the area of the former Soviet Union, while a relatively high proportion of those from Anglo-Saxon countries are working as leaders and white-collar workers. As regards date of arrival, entrepreneurs are overrepresented among those who came 9 or more years ago, most white-collar workers have lived here for at least 16 years and the majority of manual workers have arrived over the past 8 years. In other categories, no such clear tendencies can be discerned.




Figure 15 Occupation, employment position of migrants by country of origin (%)




Figure 16 Occupation, employment position of migrants by date of arrival in Hungary (%)

In sum, it can be concluded that the socio-demographic features of migrants widely differ from those of the host society, and between certain migrant groups significant differences can be identified by country of origin, date of arrival and title of stay. The age of migrants is younger on average and their place of residence – especially that of migrants with fixed term residence permits – are primarily towns, first of all in the Central Hungarian region (and within that region, in Budapest) far more, proportionately, than the Hungarian population. The survey also confirmed that the employment and labor market situation of migrant interviewees was more favorable than that of the Hungarian respondents. The economic activity of migrants is considerably higher and a higher proportion are self-employed. By the same token, their income and ownership of assets are also more favorable than those of the Hungarians, and subjective well-being indicators show that migrants are more highly satisfied. These data are explained in more detail by Eleonóra Szanyi-F. later in this volume.

CULTURAL AND SOCIAL RESOURCES OF HUNGARIAN SOCIETY AND IMMIGRANTS

An individual's possession of cultural and social resources largely influences his/her chances of integration. Below, the cultural and social resources of immigrants as compared to members of Hungarian society are examined to see if there are differences, and if so, in what dimensions. Analysis of material resources was undertaken by Eleonóra Szanyi-F. and is described later in the volume.

Possession of cultural resources

Three variables were selected for measuring the cultural resources of the respondents: the respondents' level of education and number of spoken foreign languages, as well as their frequency of Internet use. Gauging the cultural resources of respondents using any of these three variables we find that third-country nationals are, on the whole, better equipped in this regard than the host society. However, they may face difficulties when they try to have their educational achievements and vocational qualifications accepted in Hungary, and if they try to become integrated in a Hungarian community that has a low level of knowledge of foreign languages. Let us look at the data in detail.

Migrants who responded are more highly educated on average than the Hungarian respondents. Over a third of the Hungarian sample (as compared to 9.5% of migrants) have completed only eight primary years of education. 29.1% are the highest educated (with secondary school certificates) and 13.5% have tertiary diplomas in the Hungarian sample, as compared with 47.6% and 26.6%, respectively, for migrants.

Similarly to the level of education, there is a great difference between the two sub-samples regarding the use of the Internet and the number of languages spoken. While almost half the Hungarian population never use the Internet and less than a third use it every or almost every day, half of the immigrants use it daily and a mere 13% do not. Compared with 72.5% of Hungarian respondents who don't speak any foreign languages and a mere 8.3% who speak two or more, 85.6% of migrants speak at least one foreign language and 58.9% speak two or more languages. Thus Hungarians speak 0.37 and migrants 1.85 foreign languages, on average.

Table 8 Cultural resources of respondents (%)

	Hungarian society	Immigrants
LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
Maximum 8 primary grades	36.2	9.5
Vocational training	21.2	16.3
General or special secondary school	29.1	47.6
College, university	13.5	26.6
N =	1496	
FREQUENCY OF INTERNET USE		
Never	48.2	13.0
Once a week or rarer	8.1	12.8
Several times a week	12.4	24.0
Every day, almost every day	31.3	50.2
N =	1500	
NUMBER OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES SPOKEN		
Speaks no foreign language	72.5	14.4
1	19.2	26.7
2	6.8	36.1
3 or more	1.5	22,8
N =	1499	

Let us now look at the correlations between the socio-demographic features and cultural resources. It applies to both sub-samples that the younger generation and the economically more active use the Internet more while the elderly and the inactive use it less. Also, fewer people above 60 speak foreign languages than people below 60. The younger generation and the economically active in Hungary have a higher education on average than the elderly and the inactive.

However, the correlations are far from unambiguous for migrants when schooling is taken as an indicator of cultural capital. Although it is true that the proportion of those with a maximum of 8 grades of primary education is somewhat higher and the proportion of tertiary education graduates is a bit lower for migrants over 60 than for those below 60, the proportion of migrants with secondary school certificates is higher for those above 60 than for those who are between 30 and 59. As for economic activity, there are proportionately more people with vocational training and higher education and fewer have only 8 primary years of education or general secondary certificates for the active workers than for the inactive sample. Looking at the variable of gender, it may be seen that the proportions of those with maximum primary education and secondary school certificates were higher and the proportion of those with vocational training was lower for women than for men in both sub-samples. As regards tertiary diplomas, no real differentiation between genders can be made for Hungarians, while women are slightly overrepresented in the migrant sample. Gender has a statistically insignificant impact on the other two indicators of cultural resources.

Focusing only on migrants now, we can find that the length of stay in Hungary (in years) is not statistically correlated with any of the resource variables. When however, the variables are examined against the immigrant's legal status, considerable differences can be discerned: those with a fixed term residence permit are generally higher educated, speak more languages and use the Internet more often than those who have a permit to stay for an indefinite length of time.

When cultural resources are examined by country of origin, we find that migrants from Anglo-Saxon countries are noticeably better supplied with cultural resources than the rest of the sub-sample: nearly two thirds have a tertiary education, over two thirds use the Internet daily and speak two or more foreign languages. The least favorable situation in terms of education and foreign languages is that of the Chinese, while immigrants from the former Soviet areas are most likely never to use the Internet. The latter finding is at least partly attributable to the higher proportion of elderly in this group.

An important cultural asset which can promote integration is knowledge of the Hungarian language. 15.2% of migrants interviewed reported that Hungarian was their mother tongue and 62.4% spoke Hungarian beside their mother tongue at least at intermediate level. At the end of the questionnaire the interviewers were asked to rank the Hungarian language competence of the respondents on a 5-grade scale. A "1" indicated poor knowledge and a "5" indicated perfect command of the language. The results tally with the self-reporting of the respondents. 6% spoke very poorly and 12% earned a "2" while the rest knew Hungarian at least at an intermediate level.




Figure 17 Level of education of migrants by country of origin (%)

Those who had residence permits for an indefinite time spoke Hungarian slightly better than those with fixed term permits; the former gained a score of 3.97 and the latter 3.62 on the 5-degree scale. Those who have lived in Hungary for at least five years received a score of nearly 4, but those who arrived here 4 years ago or later only averaged 3.36. As regards geographic origins, those from the Balkans spoke the best Hungarian (4.41), followed by migrants from the former Soviet Union (4.11). The poorest speakers of Hungarian were the Chinese with an average of hardly over 3. Differences are statistically significant.




Figure 18 Migrants' knowledge of Hungarian
(as evaluated by interviewers using a 5-item scale, mean)

Social resources

Research results have previously indicated that the amount of social resources considerably influences an individual's well-being and the success of their integration. We therefore measured several dimensions of social capital: number of friends, the level of generalized and institutional trust, and the capacity for cognitive mobilization (Inglehart 1970). Let us start by describing interpersonal relations.

91.6% of migrants mentioned that they had foreigners (non-Hungarians) as friends, either in their native country, or among their ethnic group in Hungary, or from some other country. By contrast, only 16.2% of Hungarian respondents had foreigners as friends. Since over two thirds of Hungarian respondents have not been abroad in the past 5 years and 95.2% have never lived in another country for more than three months, the low number of foreign friends is not surprising. 95.3% of migrants have Hungarian friends, and although the number of Hungarian friends cannot be defined from the questionnaire, the process of integration is likely to be made easier by having at least one Hungarian friend.

When asked if the main criterion for choosing friends is that the individuals should be people from their own social stratum or their own nationality, a little over two thirds of Hungarians and half the migrants answered that they would choose friends on the basis of social stratum. A sense of national homophily characterized about one third of both sub-samples. 17% of migrants (compared to 6.3% of Hungarians) claimed they would choose a friend using quite different criteria. The main stress was laid on personality traits and the importance of common interests as well as homophily by age.

Migrants have far more friends on the average than Hungarians. While the Hungarians had an average of 7.8 friends,¹⁵ the corresponding mean was 13 for migrants. This difference is partly attributable to the composition of the sub-samples: the migrant sample has proportionately more males and more of the higher educated, younger and urban residents. These socio-demographic variables are generally correlated with having more friends (i.e. compared to variables of being a woman, less well educated, older and living in small communities¹⁶).

Looking at the sub-groups of migrants we find that there are no significant differences between the immigrants' legal status and their having or not having Hungarian friends. But those with a fixed term residence permit usually have more friends than those who stay for indefinite periods of time (average number of friends being 13 and 9, respectively). As for country of origin, somewhat fewer respondents from China and from "other" (African, South American, Near eastern) countries have Hungarian friends (89-92%) than those from other regions but the difference is statistically insignificant.

15 To deal with the distorting effect of outlier values reported by respondents who said they had more than 25 friends, researchers calculated using a maximum value of 25.

16 Two things must be noted here: first, in both sub-samples those who report to having no secondary education certificate reported to having more friends than those with diplomas, and second, there is no linear connection between age and number of friends in the migrant sample, with the average number of friends in the group of 50-59 years being higher than for the previous two age groups.

The number of friends is highest for those coming from Anglo-Saxon and other Asian countries with an average of 16 friends and lowest for those who come from the former Soviet areas (11 friends). Considering the length of stay, it was found that fewer of those who have been living in Hungary for 0–4 and 9–15 years have Hungarian friends than those who have lived here for 5–8, or at least 16 years. As regards the average number of friends, no statistically significant differences were found.




Figure 19 Number of friends (mean)

Note: The question was: "Altogether, how many friends do you have at home (in Hungary) or abroad?"

The level of cognitive mobilization (operationalized through discussions about political topics) (Inglehart 1970) is lower for migrants than Hungarians (except for those from the Balkans and from Anglo-Saxon areas; the proportion for the latter being even higher than for Hungarians¹⁷). Over half of all migrants almost never discuss political questions with their friends, two fifths rarely do, and only 7.3% often discuss political issues. By contrast, double the number of Hungarians (14.5%) discuss political questions with their friends (and 10.2 percentage points fewer Hungarians never talk politics with friends). These findings are particularly intriguing because when the correlation between schooling, gender, age and the answers to this question are examined, we find that the higher qualified, the men and the elderly discuss politics more than the lower educated, the women and the younger generations. Those in the 50-59 year age bracket appear to be the most active at discussing politics and this proportion slightly decreases above 60. Two of the three effects – education and gender – would in theory suggest that the migrants would be more active at discussing politics as they are higher educated on average and there is a higher proportion of male migrants than for the Hungarian sample. Nevertheless, fewer migrants reported that they discussed political issues with friends than Hungarians.

¹⁷ On the basis of length of stay in Hungary, no statistically significant differences were found between groups of migrants.

One reason for this may be that migrants are less interested in Hungarian politics and pay more attention to the events in their countries of origin. Indeed, migrants' answers revealed that they are generally less interested in politics in general, but pay somewhat more attention to political, social and economic events in their native countries than in Hungary (see Borbála Göncz's paper in this volume for more detail).

Beside interpersonal relations, another important type of social resource is trust. During our research we tested the level of generalized and institutional trust of the two sub-samples.

The level of generalized trust is considerably higher for migrants than Hungarians. Every sixth migrant opined that one can trust people "almost always", while only every thirty-sixth Hungarian respondent shared this view. While over half the migrants said "one can usually trust people", this proportion is hardly more than one third for Hungarians.

Checking the effects of control variables using cross tabulation we find that women, the less well educated, the economically inactive and older people are on the average less trusting (for the Hungarian sample) than men, the more highly educated, the economically active and younger individuals, although there is no linear correlation with age. By contrast, the only statistically significant correlation was between trust and age of migrants: younger migrants are generally more trusting than older ones.

Table 9 Distribution of respondents by various levels of generalized trust (%)

	Hungarian society	Immigrants
GENERALIZED TRUST		
People can almost always be trusted.	2.8	15.8
People can usually be trusted.	36.5	51.2
You usually can't be too careful in dealing with people.	44.2	26.1
You almost always can't be too careful in dealing with people.	16.4	6.9
N	1480	

Note: The question was: "Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"

So as to be able to compare various groups of respondents, we ascribed marks from 1 to 4 to different answers, "1" corresponding to "You can hardly ever trust people" and "4" to "You can almost always trust people". On this virtual scale Hungarians scored 2.26 and immigrants 2.76, indicating that migrants have more generalized trust in people. Analyzed using the variable of country of origin, those coming from former Soviet areas displayed the lowest level of trust at 2.56, but even this is well above the Hungarian mean. The highest level of trust is found for those coming from other Asian countries (3.02), followed by those from Anglo-Saxon countries and then from the Balkans. The general trust of migrants from "other" (African, South American, Near Eastern) countries is around the average for the migrants. No significant differences are found according to date of arrival, whereas the immigrant's legal status proved to be significant: the trust levels of those with a residence permit for an indefinite length of time (2.36) comes close to the mean of the Hungarian sub-sample, while the level of those with a fixed

term residence permit (2.75) is close to the mean of the migrants. Those who left their countries to study are more trusting (3.10) than others, but those who left with the hope of a better standard of living had lower trust in people (2.59) than those who did not mention this cause for their emigration.




Figure 20 Generalized trust by groups (mean)

We also examined trust in five institutions. Respondents utilized an 11-point scale to record their trust in the Hungarian parliament, the police, the Hungarian government, the Office of Immigration and Nationality and the local government. Migrants displayed greater trust in all five institutions on the whole than Hungarians, with the greatest difference between the two sub-samples being with the Immigration office. While the migrants trusted this institution to the greatest extent,¹⁸ this office was placed third among trusted institutions in the Hungarian sub-sample. It must be noted, however, that compared to the other institutions, the Immigration office was the one which Hungarians knew least about (or did not wish to answer the question related to it): while 96% of Hungarian respondents replied to the questions about the other four institutions, only 72% expressed an opinion concerning the OIN). In both sub-samples highest trust was felt toward the local government and the police while parliament and the government were thought to be least trustworthy.

18 Concerning this question, quantitative and qualitative research results are somewhat contradictory: in focus group discussions, migrants unequivocally expressed negative opinions about the OIN (see Éva Vépy-Schlemmer's research in this volume). It is hypothesised that, when filling the questionnaire, some latent motivation (wish to fulfill expectations, fear) resulted in the high rate of positive answers, or perhaps immigrants had no first-hand experience of the rest of the institutions, unlike with OIN.

Table 10 Trust of respondents in institutions (mean)

How much do you trust...?	Hungarian society	Immigrants	N
the Hungarian Parliament	4.51	6.68	1417
the Police	5.35	7.18	1443
the Hungarian Government	4.45	6.64	1418
the Office of Immigration and Nationality	4.66	7.83	1192
the local government	5.38	7.51	1420

Note: The question was: "Please tell me, on a scale of 0 to 10, how much you personally trust each of the following institutions to usually make the right decisions. '0' means that 'you do not trust an institution at all' and '10' means 'you have complete trust'."

Looking at the distribution of answers, one finds that the migrants' answers are left-tailed, while the answers of the Hungarians are fairly evenly distributed along the scale. For the migrants, the proportion of those who do not trust (indicated by 0-4 on the scale) in the mentioned institution was highest (17%) for the Hungarian government; followed by the Hungarian parliament (15.5%); the rest of the three institutions being judged somewhat more trustworthy.

To measure institutional trust we used principal component analysis for the answers, revealing the respondents' trust in the mentioned five institutions. The principal components preserved 77% of the information in the answers of the Hungarians and 80% in the migrants' answers. Positive principal component scores indicate a higher level of trust, negative scores indicate a lower level of trust. The analysis confirmed that the highest level of trust in the institutions of the host country was reported by migrants from other Asian countries and the least trust was found for those from "other" (African, South American, Near Eastern) countries. The mean of the scores were also negative for those originating from former Soviet areas and the Balkans. Considering the date of arrival, the only positive score was found for the group that arrived 5-8 years ago, while those who have lived here for over 15 years had the least trust in Hungarian institutions. No statistically significant differences could be found according to the legal status of immigrants. When trust was correlated with the causes of migration, one variable was significant: those who left their native country in the hope of higher living standards displayed less trust in Hungarian institutions than those who did not mention this reason as a motivation. This result might also be attributed to the fact that those without a secondary education mentioned having a "better life" as being among their hopes to a greater extent than those with a secondary education, but the difference remains significant even if the effect of schooling is controlled for.




Figure 21 Trust in institutions by country of origin (mean of principal component scores)




Figure 22 Trust in institutions by date of arrival in Hungary (mean of principal component scores)

To conclude, it can be declared that, on the basis of studied variables, migrants are better supplied with social resources both in terms of friendships and of generalized and institutional trust than the host society, Hungary. Of all the examined variables the level of cognitive mobilization was higher in the host society than for migrants, but it is also possible that this variable should be reckoned with as a manifestation of political interest, and not as a social resource. It should not be forgotten, however, that the conversion of the migrants' cultural and social resources into their advantage requires the overcoming a lot of potential difficulties (i.e. qualifications, expertise, knowledge of foreign languages cannot usually directly be translated into economic value). There are also great differences between individual migrant groups in their possession of resources. Those who have lived in Hungary with unrestricted residence or immigration

permits are more similar (according to several indicators) to Hungarian society than those who have fixed term residence permits, while the command of Hungarian in the former group is better than in latter. As regards country of origin, those coming from Anglo-Saxon areas are the best equipped of all with resources.

CONCLUSION

The research described herein focused on a comparison of the socio-demographic features and cultural and social resources of third country nationals and members of Hungarian society. It also explored differences between migrant groups as regards their legal status and length of stay in the host country, their countries of origin and their motivation for migration.

In sum, it can be said that the largest number of the studied migrants came from neighboring countries but the share of migrants from Asia is also high. About half of all migrants studied have permanent residence permits and half have fixed term residence permits, meaning that Hungary is probably not their final destination, or that they may have affiliations with other countries. A very high proportion of migrants relocated for family reasons (or when other reasons were specified, family, kinship or friendship relations were additional influential factors in their decision to move to Hungary). Many mentioned work, study or the hope of a higher standard of living as reasons to migrate.

In harmony with official statistics and other earlier empirical research findings, our research confirmed that the age structure of migrants is younger than that of Hungarian society. Immigrants are also more economically active and they are concentrated in the Central Hungarian region (and within it, Budapest) to a far greater degree than the Hungarian population. As for cultural resources, migrants are more highly educated, use the Internet more and speak more foreign languages (on average) than Hungarians. However, when having qualifications and knowledge which they have accumulated elsewhere accepted, they may face difficulties. This topic was not explored in the frame of this research. As regards social resources, we found that migrants have more friends and have higher levels of trust in people in general (even their trust in Hungarian institutions is higher). If the conclusions of Örkény and Székelyi (2009a) prove to be true, this higher level of trust might be a sign of a low level of integration and will not function as convertible capital.

For migrants, significant differences can be found according to their legal status, length of stay in Hungary and country of origin. Immigrants from the successor countries of the former USSR – the greater part of whom are from Ukraine – are overrepresented in terms of their likelihood of having a permanent residence permits, having lived in Hungary for a long time and being older than average. Concerning socio-demographic and labor market variables they are thus closest in nature to the host society. Migrants who originate from Anglo-Saxon countries on average fare better than the rest of the migrant groups (and the Hungarian population) in terms of labor-market positions and cultural and social resources; only migrants from Asian

countries are supplied with social resources to a similar but somewhat lesser degree. As for correlating drivers of migration and resource variables, those who left their native lands in the hope of a better standard of living have below average trust both in people in general and in Hungarian institutions. Though the hope of a better life was mentioned more frequently as a driver for migration by the less well educated than by those with a secondary school education, the correlation remains significant when the variable of education is controlled for.

The rest of the research in this book explores how the socio-demographic variables and cultural and social resources of immigrants (and the Hungarian sample) correlate with their material resources, their sense of justice and dignity and their objective and subjective well-being, and also how all this relates to the political and civic activities of migrants.

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THE SOCIAL INDICATORS OF IMMIGRANTS AND HUNGARIANS

Eleonóra Szanyi-F.

INTRODUCTION

Most of the research in this volume focus on the factors which influence political and civic participation; themes which the present chapter only touches tangentially. This chapter describes the social variables of the Hungarians and immigrants, and the factors that presumably influence subjective well-being. The cognitive dimension of well-being – satisfaction – is at the heart of this chapter, analyzed using a group of variables which cover various dimensions of life.

Besides the objective factors which make up quality of life, such as the economic resources of both society and the individual, increasing emphasis has paid to on examining subjective well-being in recent decades. In reviewing the set of subjective social indicators, Hegedűs (2002) differentiates between three groups. The first group contains indicators based on personal opinions, which measure well-being indirectly but are not overtly centered on it (e.g. subjective social status). The second group includes indicators that relate directly to personal or social well-being (e.g. through the evaluation of a country's economic situation), and the third group includes variables through which respondents do not merely assess their own or society's status but also qualify it. Indicators for satisfaction and happiness belong to this third category. Researchers specify the former as being the cognitive component of subjective well-being and the latter as its affective dimension. As Lengyel (2002) points out, the interrelation of the two dimensions may change by culture; different societies being predominated by different norms which serve to regulate when it is "proper" to be happy or satisfied. By way of an example, Lengyel and Janky (2002) mention the traditions of countries in which there is a Confucian following where indicators of satisfaction "tend to the middle"; that is, social norms dictate that individuals should not be too satisfied or too dissatisfied. An interesting finding related to this example comes from the research of Örkény and Székelyi (2010a) who examined six immigrant ethnic groups in Hungary. They found that the level of satisfaction with their situation was lowest for Chinese immigrants. In western societies it is the ambition to be satisfied, rather than reaching some ideal level of satisfaction that is expected of the individual.

When categorizing subjective social indicators, Hegedűs (2002) mentions another two theories. After Eckersley (2000) she differentiates between information about the working of entire societies and information about an individual's own life. In this regard, the present research concentrates on the latter. Hegedűs mentions another typology

which describes the quality of living; namely the categories drawn up by Berman-Philips (2000), who differentiates between four dimensions: social-economic security, social involvement, social cohesion and social entitlement. All of these dimensions are dealt with in various elements of research throughout this book.

International research efforts indicate that only a weak correlation can be found between the objective and subjective dimensions of well-being. However, research by Veenhoven (1996) and Cummins (2000) reveals that the strength of this correlation may differ when examined using macro-economic indicators. Also, examining the relationship between the cognitive or affective dimensions of subjective well-being and economic resources may result in different outcomes. The more limited the individual's economic resources, the stronger the correlation between the two variables (Hegedűs 2002). In an international perspective, one finds that a certain level of material security is required, but in countries with more developed democracy in the use of objective well-being indicators will not give decisive results. More precisely, the connection between the level of development and subjective well-being at a macro level does not necessarily mean that within a given society material relations play an important role (Lengyel 2002). With reference to German social well-being research, Lengyel (2002) proposes the following framework for explaining the terminology of objective and subjective well-being:

Table 1 The connection between objective and subjective well-being

	Subjective well-being	
Objective well-being	Good	Bad
Good	Well-being	Dissonance
Bad	Adaptation	Deprivation

Source: Berger-Schmitt and Noll (2000), (quoted by Lengyel 2002, p. 15)

Lengyel contends that, when taking the whole of society into account, the fewer the deprived and the closer the evaluation of objective well-being is to subjective appraisals of wellbeing, the more balanced the functioning of that society is.

Of particular interest for research into migration is the volume "Culture and Subjective Well-being", edited by Ed Diener and Eunkook M. Suh (2000), for the essays in the book look at the effect of individual variables on subjective well-being alongside the different cultures typical of different societies. Comparative analyses suggest that, in richer countries which function according to democratic principles, subjective well-being is higher. One of the starting statements provided in the research of Inglehart and Klingemann (2000) is the contradiction that although the satisfaction and happiness indexes of more advanced countries are higher on average, there are some countries that display lower levels of subjective well-being than their level of development would indicate. One of these countries is Hungary. The authors conclude that the socialist past and the high proportion of workers employed in the industrial sector exerts a significant negative effect on subjective well-being, while economic development influences it positively. These implications cannot be overlooked when the situation

of immigrants is scrutinized, since migrants often come from less developed and non-democratic countries.

As for Hungarian society, subjective well-being (and particularly satisfaction and happiness) have been examined by Lengyel and Janky (2002). For both variables they analyzed the impact of economic, social and cultural resources with the help of individual and contextual variables. Their examination concluded that in Hungary, trust (reflecting social embeddedness) exerted a more powerful effect than economic resources on wellbeing. The extent of subjective well-being was significantly influenced by the level of trust in the social environment. Regarding models which attempt to explain subjective well-being, Diener and Suh (2000) warn that the causal relation between the dependent and explanatory variables is not always unambiguous because the direction of causality cannot always be determined by cross-section analyses. Taking the previous finding, for example, it is not clear whether people who have higher levels of trust evaluate their subjective well-being more highly, or conversely, whether satisfied people tend to trust their environment to a greater extent.

Indicators of objective well-being

The degree of objective well-being was examined along several dimensions using the questionnaire from the research described herein, of which two dimensions are highlighted in this chapter. One variable was household net income, while the other was a property index – a standardized, additive index – created according to the assets of respondents¹. The net income of host country households did not exceed HUF 150,000 for 50% of the sub-sample. The most commonly chosen income category – 18% of the sample – was HUF 150-200,000. As for the immigrants, the mode and median of the sub-sample fell into the same income category, HUF 150-200,000. It may be noted, however, that there was a very high proportion of missing data about income (44%)². The sub-samples of Hungarians and immigrants slightly differed in this regard. More immigrants refused to answer the income question (53%) while only 40% of Hungarians refused to supply the requested information. The “no-answer” pattern is similar for the two groups. Due to a lack of sufficient data about income, it was expedient to use a property index in addition (and often instead of) household income to gauge objective well-being³. The property index gives an approximate

1 The index includes the following items: car of less than 3 years old, holiday cottage, valuable art object, digital camera, automatic washing machine, mp3 player, PC, colour TV, credit card, bank account, cell phone. After standardization of the number of properties, values were added up to create the index.

2 Örkény and Székelyi (2010a) faced a similar problem and therefore did not examine income because of the “extremely high rate” of non-answers.

3 In some parts of the analysis the 19 income categories of the survey were further simplified to “below-average”, “average” and “above-average” categories. The below-average group had an income of less than HUF 110,000, the average group had a family income of between 110,000 and 250,000, and the above-average group had household income of above 250,000.

economic picture of those who were reluctant to identify their income. In both sub-samples, those in the lowest income categories were overrepresented from the group of those who refused to report on their incomes (and this proportion was slightly higher for immigrants). Above the bottom income category, the readiness to reply increased considerably, then started to decrease again towards the top income bracket (see Figure 15 of the Appendix). The correlation between the two indices for those who answered the question was 0.614; and was slightly higher (0.651) for Hungarians than for migrants (0.539).

On the basis of the property index, the property status of migrants was found to be better than that of the Hungarians. The value was -1.07 for Hungarians and 2.14 for immigrants; the difference not being notable if we consider that the standard distribution for the Hungarian mean was 5.61 and that of the immigrants 7.1 – but the results of T tests show a significant difference. What partially explains the different means is that, in the sub-sample of immigrants there are a higher proportion of qualified, young, active people whose financial standing is also presumably better⁴. Comparing the two sub-samples, the largest differences were found between age groups. In all age groups for immigrants the mean property index was positive; the highest was for the 50–59-year-olds at 4.7⁵. For Hungarian society, only the property index of those below 29 was positive, for the next two age groups it was around zero but did not differ significantly from the group of below 29. In the age group above 50, however, it dropped below -1; a significant deviation from the value of the youngest age group. Data for income showed similar results: in the Hungarian sample younger generations appeared to be better off financially (up to 49 years of age), while immigrants above 40 reported to being in better financial circumstances. Naturally, the “inactive” had low incomes in both sub-samples. It is not surprising then that the age variable negatively correlated to household income; the connection being stronger in the Hungarian case, and weaker but positive for the migrants.⁶

Objective and subjective well-being can both influence a person's position on the labor market. The proportion of Hungarians who do not undertake regular wage earning activity is much higher at 54% than that of the migrants, which is 32% on average. There is a considerable difference between the two inactive groups using the property index (-2.92 for Hungarians and 2.01 for migrants). The state and length of inactivity must have different causes for the two groups.

In terms of cultural resources, similar differences can be discerned. These were measured using the variables of “level of education”, “use of the Internet” and “number of languages spoken”. For the four categories of schooling, the mean property index

⁴ See Dorottya Kisfalusi's research in this book.

⁵ From the age groups within the immigrant sub-sample the differences were only significant at a low (0.05) level.

⁶ Pearson's correlation coefficient was -0.281, at a 0.000 significance level for Hungarians, and 0.112, at a 0.087 significance level for migrants. Household income was measured using 19 categories, while age was recorded as a continuous variable.

of migrants in all categories was higher – except for those with secondary education certificates, where the results were similar. The most conspicuous difference was found in the category of “maximum eight primary grades” of schooling: here, migrants had a mean of 1.15, the corresponding figure in the Hungarian sub-sample being –4.46. Schooling and household income was far more strongly correlated for the host society. The Pearson correlation coefficient was 0.535 for the Hungarian group and 0.139 for migrants.⁷

Örkény and Székelyi (2010a) attribute the weak correlation between schooling and labor market status to the migrants’ language and other difficulties in finding an adequate job to match their education. The weak correlation between material resources and level of schooling for migrants is probably traceable back to this; in other words, it is not necessarily the higher educated that earn more.

In the questionnaire another index was used to measure cultural resources; namely, use of the Internet. Here, respondents could be divided into three categories: those who never used it, those who used it once a week/month and those who used it daily. A significantly higher proportion of Hungarians – 48% – never used the Internet, as compared to 13% of the migrant sub-sample. Proportions of daily Internet users were almost the same for the two sub-samples for the same property category. When less frequent use of the Internet is considered, the difference is greater still. The mean property index for migrants who use the Internet once a week/month was over two points higher than for Hungarians, and that of non-users was 4 points higher. Internet use only showed a strong and significant correlation with household income for the host society.

Finally, the objective well-being indicators were also compared with the number of spoken languages. In the sub-sample of migrants there were a far higher proportion of those who spoke two or more foreign languages. For Hungarian respondents, a mere 8.3% reported to speaking more than one foreign language (compared to 59% of migrants). This is presumably why – similarly to Internet use – a positive correlation between the number of foreign languages and household income can only be found in the Hungarian sub-sample, as a positive answer actually has some “resource value” for that group. The same reason must underlie the fact that there are no considerable differences between sub-samples in terms of the number of spoken languages, though for the category of “no other languages spoken” the Hungarians lag behind by two points. There is nothing surprising about findings concerning info-communicational tools and foreign languages, for being an immigrant implies the daily use of these instruments. As for foreign languages (Hungarian for the majority of migrants) these are obviously required to succeed in getting about in a new environment, while immigrants rely on the Internet to maintain contact with home.

In sum, it can be said that the sub-sample of migrants benefit from stronger objective well-being indicators, which can partly be attributed to their being better equipped with

⁷ Household income was ranged into 19 categories, and schooling into 4.

cultural resources. Schooling, the number of languages spoken and the use of the Internet correlate to property or income less weakly for this group, as the sub-sample appears to be more homogeneous regarding these three variables than the Hungarian sub-sample. Our findings confirm the pattern that has been identified in other pieces of research (e.g. Örkény and Székelyi 2010b): the proportion of younger, better educated, urban males is greater for immigrants, which shows in their greater ownership of economic resources as well. The differences between the two sub-samples are more conspicuous in the groups with some sort of disadvantage. Lower educated and inactive migrants are somewhat better equipped with economic resources than Hungarians. One explanation may be that migration itself requires the mobilization of resources; that is, migrants arrived to Hungary already in possession of some resources, be they material resources or psychological factors such as strong motivation or aspirations.

It is worth examining whether the homogeneity of the migrant sub-sample remains when the country of origin is looked at. The following groups of countries were differentiated: successor states of the former Soviet Union, China, Anglo-Saxon countries, former Balkan states, other Asian countries and the "other" areas (Africa, South America, and Near East). The means for these groups are the following: the table is topped by the Anglo-Saxons with an index value of 7.14, although the number of respondents in this group was very low (27 people) and the distribution was the greatest (see table below). This group is followed by migrants from the other Asian countries (with 4.88), the Chinese (3.51) and those from "other" counties (2.33). Last but one in the table is the group of migrants from the former Soviet areas (0.66). Those from the Balkans are placed last (−0.26). Since the most populous subgroup of immigrants from the former USSR came from Ukraine, it can be asserted that property ownership of migrants from geographically closer areas is closest to the average of Hungarian society. A similar pattern is found when examining average, above-average and below-average household incomes.




Figure 1 Property index means by country of origin

Indicators of subjective well-being

Several questions in the survey probed the respondents' subjective well-being. The affective dimension – happiness of the respondents – was measured using a 7-point scale. Satisfaction – the cognitive dimension index– was assessed using a group of 13 variables. Questions related to the individual's financial standing, housing conditions, career, personal relationships, state of health, impressions about law and order, social prestige and future prospects. Since there were themes addressed by several questions and the mean of the answers were near identical and strongly correlated, they could be grouped. A principal component was also created from the variables to describe "satisfaction". Separate satisfaction indicators were drawn up for the two sub-samples (which excluded career variables because the proportion of missing answers would have significantly reduced the size of the sample).

Our variables were well suited to factor analysis on the basis of Bartlett's test and the KMO criteria alike. The eigenvalues and the variances they explained would have justified the creation of two principal components as well, but since all variables sat more strongly on the first factor and the aim was to reduce the number of variables, the use of one principal component was decided upon. A similar pattern emerged for the majority society sample and the migrants, but the first variance explained by the principal component slightly differed.

Table 2 Factors of subjective well-being

	Hungarian	Immigrants
KMO	0.915	0.896
eigenvalue 1	5.76	6.19
eigenvalue 2	1.43	1.01
variance explained 1	52.39	56.313
variance explained 2	12.975	9.179

On the whole, the model accounted for the variability of the host society to a greater extent, while for migrants the first two factors and the selected first factor condensed a greater proportion of the information.

The first principal component can be labeled "general satisfaction" in both samples as it was at least moderately strongly correlated to all variables (financial standing, income and standard of living correlated most strongly to this factor) The second principal component was comprised of the interpersonal relations factor of satisfaction, as strongest correlation was found with the variables of friends and family. The latter factor suggests some sort of compensation, as in both sub-samples it negatively correlated to variables which recorded material satisfaction. In other words, besides the category of general satisfaction, there is a group of respondents who are less satisfied with their economic resources and emphasize their satisfaction with their interpersonal relations.




Figure 2 Indicators of satisfaction⁸

The figure reveals that migrants testify to a higher degree of satisfaction (with all variables) than the host society: T-tests proved that the difference was significant in each case. The greatest variance is found with “future prospects”. In both sub-samples answers were most widely deviated when future prospects and social prestige were examined; for Hungarians the question addressing health also produced a greater degree of standard deviation (N. B. valid answers to questions about careers were collected from far fewer respondents: 737 Hungarians and 309 migrants).

Satisfaction correlates to age and level of schooling somewhat differently for the two sub-samples. For Hungarians, schooling significantly correlated to all studied themes, and most significantly to health. For migrants, by contrast, there is hardly any correlation with level of schooling. Age correlated to some variables in both sub-samples, most strongly to the indicator of health, which is not surprising. Compared to schooling, age appears to be a more relevant variable for migrants, as it correlates to more indicators (and more strongly to them) than for the Hungarian sub-sample.

⁸ “Finances” implies satisfaction with standard of living, household income and financial standing, “housing conditions” means satisfaction with housing and its surroundings. “Personal relations” designates family and friendships.

Table 3 Correlation coefficients of satisfaction by schooling and age in the two sub-samples

	Schooling				Age			
	Hung.	Sig.	Imm.	Sig.	Hung.	Sig.	Imm.	Sig.
Finances	.283	.000	-.008	.863	-.057	.077	-.260	.000
Career	.225	.000	-.003	.958	.066	.172	-.072	.210
Housing conditions	.176	.000	-.029	.522	.114	.000	-.008	.850
Personal relations	.249	.000	.087	.053	-.142	.000	-.230	.000
State of health	.317	.000	.009	.845	-.441	.000	-.504	.000
Public law and order	.077	.016	.001	.978	-.048	.130	-.246	.000
Future prospects	.282	.000	.088	.053	-.123	.000	-.386	.000
Social prestige	.172	.000	.062	.176	-.036	.261	-.284	.000
Principal component	.310	.000	.036	.439	-.090	.006	-.318	.000

Examining the variable of happiness we arrive at similar results: on an imaginary 7-step ladder the migrants (5.04) occupied a higher step than the Hungarians (4.29); T-tests suggest that the difference is significant⁹.

A subjective assessment of the current life situation of migrants is also reflected by the answers given to the question of whether if they had stayed in their country of origin they would be worse (-1) or better off (+1), or in the same situation (a positive value means a negative appraisal of their status in Hungary). Migrants generally reported that their finances, housing conditions, career and social prestige were higher after the relocation. The means of the answers to family relations (0.05) and state of health (-0.05) are around 0, but as regards friendship and a sense of familiarity, migrants indicated that they would have been better staying at home.




Figure 3 Assessment of migrants' situation in Hungary compared to what their imagined situation would be in their country of origin

⁹ T-test = 14.28****

When the variables are examined in pairs, significant correlation can be found between the dimensions at a 0.000 level.¹⁰ Some regularity can also be discerned in the relationships between the indicators. External dimensions (such as finances, work, housing conditions, and social recognition) correlate more strongly to each other than to other variables. Personal relations variables (family, friends, a sense of familiarity as well as social prestige) also strongly correlate to each other. Out of the variables studied, health has the lowest correlation to the rest, and social prestige has a medium strong correlation to all the others. It is interesting that social prestige correlates most to having a sense of familiarity.

Since the number of dimensions was too high, some variables were combined along the mentioned categories. One variable which stood for external resources and one for personal relations was created (as the simple means of the previous three variables). The variable about social prestige was treated separately and the question about health was ignored.

Breaking down the data to geographic groups, it was found for each theme that those from Anglo-Saxon countries would have fared better if they had remained at home. It applies to all the other groups of countries that in terms of objective factors the migrants assess their decision to relocate positively and in terms of personal relations, they judge it rather negatively. Apart from the Anglo-Saxon countries, there are no significant differences along any dimension with other groups of countries. In all groups, a negative assessment of changes in friendships and a sense of familiarity served to reduce the combined variable; that is, the loss of these factors are most painful.




Figure 4 Comparison between the actual situation of the immigrant in Hungary and the imagined situation in the country of origin, by geographic group

¹⁰ Principal component analysis was not possible for the size of the scales.

When the distribution of answers to this question is measured against level of schooling, it is found that there is no difference between groups in their evaluation of personal relations, but there is a lot of difference when it comes to evaluating external dimensions. Those who had gone through a maximum of eight years of schooling judged their current situation to be better to the greatest degree than it would be at home. The higher the level of education, the closer the means came to zero and the distribution of answers increased. Differences by geographic category are significant. As regards social prestige, the proportion of those who judged their social recognition to be better in Hungary also increased with a rising level of education, but the differences between the groups are not significant.




Figure 5 Evaluation of the decision to migrate by level of schooling




Figure 6 Evaluation of the decision to migrate by age group

By age, no significant differences can be found along any dimension. In the age group of 30–39 years there are a slightly higher proportion of those who appraise their external conditions in Hungary to be better, but the difference is only significant compared to those who are above 60.

The imaginary situation at home versus the actual situation in Hungary was also examined using the principal component (incorporating the property index and subjective well-being). The results show that the property index correlates stronger to the variables. The correlation indices reveal that the wealthier evaluate their decision to migrate positively in view of personal and external relations and social prestige. Satisfaction, however, only had a similar impact on the assessment of social prestige and external factors. In other words, a higher proportion of the more satisfied think that their financial and social standing in Hungary is better than it would be at home. It should be noted though, that although the correlations were significant, the connections between the variables were weak.

Table 4 Evaluation of the decision to migrate, by satisfaction and property index

		Satisfaction princip. comp.	Property index
Social prestige	Pearson	-.126	-.157
	Sig.	.008	.001
Satisfaction with external conditions	Pearson	-.128	-.160
	Sig.	.010	.001
Satisfaction with personal conditions	Pearson	-.077	-.176
	Sig.	.108	.000

Social resources and indicators of well-being

Social resources as such and their connection with objective and, more important still, subjective well-being, deserve separate attention. Social relations and their functioning as social resources are illustrated using two variables: number of friends and self-assessment of social standing. As for the former question, the respondents were asked how many friends they had. The results were categorized into three groups: "0" designates no friends, "1" means 1–10 friends, "2" means more than 10 friends. Social standing was represented by an 11-point scale (a "ladder") on which the respondent was asked to place him/herself, as compared to the rest of society.

Some problems are met with when the number of friends is compared between the two sub-groups, for a migrant's circle of friends may "double" as he/she may keep in contact with friends at home *and* establish new friendships in Hungary. It was nonetheless posited that a complete lack of friends must still be used as a qualitative indicator. We have found that this was far truer for the Hungarian sub-sample than for migrants: 10.3% versus 3.4% reported to having no friends. For migrants, there were a far higher proportion of those with more than 10 friends (60.1%) compared to 34.7% of the Hungarian sub-sample. It is obvious that the friends of migrants include far more non-Hungarians: 91.5% of migrants reported to having "foreign" friends as compared to 16.2% of Hungarians. 95.45% of immigrants also had Hungarian friends. The number of friends correlates to the property index and the principal component of satisfaction for both sub-samples.




Figure 7 Number of friends (by terciles of satisfaction)

The figure well illustrates that it is most frequently respondents in the lowermost category of subjective well-being that have no friends. When satisfaction increases, so does the number of friends for both sub-samples, although more linearly for the Hungarian group.




Figure 8 Number of friends by terciles of property index

On the property index a similar tendency can be observed: respondents who fall in the lowest categories of the index have least friends. In the Hungarian sub-sample, the higher the category, the higher the number of friends, while for migrants there is no substantial difference for the categories, apart from the lowermost.

Looking at these results one may wonder whether a lack of social resources causes respondents to have low levels of satisfaction and objective well-being, or whether, conversely, the less satisfied and financially worse off have more difficulties in establishing friendships.

When we examine the self-assessment of respondents by social status, we find a 1-point¹¹ difference between the two sub-samples; members of the host society placing themselves lower, at an average of 4.48 points. A study of the correlations in pairs reveals that in both populations a positive and a medium-to-strong self assessment strongly correlates with the additive index of satisfaction. Pearson's correlation coefficients assume a value of 0.603 for migrants and 0.515 for Hungarians. This variable also correlates to the property index, the coefficients being 0.351 for the Hungarian and 0.217 for the immigrant sub-sample.

Well-being and deprivation

After having described indicators for objective and subjective well-being, an attempt is made to combine the two methods of assessment according to the logic outlined in the section on their theoretical background. Berger-Schmitt-Noll (2000) and their colleagues mention two situations of equilibrium (deprivation and well-being) in their description of the interrelation of objective and subjective well-being. Deprivation is the state in which the individual is disadvantaged along both dimensions, and well-being is advantageous in terms of both subjective and objective criteria. In addition, the authors differentiate between "inconsistent" situations in which the extremes of the two dimensions are combined (e.g. a dissatisfied rich person a satisfied poor person). To construct the new variables, the property index and an additive indicator were used to combine questions about satisfaction (the question about work was removed to eliminate the high frequency of responses from "inactive" respondents). Subjective well-being¹² and the property index were found to correlate more strongly for Hungarians (Pearson's correlation index value = 0.332) than for immigrants (Pearson's correlation index = 0.201). This indicates that property and subjective well-being is more strongly correlated in Hungarian society.

A disadvantage of the satisfaction index built of two dimensions is that the number of members of each category is different for the two sub-samples, since both the subjective and the objective well-being indicators for immigrants had higher values, meaning that deprived migrants are underrepresented and well-off migrants are overrepresented. The correlation between the two variables makes their distribution more uneven. Since the correlation was stronger in the Hungarian subsample, there was a greater chance that a member of the host society would fall into the same group (i.e. both dimensions). The following table illustrates the structure of classification, and the figure shows the distribution using this classification.

¹¹ T test = 10.301****

¹² It speaks against the use of the previously analyzed principal component which describes subjective well-being that it was created separately for the two sub-samples (that is, the 0 values do not coincide, which would result in errors in comparison, so it was thought more expedient to involve the variables in another form). The correlation between the additive index of a simple sum total and the principal component is 0.998****.

Table 5 The structure of classification

Terciles of property index	Terciles of satisfaction		
	<= 59.00	60.00–80.00	81.00+
<= –3.20	Deprivation	Mean	Adaptation
–3.19–1.95	Mean	Mean	Mean
1.96+	Dissonance	Mean	Well-being

The data clearly show that the two-subsamples do not tally, the majority of Hungarian respondents being shifted toward the “deprived”, and migrants towards “well-being” descriptors. The classification “works”, as in both the whole sample and in the sub-samples there are fewer cases which appear inconsistent (i.e. show dissonance and adaptation). When inquiries are made to respondents about their level of satisfaction, it would be intriguing to know who they look upon as the reference category for their comparative self assessment.

Table 6 The explanatory model of subjective well-being in the two sub-samples

	Hungarian		Immigrant		Hungarian		Immigrant		Hungarian		Immigrant	
	St. B.	Sig	St. B.	Sig	St. B.	Sig	St. B.	Sig	St. B.	Sig	St. B.	Sig
Constant		.020		.073		.000		.000		.062		.000
Logarithm of property index	.200	.000	.197	.001	.073	.075	.119	.029	.066	.144	.151	.004
Higher education	.059	.237	–.043	.459	–.067	.101	–.110	.042	–.040	.376	–.075	.142
Age (reference below 29)												
30–39	–.023	.694	.016	.807	–.007	.880	.030	.615	–.006	.903	.062	.284
40–49	–.063	.268	–.152	.021	–.061	.185	–.109	.075	–.095	.065	–.053	.372
50–59	–.078	.175	–.192	.003	–.056	.221	–.137	.020	–.050	.326	–.091	.112
60–	.032	.557	–.152	.012	.018	.679	–.127	.023	.027	.570	–.035	.513
Has no friends					.043	.284	.055	.299	–.046	.305	.073	.154
Position on the social ladder					.614	.000	.411	.000	.473	.000	.345	.000
Fairness									.293	.000	.231	.000
Trust									.212	.000	.326	.000
Adjusted R ²	4		7		39		23		50		44	

In the linear regression model for the explanation of subjective well-being the principal component representing 11 variables is the dependant variable. The above table

shows the results of the three models generated for the two sub-samples where the explanatory variables are the property index, higher education diploma, age, friends (more specifically, the effects of a lack of friends), self-assessment on the social ladder and the principal components created about procedural justice and trust. The property index was changed in the model and replaced by the logarithm of the property index as an explanatory variable because of the uneven distribution of the original variable.

The first model reveals that property has nearly identical explanatory power for the two sub-samples, and schooling does not correlate to the dependant variable in either group. For migrants, age plays a significant role, as those respondents above 40 deviate from the reference category.

The second model also included two variables which refer to social resources; namely, the presence or absence of friends and the self-assessment position on the social ladder. The latter immediately took the dominant role from all the explanatory variables, and the explanatory force of the property index decreased with its involvement, particularly for the host country sub-sample. The having or not having of friends did not have any explanatory force for either group.

The last model additionally took the respondents' levels of trust and opinions about procedural justice into consideration and both largely contributed to increasing the explanatory power of the model¹³. In both sub-samples the explanatory power of the assessment of one's social status decreased, while the effect of age was eliminated entirely for migrants as was the effect of the property index for Hungarians. The final model has a somewhat greater explanatory power for the Hungarian sample than for the migrants.

In sum, it can be concluded that similar results were arrived at for the two sub-samples, the studied indicators were similarly structured. The main influence on the subjective well-being of the respondents was exerted by their self assessment of their social positions, how much they trust their environment and how fair (they think) that existing conditions are. For immigrants, property also has an impact on subjective well-being, but its explanatory force decreases when the range of dimensions is increased. This presumably means that "property" does not exert an influence directly but through other resources obtained through it.

Correlation of well-being indicators with political activity and civic participation

Another aim of the analysis was the examination of the interrelation of well-being indicators and political activity for the two sub-samples. Answers to questions about political activity and civic participation in the questionnaire suggested that the immigrants were less politically involved than Hungarians. This is even though they are in a more favorable position in terms of economic, cultural and social resources, which enhances inclination to participate in both fields, in general. On the scale which

¹³ See in more detail the chapters of Lilla Tóth and Dorottya Kisfalusi in this volume.

measures interest in politics, immigrants lag half a point behind Hungarian respondents, and the result is similar for interest in Hungarian economic, social and political news. Another difference between the two sub-samples is that, while for Hungarians the property index and satisfaction positively correlate to political interest and the following of news (as well as to media use), no such correlation can be found with migrants.

The picture is different when active participation is examined: the higher the category, the greater the extent of political activity and civic participation in both sub-groups. In the questionnaire a block of 12 questions were designed to collect information about political activity. These questions were transformed into a dichotomous index with "0" designating no participation in any political action and "1" designating some sort of political involvement. The dummy variable for measuring civic participation (whether the respondent was a member of any civic organization) was created using the same logic.¹⁴

The figures clearly show that as one moves upwards through the terciles of the property index, inclination to participate increases for both sub-samples.¹⁵ For the Hungarian sub-sample this increase is more even, while for migrants the number of organizational members and the politically involved doubles.




Figure 9 Organizational membership by terciles of the property index

In the highest and lowest property categories there are no significant differences between the two sub-samples concerning membership in organizations, but in the intermediate income bracket a higher proportion of Hungarians reported to being members. In terms of political participation, significant differences were found between the sub-samples.

¹⁴ See for more detail the research undertaken by Borbála Göncz contained in this book.

¹⁵ The significances of the figures relate to two items: 1) the correlation between the well-being indicator and participation on the basis of Sommer's d index where it is posited that participation depends on well-being; and 2) the significance of the variance between the two sub-samples using the T-test (which assumes independence of samples).




Figure 12 Political participation by the terciles of the property index

What may account for the uneven distribution is that the terciles of the property index were formed using the entire sample, so the distribution of migrants within it is less even than that of the Hungarians. Since frequencies reflect the distribution within and not between categories, and the number of people within a category was at least 70, even for migrants, this weakens the reliability of the results rather than distorts the results.

Another possible explanation may be that the ethnic composition of higher property groups is different from the lower groups (e.g. the property index mean of those from Anglo-Saxon countries was far higher than that of the other geographic groups, while the inclination to participate is also stronger in the political and civic culture of the latter countries).




Figure 11 Political participation and organizational membership by country of origin

The figure illustrates that this assumption was not groundless; the sub-sample of immigrants is not homogeneous. Those from Anglo-Saxon countries and from other Asian countries reported belonging to civic organizations and taking part in political action to a far greater extent than the rest of the groups.

There is less unambiguous correlation with satisfaction. In the Hungarian sub-sample, as respondents report higher levels of satisfaction, we find that in the second tercile the rise in the proportion of those participating and those who are engaged in activity comes to a halt. In the higher categories, lower political participation is indicated. For migrants, the increase in organization membership is steady according to rising level of satisfaction. The correlation between the two variables is weak but significant for both sub-samples. In the sub-sample of migrants no significant correlation is found between political participation and subjective well-being.




Figure 12 Organizational membership by terciles of satisfaction




Figure 13 Political participation by terciles of the satisfaction index

The figures also reveal that the difference between the two sub-samples is greatest for the intermediate category of subjective well-being, with Hungarians being far more politically active than immigrants.

One may conclude from the results that the property index (which describes objective well-being) is significantly correlated to political activity and civic participation in both groups, and with a higher level of property ownership the extent of involvement increases.

Less unambiguous is correlation to subjective well-being. For Hungarians a weak but positive correlation to political activity and civic participation is observable, while for migrants this only applies to organizational membership.¹⁶

In addition to an independent examination of subjective and objective well-being, the categories created by the combination of the two variables on the basis of Noll's categories were also examined. Other chapters of this book are devoted to explaining compound, multi-variable models explaining participation, so here only whether any differences can be found on the basis of the "constellation" of well-being indicators is detailed.




Figure 14 Correlation of well-being with political and civic participation

The Hungarian sub-sample¹⁷ shows that those in deprivation are substantially underrepresented in terms of civic and political participation, and this also applies to the category which describes those who "adapt" (that is, whose ownership of property places them in the bottom tercile but who belong to the top tercile in terms of subjective well-being).

¹⁶ See also the essay by György Lengyel in this book.

¹⁷ Breaking the sub-sample of migrants into further categories decreased the sizes of groups so much that reliable conclusions were impossible to draw.

The well-off are slightly overrepresented among the politically active, while civic participation is highest for this group. Those who gave dissonant responses in terms of the well-being indicators – that is, those who own most property yet at the same time report to having the least subjective well-being – were slightly overrepresented as civic organization members, and more interestingly, they were politically the most active. The question may be asked whether greater political involvement in the dissonant groups is caused by the constellation of the two variables; that is, by the fact that the person has resources and yet feels frustrated, or if the differences are caused by the generally observable higher activity of more propertied groups. On the basis of Sommer's d and Cramer's v indices which examine the connection of the variables, one may presume that belonging to a certain well-being category and the degree of civic participation are correlated, yet the variance is not explained by belonging to the given group.

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APPENDIX




Figure 15 Proportion of no-answers to the question concerning income for different categories of financial standing

Table 7 Composition of sub-samples by schooling

		max. 8 grades.	vocational	secondary	tertiary	total
Hungarian	N	362	212	291	135	1000
	%	36%	21%	29%	14%	100%
immigrant	N	47	81	236	132	496
	%	9%	16%	48%	27%	100%
Total	N	409	293	527	267	1496
	%	27%	20%	35%	18%	100%

Table 8 Differences in property index means by groups of countries

(I) groups of countries	(J) groups of countries	Difference of means (I-J)	Std. error	Sig.	95%os Confidence intervals	
					Upper limit	Lower limit
Countries of former Soviet Union	China	–2.84469	.90720	.022	–5.4402	–.2492
	Balkans	.92153	.88208	.903	–1.6021	3.4451
	USA/Canada/Australia/New Zealand	–6.48400	1.41984	.000	–10.5461	–2.4219
	Other Asian	–4.21610	.95696	.000	–6.9539	–1.4783
	Other (Africa/Near East/South America)	–1.56629	1.02909	.650	–4.5105	1.3779
China	Countries of former USSR	2.84469	.90720	.022	.2492	5.4402
	Balkans	3.76622	1.00223	.003	.8989	6.6336
	USA/Canada/Australia/New Zealand	–3.63931	1.49745	.148	–7.9235	.6448
	Other Asian	–1.37141	1.06873	.794	–4.4290	1.6862
	Other (Africa/Near East/South America)	1.27840	1.13377	.870	–1.9653	4.5221
Balkans	Countries of former USSR	–.92153	.88208	.903	–3.4451	1.6021
	China	–3.76622	1.00223	.003	–6.6336	–.8989
	USA/Canada/Australia/New Zealand	–7.40553	1.48237	.000	–11.6465	–3.1645
	Other Asian	–5.13763	1.04749	.000	–8.1345	–2.1408
	Other (Africa/Near East/South America)	–2.48782	1.11377	.224	–5.6743	.6986
USA/Canada/Australia/New Zealand	Countries of former USSR	6.48400	1.41984	.000	2.4219	10.5461
	China	3.63931	1.49745	.148	–.6448	7.9235
	Balkans	7.40553	1.48237	.000	3.1645	11.6465
	Other Asian	2.26790	1.52811	.675	–2.1040	6.6398
	Other (Africa/Near East/South America)	4.91771	1.57428	.023	.4137	9.4217
Other Asian	Countries of former USSR	4.21610	.95696	.000	1.4783	6.9539
	China	1.37141	1.06873	.794	–1.6862	4.4290
	Balkans	5.13763	1.04749	.000	2.1408	8.1345
	USA/Canada/Australia/New Zealand	–2.26790	1.52811	.675	–6.6398	2.1040
	Other (Africa/Near East/South America)	2.64981	1.17397	.214	–.7089	6.0085
Other (Africa/Near East/South America)	Countries of former USSR	1.56629	1.02909	.650	–1.3779	4.5105
	China	–1.27840	1.13377	.870	–4.5221	1.9653
	Balkans	2.48782	1.11377	.224	–.6986	5.6743
	USA/Canada/Australia/New Zealand	–4.91771	1.57428	.023	–9.4217	–.4137
	Other Asian	–2.64981	1.17397	.214	–6.0085	.7089

PART II

CIVIC DISCUSSIONS AND FOCUS
GROUPS ABOUT THE SOCIAL
INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS

CIVIC DISCUSSIONS ABOUT IMMIGRATION

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INTRODUCTION

This chapter details the experiences of civic discussions about migration and their interpretation by experts.¹ The aim of this phase of research was to explore with a combination of methods how immigrants saw the process of integration and how members of the host society approached the immigrants, and what suggestions they both had to solve any problems. Civic discussions were organized in which non-expert participants could thrash out crucial immigration-related questions and formulate their recommendations after listening to the opinions of experts. In preparation for the discussions, a representative opinion poll and focus group discussions were conducted with members of the host society together with in-depth interviews with immigrants and interviews with experts. The results of this preparatory phase are not discussed here.² The process of deliberation, forthcoming recommendations and their evaluation are the focus of this section.

One finding arising from the research is that, while the members of the host society, Hungary, are considerably under-informed about and have a tendency to reject immigrants, those who became informed during the discussions and could argue their positions appeared to be more empathic and tolerant than average. The topic of previously-conducted civic discussions in 2009 was not the civic participation and political activity of immigrants, but social integration in a broader sense. The method itself, civic discussion, must however be seen as an experimental form of civic participation and civic activity. In 2011, some experts were asked to evaluate the recommendations of the civic discussion of 2009. In addition to the conclusions drawn about the civic discussions, the outcomes of the evaluations are also presented in this chapter.

¹ The research "Citizens' Jury on the Integration of Immigrants" was carried out by the Institute of Sociology and Social Policy at Corvinus University of Budapest, with support from the European Integration Fund in 2009.

² An earlier version of this paper was published in A. Örkény and M. Székelyi, *Az idegen Magyarország. Bevándorlók társadalmi integrációja* [Alien Hungary: The social integration of immigrants] (Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, 2010). Detailed results of the preparatory phase can be found in the study mentioned as well as at: <http://www.etk.uni-corvinus.hu/index.php?id=25740>

It may be said that the topic of participation – civic involvement – is currently witnessing a renaissance. Participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, the involvement of those concerned, consensus-seeking are all catchwords that covertly indicate that deeper processes which go beyond traditional participatory mechanisms and also require greater commitment from participants are in vogue. This revived interest in facilitating “participation” is due to a variety of reasons.

The tensions created between the principle of representation and the limitations of meaningful, sensible participation in modern pluralist societies have created as a response the idea of “deliberative democracy”, a version of which was delineated by Jürgen Habermas. Deliberative democracy offers an alternative to other forms of political participation through its characterization of an “ideal small community” and “representative democracy” at the two endpoints of the political spectrum (Habermas 1996).

Habermas stresses that it is not possible today to return to the (ideal) direct democracy model of small communities to solve contemporary problems. Complex pluralist societies are not able to simplify their intricate political processes to the level of face-to-face negotiations.

So-called “deliberative techniques” are designed to provide a solution to these problems. Their purpose is to involve those concerned (using a certain theme) into the preparatory process of decision making. These processes attempt to create a field of communication in which members of the community can discuss matters of signal importance to them, allowing them to express their views and (perhaps) be molded by and mould the opinions of other participants. As a result, participants may then be capable of taking well-informed decisions and offering recommendations on matters that affect their lives. The Citizens’ Jury (or civic discussion, as it is called here) is the most frequently used deliberative technique and was developed by Ned Crosby in 1971 in response to the perceived deficiencies of mainstream American democratic processes (Crosby 1991, 1996). The two central elements of civic discussions – balanced debating circumstances and the providing of information to participants in an objective manner as possible – are theorized to give rise to a situation in which the selected panel members become capable of taking well-grounded decisions on the given matter as “lay sages” (Pataki 2007). In addition to the civic discussion itself and to the collective thinking process (i.e. group deliberation) the panel must take a stand on the issue in question either by providing recommendations or supporting or rejecting a given decision.

Although this method has primarily been used to assist in finding answers to pending problems of countries with a long democratic past (institutionalized democracies) it is nowadays more and more frequently used in developing countries such as India and new democracies such as Russia (Wakeford 2002). This “technology transfer” has its snags. In differing political cultures society reacts differently to deliberative processes and moreover, it is questionable how open decision-makers are to the deliberative approach, how much citizens are inclined to cooperate and how effectively the results can be used.

The current authors know of no civic discussions about the issue of immigration or integration, but the topic has been researched using other deliberative methods³. In the research described herein, the immigrants' panel also sat to deliberate – a new element. As the name of the method indicates, a citizens' jury is designed to involve those who already belong to a political community in shaping special policy decisions. Rarely are civic discussions organized for groups who are little involved in traditional forms of manifesting political will.

EXPERIENCES FROM CIVIC DISCUSSIONS

Although the civic discussion was organized according to the accepted professional protocol of citizens' juries, the method was adapted on several counts.

In view of the unsympathetic attitude of members of Hungarian society to the integration of immigrants, it is particularly important to examine how petrified positions change – if they do – through a process that allows for deeper knowledge acquisition and the shaping of a subtler perspective on the issue.

A civic discussion is designed to involve the members of a political community into the decision-making process about public policy issues, thus those who are not endowed with traditional political rights (e.g. immigrants) are usually shut out of such deliberation processes. Organizing a discussion for immigrants was a challenge, not only because of the usage of a relatively rare methodological approach for involving those who are usually without a voice, but also because of the specific nature of immigration into Hungary. As the briefing material written for the participants emphasized (Göncz and Tóth 2009), the greatest numbers of people who wish to immigrate to Hungary are people of Hungarian ethnic origin who live in neighboring countries. However, the "most visible" groups of immigrants come from "alien" cultures (Asia, Africa, South America); these individuals also took part in the discussion. Different language competencies and tensions due to different cultural backgrounds created special challenges which needed to be addressed.

The project also allowed for the comparison of the panel of immigrants and that of the host society. Comparison of changes in group dynamics, opinions and themes in the two panels was a valuable experience and provided material for further analyses.

In the first phase of the process – orientation of participants – the emphasis was on introducing and getting acquainted with the process and the theme of deliberation, rather than on actual deliberation by participants and experts. In this phase moderators also asked participants to highlight specific problems they would like to discuss and ask the opinion of the specialists about during the next phase (the next day).

3 Immigration was the theme, for example, of an all-European deliberative opinion poll (Europolis. A deliberative policy-making project - <http://www.europolis-project.eu/>), and an Italian deliberative opinion poll (IntUne - <http://www.intune.it/research-materials/turin>).

Next morning the problems were sorted into groups (written down on pieces of paper/post-it notes and stuck up on a board). During the civic discussion the number of questions/issues and possible solutions steadily increased. Monitoring the discussion visually on the board enabled participants to determine which problems were of crucial importance and to “convert” them in the last phase of the process into recommendations. It would take too long to present the process in its entirety, so we will now only touch on the main issues which emerged for both panels.

During the discussion, experts helped the work of the participants. The selection of specialists was adjusted to the structure of the discussion on integration. Three critical topics were put up for discussion: “legal-bureaucratic issues”, “work and employment” and “education”. On the last day of the civic discussion, the verdict of the jury – the recommendations of the participants in the process – was formulated (see Appendix 3). One of the advantages of the civic discussion method is that it ends with clear-cut, unambiguous statements, positions and recommendations that can serve as feedback – i.e. a lay evaluation of current regulations, prevailing problems and recommended solutions.

It needs emphasizing, however, that a great part of the recommendations cannot be regarded as being directly useful input for the use of legislators. The recommendations have a different purpose (and different advantages). The recommendations outline certain groups of problems that thematize the participants’ collective thoughts. Enhanced attention should be paid to these thoughts when existing systems are reformed in the future. In their present form the recommendations are most useful at the lower levels of decision-making and should serve as feedback about how ordinary people perceive government positions about certain issues and what their preferences are about certain public policy issues.

Analysis of the Hungarian panel

It should be stressed that the participants reflected upon their own situations and their own expectations of the political actors from the beginning; in other words, they voiced that the often precarious social and economic situation of the Hungarian population needed to be recognized as well. This aspect, however, was gradually pushed into the background during the discussions and came to the fore again when recommendations were formulated in the last phase of the event.

From the beginning, this panel voiced firm expectations about immigrants – such as the need for them to pay taxes, deal with the situation of how they are housed (e.g. several families living in an overcrowded flat), and handle their cultural self-isolation.

The underlying implications of these expectations and the panel discussions clearly revealed which nationality the panel members regarded as being typical immigrants: the Chinese. Despite the reading of the briefing material and presentations by the experts – who nearly all put great stress on of the peculiar nature of immigration into Hungary (notably, that a high proportion of migrants have Hungarian as their mother tongue and culture) panel members concentrated their efforts on a more easily perceptible and identifiable group, on account of their different physical features. Much

less time was devoted to discussing Hungarians from outside Hungary and this group of immigrants were only mentioned after the last lectures were given by specialists about bureaucracy. Thus the greatest number of “problems and expectations” were identified with a group that is culturally and economically closed, has difficulty in speaking Hungarian and is isolated from Hungarian society in several regards.

This finding reveals that the average member of Hungarian society probably overestimates the impact of Chinese and other Asian migrants on the Hungarian economy and society, and has a tendency to overestimate any problems entailed by their presence in Hungary. The survey conducted within the research project also confirms this presumption, as it revealed that Hungarians are most hostile to the Chinese from all the relevant groups of immigrants. The immigration of Hungarians from neighboring, non-EU countries was not perceived to be a weighty problem and no special significance was attributed to it; the panel did not discuss specific issues concerning these immigrants.

Among the recommendations formulated in the Hungarian panel, only one is concerned with the situation of ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries. Panel members did not deem the integration of Hungarians from outside Hungary to a problem needing a solution, while recommendations concerning the integration of less populous but culturally more isolated groups (such as the Chinese) comprised the lion’s share of recommendations.

Another noteworthy characteristic of the recommendations is a strong focus on education-related items among the proposals. Seven of the thirteen recommendations (or eight, if we include the proposal for an “integrated approach to immigration”) related to education. One reason for this is that, for participants, education was the most palpable topic; the presentations about education also being the most easily comprehensible to panel members. This may be reflected in the recommendations.

A contributory factor may be that participants thought the lack of information about immigration and about cultural differences was a serious problem. The notion of creating of contact points between cultures was contained in several recommendations.

It is important to stress that panel members thought that knowledge of Hungarian was one of the main criteria for success in the process of integration. Knowledge of the Hungarian language appears to be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition in the recommendations; a prerequisite for any further integration to take place. This is confirmed by a recommendation that proposed cutting back the time that a Hungarian-speaking migrant who has studied Hungarian would have to wait before being granted a permanent residence permit.

Panel of immigrants

It was a serious challenge to ensure the collaboration of panel of immigrants. It is a critical and delicate problem to ensure that the right group dynamics – motivation of interactions, creation of balanced communicative situations and promotion of the flow of information – are facilitated, particularly in heterogeneous groups whose members have different social, cultural and economic backgrounds. The immigrant panel was

a very heterogeneous group (eight of the fourteen members were Europeans, three Asians, one North American, one South American and one was African). The difference in countries of origin also meant differences in cultures, which were able to appear as potential rifts in the group. More substantial than the cultural rift was the potentiality of language problems within the group: six panel members were from Hungarian areas beyond the borders and were thus counted as being Hungarian speakers. It was feared that through their language competence they would dominate the discussion, which would severely violate the basic principles of the deliberative process. Additionally, the group of ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries might have shared a common Hungarian identity, giving rise to a "we" vs. "they" disconnect.

The behavior of the participants, however, disproved these expectations. Language/communication problems, considered a potentially daunting prospective during preparation, did not arise at all in the panel. Most of the participants had a good command of Hungarian and the group listened to each other with attention and patience. The existence of a cultural rift can not be so unambiguously identified. First of all, it should be stressed that the multicultural composition of the group was more to its advantage and ensured that the participants could thrash out a wider range of experiences and opinions. Different norms and behavioral patterns caused no obvious tension in discussions; the panel members were open and receptive despite the fact that in the discussions the cultural differences were clearly manifest: some participants would only speak when asked to do so; others applied themselves effusively to the topic. All we could conclude from the limited observations was that, in a multicultural group there are differences in the communicative competencies of individuals which however can be offset by a strong motivation to cooperate.

The attitude of the panel members was positive from the start, and they behaved with cordiality and responsiveness towards each other throughout the entire process. They mostly observed the rules of participation introduced during the orientation talk and adapted themselves to the structure of the deliberating process. During the discussions two attitudes were predominant: on the one hand, there was a sense of duty; participants felt that if the majority of society was so interested in their opinions as immigrants and in their experiences of the process of integration, then it was their duty to support them by taking part in the event. On the other hand, participants often voiced their skepticism about the final outcome of the process; they frequently mentioned that they had no trust that any rapid changes would be made, nor did they believe that their work in Hungary would create significant changes, although they looked upon the discussion as being a positive omen. Over the weekend the positive attitudes of panel members steadily strengthened (though their skepticism did not wholly disappear) and group cohesion perceptibly increased as the members got to know each other more thoroughly.

It was an interesting facet of the discussion that in creating their opinions, participants not only pondered about one another's views, but also constantly reflected upon the host society ("is it really good for the Hungarians if we come here?") and they tried to take into account the presumed or real interests of the host society too. The

importance of adaptation was a recurring motif of the discussions. This was eventually not formulated as a recommendation but apparently it was an expectation by the group members of themselves.

During the discussion the crucial issues (the topics of the debates) quickly crystallized. They can be sorted into five groups: language competence, bureaucracy, job seeking, cultural differences and miscellaneous other issues (conflicts caused by different appearances, preservation of own traditions). As participants were engrossed by these problems during the two days of the deliberation, their recommendations obviously also highlight these issues.

The majority of the recommendations – 27 – were formulated about legal rules, adherence to laws and administrative matters. It was clear from the debates that the most unpleasant or negative experiences of the immigrants arise due to red tape. In sum, the immigrants feel that: 1. it is not clear what they are expected to do (don't know/don't understand the statutes; don't know what papers to acquire, or where; feel lost amidst the multitude of permits and applications); 2. they do not get the necessary assistance (no adequate explanations; no information; overburdened officials do not pay enough attention to cases); and, 3. the immigration procedures are too long and costly. Their recommendations also reflect these frustrations, as they partly focus on making it easier for immigrants to meet requirements, and partly on making the work of the offices more constructive.

Concerning education, lots of good experiences were shared: it was felt to be a success by the majority that their children had become well adapted and successfully integrated into Hungarian schools, or they themselves had success in some educational institution or other. In some recommendations they proposed the institutionalization of these experiences – e.g. the introduction of multicultural lessons – in the curriculum.

The role of language competence was also emphasized in the recommendations: the immigrants regarded it as being a fundamental prerequisite for integration. It was crucial for them to have the opportunity to learn Hungarian and then to improve this knowledge. Job seeking was also a central interest of the panel, particularly because most discrimination was suffered in this area. Immigrants proposed simplified rules and more transparent conditions as remedies for decreasing their handicap.

EVALUATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS BY EXPERTS

As a follow-up to the recommendations of the non-expert civilians, in 2011 we asked four specialists to give their opinions about the proposals put forth during the deliberative event. Below we present the ideas of an expert from a non-profit organization that deals with immigrants, one from the Ministry of the Interior, one from the parliamentary Ombudsman's Office, and one from Office of Immigration and Nationality.

There was consensus from the experts about some of the recommendations, but there were some recommendations that the specialists appraised differently. As for legal rules and adherence to laws, specialists with legal qualifications unanimously

declared that, by nature, laws cannot be simplified, but this problem can be overcome by ensuring better communication (i.e. providing informational materials). Several experts mentioned that before legislation on immigration is created, consultations are usually conducted with non-profit organizations who deal with immigrants. However, the Ministry of the Interior official and the civic organization expert judged the effectiveness of the consultation procedure and the incorporation of the civil organizations' recommendations into law quite differently. The proposal that schools get a "head quota" for each and every child attending school was unanimously approved, with some experts even saying that the children of immigrants should get a double quota.⁴ The elimination of the monopoly of the National Office for Translation and Attestation was agreed with. It was recommended that the years spent studying at university should also be included in the eight years required for naturalization, but several specialists stressed that if the immigrant had gained a permanent residence permit during his/her studies, those years were already included in the eight years.

Regarding bureaucracy, several recommendations – the experts claimed – had actually already been implemented over the few past years, but some of those still pending face legislative obstacles (e.g. online access to databases of other offices). As for online administration, several experts said it was imperative when aliens were registered that officials should meet with the immigrants personally.

As regards recommendations about education, culture, tolerance and language competence, experts declared that there are too few immigrants in Hungary for the implementation of some proposals (cultural-leisure time programs to be jointly implemented with immigrants, putting a school per district in charge of language teaching, etc.). Experts of course deemed provision of support for improving the immigrants' Hungarian language skills to be important (though they did not agree on the way to achieve this goal) and they also laid stress on the further training of teachers. There was also consensus about the need for the intercultural training of policemen (and other office workers) but several experts emphasized that examples of this could already be cited, as there are several non-profit organizations who conduct intercultural training for these target groups.

For different reasons, no expert agreed with the recommendation concerning work that a job webpage should be created that would list places ready to employ immigrants. Concerning the creation of the position of a mediator to mediate between employer and employee, several experts opined that the chance of financing such a mediator was questionable.

⁴ Hungarian public education is mainly financed by the central budget through a normative support known as the "head quota" provided after each student.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

One of the major conclusions of this research is that, while the members of the Hungarian society are considerably under-informed about and unsympathetic to immigrants, those who acquired deeper insight into the facts of immigration during the discussions and could formulate their positions with adequate arguments were more curious, empathic and tolerant than average.

A related, cautious conclusion may be that, although in public thinking there are stereotypes about immigrants and these stereotypes are mostly negative, getting acquainted with real problems and with individual migrant histories may contribute to the dissolution or weakening of these stereotypes. Feedback from the civic discussions supports this inference.

When it comes to comparing civic discussions, identifying both differences and similarities are important. Similar ideas and recommendations appear in both panels. Of course, the two panels were not separated hermetically and they could have shared ideas during breaks. It is also probable that, exposed to identical information inputs, any other two identically structured heterogeneous groups would have identified similar problems.

The similarities are most marked for the topic of “education” and “knowledge of the language”. The ideas about these two matters that are similar (though worded differently) in the two panels’ recommendations include encouraging the spontaneous organizations of immigrant groups, multicultural lessons at school and teaching immigrant children Hungarian before their integration into schools. The high priority given to language knowledge indicates that communication is a key issue for both groups – the Hungarian panel’s attitude clearly placed stress on this issue (e.g. were supportive about providing information about language courses or giving credit to immigrants for language acquisition), whereas for most questions they did not hold a positive stance. The immigrant panel also deliberated about several ideas and also recognized their own responsibility (i.e. suggested providing volunteer teachers). As a side effect of the process, both groups expressed the wish to get to know the opinion of “the other group” and to have more shared discussions.

To move on to the differences: one of the most spectacular differences is in the number of recommendations. The immigrants formulated nearly four times as many proposals as the hosts. The obvious reason is that immigrants apparently perceive and comprehend the problems related to immigration more clearly (and deeply), so it was easier for them to put forth possible solutions. By the same token, there are more specific recommendations about minor alterations to the existing system on their list (concerning procedures, bureaucratic processes or the assertion of interests). Host country members did not have such profound and personal knowledge about these themes, so their recommendations often only remained at the theoretical level.

Another important difference is that the topics of “laws and legal awareness” and “employment” are only included in the immigrants’ recommendations. These issues are enshrined in concrete propositions which reveal an understanding of the

legal background of immigration as well as some personal involvement. They tend to urge the relaxation of the current legislation that is found to be too severe (while mitigation of the rules was proposed by the host panel only for ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries and immigrants who had earned their qualifications or diploma in Hungarian). A positive evaluation of or encouragement for immigration was missing from the recommendations and thus probably from the thoughts of the Hungarian panel, and the discussion did not modify this. Yet it is also worth noting that the Hungarian recommendations did not contain negative statements about the employment of immigrants, which is particularly interesting in the light of a recent opinion poll (also included in participant briefing material) which found that nearly three quarters of Hungarians agreed with the statement that “immigrants seize job opportunities from Hungarians”. It is hard to empirically examine the lack of a negative sentiment, but it may be equally attributed to the positive effect of the process of deliberation, to the weaker presence of negative stereotypes when deeper insight is gained about a topic, or to the constraint about representing such a strongly negative view to a wider group (so it did not reach the stage of being formulated as a recommendation). To further improve the method, it would be expedient to examine how a joint discussion between members of the host society and immigrants would deepen the knowledge of the two groups about immigration and how it could change the evaluation of immigrants in the two groups.

It should be noted that the recommendations were worded by lay people, affected (to a lesser or greater degree) by the given theme, so they should not be viewed as being expert proposals. However, it may be useful for political decision-makers to know about the problems, opinions and experiences of those concerned in the process of immigration and to take them into account when it comes to legislation. This fact was also stressed by the experts who evaluated the recommendations.

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ANALYSIS OF THE FOCUS GROUPS ON CIVIC PARTICIPATION, FAIRNESS AND SENSE OF JUSTICE

Éva Vépy-Schlemmer

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the results of two confirmative focus groups conducted on the topics of fairness, justice, political and civic participation and action potential are summarized, with special regard being paid to comparing immigrants and Hungarian society.¹ The focus group investigation was designed to assess the existence of a sense of fairness and justice, and thereby to complement and refine the results of the surveying.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FOCUS GROUP RESEARCH

In focus groups, participants discuss a given theme and through these group interactions we may acquire information otherwise only accessible with difficulty to researchers. The method is not only good for assessing people's knowledge and experiences, but also helps researchers observe what arguments and what information contribute to changes in participants' minds. To undertake focus group research, several factors (concerning structural, social and group processes) have to be taken into account, such as size and number of groups, their degree of "structuredness", internal composition, homo/heterogeneity and whether the participants are acquainted or not, for these deeply influence group interactions. It is considered to be a drawback of the method that certain group effects (such as group pressure, conformity or conflict avoidance) can cause certain opinions to remain latent and unvoiced (Síklaki 2006, Vicsek 2006).

The results of focus group research are characterized by their limited quantifiability and a lower degree of standardization compared to questionnaire surveys; their reliability is thus lower but their validity is higher than for the former method. Some regard the higher degree of validity achieved by low standardization as being the main advantage of the method (Vicsek 2006). Analyzing focus groups can be done using various methods. In the research described herein, Vicsek's (2006) two-component analytical scheme (which combines certain elements of constructivist and discursive

¹ I herewith express my gratitude to Attila Melegh and Borbála Göncz for their valuable comments on the earlier working version of the paper which made my analysis subtler and richer.

psychology) is utilized. In analyzing the transcribed text of the focus group discussions, the aim was to explore the contents, structure and dynamism of the group discussion to outline the changes in the topics of conversation (Oblath 2007). The backbone of the analysis is given by the moderator's guiding questions which determined the course of discussions. In describing the succession of themes an examination is made of what vistas opened up, what peculiar discourses and well-shaped standpoints appeared (Meleghe 2010). First, however, I give a brief review of the recruitment process, the group composition, individual and group characteristics and the general atmosphere of the talks.

THE FOCUS GROUPS THAT REPRESENTED THE IMMIGRANTS AND THE HOST SOCIETY

The two eight-member groups met for three hours each in Budapest, in a room assigned for quantitative research at Ipsos Co., on 17-18 August, 2011. Recruitment was determined by use of pre-set quotas. With a view to the research goals, we recruited two homogeneous groups, one of immigrants and one of Hungarians to represent the host country. The groups were heterogeneous by gender, age, schooling and country of origin. Recruitment was carried out by use of a filtering questionnaire finding people in street, and right before the discussion additional filtering was also done to confirm the eligibility of the participants.

ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE IMMIGRANTS' FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION

Presentation of the participants

After a description of the research and the technical circumstances of the discussion, the moderator asked the participants to briefly introduce themselves. There were 4 men and 4 women between 21 and 50 years of age, the mean age being 30. Most had residence permits which were acquired with the intention of gaining permanent residence. The individuals had been in Hungary for between 2–13 years. Two were unemployed, 1 was studying and the majority had paying jobs. As for the country of origin, 2 were from Africa, 3 from Serbia (1 Serb, 2 Hungarians), 1 from Macedonia (Serb) and 2 from Ukraine (1 Ukrainian, 1 Hungarian). It should be noted that neither Chinese, nor Vietnamese persons could be included, although as a group they were to feature frequently in the discussions. The majority of participants had completed secondary or tertiary education. They were moderately active in civic matters: only 3 mentioned that they had participated in public affairs or were members of some non-profit organization (see Table 1 presenting the personal data of the participants in the Appendix).

The atmosphere and tone of the discussion was calm, informal and friendly. There was nothing obviously disturbing participants and they were all interested to hear the others and become familiar with the topics. Being aware of the time limit, they accurately adhered to the agenda of the moderated discussion and they were satisfied with its circumstances and the moderation process. It is important to note that, although the participants had a good command of Hungarian and followed the process actively and accurately, those who spoke somewhat slower or more hesitantly resorted to English spontaneously as a mediating language for clarifying concepts more exactly. This did not interrupt the fluency of the conversation, since everyone spoke English, and in fact made the process even more fluent, richer and subtler.

Civic activity

First, participants spoke about what ideas the basic concepts of civic activity brought to their minds, mentioning certain cases and examples as well. In their interpretation, a public issue was any event of common interest that affected everybody. This definition was further elaborated:

"It affects me directly, not indirectly; after all, the problem of an individual might affect me directly just as well, but it is not a public matter which affects people directly. There are always some isolated groups in society that are not affected by such questions. [FOR EXAMPLE?] A man living in the provinces, tilling the land, sustaining himself. He is not affected by all the public issues that affect a person in the city. A person who is dependent on society. These are very few in number, so we may say a public matter is one that affects everybody." V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)

Participants enunciated that public affairs included politics, education, health issues, economy, market, legislation, and also the acceptance of pluralism. They considered under the term "citizens" duties voting, tax payments, registered work, adherence to laws, and also ethical, "decent" behavior. Their feelings about the term "citizen's duty" were, however, negative, as for them it designated obligation, the compulsion to observe some rules. One of them added that it was not necessarily negative when it was aimed at a certain goal. The goal could be a better, faster developing country that would ensure well-being and a better life for all.

Hearing the term "civic activity", the members of the group mentioned various aid agencies (e.g. The Red Cross) or environmental protection, the aim of which might be to create a more livable city or to help people. Somebody mentioned the promotion of social dialogue and that actually all non-profit activities belonged to that category.

"The first to come to my mind were those who act to protect the environment and animal rescue non-profit organizations. Then I remembered the foundations, the Shelter Foundation (...) I think more and more organizations are emerging that stimulate people to take responsibility. The final goal is to change the thinking of people, which I think is a very good goal." V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

Among civic activities, mention was also made of selective garbage collection, energy-saving and other politically neutral activities. These activities could be government financed, but it was also expressed that at the level of the individual these activities did not depend on having citizenship. When Hungary was compared with their countries of origin, two contrary opinions and experiences were voiced:

"At home, the institutionalization of non-profit activity is still rudimentary – as least it was 4-5 years ago when I left. Besides, at home I lived in a small town where there were not so many stimuli as in a big city, and there were not so many possibilities to be active, for civic activities. I think Hungary is far further ahead in this regard than say Serbia." V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

"I came away two years ago, not even two, but in the area I used to live [Central Bácska] environment protection was fairly well organized, and many other things functioned fairly well. I daresay it was even more organized in smaller towns and communities because perhaps people depend more on one another, they know each other, they are more cooperative than here in Hungary. (...) In the community I came from things were well organized. In addition to that, it was the same with cultural events, I felt the cohesion of the people, mutual affection, readiness to help more there." V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

As regards municipal elections, several group members remarked that they kept away because of a shortage of time or a lack of information or interest. The following opinion was also voiced about participation:

"If you look at it closely, how great a variety there is of Hungarian citizens within local governments, you will find it far greater than among people who take part in municipal voting. Basically it's up to the social stratum or the disposition of the individual whether he/she takes part in municipal politics or not. Once you've got integrated into society it's immaterial what you will be in the district (...) it is independent of what you are – Hungarian citizen or not. Anyway, there are very few people who take an active part in politics." V1 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)

In addition, they did not seem to know for sure who had the right to take part in local government elections. Many thought only Hungarian citizens could vote, while others claimed that immigrants had the same rights:

"As far as I know, when you are settled permanently, you belong to a certain address officially, then you have the right to vote for a municipal government. Not for the parliament, but for the local government, yes." V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)

"Permanent residence is not enough. You must have a Hungarian ID card or passport." V2 (MAN, NIGERIA)

"An ID card doesn't mean Hungarian citizenship. I have a Hungarian ID card." V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)

It was also made explicit that the three notions (public matters, citizen's duties, civic activity) were intertwined:

"A citizen has obligations which are related to public issues." V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)

"To solve the problems of public matters, there may be some solutions which are rooted in citizens' obligations. What are only sort of ethical questions, they are mainly connected to the area of civic activity." V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)

"I can connect them insomuch that citizen's duties and civic activity are both public matters – with the difference that civic activity is optional, closely dependent on the person's mental constitution. (...) But going to the polls, voting, would be the duty of all people living in society. I'd place it a step higher than civic activity." V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

Distributive justice

The concept of distributive justice was first ruminated on using the three statements presented below.

1. Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its functioning.

The immigrants opined that this approach was a fair but not humane solution; the extent of one's contribution was hard to measure, and besides, the principle of solidarity should also be used.

"The state itself doesn't work like that. There is some common solidarity; irrespective of who pays what tax, all make use, say, of the public roads or health care. At present the state works in such a way that you can't implement this idea." V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)

"It wouldn't be humane. Those who have to pay less tax to the state out of no fault of their own would receive proportionally less support, whereas just the opposite is necessary. From a smaller income you pay less tax. When you live in straightened circumstances, you have to get more aid, more support." V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

"Those who don't contribute anything shouldn't get anything – that would be the fairest. Why should I keep someone because he is not willing to do anything to keep himself in order?" V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)

2. Everyone should partake equally of goods produced.

Many of the participants did not think this was fair, but concerning the system of social welfare benefits, the principle was accepted:

"Lots of people simply have no access to work. If this [benefit] was also withdrawn, it'd be far worse than now till some new solution were found. I don't know what that new solution should be. It isn't perfect now, but we haven't anything else at present." V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)

Similarly to the discussion about the concept of civic activity, the concept of working for the public good was also touched on:

"If your goal is money and getting a share, you'd surely not work, just pocket your share. If you have a higher goal to work for, say, society, or anything, then you'd work for that and not for the money." V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)

3. *Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and should get as much as they need.*

The group members regarded a state which worked by this principle as being a fair one, but they thought that this principle was impossible to implement in practice; it would only remain an ideology – albeit the ideal situation of a society (the survey data, by contrast, reveal that the majority supported this statement).

"If this was to be controlled legally, people would have to be forced to contribute to the best of their abilities. (...) If there was such fair judgment, this would be the most reasonable, but who would decide, who would check what someone's 'best ability' is?" V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)

Participants also thought there were certain groups in Hungarian society who ought to receive a greater share of the goods produced than the rest, such as the disabled, the poor, the sick, mothers who rear their children alone, pensioners, the aged, and also immigrant foreigners who wanted to work but who had failed to obtain the official permits to do so.

Out of the three statements, the third was preferred by most of them as being the most desirable system of distribution, but there was someone who spoke up for the first:

"I liked the first idea best. All should receive as much as they contribute to functioning, with some exceptions, say, for the mentally or physically disabled. Able-bodied people who don't work because they are loath to work should not live on welfare benefits." V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)

Out of the three statements, the second was regarded as being most typical of contemporary Hungary.

After discussing the above-presented three statements, the group members discussed – on the basis of three models of distributive justice – whether people involved in given situations get more from society than they contribute to common expenditure, or whether they contribute more than they get. The following statements were used for discussion:

1. *An entrepreneur of high socio-economic status employs lots of people, providing a living for them but he employs some of them in the "black" economy, illegally, not paying tax for them.*

This was judged in strongly negative terms by the participants:

"It's bad not only for the foreigner, it's not good for any citizen, it's only good for the entrepreneur. He has lots of money, but for people it's not good." V8 (MAN, SIERRA LEONE)

But the evaluation of the situation was not quite unambiguous:

"It's a necessary evil – when you have no other choice to find work. When you have no special qualifications, after all, it gives a chance for someone not to starve to death, but he won't be registered, so he won't be insured. It's good for the employer because he must pay a great deal [of tax] for an employee; maybe this is his only possibility to hold his ground, by not paying into the Hungarian tax system, because it's awfully much. In this way, he can preserve the jobs of those who are employed legally and officially. He won't go bankrupt, for it's really an enormous sum he has to pay for an employee. (...) He is useful to society because he creates jobs. By employing 'black' workers he also contributes [to society] because those persons don't starve to death, they have a chance to earn money. I think it is a necessary evil." V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)

"The question is why he employs them illegally. Because he can't afford to give them a legal job, or because he wants to save money? If the latter is the case, he probably only takes his own interest into consideration, then he acts in a negative way." V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)

2. A retired old lady, who has worked throughout her life and paid all she was expected to contribute can now hardly make ends meet on a government pension.

"It's surely not fair, but how to solve the problem? What's there to be done about it? Nothing. Or withdraw from others, but that would have bad consequences. When you have a country with a fairly poor economy, this problem simply can't be solved. Maybe it could be prevented but it is very hard to handle it when it is there." V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)

"It's sad. I think everyone pensioner lives like that, all who haven't had some good position or high salary." V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)

"You must see what work the person has done, how much he earned. For instance, he may have been a soldier, gone to another country and when he comes back, one arm or leg is missing. You must see the person you want to support. Someone who's been to war ought not to get the same pay as one who has sat in an office all his life." V2 (MAN, NIGERIA)

"I know two people like that. I was reluctant to speak because they are at the two extremes. One worked in a mine, he's got practically nothing for a pension, and he inhaled all that dust, everything in the mine. The other one worked in a noted office and he goes 'hawaiing' every year with his children and grandchildren. I mean by 'hawaiing' travelling abroad, not to Budapest." V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)

3. A middle-aged woman who has lost her job is on the dole but works as a cleaner for families, illegally.

"When there's no other way, it's the only thing to do. When you have a family, children, there's nothing else. Then it's a must." V4 (WOMAN, MACEDONIA)

"This must be put in the category of forgivable sins, for a middle-aged woman is really hard put to find a new job when she's lost one. She may still have a family to take care of. I'd place this woman, who is committing tax fraud, in another category please than the factory owner in the first example. I think the person we talked about at the beginning was not a small businessman who employed workers illegally to keep his business going, but he gave work to many people. So I don't think he gives work to people to remain on the surface. The two categories of tax fraud are perfectly different. (...) The woman might have contributed to society through the best of her abilities, and this connection between society and her became broken. From that moment, society cannot satisfy her requirements, she doesn't get what she needs, so she must act one way or another." V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

Procedural justice

Individuals enter into some relationships with the state that do not match what they expect to get, or what they feel have contributed to the common good. In everyday life there are many interactions with the state during the administration of official matters. Participants mentioned many examples of unfair, unjust treatment and situations related to administrative procedures. The most frequent associations included being "cold-shouldered", having "knots in the stomach", of the experiences being a "waste of time" and "stressful". However, the experiences are diverse:

"I met people who felt they belonged to another world there behind the glass wall. But I have good experiences, too. I don't want to discredit all who work in Hungarian public affairs or customer services. There are indeed negative examples, maybe the overwhelming majority of the cases are like that, but you must give credit to the exceptions." V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

Unanimously unfavorable were participants' opinions of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN). In reference to this office they used words such as "tough place", "purgatory", "condescension", "protectionism", "bribery".

"If you survive it, you can stay, like in Paradise." V7 (MAN, SERB FROM SERBIA)
"Disrespect for deadlines, compelling [you] to do lots of unnecessary trips to meet missed deadlines... An ombudsman would have quite a lot to say if he tried to acquire a residence or permanent residence permit in Hungary incognito. (...) I think many unnecessarily documents are required and some documents must be translated for no purpose." V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)
"I was turned down three times, to begin with. Then I managed to get a work permit using some slush money. Through some influential connections and all that. Because I was not found eligible for the job I was appointed to by my boss, despite knowing three languages. There was no explanation why I wasn't suited for the job." V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)

Participants all agreed that the OIN did not explain its decisions adequately and it was not always clear what the rules in a given situation were and what they were supposed to do. There was also a participant who found that the administrators usually

acted according to the rules, very rigorously and strictly keeping to regulations. The immigrants also thought that other clients received different treatment, and this treatment depended on how long they had stayed in the country and whether they had Hungarian ancestors.

Individuals and groups may equally receive unfair or unjust treatment during daily administrative procedures, but also through regulations which apply to them. When asked how much they could do against injustice or unfair treatment alone or in cooperation with others, they said:

"I think as long as you are in such a [defenceless] situation, you don't even think of such things." V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

"It's all subjective, we try to cause as little trouble, to put up with as much as possible, to be as kind as possible. (...) We are not in the position from which you can make objections." V7 (MAN, SERBIAN FROM SERBIA)

"In the street I wouldn't tolerate it that a person should talk to me like that, but there I must put up with it because I am at their mercy. When Miss Smith decides not to put a tick next to your name, you can go back two or three months later. You must do everything, you just sit and shut up, for where can you go? Shall I write to the Prime Minister? Who shall I write to, where shall I go?" V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)

Immigrants and fairness

Social groups may differ in the extent to which they feel defenceless. The respondents claimed that there were groups that had to suffer more injustice and unfair treatment than others: the poor, the sick, the unemployed, the children or pregnant women, but immigrants were also mentioned; immigrants who...

"are deprived of the freedom of choice. They can't work even if they want to, they can't study because they must struggle to make a living. I think their situation is the worst, for they haven't a chance to decide." V7 (MAN, SERBIAN FROM SERBIA)

Some concrete situations were also mentioned in which injustice or unfair treatment was suffered:

"The doctor. They see on your health card that you aren't a Hungarian citizen, and it is not sure they will behave the same way to you as for Hungarian citizens, although you pay health insurance, or it's paid for you." V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)

"One of my bosses liked me very much, he told me directly that I shouldn't say I was Hungarian from Voivodina. So that people shouldn't know, as they don't like foreigners. Now, I don't want to meddle with politics, but whose fault is it that society is turned against foreigners? Against Hungarians living outside the borders, in the first place? This generated a sort of defiance in me, which I never had before. And I say right away that I'm a Hungarian from Voivodina, and we can make it clear right away if I'm wanted or not." V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

"Hungarians are given priority if there is a possibility to choose, they employ Hungarians rather than foreigners. That's discrimination." V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)

Immigrants experience discriminative treatment in several ways, not only in the labor market and health care, but, for example, in shopping centers, too. There was one participant who had positive experiences as well:

"I've been to many places alone at night. There has never been any problem, the Hungarians accept me." V8 (MAN, SIERRA LEONE)

Apropos the following situations, respondents were asked to consider whether in the following situations, the specified person gets more from Hungarian society than he/she contributes, or vice-versa (he/she contributes more than he/she gets).

1. A Chinese immigrant employs Chinese and Hungarian people in his shop selling cheap Chinese goods.

"The Chinaman is also an immigrant, if he had enough to set up a business, why shouldn't I start a Russian shop and employ Hungarians if I had the possibility? I'm legal, I pay all I have to, I think it's good for the state because I pay tax." V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)

"I agree. If someone wants to make a living in Hungary, even a business of his own, he should do so because it's good for the state that he pays tax. If we say that he pays all the taxes it means he contributes to everything. He also creates a workplace if he employs a Hungarian or he may help his compatriots." V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

"It's perfectly all right. If the Hungarian state allows him to live here, to start a business and to employ Chinese and Hungarians, too." V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

2. A Hungarian from Ukraine works 12 hours a day in construction. He is designated as being an unskilled worker. He pays his taxes, lives with nine of his colleagues in a flat and visits his family every three months.

"I've had such experiences, too. They were kept amidst inhuman conditions, guarded by dogs, German shepherds, on some deserted premises. The windows were broken and in the autumn when they were supposed to have been paid, the contractor said that a concrete mixer had disappeared, somebody had stolen it, so they wouldn't be paid and they could go home. This is the better case, this worker one is registered and all that. It's awful enough as it is, but there are far worse cases." V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)

"I try to see the other side, the positive side. This man stays in Hungary legally. He must have chosen this job because he found no work at home. He would surely work closer to his family if he could. This is what he can do, but at least he works legally. He pays tax to the state, this is acceptable, as a makeshift solution." V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

"As long as the country is poor, there's nothing that can be done about it. They couldn't pay more or provide better circumstances, entrepreneurs employ the cheapest labor.

Pressure should be put on large companies, or legislation should be improved through economic development.” V7 (MAN, SERBIAN FROM SERBIA)

“The exploiter should be somehow restrained so that he couldn’t exploit him.” V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

The government, political decision-makers, offices and authorities have different attitudes to immigrants. In the opinion of participants they should ensure:

“integration [of migrants] in[to] society. They shouldn’t allow enormous masses of immigrants to come into the country, which would undermine the functioning of Hungary, to make another country of it. Instead of aggravating their situation [the incumbents in power] should integrate these people into society so that they can become real Hungarian people. Not in terms of nationality, but in terms of the country.” V7 (MAN, SERBIAN FROM SERBIA)

The group members argued that the integration of the immigrants could be promoted along the following lines:

“There should be integration programs like the gift parcel in Israel. They help them find work. That would require a change in Hungarian mentality, too; to understand that I’m not a worm who wriggled herself in here because I get much more money and life’s much better. They should accept me as a person who works, and not hinder me. Like in the offices, at work Hungarians are given priority. Sometimes we have the same knowledge as Hungarians; things shouldn’t be made harder.” V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)

“They should be given work, that’s all.” V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

“It is perhaps the media that could help improve this, to help foreigners be more accepted.” V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)

To the question of how tolerant Hungary is and what the decision-makers and offices do to help the immigrants get their due, they voiced the following opinions:

“Hungarian society on the whole is more rejection focused, the politicians are also rather unsympathetic – I think they suck up to society. I don’t think that individual politicians would turn down Hungarians from abroad, if we speak of Hungarians outside the borders. They just suck up to society.” V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

“I think it’s the job of the politicians to reconcile two peoples, it’s not up to the Hungarian people to decide who should come to Hungary and who shouldn’t.” V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)

The respondents felt a certain hierarchy about which foreigners were accepted by Hungarians. They thought that the Chinese were accepted most easily, followed by the English and others from the West, and last were Hungarians from outside the borders.

“A Chinaman is admitted far quicker than a Hungarian from Ukraine. (...) You should just pop into the Immigration Office to see how many Chinese get permanent

residence permits every day, while a wretched Hungarian from Ukraine must produce scores of documents to receive one.” V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)

“I’m a foreigner, but someone from the EU is from a different continent from mine. I am from Africa. What he can do, I can’t do. He is a foreigner and I am one, too, but there is a difference between us.” V2 (MAN, NIGERIA)

“The Hungarians who used to live in the territory of historical Hungary are not welcome. They told me, many people, that I shouldn’t say I was a Hungarian from abroad. I can’t understand it, I’m just as Hungarian as they are. It’s also strange that Asians are accepted more easily, Hungarians regard them sort of exotic. (...) You haven’t experienced it because you are not Hungarian, though you are from Serbia. I am from Serbia and I am Hungarian. They look at me differently than at you. You are an interesting phenomenon, a curio. You came here to study as a Serb, you speak Hungarian, you speak broken Hungarian. I don’t speak broken Hungarian, that’s a problem. I even speak better than some Hungarians. That’s an even greater problem. Do you understand? They think a peasant from Bácska has come here to be unemployed while he/she has some rich plot of land at home.” V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIANS FROM SERBIA)

“I think they treat the Chinese as they do partly because they are cheap labor, probably they won’t cause unemployment problems. (...) A Chinese person is not out for unemployment benefit, he/she can find some work around a Chinese bazaar.” V7 (MAN, SERBIAN FROM SERBIA)

The topic of the 2004 referendum² was also touched on:

“In 2005 the attitude of Hungary was made clear; remember that they voted No.” V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)

“I was listening to Kossuth Radio every morning, they repeated at least 20 times during that one hour that you should vote against it. Then I went about my business.” V3 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

Comparing Hungary with their country of origin, as regards the reception given to foreigners, the interviewees stressed:

“In the past 15 years it has never happened that someone wanted to relocate to Serbia.” V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

“Ukraine is perfectly open. We don’t care that a Georgian or Armenian has moved in. It simply doesn’t happen that we should be hostile to them. Mind you, we don’t experience it in Hungary, either, except for the offices. It’s great, there’s nothing.” V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)

About the representation of their interests and the opportunities for changing attitudes towards foreigners, they voiced the following ideas:

² In a 5 December 2004 nationwide referendum Hungarian voters were asked whether ethnic Hungarians residing in nearby countries should receive dual Hungarian citizenship. Since only slightly more than 37 per cent of eligible voters cast their ballots, the motion failed.

"The local government's usual concern is to relocate a bus stop because it disturbs somebody. I've never heard a mayor say that in this district 50 Russians, 30 Chinese and 25 Africans are living. He'd like to give work to everyone. That's how I'd promote myself [if I were him]. I know they [the immigrants] are here, they need me, we'd like to help. Instead, what I hear is that someone has pinched the money and now we have to build a sewage system." V6 (WOMAN, RUSSIAN FROM UKRAINE)

Seeking legal remedy at the ombudsman's office was an option also raised, but participants were very skeptical about this:

"My letter will be the 625th, he won't deal with my case." V5 (WOMAN, HUNGARIAN FROM UKRAINE)

"By the time he comes to read it, your residence permit has expired three times and you have to go home. We'd better keep a low profile." V1 (MAN, HUNGARIAN FROM SERBIA)

ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE HOST SOCIETY FOCUS GROUP

Introduction of participants

After the description of the research and the technical details of the discussion, the moderator asked the participants to briefly introduce themselves. 4 men and 4 women took part; namely Hungarian citizens aged between 20 and 57, with the average age being 40. Half of them had been through secondary or lower education, half had tertiary schooling, 2 were students, the rest were employed. All were actively involved in civic programs, half of them as members of some non-profit organizations. They claimed they were open and receptive toward immigrants (see Table 2 about participants' personal data in the Appendix.)

The atmosphere and tone of the discussion was calm, informal and friendly. Nothing disturbed the participants and they all listened to each other and the topics with interest. They adhered to the discussion agenda by more or less keeping to time limits, but several times the moderator had to repeat or explain a question or task. Group members were satisfied with the circumstances and the moderator.

Civic activity

The participants first expressed their ideas about the basic concepts of civic activity, mentioning concrete cases and examples. When it came to the term public matter, it was described as something ...

"that we turn away from. (...) When a public issue concerns everybody, we say it's not my business. (...) When it's a public issue, we turn away. Many ignore it, they don't feel it's their business, either." V6 (MAN)

Several group members thought that all of the problems which affected everyone were public affairs, but they also added that what affected everyone was always somebody

else's business, not "my business". Someone mentioned low participation rates in referenda as an example of how people avoid engaging in public matters.

"If you take attendance at a referendum, you will see that they are struggling to reach the threshold of 50% in some areas, because of this 'others will solve it, my opinion doesn't count' attitude. People don't care, they don't believe that their vote, their ideas are the solution." V5 (MAN)

Among public concerns they mentioned environment protection, natural disasters, the homeless, public health care, infrastructure, transport, education, jobs and some also listed the political and spiritual cohesion of the country here. One of the participants embedded the question in a broader perspective:

"Public matters can be divided into two groups basically: local and national matters. Local matters are connected with everyday life, work, neighbors, shoveling snow, keeping pets, cats, hangover (...) There are then the more important matters, ranging from participating in elections, referenda to crime, social welfare problems and the like." V7 (MAN)

The term citizen's duty reminded them of voting, paying taxes, abiding by the law, defending the country, giving help, rearing children, ethical, humane behavior, protection of values and solidarity, and also cherishing traditions. Students' obligations to learn well in government-financed tertiary education, as well as support for drop-outs from school were also mentioned. The term citizen's duty elicited both positive and negative feelings.

"Duty sounds a bit severe. It's to be done compulsorily, whereas some things we listed, for example, providing help with disasters is not a compulsory thing for people. The word duty suggests it is. We ought to have such an expectation of ourselves." V4 (WOMAN)

By civic activity the embracing of some cause such as the work of activists for the protection of animals or the environment was understood. Participants thought that in ideal cases civic activities were devoid of political overtones, but in practice it was not so clear:

"They are not free from politics, for there are civic organizations that the given power or government, it doesn't matter which one we speak about, has set up or supports in order that their policies be put through to the people down there, under the banner of the civic organizations. [However, we have e.g.] "Solidarity for Csömör Society". It's perfectly free from politics. It includes pro-Fidesz people, all sorts, even pro-Jobbik [extreme right] members, pro-MSZP, and believers." V7 (MAN)
"I have the impression that everything is linked up with everything in general. The non-profit organizations, civic activities are connected to the economy and politics, they can't be separated." V1 (WOMAN)

Speaking of their own lives, they typically mentioned selective garbage collection, preference for Hungarian products, pooling of opinions, participation in cultural events and cherishing of traditions as civic activities.

The moderator guided the discussion by listing various civic activities, asking the participants to evaluate how effective they were and if they had personal experiences of them. Opinions differed about the popularity and effectiveness of phoning into a radio program.

"I'm sure there are people who can be influenced in this way. I think it is important, not only for political questions but for both political and non-political questions." V2 (WOMAN)

"I don't think they have any influence, because everybody watches or listens to a channel that suits his/her political affiliations. If their opinion was different, they wouldn't follow that program." V1 (WOMAN)

A participant said he had phoned into a radio program exactly about the topic of admitting foreigners (Hungarians from Transylvania) into Hungary, to tell them his opinion.

There were conflicting opinions about the effectiveness of newspaper articles or comments, too.

"Everyone looks at pages, news reports that are close to them anyway. That's why it can't mobilize many people." V3 (WOMAN)

"At the end of the Metro newspaper there is a letter, readers' letters. Very interesting things can be read there, things that have no political bias. There were a few things that could even change me (...) after all, they can be effective." V5 (MAN)

About participation in some illegal protest action, the following was said:

"These are not always effective, in vain do they want to do something to preserve our historic buildings; there is always a counter force whose financial interest is that you shouldn't achieve your goal. Permanent protests, lawyers, all are mobilized in vain, all able-bodied people, nothing happens. When in the 7th district historic buildings were to be demolished and sold for a song to investors, in vain were the protests; the counter-interested group is always stronger." V1 (WOMAN)

About legal, organized demonstrations one of the group members said:

"As for the events of the past 20 or 21 years, none of these protests or demonstrations has achieved a single goal." V7 (MAN)

When the theme was donating money to a political organization, the participants agreed that no political party is in need of the salary of ordinary people.

"I sure wouldn't [give them anything], they get enough. No need to donate. I think they rake it in together. To support them, my foot! I can't really sympathize with any of the parties. I wouldn't give money – even if I had enough – to any party." V5 (MAN)

When the discussion was about buying or not buying certain products due to consideration for principles (political, ethical, environmental), several people said they preferred Hungarian goods and buying from the growers directly in order to promote the recovery of the Hungarian economy. Products from cosmetics firms who are known to carry on experiments on animals were also mentioned.

"Very often we decide [about buying] like this, saying if that's all we can do, it may trigger off a chain reaction: there will be more money, he can sell cheaper, invest more and even greater numbers will buy. This would automatically sustain itself." V5 (MAN)

"I think I should step further, not remain within the borders. If I buy that Slovakian product, I help them too. I don't [buy] within the country frontiers, not only Hungary but Europe is important, too." V2 (WOMAN)

As for letters of protest and petitions, several respondents said they had signed some and thought that this form of protest was more effective than street demonstrations.

"I don't remember exactly, they wanted to build a motorway or divert traffic there, so we signed the petition. There is a housing park there, families, small children, the noise would be too great. It was not implemented." V3 (WOMAN)

"It's more effective than demonstrating. When the necessary number of signatures is collected, it has a legal force. (...) There are better chances that will reach those who are in charge." V7 (MAN)

"It's far more human, if you will, it's also far quieter to sign something than go out to demonstrate, destroy buildings, to cause sure harm to somebody. And who will pay for it? The citizen. They smash everything. With a petition I just scribble down my name." V3 (WOMAN)

Regarding the wearing or placing of political badges and symbols, some people mentioned that the use of some symbols are regulated by law and can have a provocative impact:

"I think it's rather provocative. I provoke the rest of the people. If I put on a badge of the extreme right, to provoke minorities and liberals. That has no use, no objective." V3 (WOMAN)

As regards taking part in the work of a political organizations or movement, as it turned out, most of them had never been involved, and there were also different opinions about it.

"I think it's no longer civic activity when it's about politics. It is political activity." V1 (WOMAN)

"I can imagine that I help with their work. And I'd also help in the elections, to promote participation on that day." V2 (WOMAN)

Speaking of contacting politicians or municipal decision-makers, several participants stressed its importance and effectiveness, but there was some skepticism as well:

"I think you can lend help to politicians, too. It is a direct connection, when a lay person talks to a politician, for a civic person draws his opinion from everyday life, he may communicate the opinions of several people. I feel it's important, because it's not sure that he [the politician] lives in a milieu in which he can learn about these things." V2 (WOMAN)

"I don't know, I haven't been in this situation. Maybe I'm too pessimistic, but I don't think that going up to the mayor or a deputy with our problems would greatly influence their decisions or anything." V3 (WOMAN)

The respondents regard it as a citizen's duty to take part in parliamentary elections.

"It's natural that you go, it's even your duty as a citizen, and that the county should improve, it should take the right course, that's what we'd like." V6 (MAN)

Regarding participation in local, municipal elections, the general opinion of the group was that it was at least as important as voting for national elections, or maybe even more important, for the given issues were closer to the everyday lives of voters.

Civic activity can take a variety of individual or organized forms. The participants had different first-hand experiences:

"Our civic organization – I don't want to praise it to the skies – does lots of things. Starting with renewing playgrounds. We have a charity ball every year. There is an institute for the disabled in Csömör with a huge restaurant, and we have always given all of our revenue to that disabled institute." V7 (MAN)

Their general opinion is that non-profit organizations are useful and positive because they voice opinions about problems that perhaps others don't even notice; they can take action about some important cause, not only for their own goals in the strict sense.

It was also made explicit that the three concepts (public affairs, citizen's duty, civic activity) were interrelated:

"There is some overlapping. Elections would go into all three areas, I think. An election is a public matter, a citizen's duty as we said, and civic activity. All three apply to voting." V5 (MAN)

"The work of a non-profit organization is normally tied to some public matter, and it may also be related to our duties as citizens. When there is a natural disaster, civic organizations join forces to help people there. This is a public issue and civic activity as well. And helping others may as well be taken for being a citizen's duty, after all." V4 (WOMAN)

Distributive justice

The concept of distributive justice was debated along the lines of the three pre-formulated statements below. The group weighed how much they agreed with and how fair or just they deemed them, one by one.

1. Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its functioning.

Many complemented this statement by declaring that everyone should get as much as he/she was able to contribute to society's functioning, thus emphasizing the importance of individual abilities. The moderator however warned that it was important to evaluate the originally-worded statement. This generated the first divergence of opinions. Some opined that the situation in the statement was not fair or just, it was utopian, had never been realized. Others claimed it was just, the animal kingdom worked according to this rule, and if the principle was put into practice, no one could "sponge off the welfare network". The problem was there was no way to measure and compare the extent of contributions.

2. Everyone should partake equally of goods produced.

"It makes no sense, for it will never be realized. The idea is beautiful." V7 (MAN)

Many associated this statement with the idea of communism, and expressed that it was unjust, unfair, unrealizable and utopian.

3. Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and should get as much as they need.

The group members thought that this was the most attractive idea of the three and that it would be good to realize this principle in practice as it would result in a just and fair society. However, the term *need* was seen as being hard to interpret, as it could only be measured with difficulty. Besides this, participants primarily took the goods produced as being financial resources (payments) which at first shrunk the conceptual frame of the discussion but the moderator tried to extend it.

Compared to the third statement, participants generally regarded the first two as being utopian, unfair and unfeasible (by contrast, the first statement received most support in the questionnaire survey). The typical situation of contemporary Hungary was judged to be in accordance with the first, or maybe the second statement, but participants also remarked that in practice these models were mixed; neither was predominant, the country was ruled by "chaos" in this regard.

After the above three statements were presented, the group members discussed – on the basis of three models of distributive justice – whether the following persons involved in a given situation were getting more from society than they contributed to common expenditure, or whether they were contributing more than they got.

1.1. An entrepreneur of high socio-economic status employs lots of people, providing a living for them but he employs some of them in the "black" economy, illegally, not paying tax for them.

They thought it was wrong but frequently met with this situation in reality and many expressed sympathy for those involved.

"That's the actual situation. But that has two sides to it, for yes, everyone should pay the tax he is liable to pay, but probably the tax liability would be so much that nobody would have to lie about it. Those lie who are forced to lie." V1 (WOMAN)

"Both of them fare well, only the state is left out of the business. You often hear: why should I keep the state, why should others sponge off me? Shall I pay yet another politician? But you may also think that it's what we'd do. Just search your own conscience, to be quite frank, I would do the same if I were in their place (...) I am lenient towards the entrepreneur because he provides work." V5 (MAN)

"But the job taker doesn't fare well, for if his employer doesn't pay health insurance after him and – God forbid – he has an accident and is hospitalized, he may get a bill for millions for the treatment." V4 (WOMAN)

Contradictory opinions were voiced whether the entrepreneur gets more than he contributes or contributes more than he gets.

"I think the entrepreneur contributes more than he receives. He pays some tax, he also pays tax after his profit – as much as he reports, of course. Thirdly, even if he didn't report anything, just scoop up the money, even then he gives money to people so that they can invest. That means capital is circulating. We all pay V.A.T. When people have no money, they can't buy anything, there is no V.A.T., the whole thing grinds to a halt." V5 (MAN)

"He doesn't contribute more. He takes out more, because he doesn't pay for those people, it doesn't matter how many. He sells the product anyway, he profits more." V8 (MAN)

"It makes a difference how many he pays and how many he doesn't pay. If he pays [taxes for] 120 employees correctly and doesn't pay for 10, he evidently contributes more than he receives. That's why I asked for the proportions. If we take the whole staff, 130 people, 10 is negligible. He gives jobs to 130, after the great majority he pays taxes. Then why does it bother anyone that he doesn't pay for ten people? Should he sack them, rather than pay tax? That would really be the wrong thing to do." V4 (WOMAN)

2. A retired old lady, who has worked throughout her life and paid all she was expected to contribute can now hardly make ends meet on a government pension.

"She gets less than she contributed throughout her life. That may be said of my grandmother. If her children didn't help her, she would be in dire straits." V4 (WOMAN)

3. Middle-aged woman who has lost her job, is on the dole but works as a cleaner for families illegally.

The participants sympathized with the woman, thinking it was a true-to-life, and negative situation.

"Unfortunately that's what there is, we are realistic, we understand it." V6 (MAN)

Procedural justice

Individuals enter into some relationships with the state in which they receive less than they expected to get, or what they feel they have contributed to the common good. In everyday life there are many interactions with the state during the administration of official matters. Participants mentioned a lot of unfair, unjust treatment and situations in connection with administrative procedures. The most frequent word associations included "bureaucracy", "corruptibility", "waste of time", "circuitousness", "nerviness", "cold-shouldering" and a short story by the Hungarian writer Kálmán Mikszáth (*Korlátfa* [barrier]). Experience was gained at various places in diverse procedures. Many complained of the manners of administrators and their lack of competence although much depends (for the clients) on their expertise and helpfulness. Participants often met with malpractice and had the opinion that, without aggressiveness or at least a firmness of purpose, it was impossible to arrange official matters with success.

"They slight you, as if you were supposed to know what to submit, in what order. They only tell you what you ask, and that has to be dragged out of them, too." V3 (WOMAN)

"I have a more or less comprehensive picture. It depends on the local government, the municipal assembly. On the town clerk, on his deputy, they are in charge of maintaining lawfulness in the office. The clerk and his deputy have calling hours, you can go and launch your complaints. The people who work there... what sort of people are they? What is their personal attitude? There is no difference in their salary." V7 (MAN)

"It depends on the person. There are places where they are very kind indeed. They are astonishingly kind, they are wholly human. It's not dependent on money, on the salary they get. It's humanity, how you treat people. I used to work in customer service, I earned as much as my colleague but she treated people in such a way that when somebody came in, I left the office. Gosh, how ashamed I was that I was working there. There were examples like that." V2 (WOMAN)

Individuals and groups may receive unfair or unjust treatment during their daily administrative procedures, but also through regulations which relate to them. When asked how much they could do against injustice or unfair treatment (alone or in cooperation with others), if they experienced any, they said:

"It must be gross malpractice or grievance that would make you say: Goddamn, I will get entangled in yet another case, defy the office, undergo another procedure. That must be a very grave thing. Okay, once I survived, all right." V5 (MAN)

Immigrants and fairness

Social groups differ in the extent to which they are defenseless. Respondents named certain social groups that have to suffer more unfair treatment of injustice than the rest. They thought that Roma, foreigners and the aged are groups which are handicapped in the sense that they must tolerate more injustice. To the question of why immigrants are in this situation they listed several reasons such as language, poor knowledge of laws and administrative procedures. Some quite extreme opinions could also be heard.

"You must be careful with them, they whip out a knife." V6 (MAN)

"When a foreigner enters somewhere, he expects to be helped by the person. I think a foreigner raises his voice much more quickly when he doesn't like something. (...) An Italian would raise his voice, that is, what I saw involved an Italian chap; in two minutes he was shouting at the official." V3 (WOMAN)

"Foreigners have a different mentality. Not all foreigners can be identified. A European, African, Asian must have different mentality... that may cause the difference. Asians can arrange their matters well, they arrive here with a sort of administrator, lawyer." V1 (WOMAN)

The Hungarians were aware that immigrants might face diverse injustices; for example, they might be discriminated against in education, at offices, the labor market, during police activity, etc. There is practically no legal remedy available to them except at the embassy. The cause for discrimination may be a general prevalence of prejudice (e.g. if an immigrant is judged by his country of origin or presumed financial status).

"... I was startled that a Transylvanian Hungarian person was categorized differently to a Chinese person. The Chinese had priority, he was more welcome than the Transylvanian." V1 (WOMAN)

"Apart from the embassy they can do nothing, their only defense is the embassy; we can do with a person who has come from far away what we want, to put it rudely. At most he can go to the embassy, that's all." V5 (MAN)

The respondents said that not only the evaluation and position of different immigrant groups were different, but there are differences individually between immigrants. It is an important differentiating feature whether the immigrant speaks Hungarian or not. Many group members declared that it was typical for immigrants to work illegally...

"but not all. Say, the Arabs try to set up grocery shops... things that can bring a little money. The Chinese help each other, they are a different type. There are Romanians at quite a lot of places, they work illegally. They only do black work, they grab the job from Hungarians because they do the work more cheaply." V6 (MAN)

"Immigrants are of two types. Maybe they are not exactly called immigrants, the foreign citizens who are working for foreign firms. They are also here among us somehow, immigrants as it were. Maybe when the five years is over, he goes back. Or he doesn't, because he has married a Hungarian girl. Then he'll like it here. The immigrants are the ones who just want to live here, the others are guest workers; this is a possible differentiation. A layer has legal employment, they are categorized

differently, and those people who have no safe workplaces are categorized in another way, they are different... I think..." V1 (WOMAN)

"A Transylvanian Hungarian is a Transylvanian Hungarian, a Romanian is a Romanian. There is an enormous difference. Even though he lives in that country, there is an immense difference. If you don't know the Romanians, you won't know it." V1 (WOMAN)

"I think the global economic recession [reinforces] extremists, each increase in poverty strengthens extremists. There were those tough moves by Fico. Since then, it must be lurking in the Hungarians' minds: well, the Slovaks. I'm sure there are people who subconsciously or consciously condemn them more." V5 (MAN)

It was the general opinion of the groups that, excepting some individuals, Hungary was prejudiced and unsympathetic to aliens.

Apropos the following situations, the respondents were asked to consider whether the mentioned person gets more from Hungarian society than he/she contributes to common expenditure or vice-versa, he/she contributes more than he/she gets.

1. A Chinese immigrant employs Chinese and Hungarian people in his shop selling cheap Chinese goods.

"I think he gets as much from Hungarian society as he contributes. His child gets the same, when a woman has a child, she gets child-care benefit." V6 (MAN)

"Yes, he immigrates, pays tax, becomes a beneficiary of the Hungarian government, a constituent of it. He pays tax, he gets a country, state allowances. It's ideal, I think." V5 (MAN)

"I think, too, that he gets as much from society as he gives, if he employs everyone, Hungarians, too, legally. Where I live there are lots of Chinese restaurants, only Chinese work there." V4 (WOMAN)

Facing this situation, participants first wanted to judge the truth of the statement, and said it was not probable, but the moderator reminded them to stay on topic. One participant then declared that she had a negative opinion of this situation. Interestingly, the illegal employment of workers was immediately raised, and when speaking about the previously-discussed situation of the entrepreneur who employs people in the black economy, the discussants came up with several excuses in support of them. However, they then firmly declared that, concerning illegal employment, a Chinese person – or immigrant – should abide by the rules.

"If he has come to a country, he should keep the country's norms and laws." V1 (WOMAN)

"He can choose which country to relocate to from China. He may choose a country where the taxation conditions are more favorable, if he doesn't like the Hungarian system." V4 (WOMAN)

"He may move on, but we can't. He can go on, but we live here." V6 (MAN)

The respondents claimed that the hypothesized Chinese individual was receiving from the Hungarian state as much as he contributed to common spending.

2. A Hungarian from Ukraine works 12 hours a day in construction. He is registered as an unskilled worker. He pays his taxes, lives with nine of his colleagues in a flat and visits his family every three months.

Contrary opinions were heard about this situation. On the one hand, participants found it realistic and thought that people might be forced to enter into such a situation, while others stressed he had chosen the situation, and when Hungarians went abroad to work, they were living under similar circumstances. As for the question of contribution to the state vs. what is received from the state, the following opinion was voiced:

"The Chinese person is an employer, the Ukrainian is only an employee, if we compare the two examples. The Chinese gives work to five people, but here is this Ukrainian unskilled worker who came here to work, working 12 hours. Furthermore, take this dual taxation law between Ukraine and Hungary, the Ukrainian could choose whether to pay tax in Hungary or in Ukraine. So he fares better." V7 (MAN)

The government, the political decision-makers, offices and authorities have different attitudes to immigrants. In discussing how to improve the status of immigrants, participants mentioned the elimination of prejudices and discrimination, among other things.

"... they should have representation at such places. They wouldn't be forced to approach someone defenseless, alone in an alien country that speaks an alien language, full of emotions, maybe chauvinism. They should have someone by their side who would speak up for their interests in Hungarian, an interpreter perhaps. (...) it should be provided by the state." V5 (MAN)

"In my view, quite a lot of things are provided for them (...) it's another matter that many come here ignorant, unprepared. In Hungary 13 minorities have their self-government (...). It is the duty of minority self-governments to help those who come from the parent country. Polish, Armenian, Greek, Croatian, Serbian, I don't want to enumerate all the 13. Ukrainian minority self-governments have this duty under the local government act of 1993 to help those relocating from their parent country, if they have some concerns or problems and can't arrange it through the embassy, trade representation, or consulate, you can knock at their door, no problem." V7 (MAN)

The issue was raised that the Ukrainian was taking work from Hungarians, while others opined:

"... a Hungarian wouldn't undertake the job for the pay the Ukrainian did, he works for any sum of money. It's the same when we go to Germany, we also take a job for half the pay." V6 (MAN)

They judged that if he paid tax after his work, he got from society as much as he contributed:

"He receives what he needs, that's quits. He pays the tax that he's due. He knew why he comes and receives it. He gets his money, takes it home, he does what he wants with it

after taxation. If he doesn't spend it here, I say it's quits. He would give more if he lived here, worked here, got incorporated into our society. But he goes home and spends it there." V5 (MAN)

A COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS OF THE IMMIGRANT AND HOST SOCIETY'S FOCUS GROUPS

Civic activity

Regarding the concepts related to civic activity, both groups understood "general matters affecting everyone" by the term public issues, mainly pertaining to education, health care and politics. Immigrants also included here the acceptance of pluralism, while Hungarians mentioned the political and spiritual cohesion of the country. Both groups differentiated between local and national public affairs. Immigrants also mentioned isolated groups removed from involvement with public issues, who were not directly affected, such as self-subsistent rural people, thus differentiating national and Budapest-centered matters. A marked characteristic of the Hungarian group was skepticism about public affairs, expressed by their rejection of them, stressing "everyone's business is nobody's business".

As citizen's duties, both groups listed participation in elections, observation of laws, paying taxes and ethical behavior. A further common feature was that in both groups emphasis was laid on the negative emotional aspects of the term *duty* (i.e. as being pressure on individuals).

The phrase civic activity was associated by both groups with environmental and animal protection, first of all, stressing the non-profit and politics-free aspects of these activities. One of the Hungarian group members was very skeptical, claiming that non-profit organizations were set up to be the mouth-pieces of parties, to have their political platforms accepted by society. Both groups laid stress on the importance of individual selective garbage collection.

The Hungarian group also mentioned a preference for Hungarian products and a refusal to buy the goods of firms which conducted experiments on animals. About the efficiency of other civic activities such as phoning into a radio program or writing newspaper articles or comments, opinions differed for Hungarians. There was consensus among them about the futility of taking part in illegal protest actions or legal demonstrations, and they also rejected the donating of money to political organizations or wearing/putting up political badges/material. By contrast, they deemed signing protest letters and petitions, contacting politicians and participating in parliamentary and municipal elections to be important and effective.

The immigrants typically kept away from municipal elections due to a lack of time, information and interest. What is more, they were not sure who was (and on what grounds) eligible to vote for the local government.

A conspicuous difference between the two groups is that the Hungarians listed far more items as being public issues and citizen's duties and civic activities than immigrants did. It was voiced in both groups that all these issues were closely interlaced.

Distributive justice

Both groups agreed that the goods produced ought to be distributed fairly, but the method and practice of doing this fair distribution was viewed differently. Should it be governed by the principle of contribution, of equality or of need? Fundamentally, both groups felt proportional distribution with contribution to be the most just, stressing the principle "if you don't work, you don't eat", but in both groups the problem of measuring contribution objectively and the importance of social solidarity were also voiced, since there are always some people who can not contribute to the functioning of society out of no fault of their own, and they have to be provided for too. An immigrant noted that, at present, the extent of an individual's contributions were not being measured correctly and people who contributed little received much. Another immigrant claimed that Hungarian society was working differently now, with solidarity for everybody because, for example, public roads could be used by all. About the principle of equal distribution of goods, both groups expressed their opinion that it was unjust, unfair and unfeasible. Distribution by need was thought to be just and fair by both groups, but it was also found impossible to implement because of the difficulty of interpreting the idea of or measuring "needs" so this principle would have to remain an ideology only. Yet this model was most acceptable or desirable for both groups. They thought the second model was most characteristic of contemporary Hungary, but the immigrants also raised the thought that there were handicapped groups in society who would should receive more of the good produced.

The participants then deliberated on the basis of three examples whether the persons involved got more than they contributed or contributed more than they got. The entrepreneur who employed some workers illegally was negatively judged by several immigrants and with understanding by Hungarians. The immigrants argued that that situation was bad for the entrepreneur, for the employees and bad for the state. Some participants said it was a necessary evil because the workers at least received some earnings and the contractor could also survive in the teeth of immense tax burdens and would eventually create workplaces this way. The latter idea was voiced by the Hungarians, too, and this made them more sympathetic toward the entrepreneur, but about his contribution to society, opinions differed. The old lady struggling to make ends meet after a life of work was unanimously judged with sympathy as being a sad but realistic case. The Hungarians said she received less than what she had contributed. An immigrant also expressed the view that pensions should be determined by the services rendered; a soldier or a miner should not get less than someone who had sat in an office all his life. Both groups perfectly understood the situation of the middle-aged woman who had lost her job; they thought her case was forgivable, frequent in reality and a sorry plight.

Procedural justice

Concerning offices and administration procedures, both group members mentioned lots of unfair, unjust cases. Their associations with the topic included “corruptibility”, “waste of time”, “red tape”, “stress”, “costliness” and “contempt”. Both group members complained about officials’ manners and lack of competence, although much depended on their knowledge and helpfulness. In many cases they met with incompetence and malpractice. In both groups, however, positive examples were also quoted, thus the experiences are not wholly negative. The immigrants’ opinion of OIN was univocally bad. They said the OIN decisions were not adequately justified, it was not always clear what the pertinent rules were or what was to do. There were also some who found that officials had administered cases (too?) rigorously, adhering strictly to the rules. They had the impression that the treatment of clients in a different position from theirs would also be different. This depended on the immigrant’s length of stay in the country and whether the client was of Hungarian origin or not. There was overt skepticism from both groups about the possibility for individual or group assertion of interests. As regards representing their own interests or their influence in changing attitudes to foreigners, the immigrants thought that local governments were incapable of embracing their cause.

Immigrants and fairness

Social groups differ in their degree of defenselessness. The Hungarian group thought that the Roma, the foreigners and the elderly were handicapped social groups who have to suffer more injustice and unfair treatment than the rest. When asked why immigrants were also in this category, they described several reasons, such as the language barrier and lack of familiarity with legal and administrative procedures. The immigrants claimed that the poor, the unemployed, the children, the pregnant women and immigrants were discriminated against.

Both groups thought that injustice towards immigrants took different forms. It could be found as discrimination in education, in offices, on the labor market, in police activity or in health care. The Hungarians were also of the opinion that immigrants could not resort to legal remedy except at their embassy. The cause of discrimination was thought to be the prevalence of prejudices in the country when an immigrant is judged by his country of origin or financial status, for example. The Hungarian group opined that the Chinese were treated more attentively than, for example, Hungarians from Transylvania; this opinion being shared by the immigrants, too, who even discerned a strong hierarchy in the Hungarians’ attitude towards immigrant groups. Their impression was that Hungarians welcomed the Chinese most warmly, followed by people from the West and least welcome were Hungarians from beyond the borders. They claimed that Hungary generally “rejected” rather than “welcomed” immigrants, and they stressed the responsibility of politics and the media.

The immigrant group voiced that better conditions for integration and work should be ensured, via e.g. integrative programs and the regulation of the media. As for integration, the Hungarians thought the elimination of prejudices would be the

solution at the national scale, and state-subsidized representation of the immigrants' interests should be provided. A Hungarian former local government deputy expressed a critical opinion claiming that *"quite a lot is ensured (...) that's another matter that many come here ignorant, unprepared. Hungary has 13 minority self-governments (...) you can knock at their doors."* He was also convinced that in Hungary the Immigration Office functioned very well and that immigrants were treated adequately. In his opinion, Hungarians and Hungarian politics were sympathetic towards foreigners. *"We have laws about foreigners, about immigration that many a western country could envy. It's another matter how these laws function, but the people – in my humble opinion – are open and hospitable."*

Both groups deliberated about two hypothetical situations to decide whether the person involved got from Hungarian society more than he contributed or contributed more to common expenditure than he received. Immigrants found the situation of the Chinese immigrant who employed Chinese and Hungarians not to be a problem if he reported his employees and paid tax regularly, because he got what he wanted, and besides, he created workplaces. The Hungarians also approved of this situation and said that the Chinaman received as much as he contributed. Regarding the entrepreneur who also employed illegal workers, the Hungarians mentioned several excuses for the employer, while when the possible illegal employment situation of the Chinese was also considered, they firmly declared that a Chinese person – or any immigrant – should observe the law. As for the example of the Hungarian from Ukraine employed as an unskilled worker in construction, opinions differed in the Hungarian group. On the one hand, they regarded the situation as being realistic and thought that the man was under pressure to take that type of job, others stressed that he had chosen this work and when Hungarians went abroad to work, their circumstances were similar. Someone said the Ukrainian was taking a Hungarian's workplace, but another participant added that he did work that Hungarians refused to do. They concluded that if he paid tax in Hungary, he got as much from society as he contributed. The immigrant group was empathic to the worker's situation and regarded it as positive that he was working legally.

Finally, it should be noted that although in the Hungarian group many emphasized that they and the Hungarians in general were open and sympathetic to foreigners, several remarks which implied prejudices arose: *"you must be careful with them, they whip out a knife," "I think a foreigner raises his voice much quicker," "there are Romanians, at many places, working illegally. They only do black work, they grab the work from the Hungarians as they do it for less money",* while the Arabs or Chinese *"are another type",* they open grocery shops and work legally. *"If he is a human being, it's all the same where he comes from. If he isn't, then he shouldn't come, if we mean an evil group, he shouldn't come. (...) If he is correct, right-minded, honest and wants to come here, why not? Very many come to carry on foxy business, trickery, steal, cheat, lie."*

Discourses and positions

During the group discussions no thorough-going dispute or heated conflicts arose about the examined topics. Yet some typical opinions and characteristic positions can be outlined and, by identifying them, more light can be shed on the dynamics of the discussions.

The normative principle of rendering services for the public good was markedly present in both groups when the general themes were civic activities, distributive justice and fairness. As for procedural justice, both groups judged their own situation similarly, feeling defenseless, incapable of protecting their rights or representing their interests. Concerning the attitude to immigrants, the need for discourse about the necessity of adequate legal representation for the immigrants arose in both groups and they also made attempts to identify various groups of immigrants by elaborating some selection principles. Also detectable in respondents' discussions was a general discourse which included a critique of the current state of affairs, existing xenophobia and a stressing of the responsibility of the state, politics and the media.

Finally, it is important to note that in the Hungarian group there is a sort of partial, latent duality of values concerning hostility to foreigners and illegal employment. On the one hand, they make it expressly clear that members of the Hungarian society – including themselves – are hospitable, but the country itself is not (but they also made comments during the talks that hinted at a less welcoming view of immigrants). On the other hand, it was conspicuous that they were permissive when it came to illegal employment by a Hungarian entrepreneur, while they strongly disavowed breaches of regulations by immigrants.

CONCLUSION

The results of the focus group examination have revealed several similarities between the two groups which may be important contributions to elaborating migrant-related policies in the future. It should be noted here that the discussions were in the Hungarian language and that the immigrants had lived in Hungary for an average of 5-10 years, which means they had a higher degree of integration and experience (i.e. resembling more closely members of Hungarian society).

By public affairs, citizen's duties and civic activities both groups understood more-or-less the same issues and activities. Typically, the immigrant group kept away from public matters and did not take part in municipal elections, while the host society group expressed skepticism about politics. Both groups found the principle of proportional distribution of resources according to contribution to be just, but both also raised the problem of measuring the extent of contributions and stressed the importance of social solidarity. The distribution of goods using the principle of equality was deemed to be unjust, unfair and unfeasible in both groups. Distributing goods according to the principle of necessity was considered fair and just but unrealizable, for "need" is a notion that is hard to measure or interpret. Yet this was the principle

of distribution both groups preferred. Another notable finding is that members of both groups feel that they have suffered lots of unfair and unjust treatment when undertaking administrative procedures. This is important because earlier research on migration mainly attributed the difficulties foreigners faced in bureaucratic situations to institutional xenophobia. The respondents also expressed skepticism about the possibility of asserting their individual or collective interests. Both groups thought that immigrants were among those handicapped social groups that were exposed to more injustice and unfair treatment than others. Both groups argued that Hungary in general was unsympathetic towards foreigners, but was more attentive to the needs of the Chinese than, for example, to Hungarians from outside the borders of the country. Both groups also stressed the importance of efforts to banish prejudices to promote the better integration of immigrants.

Some differences were also discernible between the two groups: the immigrants were characterized by their lower levels of participation in political and civic activity than the host society. In connection with political and civic activities, immigrants stressed the importance of rendering services for the public good more often than Hungarians did. The entrepreneur who employed workers illegally was judged negatively by several immigrants, while the Hungarian group members were essentially permissive about this situation.

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APPENDIX

Table 1 Composition and characteristics of the focus groups

		Immigrants	Hungarians
	Total	8	8
Gender	Male	4	4
	Female	4	4
Age	18–35	6	3
	36–55	2	3
	56+	0	2
Schooling	Secondary or lower	3	4
	Tertiary	5	4
Activity	Active	5	6
	Inactive	3	2
Country of origin	Serbia (Serb)	2	-
	Serbia (Hungarian)	2	-
	Ukraine (Ukrainian)	1	-
	Ukraine (Hungarian)	1	-
	Africa	2	-
	Near East	0	-
	China	0	-
	Other Asian	0	-
Civic activity	Filter questionnaire. Q 5 ³ – at least one “yes” answer	1	8
	Filter questionnaire Q 6 ⁴ – “highly likely” answer	1	8
	Filter questionnaire Q 7 ⁵ – “yes” answer	2	4

3 Filtering questionnaire question 5: Did you try to do any of the listed things in the past five years? 1. Contacting a politician or local government deputy 2. Signing a protest letter or petition. 3. Taking part in a legal demonstration. 4. Boycotting certain products 5. Buying products for certain political, ethical, or environmental reasons.

4 Filtering questionnaire question 6: Suppose the Parliament passed a law which you find unjust or harmful. How likely is it that in such a situation you could do something against it alone or in cooperation with others? 1. Highly likely, 2. fairly likely, 3. not very likely, 4. not likely at all?

5 Filtering questionnaire question 7: Do you take part actively in, or work as a volunteer for one or more organizations? 1. yes. 2. no.

Table 2 The focus groups participants' characteristics

Serial no.	group	gender	age	status	aim of stay	citizenship	schooling	labor market status	current occupation	Qualifications
1	immigrant	male	27	residence permit	perm. residence	Nigeria	university	unemployed	-	-
2	immigrant	male	42	residence permit	perm. residence	Sierra Leone	university	unemployed	-	-
3	immigrant	male	21	perm. resid. permit	perm. residence	Serbia (Serb)	secondary	student	-	-
4	immigrant	male	33	residence permit	Work	Serbia (Hungarian)	secondary	employee	assistant quality controller	car mechanic
5	immigrant	female	26	residence permit	perm. residence	Macedonia (Serb)	university	employee	accountant	Accountant
6	immigrant	female	50	residence permit	perm. residence	Serbia (Hungarian)	elementary	employee	social worker	social worker, deaf and dumb interpreter
7	immigrant	female	27	perm. resid. permit	perm. residence	Ukraine (Ukrainian)	higher vocational	employee	assistant executive	tourism manager
8	immigrant	female	26	residence permit	Work	Ukraine (Hungarian)	higher vocational	employee	logistic manager	
9	host society	male	20	-	-	Hungarian	secondary	student	-	-
10	host society	male	53	-	-	Hungarian	secondary	employee	supply-man	Printer
11	host society	male	57	-	-	Hungarian	college	employee	economic counselor	Teacher
12	host society	female	31	-	-	Hungarian	college	employee	insurance assistant	arts graduate
13	host society	female	42	-	-	Hungarian	college	employee	accounting clerk	accounting clerk
14	host society	female	20	-	-	Hungarian	secondary	student	-	-
15	host society	female	47	-	-	Hungarian	university	self-employed	tourist guide	Engineer
16	host society	male	57	-	-	Hungarian	secondary	employee	car driver	mechanic

serial no.	group	How long have you lived in Hungary? (year)	Civic activity			Attitude to immigrants****
			Activity in public matters*	Action against a law*	Activity in an	
1	immigrant	-	didn't try	not likely at all	no	-
2	immigrant	13	didn't try	not very likely	yes	-
3	immigrant	10	didn't try	fairly likely	no	-
4	immigrant	6	didn't try	not very likely	no	-
5	immigrant	5	didn't try	not very likely	no	-
6	immigrant	2	Boycotted certain goods, bought certain goods for political etc. reasons	not very likely	yes	-
7	immigrant	7	didn't try	not very likely	no	-
8	immigrant	10	didn't try	not likely at all	no	-
9	host society	-	Signed protest letter, petition, bought certain products for political etc. reasons	fairly likely	yes	1-4
10	host society	-	Contact with politician, petition, bought certain products for political etc. reasons	fairly likely	yes	1-4
11	host society	-	Contacted politician, bought certain goods for political etc. reasons	fairly likely	yes	2
12	host society	-	Signed petition, bought certain goods for political etc. reasons	fairly likely	no	1-5
13	host society	-	Contacted politician, signed petition, bought certain goods for political etc. reasons	fairly likely	yes	1-5
14	host society	-	Bought certain goods for political etc. reasons	fairly likely	no	4
15	host society	-	Contacted politician, bought certain goods for political etc. reasons	fairly likely	no	2-4
16	host society	-	Contacted politician, petition	fairly likely	no	2

* Filtering questionnaire question 5: Did you try to do any of the listed things in the past five years? 1. Contacting a politician or local government deputy 2. Signing a protest letter or petition. 3. Taking part in a legal demonstration. 4. Boycotting certain products 5. Buying products for certain political, ethical, or environmental reasons.

** Filtering questionnaire question 6: Suppose the Parliament passed a law which you find unjust or harmful. How likely is it that in such a situation you could do something against it alone or in cooperation with others? 1. Highly likely, 2. fairly likely, 3. not very likely, 4. not likely at all

*** Filtering questionnaire question 7: Do you take part actively in, or work as a volunteer for one or more organizations? 1. yes. 2. no.

**** Filtering questionnaire question 10: Which of the following options are realistic concerning your relationship with immigrants? 1. I can imagine and accept that I get into family relations with immigrants (marriage, my child's partnership with an immigrant). 2. I can imagine that I befriend immigrants 3. I can imagine that we become neighbors. 4. I can imagine that we become colleagues. 5. We can be on talking terms. 6. All I can accept is that they are visiting the country. 7. I think immigrants should be banned.

PART III

DIGNITY, JUSTICE AND CIVIC
PARTICIPATION OF IMMIGRANTS
AND HUNGARIANS

ACTION POTENTIAL, DIGNITY, CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING

György Lengyel

INTRODUCTION

In this paper I first explore how exit inclination and sense of dignity correlate to economic, cultural and social resources in Hungarian society as a whole and for immigrants. Next, how all this influences social participation and subjective well-being is examined. Individual and collective actors are in possession of various skills and abilities which may improve their situations or prevent their deterioration. Forms of the latter – reactive – action potential include inclination for exit and voice, as explained by Hirschman (1970, 1978, 1993). If we are dissatisfied with the performance of a firm, we may warn the owner, refuse to buy its goods or avail ourselves of its services, or if we are share holders, we get rid of the shares. If we are dissatisfied with a party or a policy, we no longer vote for them or may try to write petitions, news articles, demonstrate or emigrate. By the same token, if we are dissatisfied with our social status, we may move away, emigrate, set up a business of our own, or go, outraged, to the streets in protest. Since, for immigrants, both the inclination to move and the tendency to start a business may be higher than for Hungarian society, it is evident to presume that exit potential (interpreted as being the combination of the former two inclinations) is also higher for migrants than the Hungarian society. Voice inclination, being taken for a form of civic participation, is among the dependent variables of this project and will be discussed later. Hirschman (1978) argues that exit and voice provide alternative solutions to a problem, and when the chances of exit are greater; the tendency to protest may weaken. It also seems expedient to presume however that there is positive correlation between *exit inclination* and various forms of civic participation as they are based on similar feelings and situational assessments. By contrast, the correlation between exit potential and *subjective well-being* is presumed to be negative, as exit inclination is probably fed primarily by dissatisfaction. It should be added that subjective well-being is understood here – similarly to with the majority of empirical well-being research – as being the *hedonistic* concept of well-being based on utilitarian traditions. It requires consideration, however, that components of the other dependent variable – civic participation – (such as public activity and involvement) have much in common with the *eudaimonic* concept of well-being as “good action” (Ryan and Deci 2001, Wood and Joseph 2009).

There is a relatively rarely-used concept in empirical social research; *dignity*, which we tried to measure during our research. It can be presumed that the neglect of the problem of dignity may stem from it being an abstract notion, rarely injured in normal cases, and thus having little variability. But, giving it a second thought, one may easily realize that amidst conditions of wars, crises, suppression and defenselessness, the injury to dignity might take on a mass dimension and affect generations. Under the circumstances of both crises and consolidation there may be life situations and organizational settings in which dignity is easily harmed: old age, illness, hospitalization and imprisonment are likely to enhance the chance of grave and frequent injury to dignity (Kathib and Armenian 2010). Workplaces and various sites of everyday life – from transport to shopping – also offer multiple opportunities for potential harm to be caused to one's sense of dignity (Hodson 2004). As this paper was written within the topic of research on the civic integration of immigrants, we can hypothesize that immigration is a life event for which examination of the concept of dignity might be important. Being an immigrant, one's dignity might be injured more frequently. This may particularly be the case in a country in which xenophobia is notably high (Göncz et al. 2011) and the level of trust is low (Giczi and Sik 2009, Tóth 2009). It appears therefore logical to hypothesize that the injury (or low level) of the sense of dignity could be paired with a high exit potential and greater civic social participation, and also that there may be positive correlation between dignity and subjective well-being. As will be seen, the relations are more intricate, and it is not always the victims of grievances that undertake civic action (Lengyel 1999, Klandermans et al. 2008).

This statement can be verified if the immigrants' socio-demographic specificities are used as control variables, for it is easy to see that immigrants constitute a special social group in terms of age, gender, schooling and economic activity. In the followings the components of action potential and sense of dignity are first described with the help of elementary statistical indicators. Next, I examine with cross tabulation and regression models what social, economic and cultural peculiarities exit inclination and sense of dignity both the Hungarians and the immigrants display. Finally, I also use regression models to explore how exit potential and sense of dignity correlate to civic participation and subjective well-being.

EXIT POTENTIAL AND SENSE OF DIGNITY

Exit potential is estimated from the factors of the inclination to migrate and inclination to entrepreneurship. If the respondent answered in the affirmative to any of the questions concerned, it resulted in a positive value for the exit index. Obviously, when they mentioned several factors, these were not added up but counted only once. The proportion of those who planned to move to another settlement or country was low for both Hungarians and immigrants at below 10%; the difference between the two sub-samples not being significant. A little higher was the proportion of those who could imagine moving to another country (one out of ten and seven, respectively),

the difference being somewhat significant. The real divergence was found with entrepreneurial inclination: in the Hungarian sub-sample about every eighth, (and for immigrants every third) said they would gladly set up on their own. As a combined effect of all this, nearly one quarter of the Hungarian sample were identified as having an inclination to exit. Similar results were arrived at in an investigation on intention to migrate conducted in the late 1990s, but while the proportion of those ready to start their own enterprise was one fifth, now it was only one eighth (Lengyel 1999). In spite of that, exit potential remained basically the same for the two years, which may suggest that, in the nineties, there was greater overlapping of those ready to enterprise and those ready to migrate than today, though the two groups are still positively correlated.

Table 1 Components of exit potential in 2011 (%)

	Hungarian society	Immigrants	N (Chi-square)
plans to move to another settlement	8.6	7.9	1416 (n.s.)
can imagine relocating to another country	10.9	14.7	1390 (3.9**)
plans to settle in another country	6.3	7.9	1411 (ns)
would gladly become an entrepreneur	13.0	32.1	1319 (71.8****)
exit potential (any of the above components)	22.9	37.2	1500 (34.1****)

In general, the overwhelming majority of statements posited to measure human dignity were found by the people in both sub-groups to be true of their situation. For the sake of easier presentation, if we take the category of strong identification, we see that a higher proportion of immigrants find that these statements are perfectly true of them.

There is one component for which the same proportion of Hungarian and immigrant respondents exactly agreed; notably, that they have the right to act upon their beliefs. When, however, the “perfectly true” and “partly true” options are combined, the self-assessment of the immigrants is more positive. Measuring the correlation on the original 5-point scale, we always find a significant difference between the Hungarian and immigrant sub-samples in each case. Kathib and Armenian (2010) examined human dignity with fourteen questions. For considerations of content and because the Cronbach alpha value indicated redundancy, we only took nine questions into account when drawing up our indicator of dignity. The combined indicator was created by adding the scores given to the nine questions and regarding the members of the upper quintile as being people with full human dignity.

Table 2 Components of human dignity in 2011 (proportion of “perfectly true” answers (%))

	Hungarian society	Immigrants	N (Chi-square, value measured on a 5-point scale)
When I am suffering physically, people (other than my family) around me usually do not know it	24.9	29	1472 (31.3****)
When things go wrong around me I usually do not blame others.	29	36.3	1480 (14.7****)
I have control over life decisions and choices, such as where to work or when I can leave home	38.6	46.7	1478 (25.5****)
I treat people the same way I like to be treated by them	48.7	61.7	1475 (34.4****)
I am free to act upon my beliefs.	49.1	47.7	1471 (16.1****)
I have a high sense of self-respect.	21.6	38.6	1469 (73.6****)
I do not feel I need to depend on other people around me to get things done	32.6	39.6	1471 (13.8****)
I have the freedom to exercise my rights as a human being	46.4	61.3	1467 (51.8****)
I respect other people	47.5	67.1	1478 (79.7****)
Sense of dignity	46.4	61.9	1442 (30.9****)

If we take the means of basic breakdowns, we find that Hungarian society and the immigrants considerably diverge in terms of exit inclination and sense of dignity.

Table 3 Exit potential and human dignity for Hungarians and immigrants (mean scores)

	exit inclination	sense of dignity
Hungarians	0.23	0.46
Immigrants	0.37	0.62
F	35****	31****

The breakdown reveals that exit potential is considerably higher for immigrants than for Hungarian society as a whole. (N. B. Using Hirschman's other kind of response, voice – to be analyzed later – the tendency is that the immigrants resort to using it in far smaller proportions than members of the Hungarian society.)

Compared to less than half the Hungarian sub-sample, three immigrants out of five thought that their sense of dignity was “above average”. As noted in the introduction, this cannot be independent of the special composition of the group of immigrants: they are younger, there are a greater proportion of men, they are more highly educated, their activity rate is higher and there are proportionately more entrepreneurs among them. The question is whether the different exit potentials and different levels of human dignity remain unchanged for Hungarians and immigrants if they are checked using socio-demographic control variables. There are two ways of testing this: either

with three-dimensional tables or with logistic regression models where immigration and the socio-demographic variables are jointly included.

Table 4 Exit potential and sense of dignity for immigrants and Hungarians by gender (%)

		Exit potential	N (chi-square)	dignity	N (chi-square)
male	Hungarians	25.5	466 (12.7****)	45.3	446 (21.6****)
	Immigrants	38.1	231	63.5	255
female	Hungarians	20.4	534 (21.4****)	47.4	519 (9.7****)
	Immigrants	36.2	232	59.9	222

The sub-samples retain their difference when exit potential is broken down by gender. For women the difference is even greater. In the immigrant group there are a comparably higher proportion of both men and women (nearly two-fifths) who are willing to exit. By contrast, not only is the proportion lower for Hungarians, but men and women diverge: one quarter of men and one fifth of women are inclined to exit (i.e. would be willing to change and move on in terms of geographic or social space).

In terms of dignity, no considerable difference is found between men and women, but the advantage of the immigrants remains even if the sample groups are examined through gender. Here, the sub-sample of immigrants displays a difference between men and women: while less than half of Hungarian men and women testify to having a keen sense of dignity, this proportion is nearly two thirds for male immigrants and three-fifths for immigrant women. It is therefore verified that the sense of dignity of immigrant women is lower than that of the men, but it is still higher than the human dignity of both Hungarian women and men.

Table 5 Exit potential and human dignity for immigrants and Hungarians by age (%)

		exit inclination	N (Chi-square)	dignity	N (Chi-square)
-39	Hungarians	37.8	396 (n.s.)	46.3	382 (19.9****)
	Immigrants	42	290	63.9	277
40-	Hungarians	12.9	604 (31.4****)	46.4	582 (9.8****)
	Immigrants	29.9	211	59.2	201

There is no difference in exit potential between the sub-samples when controlled for by age. At the same time, in terms of exit inclination the divergence between the younger and older generations is far greater for the sample of Hungarian society. The age distribution of immigrants is more homogeneous and they are younger on average; this is why age plays a lesser role in exit potential, even though it is still significant.

When broken down to age groups, differences in sense of dignity between the sub-samples still remain considerable. As can be seen, less than half the Hungarians and over three fifths of immigrants have a strong sense of human dignity. Also, Hungarian society is not divided in terms of dignity into a younger and older group, while younger immigrants score more highly. However, even older immigrants have a sense of greater dignity than younger Hungarians.

Table 6 Exit potential and human dignity for immigrants and Hungarians by schooling (%)

		exit potential	N (Chi-square)	dignity	N (Chi-square)
primary school, vocational training	Hungarians	18.8	574 (10.8****)	41.3	550 (ns)
	Immigrants	31.8	132	50	120
secondary or tertiary	Hungarians	28.3	424 (10.3****)	53.4	414 (12.5****)
	Immigrants	39.1	368	65.9	358

Higher education is an important explanatory factor for exit inclination for both the Hungarian and the immigrant sub-sample, but at identical levels of schooling the difference between Hungarians and immigrants still remains significant. The higher the level of schooling, the smaller the difference (but it remains significant and considerable).

Although there is considerable difference between less highly-educated Hungarians and immigrants in terms of dignity (in favor of the latter), the correlation is not significant because within the immigrant sample there are too few people with a low education. The difference in dignity between Hungarians and the immigrants is even greater when the more highly educated are looked at. It is also found that schooling influences a respondent's sense of dignity positively and significantly for both sub-samples.

Table 7 Exit potential and human dignity for immigrants and Hungarians by "activity" (%)

		Exit potential	N (Chi-square)	dignity	N (Chi-square)
inactive	Hungarian society	16.3	540 (39.7****)	39.8	518 (14.2****)
	Immigrants	34.2	158	58.9	151
active	Hungarian society	30.3	458 (4.6****)	53.9	445 (12.8****)
	Immigrants	38.4	341	63.4	325

There is a particularly great difference between Hungarian society and immigrants concerning exit potential when the inactive people are considered. Inactive Hungarians are massively underrepresented among those who would choose one or another exit option. The difference between the active groups is less conspicuous but still significant. Typically, inactive immigrants would opt to exit (emigration, relocation or entrepreneurship) in greater proportions than active Hungarians.

In terms of human dignity, the difference remains between Hungarians and immigrants to the benefit of the latter when compared along the dimension of economic activity. Among the inactive the difference between the two sub-samples is considerably greater than for the active. However, there are a higher proportion of inactive immigrants with full dignity than active Hungarians.

When the combined effect of the above factors is examined with binary logistic models (not detailed here), we find that gender does not play a noticeable role, either in exit inclination or in human dignity. The most important predictors of exit potential are age (i.e. being young) and economic activity. Schooling plays a smaller but significant role.

As regards sense of dignity, neither gender nor age plays a role. By contrast, education has a significant and positive role, similarly to activity and the immigration status. These factors together provide a more exact and stronger prediction of potential to exit than human dignity.

Immigration status controlled by demographic variables, as well as schooling and economic activity, influences both the exit potential and the sense of dignity in a significant, positive way.

It can be stated in general that there is a significant and positive correlation between exit potential and human dignity for both Hungarian society and for immigrants.

Table 8 Correlation between exit potential and human dignity for Hungarians and for immigrants (%)

		human dignity: no	human dignity: yes	N	Phi
Hungarians	exit potential : no	56.1	43.9	748	.1****
	exit potential : yes	44.7	55.3	217	
Immigrants	exit potential : no	43.4	56.6	304	.15****
	exit potential : yes	28.3	71.7	173	

For immigrants, human dignity is higher in both groups of high exit potential than for Hungarian groups, and the correlation between exit and dignity is somewhat stronger.

CORRELATION OF EXIT POTENTIAL AND SENSE OF DIGNITY WITH MATERIAL, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL RESOURCES FOR HUNGARIAN SOCIETY AND IMMIGRANTS

From among material resources, the variables that directly or indirectly show labor or capital market presence are taken into consideration. The first one is the “active-inactive” distinction (we consider the earners, the unemployed and those on maternity leave as being among the active. In terms of several attitude variables, students are also closer to this group than to pensioners and household dependents, yet they are considered as being inactive as they are not present on the labor market).

For Hungarians, every third active person (and among the inactive, only every tenth) displays inclination to exit, i.e. to move to another settlement, to go to another country or start an enterprise. The unemployed have notably high exit potential; two out of five opting for exit. This rate is considerably up from results of fifteen years ago, although for the whole population the proportions are unchanged (Lengyel 1999). Unskilled and semi-skilled workers – that is, those in marginal positions on the labor market – are underrepresented in terms of exit potential, when compared to the unemployed. Having an above-average income shows no correlation with exit potential – presumably because of the uncertainties of such data – but having above-average wealth greatly increases the chances of exit.

Table 9 Exit potential and human dignity by material resources for categories of Hungarian society and immigrants

	Hungarians				Immigrants			
	exit potential		sense of dignity		exit potential		sense of dignity	
	%	N, phi,sign.	%	N, phi, sign.	%	N, phi, sign.	%	N, phi, sign.
Adult population	22.9	1001	46.4	963	37.2	500	61.9	478
Active population	32.3	581 .26****	50.8	561 .10****	38.8	363 n.s.	62.9	348 n.s.
Inactive population	10.2	420	40.3	402	32.8	137	59.2	130
Unemployed	41.2	102 .15****	36.4	99 .03*	71.4	14 .12****	50.0	14 n.s.
Workers	29.8	446 .15****	54.5	433 .15****	38.8	338 n.s.	63.4	320 n.s.
Leaders, professionals, white- collar workers	31.5	327 n.s.	57.8	315 .11*	37.3	314 n.s.	63.2	399 n.s.
Workers in marginal labor market positions	17.5	298 .08***	39.0	272 .09***	26.5	34 n.s.	31.3	32 .17****
Entrepreneurs	27.6	58 n.s.+	69	55 .11**	38.5	109 n.s.+	73.5	102 .4****
Individuals with above-average income	21.4	419 n.s.	51.7	412 .09****	38.5	205 n.s.	60.6	198 n.s.
Households with above-average income	24.3	383 n.s.	51.2	369 .08**	43.9	173 .1**	59.1	171 n.s.
Those with above- average wealth	28.8	416 .12****	54.3	409 .14****	43.5	306 .16****	66.0	300 .11**
Housing conditions (prefab, emergency)	23.0	273 n.s.	39.5	253 .08***	30.6	235 .13****	61.0	223 n.s.

Note: + measured only by migration components

In many regards, human dignity parallels exit potential and generally positively correlates to the indicators of labor and capital markets. While, for the unemployed, those who opt for exit are overrepresented, those with full dignity are underrepresented. Since human dignity comprises independence, justice, respect, freedom, self-respect and since in the lives of the unemployed each and every of these components is vulnerable, this finding may seem obvious. It is thoroughly documented in the sociographic and sociological literature how unemployment and marginal labor market position influence human dignity (Hodson 2004, Burawoy 1979, Jahoda 1999, Simonyi 2001, Liebow 2003).

At first sight it might be surprising that the correlation between unemployment and human dignity is only weakly significant. This is attributable, first of all, to the low number, since there is a nearly 20% gap between workers and the unemployed in terms of human dignity. Considerably below average is the sense of dignity of those employed in marginal work. Compared to the adult population, professionals employed in the competitive sphere and white-collar workers in the public sphere are

also underrepresented in terms of dignity. Examined by sectors, those in the financial sector, education and culture, as well as agriculture, report to having less dignity. Indices of income and wealth as material resource indicators are in significant and positive correlation with dignity, although their effect is weaker than that of being an entrepreneur or occupying a central position in the labor market.

For immigrants, the indicators chosen to operationalize material resources explain exit potential and human dignity to a lesser extent. Though the inactive show below-average inclination to exit, the correlation is not significant since the greater active majority of immigrants have a close-to-average attitude. It is unemployment that stimulates them to an above-average extent to opt for exit. Besides, similarly to with Hungarian society, those who are better off than average also show above-average inclination to be mobile.

Having an above-average sense of dignity is primarily contributed to by property status and entrepreneurship for immigrants. Migrants in marginal labor market positions experience injuries to their dignity to about the same extent as Hungarians do in similar situations. Professionals employed in the competitive sphere also feel that their dignity is below the average of the immigrants, though they are not so vulnerable as the former group. Their score is close to the average of Hungarian society.

As has been seen, immigrants differ from Hungarian society on many counts, including schooling. Less than one in every tenth had no more than primary education, as compared to more than every third Hungarian. At the other end of the scale, compared to every seventh Hungarian, more than one in every four had tertiary education. Three quarters of the Hungarian sub-sample which represented adult Hungarian society spoke no foreign languages, and only every twelfth spoke two or more. For immigrants the proportion of the latter is nearly three fifths, which is not surprising. It is the most marked cultural difference between the two sub-samples. When, among the recommendations concerning migration – such as those put forth after our earlier research – it is stressed that one of the major preconditions for immigrant integration is language knowledge, it must also be added that the key to the international integration of Hungarian society is also the learning of foreign languages *en masse*. As for the other important indicator of cultural resources – the use of the Internet – there are considerable differences to the advantage of the immigrants: while nearly half of the Hungarian adult population does not use the internet at all and nearly one third are daily users, only every eighth immigrant does not use it and every second uses it regularly.

When asked about their subjective well-being, over half of the Hungarian sample replied that they lived “below average” and nearly one third thought they lived at an “above average” standard of living. For immigrants it is the other way round; a quarter of them think they live worse and nearly half think they live better than average. A quarter of all Hungarians think they get more from society than they contribute, and nearly half think they get less than they contribute, meaning that they believe they deserve more. For migrants only slightly higher is the proportion of those who think they get more

than they deserve, but considerably lower is the proportion of those who feel they get less from society than they contribute.

Ten per cent of Hungarians claimed they had no friends; the corresponding figure for immigrants being a negligible 3%. A third of Hungarians and three-fifths of immigrants said they had ten or more friends. As for cognitive mobilization, the situation is reversed. The proportion of Hungarians who often discuss political issues with their friends is one seventh – relatively low – but is even lower, (half of this) for immigrants. The number of friends indicator measures the extent of primary relations, while cognitive mobilization is meant to estimate its intensity. The latter also divulges much about a society's inclination for participation. All this applies to the whole of Hungarian society. It is not known how intensely immigrants use their primary relations as profound friendships (for the purpose of mutual help and resource-enlargement, or whether they are merely used for recreational pastimes). It is a fact that immigrants are less interested in the public affairs of Hungary than the majority, and they utilize to a lesser extent the potential of personal networks to satisfy their interests in public issues.

For Hungarian society, the majority of cultural and social resources reinforce the tendency to exit. Thus, Hungarians with a maximum of 8 years of education choose this option far less than the average, and tertiary graduates choose it to an above-average degree (however, the effect of the latter is not significant, owing to their small proportion). The great majority who do not speak foreign languages opt for exit in below average proportions, while those who speak two or more languages are open to exiting at a high (almost double the average) rate. The experience of info-communication has a similar effect. Those who do not use the Internet show even less inclination than the little educated to opt for various forms of exit, while regular Internet users have a higher exit potential than the highly educated. In this case the statistical connection is particularly strong, which is attributed to the fact that the frequency of the cells is more even; nearly one third of respondents being regular Internet users. The three-grade scale variable which estimates subjective well-being is not strongly correlated with exit potential (it seems certain, however, that if the lower and upper quintiles of the eleven-grade scale were to be examined, the correlation would be stronger). Another indicator of subjective social status – the evaluation of the balance between the respondent's contribution to and his/her benefiting from society – suggests interesting implications. About a quarter of respondents felt they received more from society than they could contribute, and for these people exit potential was considerably below average. The most probable explanation is that aged inactive people are overrepresented in this category and they interpret their position in accord with dominant social stereotypes. As said above, each eleventh person self-reported to having no friends, while exit potential is lower for them than for any of the so-far mentioned groups: 10 %. By contrast, those who have many friends show a far above average interest in exit options, and the correlation is nearly as strong as with the info-communicational cultural resource. The correlation is also strong and significant in terms of cognitive mobilization. Those who never chat about political issues with

their friends have below-average exit potential, and those who regularly do have a well above-average inclination to exit.

For immigrants, the majority of cultural and social resources do not help to differentiate exit potential. At the same time, these subtler social categories (with one exception) have greater power to affect exit potential than for Hungarian society. The exception is with Internet use, since for those who do not use the Internet, exit inclination is very low for both sub-samples. The essential difference is that Internet non-users constituted nearly half the Hungarian sample at the time of the survey in 2011, but only about one eighth of all immigrants.

Human dignity closely correlates with schooling; one and a half times as many tertiary graduates identify with having a dignified self-image than those with lower schooling. Knowledge of languages and IT do not imply such great divergences. About half of the Hungarian respondents thought that they had below-average social status and their sense of dignity was also well below average, while the thirty percent who claimed to live better than the average also had an above-average sense of dignity, since the components of dignity and subjective social self-assessment both induced similar reflections in the respondents. A correlation of similar direction and intensity was shown by the other indicator of subjective life quality which weighed the “give and take” balance between respondent and society. The sense of dignity of those who felt that what they received from society was far more than the effort they put into society is far more vulnerable than average, while those who think they contribute more than they get from society – who amount to nearly half of the sample – report to having more dignity more than the average.

The dignity of those who have no friends is considerably more vulnerable; from all resources, a lack of primary relationships (i.e. friends) causes the greatest drop in dignity. By contrast, people with many friends have a greater sense of dignity. This particularly holds true of cognitive mobilization, indicative of the intensity of friendships: those who often discuss political issues with friends and acquaintances have a sense of dignity one and a half times higher than average. For immigrants, the proportion of people with a sense of dignity is higher on average and for nearly every examined dimension, too. The exception is again for those who do not use the Internet: proportionately even fewer of them reported having a sense of human dignity than for the corresponding group of Hungarians. This (one-third) proportion, which is very low for immigrants, is equal with the proportion of those without friends. Those immigrants, however, who have no friends, constitute a very small group: for the Hungarian sub-sample it is every fourteenth person but for immigrants only every thirty-third that had no friends. The small group size may explain why the correlation is not significant, although the proportion of the dignified is very low for those with no friends.

Table 10 Exit potential and human dignity by social and cultural resources for categories of Hungarian society and immigrants

	Hungarians				Immigrants			
	Exit potential		Human dignity		Exit potential		Human dignity	
	%	N, phi, sign.	%	N, phi, sign.	%	N, phi, sign.	%	N, phi, sign.
Adult population	22.9	1001	46.4	963	37.2	500	61.9	478
Schooling: 8 grades of less	15.8	361 .13****	36.7	341 .15****	25.5	47 n.s.	40.9	44 .14****
Schooling: higher education	28.1	135 n.s.	62.7	134 .13****	40.9	132 n.s.	69.5	131 .1****
Languages: knows no foreign language	18.1	725 .19****	44.3	700 n.s.	27.3	73 n.s.	49.2	65 .13**
Languages: knows 2 or more foreign languages	42.2	83	51.3	78	39.7	295 n.s.	66.7	282
Internet use: does not use it	12.2	482 .25****	43.2	458 n.s.	12.3	65 .21****	35.9	64 .23****
Internet use: uses it daily	36.3	317	50.7	304	43.0	251	70.0	237
Self-assessment of social status: below average	21.9	511 n.s.	37.5	488 .19****	32.6	135 n.s.	50.0	126 .15****
Self-assessment of social status: above average	25.8	299	58.9	292	39.1	230	67.9	224
Subjective social status 2: gets more from society than contributes	15.6	257 .12****	30.8	247 .19****	32.9	143 n.s.	58.2	134 n.s.
Social self-assessment, subjective social status 2: gets less from society than contributes	22.7	467	52.7	455	36.8	163	61.0	159
Friends: none	10.1	89 .2****	25.3	75 .17****	31.3	16 n.s.	33.3	15 n.s.
Friends: 10 or more friends	34.9	301	56.3	293	36.3	271 n.s.	62.5	259
Cognitive mobilization: almost never speaks about politics with friends, acquaintances	18.0	428 .13****	43.3	404 .15****	37.3	260 n.s.	62.8	247 n.s.
Cognitive mobilization: frequently talks about politics with friends	34.7	144	64.3	140	38.9	36 n.s.	69.8	36

Table 11 Multivariate analysis: impact of resources on exit potential and human dignity (Hungarians and immigrants)

	Hungarians				Immigrants			
	exit potential		human dignity		exit potential		Human dignity	
	Exp (B)	Sign.	Exp (B)	Sign.	Exp (B)	Sign.	Exp (B)	Sign.
labor market activity	2.511	.000	1.401	.083	1.523	.219	1.312	.400
marginal labor market position	1.143	.661	.841	.473	.901	.844	.358	.042
unfavorable housing conditions	1.122	.560	.740	.076	.513	.003	.880	.569
leader, professional. white-collar worker	1.071	.727	1.431	.028	.433	.007	.890	.700
unemployed	1.809	.049	.684	.184	5.044	.029	1.366	.661
above-average income	.683	.129	1.182	.377	.917	.765	1.084	.775
above-average household income	1.030	.898	1.030	.872	1.883	.025	.646	.110
number of friends (base=0)		.000		.005		.850		.404
number of friends 1–9	1.108	.801	2.003	.025	1.037	.959	2.306	.191
number of friends 10+	2.267	.048	2.757	.002	1.174	.817	2.016	.267
school: primary	1.242	.482	.822	.422	1.061	.897	.678	.374
Internet use (base=0)		.000		.055		.000		.069
Internet use: weekly or rarer	2.489	.006	.584	.065	1.824	.248	1.361	.465
Internet use: several times a week	2.451	.004	.727	.229	4.387	.001	1.850	.095
Internet use: every, or nearly every day	3.709	.000	.567	.011	5.250	.000	2.358	.015
cognitive mobilization: (base= never discusses politics with friends)		.110		.001		.284		.912
cognitive mobilization: rarely discusses politics with friends	1.221	.321	.896	.509	.763	.244	.918	.712
cognitive mobilization: often discusses politics with friends	1.729	.036	2.083	.002	.566	.181	1.053	.903
social self-assessment (base= below average)		.025		.000		.808		.457
social self-assessment: average	.603	.045	1.469	.054	.816	.524	1.035	.911
social self-assessment: above average	.574	.013	2.254	.000	.914	.757	1.342	.295
knowledge of foreign language (base=0)		.087		.642		.158		.223
1 foreign language	1.434	.104	1.122	.578	2.052	.065	1.558	.219
2 or more foreign languages	1.786	.057	.833	.548	1.885	.079	1.770	.083
constant	.049	.000	.291	.000	.142	.020	.289	.087
N,	870		842		446		434	
Nagelkerke R square	.22		.14		.17		.12	
Correctly rated cases (%)	78.2		62.6		70.3		68.2	

Note: Binary logistic regression, enter method

In explaining exit potential, labor market activity and unemployment, the extent and intensity of primary social relations (number of friends and cognitive mobilization), subjective social self-assessment and digital literacy (frequency of Internet use) are the components of the material, cultural and social resources that play a great role for Hungarians.

For immigrants, a very strong positive impact on exit potential is caused by unemployment and a negative effect by being employed as a leader/employed professional/white-collar worker. Also negative was the effect of unfavorable housing, while the intensity of Internet use and household income positively influenced this factor. It can be said that both positive and negative factors may boost exist inclination.

In the Hungarian sub-sample, the likelihood of a high sense of dignity can be increased by having a leading, professional or white-collar job, by number of friends and by having a positive subjective social self-assessment. By contrast, intensive Internet usage, controlled using the effect of the other variables, suggests a lower-than-average sense of human dignity.

For immigrants, the latter phenomenon is quite the opposite; digital literacy enhances the sense of dignity. This may be due to the use of the Internet for recreational purposes or its use in extending the resource pool, and to the age distribution of users. For immigrants the most powerfully negative effect on dignity is having a marginal labor market position – as the table analyses have already shown.

The models more strongly explain exit potential and human dignity for Hungarian society than for immigrants. On the whole, the correlation of resources is stronger with exit potential than with human dignity in both sub-samples.

CORRELATION OF EXIT POTENTIAL AND HUMAN DIGNITY WITH CIVIC PARTICIPATION

Two components of civic participation – voice inclination and non-profit organizations membership – were examined. (The variables are described in the chapter of Borbála Göncz, in this volume.)

Table 12 Correlation of exit potential and human dignity to voice inclination and membership in non-profit organizations (Hungarians and immigrants [phi, sign])

	Hungarians			Immigrants		
	dignity	voice potential	non-profit org. membership	dignity	voice potential	non-profit org. membership
exit potential	.1****	n.s.	.05**	.15****	.16****	.07**
human dignity	-	.17****	.1****	-	ns	ns
voice potential		-	.25****		-	.26****

Two clarification statements are needed here. First, it is true that for immigrants voice potential is lower and exit potential is higher than for members of Hungarian society. Second, the two forms of action potential are not significantly correlated for Hungarians but are in significant positive correlation for immigrants: every seventh immigrant takes part in protest action. For those whose inclination to exit is stronger, it is every fifth person.

Table 13 Influence of exit potential and sense of dignity (controlled for resources) upon voice potential and non-profit organizations membership (Hungarians and immigrants)

	Hungarians				Immigrants			
	voice potential		non-profit organizations membership		voice potential		non-profit organizations membership	
	Exp (B)	sign.	Exp (B)	sign.	Exp (B)	sign.	Exp (B)	sign.
labor market activity	1.230	.371	1.202	.402	.673	.375	2.408	.030
marginal labor market position	1.304	.370	.512	.017	2.042	.374	3.104	.111
unfavorable housing conditions	1.088	.672	1.313	.142	.493	.043	.514	.016
leader, professional, white-collar worker	1.180	.387	.919	.644	.517	.109	.139	.000
unemployed	.659	.226	.700	.316	.708	.767	.332	.337
above-average income	.700	.132	1.780	.007	.935	.874	1.118	.749
above-average household income	1.412	.124	1.278	.228	.406	.035	1.210	.582
number of friends (base=0)		1.000		.161		.951		.301
number of friends 1–9	.999	.998	2.137	.056	1.431	.756	2.721	.409
number of friends 10+	.995	.989	2.022	.090	1.370	.783	3.760	.269
schooling: primary	.783	.423	1.200	.511	.156	.123	.051	.010
Internet use (base=0)		.442		.412		.001		.001
Internet use: weekly or rarer	1.146	.687	1.664	.092	5.659	.031	6.136	.019
Internet use: several times a week	1.220	.507	1.231	.463	2.475	.240	13.862	.000
Internet use: every day, almost daily	.797	.398	1.199	.461	.959	.957	6.665	.009
cognitive mobilization: (base= never speaks about politics with friends)		.000		.000		.006		.271
cognitive mobilization: rarely speaks about politics with friends	2.252	.000	1.553	.020	1.513	.243	.657	.128
cognitive mobilization: often speaks about politics with friends	7.270	.000	2.746	.000	5.242	.002	1.049	.920
social self-assessment (base= below average)		.242		.852		.022		.047
social self-assessment: average	.658	.092	.972	.900	2.860	.051	.668	.316
social self-assessment: above average	.865	.507	1.097	.650	4.088	.006	1.442	.307
foreign language, (base=0)		.003		.145		.283		.058
knowledge of 1 foreign language	2.100	.001	.991	.966	2.536	.201	2.909	.053
knowledge of 2 or more foreign languages	1.884	.053	1.773	.060	2.920	.113	3.373	.017
exit potential	.881	.554	1.027	.895	2.625	.004	.944	.832
sense of dignity	1.813	.001	1.034	.849	.979	.949	.691	.174
Constant	.098	.000	.076	.000	.017	.006	.018	.006
N,	842		842		434		434	
Nagelkerke R square	.2		.16		.27		.32	
correctly rated cases (%)	76.9		74.1		89.3		79.0	

Note: Binary logistic regression, enter method

In Hungarian society, voice potential significantly positively correlates with human dignity and cultural resources (first of all cognitive mobilization and language skills). However, there is no significant correlation between exit potential and voice potential. This correlation does not exist at the elementary level either: about a quarter of the adult population was inclined to voice protest, and a similar proportion would choose it among those with exit option. By contrast, there is a significant positive correlation between voice potential and membership in non-profit organizations: every one in six persons who is not a member of a non-profit organization (and more than two out of five members of non-profit organizations) have taken part in protests.

For Hungarians, a little more than a quarter are members of non-profit organizations; this is significantly correlated to cognitive mobilization (friendships also exert a positive effect, just on the verge of statistical significance). Non-profit organization membership is positively correlated with income and negatively with marginal labor market position. Exit potential and sense of dignity are not correlated to non-profit organization membership when controlled for using resources. This is remarkable, because one of the components of human dignity is an ability to reflect upon the social environment.

Voice potential is lower for immigrants than for Hungarian society. Having this characteristic applies to every seventh immigrant and correlates to exit potential, cognitive mobilization, positive social self-assessment and digital literacy. Above-average household income and unfavorable housing conditions tend to decrease voice inclination, which suggests at first sight that the role of material resources is mixed. Since, however, very broad dichotomous categories are used, and the level of significance is low, we may assume that social and cultural resources play a more important role in explaining voice potential than material conditions do.

Also about a quarter of all immigrants are members of non-profit organizations and membership is not influenced by either exit potential or having a sense of dignity. Cultural resources, on the other hand (primarily digital literacy and schooling), have a strong impact. Leaders, professionals and white-collar workers are involved in non-profit organizations to a below average extent, which is probably ascribable to the fact that there are more white-collar workers and professionals in the competitive sphere than “leaders” who are generally characterized by having above-average activity in non-profit organizations.

CORRELATION OF EXIT POTENTIAL, HUMAN DIGNITY AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION WITH SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING

Subjective well-being is interpreted as being the mean of satisfaction and happiness, and for easier comparison we use the dichotomous categories of “not above average” and “above average” SWB.

It does not hold that there is negative correlation between exit potential and subjective well-being: the connection was found to be negligible for both Hungarians and immigrants. If we examine subjective well-being by its components (because we suspect that dissatisfaction and exit potential may be correlated), we find that there is no such correlation - and this applies to happiness as well. N. B. Voice potential, unlike exit potential, has a significant correlation with subjective well-being. Those who have taken part in some kind of protest claim to be more satisfied and happier than the Hungarian average. For immigrants this correlation is not significant.

Table 14 Correlation of action potential, human dignity and membership of non-profit organization with subjective well-being (above-average SWB within each category, %)

	Hungarians		Immigrants	
	SWB	sign.	SWB	sign.
exit inclination: no	40.1	n.s.	77.5	n.s.
exit inclination: yes	41.6		75.6	
dignity: no	31.2	.21****	65.3	.19****
dignity: yes	51.7		83.4	
voice inclination: no	37.7	.1****	75.8	n.s.
voice inclination: yes	48.5		80.6	
non-profit org. member: no	37.4	.1****	72.7	.15****
non-profit org. member: yes	48.1		87.4	

By contrast, a sense of dignity goes together with having above-average happiness and greater satisfaction for both sub-samples. The mean of subjective well-being is considerably higher for immigrants.

For Hungarians, neither exit potential nor voice inclination correlates with subjective well-being. Dignity and self-assessed social standing by contrast, show strong and positive correlation to satisfaction and happiness. It is not so much the number as the existence of friends that also positively influences subjective well-being, and digital literacy also has a positive impact. Under controlled conditions, there is a weak negative correlation between subjective well-being and labor market position (table analyses do not indicate the latter). Unemployment itself is negatively linked to subjective well-being, and presumably this causes the distortion of the activity effect in the model (remember: the unemployed belong to the "active" group). This is supported by the fact that if the unemployment variable is omitted from the model, the significance of "activity" increases.

Table 15 Controlled effect of action potential, sense of dignity and membership of non-profit organization upon subjective well-being (Hungarians and immigrants)

	Hungarians		Immigrants	
	Exp (B)	sign.	Exp (B)	sign.
labor market activity	.573	.018	1.070	.883
marginal labor market position	.758	.353	.310	.064
unfavorable housing	.986	.946	.886	.706
leader, professional, white-collar worker	1.287	.198	.880	.781
unemployed	.980	.954	.085	.016
above-average income	.751	.214	1.165	.682
above-average household income	1.053	.815	1.459	.308
number of friends (base=0)		.048		.068
number of friends 1–9	1.210	.640	3.916	.104
number of friends 10+	1.892	.133	5.798	.034
schooling: primary	.733	.302	3.809	.048
Internet use (base=0)		.112		.001
Internet use: weekly or rarer	1.560	.182	1.315	.599
Internet use: several times a week	1.345	.337	4.730	.003
Internet use: every day, almost daily	1.878	.018	4.509	.002
cognitive mobilization: (base= never speaks about politics with friends)		.615		.623
cognitive mobilization: rarely speaks about politics with friends	.849	.423	.730	.333
cognitive mobilization: often speaks about politics with friends	1.048	.869	.891	.855
social self-assessment (base= below average)		.000		.000
social self-assessment: average	4.080	.000	2.531	.015
social self-assessment: above average	9.848	.000	7.069	.000
foreign language (base=0)		.861		.362
knowledge of 1 foreign language	1.019	.938	2.010	.184
knowledge of 2 or more foreign languages	1.212	.586	1.347	.539
exit potential	.715	.136	.505	.044
sense of dignity	1.783	.002	2.207	.011
voice potential	1.385	.136	1.417	.477
non-profit organization membership	1.306	.188	1.519	.323
Constant	.145	.000	.051	.005
N,	810		410	
Nagelkerke R square	.4		.4	
correctly rated cases (%)	77.2		85.2	

Note: Binary logistic regression, enter method

In the sub-sample of immigrants, both the number of friends and cultural resources have a positive and significant impact on subjective well-being and both exit potential and human dignity are related to subjective well-being, but the correlation runs in different directions. Exit potential correlates to lower SWB, while a sense of dignity – similarly as with the Hungarian sub-sample – is positively correlated to SWB. It should be emphasized that under controlled conditions there is a negative correlation between exit inclination and subjective well-being, since in the two-dimensional table analyses this connection was not verifiable. In other words, given an identical combination of resources, high exit potential goes together with low subjective well-being.

Since SWB is operationalized as the mean of cognitive and affective aspects – satisfaction and happiness (after Inglehart's proposition) – it is worth checking whether the two components of subjective well-being display equally negative and significant correlation to exit potential.

When we tested these with elementary table statistics we found that exit potential was not related either to satisfaction or to happiness. Voice shows weak positive correlation to satisfaction and a strong positive correlation to happiness for Hungarians (immigrants who had never taken part in protests claimed to be happier, but the correlation is not significant).

When examining the models controlled by resources (with components of SWB being separately included), we find that the exit inclination shows no correlation to satisfaction under controlled conditions, but for immigrants exit inclination and a lack of happiness are strongly correlated. This causes the correlation between exit inclination and subjective well-being.

THE SOCIAL PROFILE OF IMMIGRANTS: SOME CONCLUSIONS

Finally, an attempt is made to outline the social profile of immigrants on the basis of the characteristics examined and a summary of conclusions is presented. For this purpose, a logistic regression model is built, the dependent variable of which is the dichotomy of immigrants and Hungarians, and the explanatory variables are the (formerly examined) resources and demographic variables, as well as action potential, dignity and civic participation.

As regards their positions on the labor market, a well-above average proportion of immigrants are entrepreneurs, leaders, professionals or white-collar workers. Concerning their living conditions on the other hand, more than average live in prefabricated housing, which is related to the fact that the overwhelming majority live in cities. Their foreign language knowledge is greater by magnitudes than average, and also they make above-average use of the Internet. They also have friends more than average. Cognitive mobilization, voice inclination and engagement in civic participation are less frequent than average. When endowed with the same resources, they have the same human dignity and exit inclination as average.

Table 16 Characteristics of immigrants in terms of resources, action potential, civic participation and subjective well-being

	Exp (B)	sign.		Exp (B)	sign.
unfavorable housing	1.809	.009	foreign language (base=0)		.000
above-average income	.848	.566	knowledge of 1 foreign language	8.458	.000
above average household income	.784	.397	knowledge of 2 or more languages	68.487	.000
number of friends (base=0)		.006	exit potential	1.129	.622
number of friends 1–9	.895	.843	sense of dignity	.819	.383
number of friends 10+	1.805	.290	voice potential	.195	.000
schooling: primary	.689	.450	non-profit org. membership	.385	.000
Internet use (base=0)		.060	active	1.323	.681
Internet use: weekly or rarer	1.689	.213	unemployed	.465	.324
Internet use: several times a week	1.609	.217	leader, professional, white-collar worker	3.535	.000
Internet use: every day, almost daily	.806	.549	marginal labor m. position	1.154	.755
cognitive mobilization: (base= never speaks about politics with friends)		.000	above average subjective well-being	3.591	.000
cognitive mobilization: rarely speaks	.490	.003	worker	1.347	.632
cognitive mobilization: often speaks	.234	.000	age 40+	1.760	.023
social self-assessment (base= below average)		.973	entrepreneur	2.027	.023
social self-assessment: average	1.042	.896	male	1.012	.958
social self-assessment: above average	1.074	.815	constant	.006	.000
N= 1500 ; Nagelkerke R square= 0.67, correctly rated cases: 88.6 %					

Note: Binary logistic regression, enter method

As presumed at the beginning, exit potential is higher for immigrants than for Hungarians. This was verified when simple proportions were compared, and was also confirmed through checking using three-dimensional distributions and by the combination of activity, schooling and demographic variables. For immigrants there is an above average potential for exit and sense of dignity and a below average voice potential and average participation in non-profit organizations. When, however, correlations

are controlled using a broader set of resources, exit shows no notable correlation to immigrant status, and the same applies to sense of dignity. Thus these particular characteristics of immigrants (above-average exit potential and a higher degree of dignity) must be attributed to a different combination of resources and the different age structure of the immigrant population. The below average voice inclination of the group of immigrants cannot be solely ascribed to their specific social composition, as it remains in the extended model as well. Though immigrants take part in non-profit organizations in average proportions, the extent of their participation is lower than that of their Hungarian counterparts with similar social-economic conditions.

The starting hypothesis of this research was that there is positive correlation between exit potential and various forms of civic participation because both rely on similar situational assessments. This can partially be verified. For immigrants there is positive correlation between exit and voice potential, when controlled for using resource variables.

It was also hypothesized that there is a negative connection between exit inclination and subjective well-being, which proved to be true, in part. Though in table statistics there is no significant connection, the model which controlled with resources shows significant correlation between these items for immigrants.

It was also presumed that immigration is a life event which may cause an individual's sense of dignity to be injured; thus dignity might be lower for migrants than for the majority of society. This hypothesis was supported by experience gained from interviews and civic discussions (see part of the results in this volume) which included several examples. Though the examples are based on real life, the hypothesis however was disproved: immigrants do not have a lower sense of dignity. Tables indicate that it is higher, owing to the composition effect, while in the combined model the correlation is not significant.

It is true that there is positive correlation between human dignity and subjective well-being, since they are subjective assessments with the same roots. The seemingly logical assumption – that injuries to one's sense of dignity (or low level of dignity) will be paired with a greater exit potential – was not substantiated: for both Hungarians and immigrants a greater sense of dignity goes together with greater exit potential. Those who would opt to change their lives, to emigrate or become entrepreneurs are not those whose dignity has been impaired but those who have a great sense of dignity and wish to live better lives.

Another logical presumption – that there is negative correlation between dignity and civic participation – was also disproved. In the sample of Hungarian society, a higher sense of dignity went together with greater voice potential. This correlation was not found with activity in non-profit organizations or for the sub-sample of the immigrants as a whole.

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PRECONDITIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: SENSE OF JUSTICE, IDENTITY, EMOTIONS, EFFICACY AND EMBEDDEDNESS

Lilla Tóth

INTRODUCTION

The participation of immigrants as active citizens in the democratic processes facilitates their integration into Hungarian society and enhances their sense of belonging. The improvement of such factors as trust in public institutions, participation in elections – for those eligible to vote – and a sense of belonging also constitute a part of official integration politics.¹

Literature about the conditions for collective action and political activity identify a few preconditions which explain individual participation. The current authors have examined the weight and characteristics of these factors for the two sub-samples, which represent the host society, on the one hand, and migrants, on the other. We look at the following factors: grievances, or observed incidences of unfairness, expectations regarding the efficacy of civic activity, identity, emotions (fear, anger), and social embeddedness. The effects of these factors on political and civic participation have been confirmed in the majority of the examined cases (Klandermans et al. 2008).

Research about the connections between the integration of immigrants and their participation in collective political action (Klandermans et al. 2008) use the following explanatory variables in interpreting collective action: the effects of grievances, the perceived efficacy of action and the effects of identity, emotions, and embeddedness in civic networks. Any time people act to represent their group with the aim of improving the conditions of the entire group can be regarded as participation in collective action.

While the social-psychological mechanisms of non-immigrant participation in collective action have been a topic of discussion in research about social movements

¹ The closing document of the 2010 European Ministerial Conference on Integration, held in Zaragoza, proposes that various indicators be introduced that assess the integration status of migrants in the Member States. One of the indicator categories is that of active citizenship.

(Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007) for quite some time, we know little about the participation of immigrants.

According to classical theories about collective action (Berkowitz 1972, Lind and Tyler 1988), people participate in collective action to express grievances stemming from relative deprivation, frustration and perceived instances of injustice.

Researchers of social movements, however, believe that the basic question is not whether the individuals participating in the protest are aggrieved, but whether those who are aggrieved engage in protest. Whether aggrieved individuals participate in protests and express their grievances is determined by factors such as efficacy, resources and opportunities (Klandermans 1984, 1997).

In recent decades, the role of identity in protest behaviour has been examined by a number of sociologists and social-psychologists (Taylor and Whittier 1992, Simon et al. 1998, De Weerd and Klandermans 1999).

The extent to which political processes can be influenced in the host country may be perceived differently by migrants than by members of the host society. As both collective identity and social embeddedness may be determined on an ethnic basis for immigrants, these factors play a key role in participation in protest activity.

GRIEVANCES

"Grievance", meanwhile, can be defined as outrage about the manner in which authorities handle a social or political problem (Klandermans 1997).

According to the theory of relative deprivation, individuals draw comparisons with their own situations according to a certain standard; their own past, the situation of others, or such abstract concepts as fairness and justice. If the comparison leads to the conclusion that a person is not receiving what he or she deserves, the resulting experience is relative deprivation. A distinction can be made between individual or group deprivation based on whether the comparison is made at the level of the individual or at a group level (Kelly and Breinlinger 1996). The role of relative deprivation at the group level is of key importance as a driver for engaging in collective action (Major 1994, Martin 1986). The cognitive components (the awareness that the person or group is receiving less than expected) have a much smaller effect on participation than the affective components, or emotions (any feelings of dissatisfaction, discontent, or indignation).

Justice-related norms

The *norm of social reciprocity* (Gross and Latané 1974) is a term in social psychology which stipulates that we are obligated to return to others the goods, services, or concessions that they offer to us. This norm can be recognized in almost every society (Gouldner 1960), with only certain small groups (children, the elderly, the ill) being exempt from having to comply. The function of norms is to ensure that individuals get back from

others what they have shared. The norm of social reciprocity strengthens bonds within a group – it facilitates trust and mutual commitment between its members.

The *norm of social commitment* states that people are required to honor their agreements and fulfill their obligations. This norm ensures that the members of a group or society behave in a predictable manner.

Norms related to the distribution of resources can vary based on the characteristics specific to the group where the distribution is realized. The *norm of justice* (Mikula 1980) often operates according to meritocratic principles, whereby rewards must be doled out in accordance with merit. In especially cohesive groups, the norm of meritocratic justice gives way to another standard of justice: the *norm of communal distribution* (Clark and Mills 1979, Fiske 1991), according to which resources must be distributed evenly, irrespective of the contribution of the given individual. The *norm of social responsibility* demands (with different levels of severity of interpretation according to culture) that those who are unable to help themselves must be helped (Berkowitz 1972, Berkowitz and Daniels 1963).

Social psychology research about interpersonal relationships has shown that people like to receive rewards that are in proportion to what they have invested. If it is perceived that allocation has been “unfair”, there will be discontent. In social relationships, it is not utilitarianism that produces contentment, but a state of balance. Those that receive proportionate rewards – those who feel that what they receive is in proportion with their investment – are more content than those who are over-rewarded. Those who feel that they are unfairly under-rewarded are likely to experience the greatest disappointment (Hatfield, Utne and Traupmann 1979).

Experimental economics literature suggests that justice is not only a precondition for social harmony and a livable society – which are important determinants for the individual at the level of cognitive processes – but that it is also built on mechanisms that are based in, and reinforced at, the biological (neurohormonal) level. Experiments have shown that individuals want justice to prevail, even if it comes at a financial cost and they do not personally benefit from it (Fehr and Gächter 2000). Furthermore, it has also been found that the act of perceiving the triumph of justice creates a neural signal that is similar to that triggered by a biologically significant, substantial reward (e.g. water in case of thirst) (De Quervain 2004).

Previous research has also indicated (Civic Discussions on Immigration, see this volume), that Hungarian society expressly expect immigrants to assimilate into society. If they fail to do so, the hosts see this as a lack of loyalty, especially if immigrants participate in protest events or movements. In these circumstances, the appropriate behaviour of migrants is difficult to decide: should immigrants stay away from protests in spite of their grievances or should they behave like any other citizens would do and express their dissatisfaction?

The theory of social justice – distributive and procedural justice

When interpersonal comparisons are drawn based on abstract principles, the concept of justice often surfaces. The theory of social justice (Rawls 1971) distinguishes between procedural and distributive (economic) justice.

Procedural justice signifies fairness in processes where disputes are resolved and resources are allocated. One aspect of procedural justice involves the administration of justice, but the idea can also be used in a non-legal context, whereby some process is used for resolving conflicts or dividing benefits or burdens amongst members of society. Procedural justice concerns such aspects of the decision-making processes as fairness, transparency and interpersonal-relations; in other words, whether the authorities treat individuals with respect, and whether one can trust that they are acting without bias, to benefit society.

Distributive justice (fair distribution, economic justice) is what is believed to be fair allocation of goods. Distributive justice ensures that every member of society receives a fair share of the available resources. At the same time, while everyone agrees that goods should be allocated in a fair manner, there is no consensus on what “fair” actually means, as the equity-based approach (allocation in proportion to contribution), the equality principle and the principle of need can equally be applied here. The just allocation of resources, or distributive justice, plays a key role in ensuring the stability of a given society and the wellbeing of its members. Experiences of injustice on the part of individuals in a society can lead to a decline in subjective well-being and to discontent. Those dealing with distributive justice often associate the concept with human rights. They argue that society is (like individuals are), obligated to help those in trouble. Which principle of distributive justice is chosen by an individual can also be influenced by various social psychological mechanisms.

Self-serving attributions (Mullen and Riordan 1988), which distort explanations which refer to one’s own successes and failures, serve as a psychological mechanism for self-protection; a means to maintain one’s positive self-image and self-esteem. During this process, individuals see their successes as a result of internal, personal characteristics (mental abilities, motivation) and attribute their failures to external factors. Thus, those who enjoy a more favorable social status will have more of a tendency to attribute this to their own merits. The generalization of this in terms of principles of social justice may manifest itself in the selection of equity-based, meritocratic value system. An unfavorable social status can also prompt attributional distortion, insofar as the individual ascribes blame to external circumstances and rejects the possibility of personally changing this undesirable situation. A generalization of this may manifest itself in the preference of the principles of equality or need-based distribution. This type of distortion can also be traced using a different line of logic: for those who receive less than average, equality would mean higher standards of living, while for those who are allocated more than average, equality would result in a decrease.

The concept of *interactional justice* emphasizes the importance of interpersonal communication between decision makers and those affected by the decisions. It is a debatable question whether the interpersonal nature of justice may be interpreted

as a principle of justice in its own right, or as part of procedural justice. Numerous pieces of research have shed light on the two distinctive aspects of interactional justice: interpersonal/social sensitivity, which means the respectful treatment of others, and informational justice, which focuses on the explanation behind the decisions. These factors set the concept of interactional justice apart from both procedural and distributional justice (Colquitt 2001, Jouglaard and Steiner 2005).

For the individual, at the level of everyday personal experience, justice means that people receive a share of the available goods in proportion to what they are entitled to; that institutions treat people in an appropriate manner; that people behave according to the rules of “fair play”; that injustices are handled in the proper fashion (Maiese 2003).

Some research indicates that people are more affected by *how* they are treated than the outcomes of a particular scenario in which the result directly concerns them (Tyler and Smith 1998).

Since the regime change in Hungary, the International Social Justice Project (ISJP) has conducted research in four waves, using representative samples of the country's population to examine the principles and ideals of justice people adhere to and the corresponding background values that people identify with. Processing the data by factor analysis revealed four latent dimensions of justice ideologies (Örkény and Székelyi 2011). According to the *egalitarian statist* approach, the government should take an active role and has a responsibility to maintain a state of relative equality. The second view, which is based on a *fatalistic* value system, questions whether we are able to recognize justice and whether it even exists in the first place. This corresponds to the content of the standard questions featured in the questionnaire which were formulated to assess anomie (e.g. “it is impossible to find one's way in the world, but there is no point to it anyway”).

The third dimension is that of the *individualist*, which stresses individual achievement and sees distribution according to merit to be the most just method (even if it is at the cost of increased social inequality). In the fourth dimension – which the authors call *fair-meritocratic*, in addition to individual achievement, solidarity towards the community also becomes a central element. The same series of analyses also measured the so-called “delegitimation potential”, an index to express the perceived level of justice. While the aforementioned four dimensions, which have been uncovered through the employment of factor analysis, correspond to the principles of distributive justice, statements used to measure delegitimation potential, in terms of their content, correspond to procedural justice. In Hungarian society, an individualist ideology seemed to be the most accepted ideology during the time periods examined. The popularity of fair-meritocratic values remained low throughout. The delegitimation potential, which also allows us to draw conclusions about the perception of procedural justice, remained the same for each period, at a level slightly higher than average.

The results of the above-mentioned research, which spanned almost two decades, provide us with important information pertaining to the attitude of members of Hungarian society. The perception of justice of migrants who reside in Hungary, however, has not until now been the subject of research.

EFFICACY

Grievances in themselves do not adequately explain participation in collective action. The number of those who suffer grievances is always much higher than those who participate in collective action (Obershall 1973). Resources and opportunities provide adequate background for the mobilization of groups. People are more likely to take part in collective action if they believe that their participation helps remedy their grievances and if they find the cost of participation acceptable. The key element of this instrumental approach to movement participation (Simon et al. 1998) is efficacy; whether the individual expects his or her participation to contribute to realizing the desired changes.

IDENTITY

In addition to the instrumental approach to movement participation, the second mobilizing factor that comes into play is the drive to satisfy identity needs. An individual's strong collective identity, which ties her or him to a group, renders a person's participation in collective action more likely. The various subcomponents of identity occasionally come into conflict with each other; protesting union members can be accused of being disloyal to their employers, just as the behaviour of immigrants who participate in protests is often interpreted as an indication of disloyalty to their new home country. According to Berry (1984), migrants' cultural adaptation in the host country can result in their integration (identification with the cultures of both the sending and the receiving countries), assimilation (identification with the culture of the host country exclusively), marginalization (when immigrants do not identify with either cultures) and/or separation (identification only with the culture of the country of origin). Research experience shows that double identity – integration in Berry's typology – renders individuals more satisfied with their situation (Sam and Berry 2006) and also increases the mobilization of the given group (Klandermans, Sabucedo, and Rodrigez 2004). Research suggests that migrants with a double identity can be expected to feel more satisfied, or, if not, they are more likely to participate in collective action than their non-integrated peers.

EMOTIONS

The significance of emotions in collective action has also come to the forefront of interest in recent decades. Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2007) integrated four factors into their theoretical framework: grievances, effectiveness, identity and emotions. Later they proposed (Klandermans 2008) to supplement this with a fifth component: social embeddedness.

Social networks operate as mobilizing structures (Diani and McAdam 2003) and secure the resources which are necessary for individuals to invest in collective action.

The emotions that precede movement participation can be described in terms of avoidance and approach. The fear that prevents people from taking action is an avoidance-oriented emotion, while anger is an approach-oriented emotion. There is a unique link between emotions and efficacy; when there is no perceived efficacy, people experience fear, and efficacy becomes associated with feelings of anger (Mackie, Devos and Smith 2000).

SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS

Social embeddedness is usually equated with participation in some civil society organization. A positive correlation has been observed between participation in a volunteer organization and subjective political competence. People learn how political institutions operate through their experience with voluntary organizations. The thus-formed social capital has a structural component – the social network itself – and a subjective component – trust and loyalty. The probability of political participation is proportionate to the occurrence of political conversations within the network and the amount of politics-related information accessed therein (McClurg 2003).

According to the findings of research conducted in the migrant communities of Dutch cities, the civic participation of migrants also increases political participation in such activities as voting and running for candidacy at elections as well as participating in assemblies and meetings (Tillie 2004, Van Heelsum 2005). We have no information as of yet about the effects of civic activity on non-conventional forms of political participation (demonstration, boycotts, protests, etc.).

Research conducted between 2006 and 2009 within the framework of the LOCALMULTIDEM project explored the levels of trust of third country nationals residing in Hungary (Örkény and Székelyi 2011). The research compared mainstream societies and migrant groups living in eight major European cities. In Budapest, groups of Muslims, Chinese and ethnic Hungarians who had immigrated from neighboring countries were compared with the host society in terms of characteristics. They measured general trust in people, trust in relation to the institutions of the receiving country, and in trust in one's own ethnic group and also examined the role these factors play in migrant integration. According to the authors' original hypothesis, trust, in the case of capital-deficient migrant groups, functions as capital and facilitates integration. Findings have shown, however, that in the case of immigrant groups, trust is not a cause but a consequence; immigrants have no choice as they are defenseless and are forced to place greater trust in people and the institutions of the host country. The level of trust of integrated immigrants decreases with the passing of time, as they lose their illusions. According to the findings for the Budapest segment of the research, the level of trust is higher for immigrants than for the host society, with the exception of the ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries, who have less trust in institutions and members of the host society.

Thus, according to research that has been undertaken to this point, the prerequisites of political participation are (Klandermans 2008): grievances (especially instances of procedural injustice); perceived efficacy; dual, ethnic-national identity; emotions (anger, and the absence of fear); and embeddedness in the institutions of civil society. In this research, when analyzing our own samples about immigrants living in Hungary and mainstream Hungarian society, we conducted our enquiry with consideration of the above mentioned factors. It was our aim to explore the unique features of these two groups with reference to the variables which are regarded as prerequisites for collective action and political participation.

THE EXISTENCE OF PREREQUISITES FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE HOST SOCIETY AND IMMIGRANTS WHO LIVE IN HUNGARY

We drew conclusions, through the *perception of justice and fairness*, regarding the grievances of the two groups and the role of these grievances in collective action. As regards justice, we enquired about the preferred principles of distribution – or distributional justice – and experiences pertaining to procedural justice.

Distributive justice

The principles of distribution and notions related to distributive justice were examined using three statements that were also related to political systems. In reference to the acceptance of the principle of equity (i.e. that individuals should receive from society as much as they contribute to it), the principle of equality (that everyone should receive an equal amount of the goods produced by society), and the principle of need (that individuals should contribute to the workings of society according to the best of their ability, and should receive as much as they need), significantly different results were found for the two groups. For both groups, the principle of need received the most support – in this respect there was no significant difference between the two groups. In the immigrant group, more respondents agreed with a meritocratic equity-based approach and fewer supported an equality-based view than for the host society. There was some discrepancy between the collected data regarding mainstream Hungarian society (the hosts) and earlier findings of the ISJP research conducted in Hungary (Örkény and Székelyi 2011). According to the latter, for each time period examined,² the approach most favored by Hungarian society was what they referred to as the individualist approach, which corresponds with our meritocratic category. The last period of ISJP enquiry took place in 2008. Now, four years after the economic crisis began, the principle of need is held in higher esteem and seems to be the most popular approach.

² Dates of data collection in Hungary: 1991, 1996, 2005 and 2008.




Figure 1 Preferred principles of distributive justice for the host society and the group of immigrants

Note: The question was: "With which of the following statements do you most agree? 1. Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its functioning; 2. Everyone should partake equally of goods produced; 3. Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and should get as much as they need".

Host society – immigrants (equity-based principle) $t = -3.054^{****3}$

Host society – immigrants (principle of equality) $t = 4.291^{****}$

Host society – immigrants (principle of need) $t = -2.72$ n.s.

It was assumed that a person's views about the just principle of distribution in a society was determined by multiple factors and that the subjective social situation, age, and level of education had a significant influence on the perception and expectations of an individual or group as regards fair distribution. The quality of a subjective social situation can determine the kind of causal, attributional distortions that are known from social psychology (as described above), which, in turn, results in the selection of the principle of justice appropriate for the given distortion.

With an increase in age, we may assume that there will be a shift; a decreasing tendency to choose a meritocratic approach, while the selection of the need-based principle will become more likely. A higher level of education can have two possible effects. It can either increase the popularity of the meritocratic value system, or it can decrease it, insofar as those with a higher level of education have a more complex and tolerant view of society, which can result in a scenario where a more favorable social status does not necessarily lead to a respondent preferring meritocratic principles.

3 Levels of statistical significance indicated from here on as: **** < 0.001, *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1.

Table 1 Selection of the principles of distributive justice according to level of education in the immigrant and host subgroups (%)

Immigrants N = 445 Hosts N = 904		Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its functioning	Everyone should partake equally of goods produced	Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and should get as much as they need	Total
8 primary grades of schooling and under	Immigrant	44	31	25	100
	Host	30	31	39	100
Vocational training school	Immigrant	52	7	41	100
	Host	37	21	42	100
general or specialized secondary school	Immigrant	39	15	46	100
	Host	38	22	40	100
institute of higher education	Immigrant	49	14	38	100
	Host	44	18	38	100
Total	Immigrant	44	15	41	100
Total		36	24	40	100

Note: Pearson Chi square value: Immigrants: 15.695**, Hosts: 14.978**

Table 2 Selection of the principles of distributive justice according to age in the immigrant and host subgroups (%)

Immigrants N = 448 Hosts N = 904		Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its functioning	Everyone should partake equally of goods produced	Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and should get as much as they need	Total
X- 29	Immigrant	41	15	44	100
	Host	30	29	40	100
30 -39	Immigrant	49	14	38	100
	Host	31	26	43	100
40 -49	Immigrant	53	8	38	100
	Host	43	17	40	100
50 – 59	Immigrant	46	10	44	100
	Host	38	19	43	100
60- X	Immigrant	25	34	41	100
	Host	36	27	37	100
Total	Immigrant	44	15	41	100
Total	Host	36	24	40	100

Note: Pearson Chi square value: Immigrants: 21.657***, Hosts: 14.010*

There is a connection between education and which principles of distribution are selected. In the host group, with higher levels of education, there is a parallel increase

in the tendency to select the meritocratic principle. Among immigrants, there is a break in this trend between the levels of vocational training school and secondary school. For general secondary school graduates, the popularity of the equity-based concept of justice decreases by over ten percent. A possible explanation for this may be that for migrants, a general academic-type education is less marketable in a foreign culture – it offers less of an opportunity for practicing one’s skills – than vocational/professional training. The need-based approach is popular at all levels of education, with one exception: only a quarter of those with only primary education chose this option.

With age, the popularity of meritocratic values increases for a while, then, after the age of 50, it decreases for both groups. It appears that, with increasing age, the danger (and fact) of decreased productivity does not increase the appeal of meritocratic distribution principles. While, for the host society, the acceptance of the principle of equality fluctuates across the different age groups, for migrants, it only increases for respondents above the age of 60.

Table 3 Selection of the principles of distributive justice according to social status⁴ in the immigrant and host subgroups (%)

Immigrants N = 448 Hosts N = 904		Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its functioning	Everyone should partake equally of goods produced	Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and should get as much as they need	Total
Subjective social status; low	Immigrant	37	24	39	100
	Host	31	25	43	100
Subjective social status; average	Immigrant	42	13	45	100
	Host	39	23	39	100
Subjective social status; high	Immigrant	51	17	32	100
	Host	35	25	40	100
Total	Immigrant	44	15	41	100
Total	Host	36	24	40	100

Note: Pearson Chi square value: Immigrants: 8.727*; Hosts: 4.482 not significant

Of the above-mentioned variables, subjective social status statistically has the weakest connection with choice of the principle of justice. For migrants, a higher social status increases the chances that the meritocratic principle will be selected. In case of the host society, the principle of equality is equally accepted by each status group. For migrants, however, in accordance with our previous assumptions, it is respondents from the group with the lowest social status that most commonly select this principle.

⁴ Subjective social status was originally assessed using the following instruction: “Please define your place on a scale where 0 marks the lowest social status and 10 marks the highest”. We used this to formulate for the cross table analysis a three-element “Subjective social situation” variable, whose values are: 1. bad, 2. average, 3. good

Then, it loses some of its popularity at the level of “average” social status, and – contrary to our expectations – slightly increases again for those with the highest social status. This latter increase (of a few percent) can be accounted for by the aforementioned explanation regarding the nuanced thinking of those in a better social situation.

The notions embraced by the immigrant group are clearly more meritocratic and less equality-oriented than for the host group. If we examine where these groups placed themselves on the left-right orientation scale, some inconsistencies can be seen, primarily with reference to chosen values on the part of the host group. With regards to political attitude, the host group are positioned more towards the right, but based on their choice of principle of distributive justice, they are of a leftwing orientation.




Figure 2 Distribution on the left-right scale, host society – migrants

Note: The question was: “Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where ‘0’ means ‘the left’ and ‘10’ means ‘the right’”? Hosts – immigrants $t = 3.409^{****}$

The figure shows that immigrants tend to place themselves closer to the centre, while in the case of the host society, there is a slight shift to the right. Our findings correlate with one of the conclusions of the 2009 research project “Immigrants in Hungary”: migrants generally tend to position themselves in the centre of the left-right scale (Örkény and Székelyi 2010).

The results of the homogeneity analysis suggest that the position of the individuals on the left-right scale is independent of the chosen principle of justice.

In addition to principles perceived as being preferable, we also asked questions how respondents perceived their own situation, in terms of what they contribute to society and what they receive from it. Results indicate that the majority of Hungarian society feels that their contributions exceed what they receive from society. This is a condition best characterized by disillusionment and disappointment. The majority of the immigrants see these two things as being balanced in their case. There is presumably a dynamic relationship between a general sense of satisfaction and the perception of whether the exchange with society is fair. Those who feel more satisfied

see the balance of contributions and benefits as being more favorable, and those who perceive gains from the exchange are more satisfied.




Figure 3 Perceptions of individual contributions and benefits

Note: The question was: "What do you think of your own situation? Do you think on the whole you get more from society than you contribute to common expenditure, or do you contribute more than you get? "0" means you get much more than you contribute, "10" means you contribute much more than you get".

Hosts - immigrants $t = 6.295^{****}$

If we group the same data differently, it becomes even more evident that, for migrants, the situation of "balance" (which gives reason to be satisfied) is much more commonly reported; fewer feel that they are getting the short end of the stick in their exchange with society.




Figure 4 Personal investments and social benefits

In relation to fairness, we asked respondents to evaluate the behaviour of political decision makers. The striving of the political elite for fairness could be an important factor in ensuring that justice prevails. In this case, we observed that immigrants have a more optimistic outlook, perceive a higher incidence of fairness; they place greater trust in politicians. At the same time, there is a definite tendency to be orientated towards the centre for migrants; the majority tries to refrain both from passing judgment on, and from being overly enthusiastic about, politicians. A quarter of the host society has a severely negative opinion about the fairness of politicians. They do not agree at all with the notion that politicians during the decision making process take into consideration the interests of people like them. If we merge the categories, nearly two-thirds of the host society place little or no faith in politician's fairness. Only one-third of the immigrants hold the same opinion.




Figure 5 Perception of fairness on the part of politicians

Note: The question was: "How true is the statement that 'politicians are fair to people like you in their decisions?'" '0' means you don't agree with this statement at all, and '10' means you fully agree with it."

Hosts – immigrants $t = -34.669^{****}$

Procedural justice

The survey questions covered all important aspects of procedural justice. Our aim was to find out what impressions individuals had received about administration in general and when dealing with Hungarian administration offices. To what extent is the *informational dimension* of justice – whereby administration offices offer adequate justification and clarify the rules – realized? Administration processes – even in case of a favorable outcome for the individual – often make for a negative experience, as administrators, legislators, and law enforcers may make no obvious efforts to minimize the informational asymmetry between clients and administrators (and their behaviors may suggest that it is in their interest to sustain it). A deficit of informational justice increases a sense of anomie. When there is a decrease in individual efficacy and sense of competence in controlling one's own life, the sense of external control increases. The apathy which develops in parallel with negative experiences (at first one does not

understand the course of the administration processes – what happens and why – then one loses interest altogether) starts a downward spiral in which ignorance reinforces a sense of defenselessness and vice versa.

Procedural justice, in its clearest form, means *proceedings occurring in accordance with the rules*. The relevant question was aimed at finding out whether respondents felt that their case was generally handled according to rules and regulations. The questionnaire survey did not explore the possible contradiction whereby if informational justice is not apparent – in other words, it is not possible to know what the rules are – than it is impossible to determine whether the process was conducted according to regulations.

One's assessment based on the *principle of neutrality* – in other words, one's experience as to whether the case of another client in the same situation would have been handled in the same manner – can depend on a familiarity with the rules and knowledge gained through networks. Considerations of neutrality are usually based on indirect experiences and superficial impressions. Furthermore, the lower the level of informational justice, the greater the grounds for conspiracy theories relating to the principle of neutrality.

The concept of procedural justice also comprises the element of *good will* (or at least an absence of malevolence); people tend to perceive situations where administrators show effort and good will as being more just. Another important dimension is respectful treatment; procedures where the dignity of the participants is not harmed (where the client is treated with respect even during the smallest personal interactions at the level of gestures and references) appear more just than situations that have a similar outcome but damage human dignity. If, in these dimensions, the level of perceived justice is high, the given outcome will be perceived as being more favorable. Also, a decision that is deemed favorable will influence the perception of justice in general. The *acceptance of the decision* – one's identification with it – is more complete if the situation is favorable in all other dimensions of procedural justice.

Thus informational justice – which manifests within the framework of interpersonal relationships and is experienced during actual participation in administration processes – and social sensitivity – which manifests in communication – are both important aspects of procedural justice. Whether decisions are adequately justified, whether it is possible to know what the rules are, whether offices and administrators adhere to these rules, whether they operate without bias and in accordance with the principle of neutrality, whether they are committed to resolving a given situation, whether they relate to people with the proper measure of respect – along with the ability to recognize positive or acceptable outcomes on the part of the client – all contribute to whether individuals experience the world that surrounds them as being fair and livable, or, to the contrary, as a place that will only bring them further grievances in the future.

The various elements of procedural justice show strong correlation and are clearly arranged into a single structure, as also evidenced by the results of the principle component analysis of the two sub-samples⁵.

Table 4 Principle component of procedural justice

	Immigrants Principle component	Hosts Principle component
	1	1
The office explained its decisions adequately.	.811	.805
It was clear what the rules were in the situation and what you had to do.	.810	.783
On the whole your matter was dealt with according to the rules.	.829	.861
A client in a similar situation would have been treated similarly.	.760	.800
The office did its best to solve your situation.	.872	.891
You were treated with due respect.	.842	.834
The matter was solved favorably for you.	.884	.872
The solution was acceptable to you.	.880	.882
<i>Variance explained</i>	70.050%	70.869%
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin ⁶	.935	.926
Bartlett ⁷	2460.900****	5170.719****

In both the host and immigrant groups, as regards the perception of procedural justice, the various dimensions are structured into a unified, consistent impression. Consistent situations may be one of the factors that play a role in the development of this consistent impression. For example, if, during an administration process, the rules are clear, then the manner of treatment will also be respectful. On the other hand, cognitive processes which are usually involved in the formulation of impressions lead to consistent impressions. Just as in any scenario of impression formation, there are central and peripheral components involved. Central components play a significant role in the development of the given impression, while the peripheral ones will have little or no influence at all. As the factor loading and communal values of the presented variables are almost equally high, we are not able to distinguish between central and peripheral components. We can, however, say that the favorability of the outcome, the result, and its acceptability have the highest values.

⁵ Prior to the principle component analysis, we had the Cronbach's alpha value checked for the items indicated here. This reliability index, which expresses the inner consistency of the scale between 0 and 1, was, in our case, 0.948.

⁶ The KMO test is an important indicator for determining how suitable variables are for factor analysis. In this respect, values above 0.9 fall into the 'excellent' category.

⁷ The value of the Bartlett test shows (at the level of highest significance) that variables are strongly correlated.

We also looked at how factors such as the time spent in the receiving country, the subjective social situation and the age of the individual effect the perception of procedural justice. It can be assumed that migrants who have been residing in Hungary for a longer time, during the course of their integration into local society, have acquired some of the mainstream attitudes, and therefore perceive situations as being less and less just.

The extent and success of their integration was measured with the help of subjective status and the length of time spent in Hungary.

In case of the host society, we only had an appraisal of subjective status at our disposal. We would like to note here that while subjective status can also be regarded – albeit only at a very abstract level – as a dimension of procedural justice, which is related to outcomes and acceptance, here we interpreted it as an explanatory variable.

Possession of a (higher education) degree can have different effects. The first type of effect concerns the dissatisfaction hypothesis: it is possible that having the status/education of an intellectual makes the individual more sensitive and critical when it comes to evaluating social phenomena and procedural justice (i.e. with a degree of higher education, the world seems more unjust). The second approach concerns the satisfaction hypothesis, according to which a degree in higher education results in an elevated social status, and, thus, increased satisfaction. It also improves the respondents' perception of justice: the world seems like a more just place.

Table 5 Explanatory model for measuring procedural justice for immigrants

	Beta	Sign.	Beta	Sign.	Beta	Sign.	Beta	Sign.
Subjective social status	.144**	.004	.122	.014	-.079	.156	-.078	.161
Duration of stay in Hungary	.087*	.083	.028	.578	.050	.299	.048	.324
Attachment to Hungary			.245****	.000	.165****	.001	.166****	.001
Satisfaction					.399****	.000	.400****	.000
Higher education					.031	.519	.035	.487
English-speaking cultural background							-.020	.688
Adjusted R ²	.024		.078		.178		.177	

We assessed subjective social status using the following question: "Where would you place yourself on a scale where '0' marks the lowest and '10' marks the highest social situation?" This variable, along with the time spent in Hungary, in the first two-variable model (with a very weak explanatory potential), appear to have a significant effect. By introducing the "attachment to Hungary" aspect, both factors lose their explanatory potential and the significant effect of the newly-introduced factor is apparent in the second, still weak model. Migrants' perception of the dimensions of procedural justice during administration processes is more affected by the extent to which they feel close to the receiving country than by their perception of their own social situation, or by the length of time spent in that country. The satisfaction factor (the principle component of satisfaction with regards

to the important areas of life) significantly improves the model's explanatory potential, and remains significant and the most strongly impactful factor even when further factors (higher education, English-speaking cultural background) are introduced.

The fact that the involvement of other variables changes the value (and significance) of parameters leads us to conclude that satisfaction is the only factor that has a robust effect on the perception of justice. At the same time, the causal relationship can function in the opposite direction as well, which means that a perception of justice affects one's sense of satisfaction.

Higher education, or lack thereof, does not explain the perception of justice, and nor does having a different socialization backgrounds such as coming from an English – or non-English – speaking environment. We also examined the effects of these factors on the perception of procedural justice for members of the host society. In this case, we were only able to include subjective status, higher education, sense of attachment and sense of satisfaction into the model.

Table 6 Explanatory model for measuring procedural justice in the host society

	Beta	Sign.	Beta	Sign.
Subjective social status	.231****	.000	-.007	.861
Attachment to Hungary	.141****	.000	.062*	.069
Satisfaction			.418****	.000
Higher education			-.012	.722
Adjusted R ²	.074		.180	

In the first two-variable model, the effects of both subjective social status and attachment to Hungary are significant. By introducing the factors of satisfaction and higher education, the explanatory potential of the model, in comparison to the previous one, increases considerably, but still remains weak. While the explanatory potential of attachment decreases and that of subjective social status becomes non-existent, the sense of satisfaction seems to have a significant effect on the perception of justice. The possible effects of higher education are not shown in this model. It seems that the principle component value of satisfaction, which is the composite index number of satisfaction in reference to different facets of life, contains certain aspects of social status and, to some extent, emotional closeness to Hungary. Those who at the given moment reside in the country and feel attached to it are more likely to feel more satisfied than those who must live in a country to which they do not feel a sense of belonging. The satisfaction factor also partially contains a subjective evaluation, or imprint, of this situation.

In both the host and immigrant groups, the sense of attachment and satisfaction are the two factors that most influence the perception of procedural justice.

When comparing the individual elements of procedural justice, it becomes apparent that immigrants perceive justice and fairness more favorably than the hosts (the values of the t-test undertaken to compare the two groups suggest a significant difference in every dimension). There can be a number of explanations for this: perhaps third-country

migrants had already acquired negative experiences with administration processes in a less civilized, less rule-of-law setting, and, thus, regard conditions in Hungary relatively more positively because of the contrast. The social-psychology mechanism of either justifying the decision to migrate or the irrevocability of this decision can also play a role, insofar as that, following the decision, the chosen alternative – or a situation that is otherwise deemed unalterable (in this case, moving to Hungary) – is always perceived as being more favorable. The unique Hungarian tradition for pessimistic evaluation, as has been recorded while conducting numerous questionnaire surveys (e.g. Eurobarometer), can also serve as a potential explanation for the above-mentioned phenomenon. It is worth noting that when direct methods of investigation – such as in-depth interviews, or a focus group setting – are employed, administration processes are perceived much more negatively.

Table 7 The perception of procedural justice of the host and immigrant groups (t-value significance)

	t- value
The office explained its decisions adequately.	-12.354****
It was clear what the rules were in the situation and what you had to do.	-8.647****
On the whole your matter was dealt with according to the rules.	-8.647****
A client in a similar situation would have been treated similarly.	-11.339****
The office did its best to solve your situation.	-12.291****
You were treated with due respect.	-10.455****
The matter was solved favorably for you.	-13.626****
The solution was acceptable to you.	-14.851****




Figure 6 Perceptions of procedural justice

Note: The question was: "We would like to know what your general impression was of the administration processes of Hungarian offices when you had to arrange something. How true are the statements below?"

5 – Perfectly true; 4 – Partly true; 3 – Neither true nor untrue; 2 – Rather not true; 1 – Not true at all."

1. The office explained its decisions adequately; 2. It was clear what the rules were in the situation and what you had to do; 3. On the whole your matter was dealt with according to the rules; 4. A client in a similar situation would have been treated similarly; 5. The office did its best to solve your situation; 6. You were treated with due respect; 7. The matter was solved favorably for you; 8. The solution was acceptable to you.

Another important question is the central role of previous socialization: whether the perception of justice in Hungary of groups originating from countries of varied political systems is different. Is the group of ethnic Hungarians who have immigrated from neighboring countries different in this respect from other groups? Will the unique characteristics of the country of origin or the characteristics of the Hungarian ethnic-cultural community be more determinative?

In the latter case, native Hungarian speakers could be expected to perceive the fairness of administration processes as being more unfavorable in comparison to other migrant groups; their judgment will be closer to that of the host society.

Further divisions within the group of immigrants showed that administration processes typically deemed as being just by immigrants were evaluated slightly differently by the different groups. The Mongolians saw the situation as most just, followed by immigrants of Hungarian ethnicity, then by Russians, Japanese and Ukrainians. The greatest negative divergence from the average was shown by Israelis, then Serbs, then Turks and Chinese. Within the group of migrants, English speakers did not seem especially critical. The reason for this is not necessarily any harmonization of Hungarian administration processes to the norm of English-speaking countries. It is possible that third country nationals who arrived from "developed" countries are received in administration offices more warmly, that the organizations that employ them have greater prestige and are more effective at supporting them and representing their interests in administration processes. In this case, it is not that English native speakers perceive the situation to be more favorable, but in fact that the situation *is* more favorable for them.

When looking at the native Hungarian speakers in the immigrant group, we also explored whether previous socialization and the political-cultural characteristics of the sending countries could have an effect on how the situation in Hungary was perceived in terms of procedural justice. What is more determinative: the possible cultural similarities with mainstream Hungarian society or the distinctive characteristics of the sending country?

There were two groups where we saw that the divergence from the average in perception matched the opinion held by the mainstream migrant group of the given country. In comparison to the majority of immigrants, native Hungarian speaking migrants from the Ukraine, similarly to Ukrainian immigrants, perceived administration processes as being more favorable, while native Hungarian speaking immigrants from Israel, much like Israeli immigrants, saw administration as less favorable. While the situation in Hungary is perceived as most favorable in terms of procedural justice by Serbian Hungarians, native Serbian speakers are the second most critical group after the Israelis. Our data did not make it possible for us to explore two important considerations: if, and to what extent, this may be connected to the alleged or actual grievances suffered by members of the group of ethnic Hungarians immigrating from neighboring countries in their countries of birth, and exactly how, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav war influenced the perceptions of Serbs, and Serbian migrants in Hungary. In this respect, we only have in-depth interview material from previous

research⁸, according to which mainstream Hungarian society was less welcoming of Serbian immigrants, as compared to migrants of other ethnicities.

Efficacy

In terms of participation in collective civic and political action, one of the key factors is perceived *efficacy*. The questionnaire was formulated to measure this in two ways, one being a question aimed at measuring anomie, addressing the issue of personal agency – the degree to which individuals feel they can influence the course of their lives. The research shows that migrants have a greater sense of inner control than the hosts. While migrants have made at least one decision of serious consequence in their lives – the decision to migrate – hosts may not have, to the same degree, experienced situations that could be characterized as autonomous decision making.




Figure 7 Individual efficacy, inner control

Note: The question was: “How true of you are the statements below?
You can hardly influence the course of your life”

The second question explored whether respondents could see any chance for changing – on their own or together with others – an unjust decision made at a high level of administration. With an estimation of an “extremely low general chance”, the host group, to a small degree, were more inclined to believe that they would be able to do something about an unjust or harmful law.




Figure 8 Collective efficacy

Note: The question was: "Suppose a law were being considered by Parliament that you considered to be unjust or harmful. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you, acting alone or together with others, would be able to do something about it?"

Emotions – fear

Fear is an avoidance-oriented emotion; it decreases the chance of one's participation in collective action. In this respect, the group of immigrants is in a more advantageous situation, as they experience fear less often than members of the host society. The relative absence of fear of migrants can also be explained by the composition of the group, which is unique in this respect as well; those who – as a result of their personality or for other reasons – experience fear more often are considerably less likely to become immigrants.




Figure 9 Fear

Note: The question was: "Some people are often afraid, some never. How often are you afraid?"

Identity

Identity is a significant component when interpreting the integration of both hosts and immigrants, as well as explaining civic and political participation. Group identities represent motivational strength and contribute to maintaining behaviour and attitudes that conform to the standards of the group.

Our research also looked at the categories primarily used by the host society and immigrants when they defined themselves.




Figure 10 The significance of categories of identity

Note: The question was: "We are all a part of different groups. Some are more important to us than others when we think of ourselves. In general, which from the following list is most important to you in describing who you are? And the second most important? And the third most important?"

As for categories thought to be important in terms of identity, the two groups only showed differences in connection with political party affiliation and being European. While 18 percent of the host society were of the opinion that political party affiliation was the most important factor in one's self-definition, in case of the immigrants, only 7.5 percent felt the same way. As regards the question of identity, being European, according to 16.7 percent of the migrants, was the most important thing. Only 7.8 percent of the host group was of the same view. Grouping migrants who chose the category of being European (as most/second/third most important) by mother tongue, on the one hand indicates that some Asians also choose this category and, on the other hand, reveals an interesting fact: in comparison to native Hungarian speaking immigrants, a greater proportion of Arab and Turkish migrants find being European to be more important.




Figure 11 Proportion of those choosing European identity (as one of the three most important categories) in the various migrant groups

Level of education only shows a significant correlation with choosing “being European” for the immigrant group. For immigrants, the higher the level of education, the greater the proportion of those who consider their being European an important part of their identity (Pearson Chi square value: 11.535*). Within the host society, the proportions of those who give importance to their European identity are as follows; primary school graduates: 33 percent, graduates of vocational schools: 15 percent, graduates of general secondary schools: 44 percent, and those with a degree in higher education only 9 percent.

Political party affiliation is a much more relevant category for the hosts. Bringing the left-right scale into the equation, it becomes apparent that for those in more extreme political positions, this category defines their identity to a much greater extent than for those who occupy more moderate political positions. This corresponds with social psychological – and everyday – experiences where the more extreme the attitude, the greater its role in shaping identity.




Figure 12 Proportion of those who chose political party affiliation as an important identity element, by left-right scale – host society

Aside from assessing the significance of categories of identity, we also examined to what extent respondents experience a sense of attachment to Hungary. For the immigrant group, attachment to the country of birth was also recorded.




Figure 13 Sense of attachment for the host and immigrant groups

Note: The question was: "How close do you feel to... Hungary? Your country of origin?"

The sense of emotional attachment to Hungary was equally strong for both subsamples. It is apparent that immigrants are not more attached to their country of origin than to Hungary, and, interestingly, the absence of attachment to the country of origin is a more common occurrence than a weak bond with Hungary for this group. The fact that immigrants felt they had ties to both Hungary and their home country is indicative of a dual sense of attachment and the integration of immigrants.

Table 8 Sense of attachment to place – immigrants

		Closeness to your country of origin				Total
		Not close at all	Not very close	Close	Very close	
Closeness to Hungary	Not close at all	0	2	2	2	6
	Not very close	1	12	24	15	52
	Close	6	55	96	100	257
	Very close	8	59	46	70	183
Total		15	128	168	187	498

The following categories were established based on the above cross table: 1. Has no attachments: those who do not feel very close, or not close at all, to their country of origin or to Hungary; 2. Attachment to Hungary: those who feel no – or very little –

sense of attachment to their native country, but feel close or very close to Hungary; 3. Attachment to country of origin: those who feel no – or little – emotional attachment to Hungary, but feel close or very close to their country of origin; 4. Dual attachment: those who feel close or very close to both Hungary and their country of origin.




Figure 14 Occurrence of types of attachment among immigrants

From the perspective of integration, it is a positive development that almost two-thirds of the immigrants can be characterized as having dual attachment, which can be seen as indicative of successful integration. Interestingly, the second most common type of attachment is to Hungary, which presumably indicates a tendency toward assimilation. The proportion of those feeling attached only to their country of origin– signaling segregation, or, as Barry (1984) refers to it, separation – is less than ten percent. Finally, those who experience no sense of attachment to any country – a position resulting in marginalization – constitute only a few percent.

The subjective aspects of social embeddedness – trust

While the structural aspect of *social embeddedness*, or social capital, comprises the networks which individuals belong to, its subjective elements are the loyalty and trust that are forged in these relationships. Participation in non-profit organizations is extremely low for both the immigrant and host groups – over two-thirds of the respondents in both groups said that they did not participate in the work of any non-profit organizations. 20 percent of hosts and 14 percent of immigrants are members of one organization. In terms of trust in public institutions, the group of immigrants gave a more positive response. The hosts place much less trust in Parliament, the Police, the Hungarian government, the Office of Immigration and the local government.




Figure 15 Institutional trust

Note: The question was: "Please tell me on a scale of 0 to 10 how much you personally trust each of the following institutions to usually make the right decisions. '0' means that 'you do not trust an institution at all' and '10' means 'you have complete trust'."

This higher level of trust of immigrants reconfirms the results of previous research. The LOCALMULTIDEM project (Örkény and Székelyi 2010) also found a higher level of trust for immigrants and noted the phenomenon whereby a long time spent in the host country caused this originally higher level of trust to decrease to that of the mainstream society. The compensation for social (and other) capital deficit was offered as an explanation: migrants have no choice but to place their trust in the institutions of the receiving country, as this constitutes their only capital. After they have been integrated to some extent, this compensatory mechanism weakens and the hosts' lack of trust also becomes characteristic of the immigrants. This, to some extent, goes against the idea (Klandermans 2008) that trust is a product of integration and its level should increase in parallel with increased embeddedness in society. In this later case, we would need to find an explanation for the lower level of trust of the host society when compared to immigrants.

For the group of immigrants, general trust is also greater; they have more of a tendency to agree that people can be trusted.




Figure 16 General trust

Note: The question was: "Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 1. People can almost always be trusted; 2. People can usually be trusted; 3. You usually can't be too careful in dealing with people; 4. You almost always can't be too careful in dealing with people."

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the previously-presented variables, the members of the host society and the group of immigrants have different prospects for participating in political activity.

With respect to *grievances, perceived injustice and unfair treatment*, members of the host society have a more negative view of the situation, and therefore are more motivated about and thus more likely to participate in political activity. Immigrants perceive all dimensions of administration processes to be more just. Satisfaction and a sense of attachment to Hungary generally increase the chances of a more positive perception of situations involving procedural justice for both groups. Immigrants of Hungarian ethnicity, in contrast to the host society, generally perceive Hungarian administration processes to be more just.

As per their choice of principles of distributive justice, it is apparent that a needs-based approach is most popular, while an equality-based approach is least preferred by both groups. Immigrants, however, choose meritocratic, equity-based principles significantly more frequently. In terms of how much is received from the society and how much is invested by the individual, immigrants perceive the situation to be balanced much more often than members of the host society.

Efficacy, as pertaining to one's influence over the course of one's life, is perceived as being better by immigrants, while intervening in governmental decisions is seen as more effective by members of the host society. It remains a question whether individuals who feel that they are able to shape their own lives choose political participation as a means of doing this, or find other ways of doing so. In critical life situations, one way to solve to problem is to choose the option to exit; to leave behind the critical situation and find a new place to live. Migration can be interpreted as being such a problem-

solving mechanism, and it is likely that migrants prefer this approach. This means that they may believe that they have control over their lives, but do not lend much credence to collective action.

As regards emotions, the *absence of fear* makes political participation more likely. In this respect, immigrants are in a better situation as they experience fear less frequently than the host group. The questionnaire was not suitable for exploring the other defining emotion: anger.

Integration and dual identity are conducive to political participation on the part of migrants. Strong emotional ties to both Hungary and the native country indicate that, in this dimension, there is no reason why activity should fall shy of that of the host society. As for the significance of the individual categories of identity, there are two notable differences between the two groups: in the categories of being European and political party affiliation. Being European is a more defining component of identity for immigrants, while Hungarian society – primarily those who place themselves on the more extreme ends of the left-right scale – considers political affiliation to be more important.

In terms of the structural indicator of *social embeddedness* (membership in a non-profit organization), the degree of embeddedness is equally low for both groups. As regards its subjective aspect, however, which is measured through general trust and trust in institutions, the immigrant group seems more embedded, which – if we accept Klandermans' (2008) approach – increases the likelihood of their political participation. Insofar as we interpret trust as being a compensating mechanism for a deficit of capital (Örkény and Székelyi 2010), the higher level of trust of immigrants (compared to Hungarian society) is not an indicator of embeddedness, but rather its very absence. For this reason, it can be considered a factor that decreases the probability of political participation.

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POLITICAL OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS

Pál Juhász

INTRODUCTION

In our questionnaire that surveys the situation and opinions of Hungarian society and immigrants there are two questions – besides those connected to satisfaction and trust – which are related to issues that were examined in the World Values Survey and the Eurobarometer survey which explored the attitudes of the population of European countries in 2009. One of those questions is to what extent the respondents regard themselves as being capable of influencing the course of their life, while the other one is whether the state should redistribute income for the benefit of the poor. As the questions in the surveys were formulated differently and their context and placement in our survey was different to that of value system surveys, we cannot make comparisons about actual distributions of responses, but we can use the lessons of the value surveys to assist in interpreting the opinions we collected.

The research of the World Values Survey across a widening circle of countries started in 1981 and was inspired by Ronald Inglehart's book which was published in 1977 (Inglehart 1977). The questionnaire surveys created by Inglehart and colleagues have already been, according to the internet page of the organizers of the survey series, carried out on representative samples in five waves: in 1981, 1990 and – as the number of the countries involved in the survey increased rapidly which led to the extending of the surveying – in 1999–2000, from 2005 to 2007 and finally in 2009–2010.

DO WE SHAPE OUR OWN DESTINY?

In Inglehart's cultural evolutionary scheme, within the population of individual countries, parallel to economic development, there is an increase in the proportion of those people who identify with the secularist values of material success and "self-assertion" (instead of traditional religious values). Correspondingly, beyond the concerns of satisfying elementary needs, an increasing appreciation for "postmaterialistic" (or postmodern) values is evident. According to Inglehart – in accordance with the cross-sectional analysis of each survey and the shifts observed in successive surveys – the increasing satisfaction of primary needs and the need for "self-realization" (along with empathy and tolerance) of respondents increases (a new and personal spiritual kind of religiosity appears within this context as well). "Self-assertion" can become a realistic need if a person *takes on the responsibility for shaping their own destiny* and trusts other

people and institutions through their belief that their deeds make sense and they can take responsibility for the consequences of those deeds.

The results of the research, carried out in an increasing number of countries, are habitually collated by the team Inglehart manages using a coordinate system. Along the vertical axis, the average of the index of "secularized" values appears, while along the horizontal axis the average of the index of "self-realization" is displayed. Hungary, after the processing of the results of the penultimate (fourth) and the last (the fifth) waves still appears on the survey's website in the neighborhood of countries – mostly from the Balkans – for which the choice of materialist-secularist values significantly exceeds the level that would be expected on the basis of the country's state of development. For the dimension of "self-realization", however, Hungary is significantly below the predicted level. On the materialist-secularist axis, countries neighboring Hungary are placed ahead of what could be predicted from their economic capabilities, but at the same time they are ahead of Hungary in terms of "self-realization". Only in Romania is the level of trust in people and institution at a similarly low level to Hungary. And there, similarly, it is only a minority of people that feel that they can influence their own course of life.

In 2003, while testing the statements in Huntington's book on the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996) using the results of the third wave of the survey, Inglehart and Norris (Inglehart and Norris 2003) aimed to prove that, from the viewpoint of the future of democracy, those cultural absolutes which stem from the past, and which lead Huntington to predict the forming of antagonisms between nations with Muslim (and Greek Orthodox) and Western (Protestant and Roman Catholic) traditions, are not so fateful. Value surveys in countries with a Muslim majority show that the citizens of such countries also hold democratic values. The supposed "intolerance" of Muslim traditions appears not in the areas of freedom of speech or assembly, but in relation to gender equality and non-conformist sexuality. The citizens of Muslim countries think differently from those of Western countries, but in "matters of Eros not of Demos" (of course, not trusting in the optimism of such analyses, and having seen the problems which arise over the issue of the immigration of Muslims and having experienced the tensions which arise over the issue of terrorism, English Conservatives and then German Christian Democrats formulated the principle of "muscular liberalism" on the basis of Huntington's world view. This claims that cultures should break away from the relativist political ethics of multiculturalism and immigrants should be expected to accept basic liberal legal and political principles) (as summarized in the introduction of Inglehart 2003).

Behind Huntington's and Inglehart's debate are two types of thinking about economic development (or simply, growth). Inglehart, although he should by no means be viewed as an economic determinist, tends to think that with an increase in welfare and the unfolding of liberal civic rights necessitated by a market economy, people's value systems will also change towards "Western" kinds of value systems (although they may still retain certain individual characteristics). Others, however, think that the dominant value system is a decisive factor both regarding to what extent a nation can make use of opportunities for economic development, and also regarding the sort of

state and forms of coexistence a nation creates from the new opportunities offered by economic growth.

Yilmaz Esmer (Esmer 2003) also identifies with those who are not satisfied with the analyses of Inglehart et al., and has processed the responses to the third wave survey into a new classification system. In this classification, the issue of fatalism vs. ability to shape one's own destiny is not a component of the self-realization index but is a part of a value system which results in "modernity"; it is a signifier of "efficacy", or the intention to be efficient. Esmer thinks that – following the train of thought of Weber's *Protestant Ethics* – undertaking the shaping of one's own life course is a prerequisite for work to become a vocation (i.e. more than merely carrying out an assigned task). The author shows that, also stemming from Muslim tradition, in all of the Islamic countries a much greater proportion of individuals feel that they are "exposed to circumstances" than people living in Christian or Far Eastern countries (that are at the same level of development). However, in order to verify this, Esmer examined whether in Muslim communities living in Balkan countries that have a Christian majority population the experience of being at the mercy of fate was also a common trait. He found that it was. But in these countries members of the Christian faith are also characterized by having almost the same (low) levels of belief in their being able to shape their own destiny. This finding is, of course, not in opposition to Huntington's interpretation of the world, since he does not regard the followers of Greek Orthodoxy as being (culturally speaking) members of the Western Christian tradition.

In order to illustrate the examination of Huntington's ideas as well, Inglehart et al. published a summary of the results of fourth and fifth wave surveying in a way that, using the two-dimensional reference frame, circles that marked the value systems of individual countries were extended to cover those countries that have the same religious-cultural traditions. Thereby it was possible to indicate that the value systems of those countries that belong to the same groups (mainly on the basis of religious traditions) are not so different from the value systems of countries with different traditions. For instance, the marker identifying the European Catholic group of countries overlaps the one for the group of Greek Orthodox countries. The markers for Hungary and Lithuania were intermingled with the markers which identified countries in the Balkans (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

Hungarian analysts were not surprised that the outcomes of the surveys on different value systems across the world and in Europe presented the Hungarian value system to be unique (to put it mildly). According to Tamás Keller's summary value surveys that Hankiss initiated (2010) as far back as the 1980s (based on the Rokeach test), postmaterialist values were only weakly evident in Hungary. A Hungarian value survey (that was integrated already into the first phase of TÁRKI's panel survey which started in 1993) showed no change in this regard. Péter Róbert stated in 1996, when analyzing the results of the first survey based on Schwartz's value test (Róbert 1996), that the majority of Hungarians appeared to be frustrated and felt their place in history was characterized by an exposure to circumstances. They expected solutions to their problems to come from above. Short of solutions, they are characterized by having a "complaint culture" (this expression then became solidified in semi-professional discourse about Hungarians). According to Schwartz's value test, using the axis of open

thinking/closed thinking, Hungarians shift conspicuously towards closed thinking: "Hungarians have a closed thinking, that is, they are passive about public issues, they are rarely characterized by caring for themselves, and they do not really accept responsibility." On the basis of Hofstede's value test, "Hungarians are characterized by an avoidance of uncertainty and short-term thinking" (Keller 2010, 42–43).

Keller himself finds the "fatality-index" (that he based on the TÁRKI-surveys) to be so decisive in the shaping of the life course of not only the community but also the individual that, by descending to micro-sociological level, he suggests that those people (and their offspring) who are most likely to succeed are those who undertake the shaping of their destinies (and are those who do not have the overwhelming feeling that they are at the mercy of circumstances). This, of course, does not answer the chicken or egg question; namely, whether a more conscious choice of values facilitates success or whether those who are more successful are more likely to be self-conscious than those who are not successful. The attitude, however, represents a particular way of passing down cultural capital to the next generation (Keller 2008).

Keller formulated an "index for measuring the control over one's own destiny" based on the following six questions that partly serve to control each other: a1): *I cannot solve my own problems*; a2): *Whatever I decide, I carry through*; a3): *I can scarcely influence the shaping of my destiny*; a4): *The shape of my future mainly depends on me*; a5): *I can hardly make a change about my concerns*; a6): *I have confidence in the future*. In contrast, in our questionnaire – as there was no place or time to include a multi-component value survey into it because of the omnibus character of the questionnaire – there is a single relevant question which addresses the topic: To what extent do you agree with the following statement: *You can barely influence the course of your life*?

Tamás Keller (Keller 2011) also attempted to evaluate how "fateful" (that is, how deeply embedded into Hungarian cultural traditions) the "deviance" of the Hungarian attitude is; so deviant that it even shows up in a value-map of the world. Hankiss and Róbert, the prime social scientists studying value systems in the 1980s, opined that the "stick-in-the-mud" character of Hungarians originated in the unique climate of Kádár's political system. Having observed results from after the system changes of the 1990s, the current authors now tend to think that the causal relationship is the opposite: the reason why the country was able to operate (with an almost content population) under the not really clear (even, uncertain) institutional system of the Kádár-era, and the reason why the shaping of the institutional system was so uncertain after 1989, is exactly *because* the Hungarian value system is like it is.

Keller examined whether from the perspective of the "closedness–openness" axis our "confinement among Orthodox nations" decreases with age but found this was not the case. Although a lesser proportion of those with a college or university degree are characterized by having a less closed way of thinking than the rest of the population, it is not in greater proportion than for Balkan countries. Even though Hungarians may be somewhat more open-minded than we appeared in former survey waves, in neighboring countries (with the exception of Romania) recent "improvements" have been greater. When Keller contrasted countries using the openness-restrictedness scale with GDP per capita, he found that Hungarians, in general, are more closed-minded than the data would suggest. Not even the late date at which the Hungarian

serfs were liberated (in 1848) provides enough explanation for the Hungarian's closed way of thinking (especially when we note that the average openness values in Slovakia and Poland could not be better either if we compare the dates of serf liberation).

Keller then justly proposes that one should go back to Jenő Szűcs's analysis about the three regions of Europe in the late Middle Ages. This explains that with Hungarian feudalism the "little worlds of freedom" only extended to the West of the Laitha river, and up until the time of the liberation of the serfs the number of "free persons" was almost only limited to the aristocracy. However, I do not think that "the thousand-year Hungarian history is like fate sitting on us". In my opinion, the decline of Hungarian political culture started around the end of the nineteenth century, and the repressive attitude that was then formed in mainstream public discourse (and the "befogging" that enraged Ady and the radical intelligentsia so much) which has hindered Hungarians from discussing our own concerns and goals with an outsider's objectivity – but Keller is probably right in thinking that this mentality harms our economic potential as well.

SHOULD GOODS BE DISTRIBUTED FAIRLY?

The reason why the state exists, among other things, is to redistribute income. Clearly, the main aim of this is to guarantee that there are so-called public goods. Beyond this, it should of course secure, or at least control, social insurance, help the downtrodden, ensure that the lives of the disadvantaged improve, have family policies, etc. But is it a task of the state to attempt to level out or even just to perceptibly alleviate income-inequality? The averages of relevant opinions of respondents to this question vary according to country, not primarily according to the level of economic development, but a strong effect derives from the "type" of capitalism that has developed in the particular country. Nonetheless, Hungarian responses do not correspond to other responses from Central Europe.

The Special 72.1 Eurobarometer survey on poverty and social exclusion in 2009 examined citizens' demand for redistribution through several questions – and then compared it to their ideas about poverty and budget constraints. The result that is interesting to us from the perspective of an international comparison is that, according to index values (between –1 and +1) derived from responses to questions about different types of redistribution demands, Hungary is among the leading countries. The first three are Greece (0.78!), Cyprus (0.59) and Hungary (0.58). Hungary is followed by Bulgaria and the Baltic countries. Hungary is in the same group as those countries with Orthodox traditions and the Baltic states, just as with value system surveys.

The decisive question from the block of questions was how much the respondent agreed with the following statement: *The government should ensure the fair redistribution of the country's wealth.* Almost three quarters of Hungarians "agreed completely" with this statement. The proportion of those who completely agreed was only higher in Greece (Keller-Tóth 2011). The distribution of responses to this question cannot of course be directly compared to the ones from our own survey - even less than in the case of the "fatalism"-variable. The possibility of comparison is limited due to three momentums:

- A. A "fair method" of redistribution does not necessarily guarantee equality.
- B. In a "just world" it is not certain that it is only the state that would ensure fair distribution.
- C. Our question was not what the respondents' opinion about their preferred distribution principle was, but rather we asked them to choose from the following three principles which one they favored:
 - 1. *Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its functioning.*
 - 2. *Everyone should partake equally of goods produced.*
 - 3. *Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and should get as much as they need.*

POLITICAL OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS IN OUR SURVEY

Within the indigenous and the migrant population the proportion of communities who profess different political (and moral) principles varies not only because a higher percentage of immigrants have a higher level of education and are of an active age than members of the host society, but also because:

- those people who establish their existence in an environment with unfamiliar traditions (and language) are generally compelled to reflexive; that is, deliberative, judgments about issues concerning the community;
- those who strive to succeed in a "world" that seems foreign from outside are probably a select group in a way. That is, they have a different modal value system to the population of their country of origin;
- the majority of foreigners that settle in Hungary, even only temporarily, do not come here because of some kind of economic or political pressure but either because it appeared practical from the point of view of their careers or for emotional reasons.

Approximately a quarter of the citizens from countries outside the European Union who permanently live in Hungary have settled here because their parents, grown-up children or spouses established an existence here, and they chose to join them. Three quarters of immigrants decided after "free" deliberation, that they would continue their professional careers here, or because of job opportunities that seemed more favorable than in their countries of origin they decided to move here, study here, or for some emotional reasons live here for a given time. The two most populous groups (economically active migrants and foreign students in Hungary) can be divided into subgroups from the perspective of life strategies. Different perspectives about life-planning are identifiable between those who live through a stage of their career in Hungary, those Chinese or Vietnamese salespersons who work as a part of a transnational network with an ethnic character, those ethnic Hungarians from Ukraine who support their families by making a living here, or those immigrants who are trying to make a home for themselves in Hungary. Among students, there are those who came to study in a Hungarian school because of their knowledge of Hungarian and they face a real dilemma about whether to settle down here in the future, make a living

at home, or whether they should market their prospective job skills in the wide space of the European Union; others, however, study here just because the opportunity for them arose, and remaining in Hungary is not attractive in their eyes. Nonetheless, it is a common for the members of these different groups that *they decided on their own to shape of their destinies*. The unique situation of immigrants, their “selected” character (compared to those who stayed on), and the fact that they are compelled to weigh up opportunities explains also why their *potential to exit* is higher than for members of the host society. The higher level of *self-esteem*, however, probably does not simply derive from the migrant existence but much rather from the unique character and roles of immigrants who live in Hungary.

NOTABLY FEWER WHO FLIRT WITH FATALISM

While *two-thirds of the host population* agree partly or fully with the statement that their lives are determined to circumstances, only thirty percent of immigrants feel that their destiny does not primarily depend on them. The more-than-double the proportion of immigrants who ascribe to the principle of individual freedom and responsibility for one’s own destiny is probably due to the features listed above. Hungarian public discourse – as the results of the formerly-quoted surveys also show – may also play a part in this; a kind of “complaint culture” dominates, the majority of citizens have a “closed way of thinking”, or, from a different perspective it can be said that they do not trust in the possibility of “self-realization”, and they believe it is not they themselves but “circumstances” that shape their destiny (this is why some moralists think that the “typical Hungarian” is immoral; is someone who always blames others and hides away from responsibility).

We changed the 1–4 scale answer to the statement “You can hardly influence the course of your life” (completely true, partly true, rather not true, not true at all) to a bivariate variable (those who flirt with fatalism/are not fatalistic) in order to be able to demonstrate the results more clearly.

Table 1 Distribution of the bivariate fatalism-variable (host society and immigrants)

	Not fatalistic	Flirts with fatalism	Altogether
Host society	346	654	1000
	35%	65%	100%
Immigrants	347	153	500
	69%	31%	100%
Altogether	693	807	1500
	46%	54%	100%

The differences between different age groups in the samples of those who “flirt with fatalism” also indicate the probability that *relying on circumstances* (or blaming them) is “socializational damage” that affects member of the host (or non-migrating) society even into adulthood. The number of individuals in this group grows with age; in the population of over 60 years of age, 75% feel that they are the victims of circumstance. At the same time, in all age groups of immigrants, those who opt for what could be identified as being “bourgeois-individualist” values far outnumber those who hold the same values in the “indigenous” sample. What is more, the proportions of immigrants who hold this view do not increase according to age: the proportion of those who believe they can shape their own destiny is the highest with the most active age group (those between 30 and 60; 77.1%). (N. B. In order to ensure a sufficient number of items for each cell, the subsamples were divided into three groups only: age group 1 – under-30-year-olds, age group 2 – 30 to 60-year-olds and age group 3 – over-60-year-olds.)

Table 2 Distribution of the bivariate fatalism-variable (host society and immigrants), %

	Age	Not fatalistic	Fatalistic
Host society	–30	46	54
	30–60	34	66
	60+	25	75
Immigrant	–30	67	33
	30–60	77	23
	60+	42	59

For immigrants, the percentage of those who flirt with fatalism is under 25% of the Chinese and those who come from Anglo-Saxon countries, and it is the highest (around one-third) for migrants from former member countries of the Soviet union and from the Balkans. Even this one-third proportion is hardly more than half the rate of the host society. However, we are aware that within the “stay-at-home” population of these nations the percentage of those who perceive their lives to be exposed to circumstances is as similarly high as with Hungary. The variation between different groups of migrants can probably (mainly) be explained not so much by the differences in the public discourse of the countries of origin, but because immigrants who are not fatalistic are overrepresented in the total sample of immigrants. Besides the variation in the ways of thinking that migrants bring with them from their home countries, what may also have a significant role is the difference in social status in Hungary of those who have come from different countries.

Of course, in the *host population* sample the proportion of those who believe their personal role in shaping their own destiny is important cannot be ignored either: half of those with a college or university degree (and from this group, 3/5 of those under 60) and 40% of those who have finished high school make up the great majority of this

group (it seems that achievements that have been recognized have a role in helping people to be less fatalistic.) Understandably, at the same time, level of education has no notable significance *for immigrants* on how they justify the course of their lives within the given circumstances. More than three quarters of skilled laborers who come from abroad feel that they can shape their own destinies, which is a ratio similar to that for individuals with a college or university degree.

SATISFACTION WITH STATE OFFICES

The eight questions that enquire about opinions regarding official administrative processes were compiled to help gather respondents' opinions about the different elements of *procedural justice*. The strong correlation between responses to the questions that focused on different issues signified that respondents only had a limited understanding of their analytical differences. Their evaluation of the questions is dominated in every case by their level of satisfaction with the outcome or the attitude of the administrative procedure. This makes it difficult to carry out an analysis according to the original goals but it offers the possibility of formulating a unified variable, *satisfaction with administrative offices* (this was done in two ways: firstly, the main component with great explanatory power was used as an index; secondly, we summed up responses into a new index with the range (-16, +16) and into a variable "satisfied" (0), "not satisfied" (1) with offices). On the basis of previous focus group and "citizens" consultation" type surveys carried out on immigrants we expected that a large proportion of them would be frustrated about Hungarian official regulations and procedural practice. It turned out, however, that migrants are more understanding. Because their problems were finally solved in the end, far fewer of them are dissatisfied with Hungarian authorities than can be said for the host society. What is more, while the modal group of the host society can by no means be called satisfied, within the migrant sample, those who are satisfied are the majority.

Our presumption was that those who had been through processes that threatened them with frustration and those who had already formed a routine-like relationship with OIN would dominate the sample and explain why immigrants were so highly contented. This *was not proven correct*. Level of satisfaction was not related significantly to length of stay and was not correlated to satisfaction with OIN.

In order to represent the distribution of opinions more clearly, we here illustrate the spread of the index values (in a range between -16 and +16) gained by summing up the responses to the relevant questions, and based on this, the bivariate variable of dissatisfied (0) and not dissatisfied (1) in logit functions.




Figure 1/a Distribution of the “satisfaction with authorities” index (Hungarian sample), %




Figure 1/b Distribution of the “satisfaction with authorities” index (Immigrant sample), %

Table 3 Relative effect of factors that influence the “not dissatisfied” value for the “satisfaction with authorities” variable (Logit model, N = 1181, unified sample)

	B	S.E.	Sig.	Odds
Level of education (reference: maximum 8 grades)				
Skilled worker	0.229	0.226	0.311	1.257
Secondary education	0.825	0.225	0	2.282
Higher education	0.697	0.268	0.009	2.009
Age (reference: <30 years)				
30–60	0.172	0.196	0.38	1.188
60+	0.887	0.271	0.001	2.427
Immigrant	1.864	0.273	0	6.451
Constant	–1.334	0.366	0	0.264

Note: The reference category for the odds was the likelihood that a Hungarian of less than 30 years of age, living in Hungary, with a maximum 8-grade-level education would not be dissatisfied with administrative authorities.

The low number of items included in the model ($N = 1181$ from the unified sample of 1500 persons) is a consequence of the fact that the model only incorporated those who replied to all the 11 questions that were included in the analysis. The distortion of the sample because of many missing elements – and the fact that the immigrant sample is half the size of the host society sample – decreases the reliability of the results. However, even though we do not have precise information on the extent of the differences between the two subsamples, we can still evaluate the direction of these.

It is true of this satisfaction variable as well that while for the host society the level of satisfaction grows in parallel with level of education (the proportion of those who are dissatisfied decreases) such a significant correlation cannot be found for the immigrant population. In other words, fluctuations in the proportions of those dissatisfied with the authorities are not significant. The outcome of the logistic regression model published here signifies that, within the unified sample, the level of education and the age group have low explanatory power in this regard; differences stem mainly from the fact that fewer immigrants at all levels of education and of every age are dissatisfied with authorities than the “indigenous population”. Of course, this probably does not mean that immigrants have fewer problems with authorities than Hungarians, but that they are less strict with their judgments.

One area for illustrating the difference between the judgments of hosts and immigrants is the different dimensions of procedural justice: 20% of responding members of the host society were dissatisfied with the results of official procedures (or associated the question with a case that was not dealt with properly) and 60% of these individuals categorically supposed that they were treated differently to other clients. A further 25% of those dissatisfied did not reject this “singled out for different treatment” interpretation either. At the same time, only 4.2% of immigrants associated the question with a procedure that had an unsatisfactory result and only 30% of these thought that representatives of the authority had picked on them.

ON DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

The three principles to choose from (Question 46) formulated in a commonplace way the basic principles of three speculative political systems. The question assumed that the norm *Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its functioning* was a formulation of the basic meritocratic principle of conservative market economy (capitalism). The norm that *Everyone should partake equally of goods produced* reflects the aspiration of socialism (and the social-liberal movement that emphasizes the dignity of every individual) to compensate for people's different opportunities by regulating distribution (in a slightly mocking way, this is also called egalitarianism). The norm that *Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and should get as much as they need* signifies the utopian goal of history, communism, or that heavenly state in which the world of prosperity and individual freedom is fulfilled.

Although, for a person socialized in the era of socialism, it is clear which “socio-economic formation” each principle refers to, the distribution of responses indicates that respondents interpreted the question at two separate levels. The meritocratic and

the egalitarian distribution principle bring up political dilemmas that compel people to make decisions about everyday life situations in the present as well, and the utopian principle envisions what kind of a future world would be good. We may assume that choosing the last option implies identification with the “communist utopia” but we may also hypothesize that choosing utopia serves as a way to avoid taking a stand about a dilemma in the present. It is also possible, however, that the respondent has only a beautiful future in mind, and not the present, when they are required to choose between basic political principles. The communism of free individuals is not the utopia of the communists.

As, according to the outcome of value surveys, the value choices of people with a college or university degree differ notably from those of the rest of the population, within both subsamples we separated the responses of those who have at least a college degree from the others (according to Keller’s investigations in the restrictedness-openness dimension – and also in the “self-realization” dimension – those who hold college or university degrees show significantly more positive results than others. At the same time, when applying the criteria of age (young-old), differences are not significant).

Table 4 Distribution of opinions regarding “distributive justice” (host society and immigrants), %

With which of the following statements do you most agree?	Host society		Immigrants	
	Does not have a degree	Has a degree	Does not have a degree	Has a degree
Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its functioning	34	44	43	49
Everyone should partake equally of goods produced	25	18	15	14
Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and should get as much as they need	41	38	42	38

More than 40% of respondents from both the host and the immigrant sample avoided taking a stand about a dilemma concerning the present (another reason for this may be that this dilemma was formulated in too exaggerated a way). The proportions of those who did make a stand regarding the dilemma, on the other hand, show characteristic differences. While 60% of Hungarians that committed themselves chose the meritocratic principle of distribution, more than three quarters of immigrants did so. For the host society, both the act of making a stand on the political dilemma of the present and the likelihood of choosing the meritocratic principle of distribution explicitly correlates with the level of education. For those with only a basic level of education, more choose the egalitarian principle than those the principle that could motivate people to achieve.

For *immigrants*, the correspondence between the distribution principle one chooses and the level of education is not significant. This is partly because (across all educational levels) those who adhere to the meritocratic principle are clearly higher in number than egalitarians, and partly because the group of skilled laborers who are

working in Hungary choose the meritocratic distribution principle of the self-assured in even higher proportions than those who have a degree.

What we found was in accord with our expectations that those who take on the shaping of their own destiny (and take responsibility for their own destiny) tend to prefer the meritocratic distribution principle (and are less likely to flee from decision-making into utopia). Indeed: cross tabulation shows that those who flirt with fatalism are more inclined to turn to utopia and are more likely to choose the egalitarian principle than those who “trust in themselves” (although, among the latter, the number of those who dodge the dilemma and who are egalitarian is also significant). The “fatalism variable” explains only a smaller portion of the distribution of opinions and the correlation can only be regarded as significant in the case of the host society sample.

We can observe that the proportion of immigrants who adhere to bourgeois (conservative liberal) values is notably higher (that is; it is only well educated Hungarians with similar value systems that are present in high proportions). However, we cannot claim about these groups that their world view is ideologically coherent (or one-sided, viewed from another perspective).

THE FAIRNESS OF POLITICIANS

Although the question formulated *How true is the statement that “politicians are fair to people like you in their decisions?”* is more sophisticated than the questions which address trust in political institutions, according to expectations, responses to this are in accordance with questions related to trust in political institutions (which reflect a much more negative picture than responses related to the issue of trust in administrative offices). The distribution of responses, however, shows even more notably the proportional differences in groups with different orientations within the host society and the immigrant sample.

The survey required responses in the form of an evaluation using a 10-degree scale, where “0” meant that in the opinion of the respondent the statement was *not true at all*, while the highest mark, “10” meant that they thought it was *perfectly true*.




Figure 2/a Trust in politicians' fairness (Host population sample), %




Figure 2/b Trust in politicians' fairness (Immigration population sample), %

While the host society is dominated by those who do not trust the empathy of politicians, the modal group of immigrants believe in the fairness of politicians to a moderate extent (rating it between 5 and 7 points).

Even in this case only an insignificant part of the difference in distribution may be explained by the fact that immigrants on average are more highly educated than the general population. The rejection of the assumption that politicians are fair becomes stronger as educational level decreases (for the host society). However, there is no apparently significant difference between the distribution of opinions of immigrants with different levels of education (here the proportion of those who awarded a score of 5 points was not lower for immigrants who were skilled laborers than for those who had a degree). What is more, there are far fewer immigrants who rejected the supposition that politicians could be trusted, whereas the opinions of those with a degree were more widely distributed.

The connection between differences in the evaluation of one's own social situation and of the fairness of politicians may be significant. Those who evaluate their own situation as being better are less likely to think that politicians lack empathy. In fact, social position accounts for almost 20% of variation in the evaluation of politicians – but for immigrants this variable has low explanatory power (just as does the background variable of the wealth index, which reflects the level of prosperity but explains the issue only to a small extent).

As the percentages of well-educated people, those of active age, those in a better-than-average economic position and with a higher social status are higher for immigrants – and there is a group of assertive skilled laborers among them – it is natural that fewer of them are inclined to make the declaration that politicians are a group of soulless people only concerned with themselves than with the Hungarian population. Nonetheless, these "more favorable" structural characteristics from the point of view of the immigrant sample do not cumulatively have enough explanatory power to explain the higher level of tolerance and trust that migrants have. Variation in the proportion of opinions within a given statistical group is generally greater between the hosts and the immigrants than between the statistical groups within the migrant population.

It is clearly required that we seek further reasons and explanations to interpret these findings. Conformity probably has a role in the overwhelming number of significantly less critical judgments: let us not judge too harshly about the world of the interviewers or host society. But because the question was related – unlike with questions concerning political institutions – not specifically to Hungarian politicians, this explanation does not seem sufficient. We can trace the effect of the differences in value systems described above (which include the idea that we should not seek the reasons for our own success or lack of success in circumstances such as “politics”). The answer may be found in that bourgeois (or philistine) principle that says that we should not relate to representatives of another “profession” with hostility; let us believe that they are trying to do their jobs well. Clearly, some of the difference also lies in the fact that – as the Eurobarometer surveys also suggest – looking for scapegoats is not as natural everywhere as it is in Hungary, and neither is the tendency to blame those in power for every problem that the Good Lord has not solved.

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POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN HUNGARIAN SOCIETY AND FOR IMMIGRANTS

Borbála Göncz

INTRODUCTION

This last chapter firstly provides an overview of different indicators of civic participation and political activity with a comparison of Hungarian society and the immigrant population, and secondly, in view of some other factors that were discussed earlier in this book. The economic, social and cultural aspects of the political or civic integration of migrants (i.e. the ways in which immigrants participate in the host society's political life) are gradually receiving more attention. This topic is interesting from the aspect of how migrants (who often originate from non-democratic countries or at least countries with a different political culture), get integrated into democratic systems, but also because civic participation offers an opportunity for migrants themselves to represent their own interests.

The concept of political integration generally comprises the host country's laws, identification with the host country, the acceptance of democratic norms and values, political participation, mobilization as the process of establishing a collective identity and representation, which embodies a sort of legitimation process (Martiniello 2006).

Research projects on the topic identify several different target groups. The subject may be studied from the perspective of the effects that gaining citizenship status has on civic participation: under this approach the attitudes and behaviours of migrants who already possess citizenship status are compared to those who have not yet gained it; the attitudes of second-generation migrants are also often studied (e.g. Röder and Mühlau 2011). A comparison of migrant communities with minority communities may also generate important outcomes (Martiniello 2006).

For a society, the notion of civic integration (Lockwood 1999) refers to the integrity of the institutional system linked to the concept of citizenship; i.e. it comprises institutional trust, political participation and activity and other forms of political activity. At the same time, the present research, which is focused on measuring the civic integration of immigrants, studied the topic of civic integration through a comparison of immigrants without citizenship status with members of Hungarian society. For this reason it is important to address traditional methods of political participation based on elections or voting – usually only available to persons with citizenship status – separately from

non-traditional ways of political participation that are not linked to elections and that are possibly available to non-citizens as well.

The issue of the political integration of immigrants is especially interesting in the case of Hungary where the level of political activity and civic participation is one of the lowest in Europe. This phenomenon may be linked to the level of development of democracy, in that the social and political institutional system does not have the same traditions as in Western European countries (Angelusz and Tardos 2000). In former socialist countries in general, and Hungary in particular, refraining from expressing one's opinion and a culture of political passivity is a tradition rooted in the Kádár-era (Angelusz 2000). This is the political environment that immigrants should get integrated into.

In Hungary the political integration of immigrants has been studied through two earlier research projects.¹ Although the focus and the methodology of these earlier studies were slightly different, current research findings will be presented in comparison to these earlier results, if overlaps in the topics allow.

INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Determining factors of political activity and civic participation

In recent years, several pieces of research have been undertaken at an international level which attempted to examine the political and civic participation of immigrants. The main research question usually revolves around the differences between the political behaviour of the majority population and immigrants and the factors that may explain this.

It is important to mention that the political integration of immigrants is not necessarily a linear process but can be dynamically uneven; it may be intermittent or even unfinished (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009). Earlier research has explored the factors behind political integration through various approaches. Besides the classic variables that influence political participation (sex, age, education, income, interest in politics, labour market status, group membership, satisfaction with the performance of the government, materialist values, acceptance of authority, political conviction, etc.), the national political environment (the mobilizing potential of already-integrated political actors, schools, trade unions, associations, etc.) and political institutions also play an influencing role. Researchers who claim that migration itself is an influencing factor on its own mostly argue that experiences gained in the country of origin (Black 1987, Harles 1997) and thus political socialization leave a lasting impact on the political behaviours of immigrants. Others, however, emphasize that short-term economic goals

¹ Namely, the international research effort LOCALMULTIDEM in 2008, and the EIF-funded research project "Immigrants in Hungary" in 2009. Details of both surveys are presented in the book introduction.

and a lack of commitment are more likely to be the root-causes of the political inactivity of immigrants than a lack of a political and democratic culture (Martiniello 2006).

This way, the country of origin and earlier political socialization processes emerge as important factors. In the case of immigrants from non-democratic countries, the level of political trust, the sense of civic duty and civic activity are presumably lower (e.g. Paskeviciute and Anderson 2007, Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009). Besides the country of origin, factors such as when the immigrant arrived and for how long they have stayed in the host country may also have an important influencing role.

When we examine the topic of political activity and civic participation, the connections between this and material and cultural resources, as well as with social resources and overlaps with the concept of social capital are also worth taking into consideration (e.g. Putnam 1993, Angelusz and Tardos 2003, Klandermans et al. 2008). Membership in a non-profit organization can, on the one hand, be interpreted as an aspect of social capital. When examining four aspects of social capital – trust, social network, societal norms and civil society activity – comparatively at the European level, it is, for instance, apparent that Hungary, together with Romania and Bulgaria, is among the worst performing countries (Giczi and Sik 2009). On the other hand, membership in non-profit organizations may be an indicator of civic activity as well, so social capital in this respect is not only a determinant of civic or political activity but the two concepts also overlap. When examining this topic, Kmetty and Tóth (2011) arrive at the conclusion, for example, that in the case of Hungary membership in a non-profit organization is not so much an indicator of social capital as an indication of a democratic attitude.

Research related to the trust aspect of social capital, especially regarding trust in institutions, has rendered interesting results when comparing host societies and immigrants. For example, first-generation migrants who do not yet have citizenship and whose experiences related to institutions were gained not or not only in the receiving country, were more likely to have confidence in the host country's institutions than members of the host society were (Röder and Mühlau 2011). At the same time, when studying earlier research results, it is not obvious how trust in institutions may influence the political activity of immigrants. If immigrants suffer some real or assumed offences from these institutions (i.e. their sense of justice or fairness is harmed), this contributes to increased political activity (Klandermans et al. 2008).

In addition, increasing amounts of research has focused on the group membership tendencies of immigrants (Myberg 2011), which is often low due to obstacles such as low levels of political participation, poor local language skills or a scarcity of social relationships at a local level. A special form of group membership (which combines the effects of group membership and the influences of migrant origins) is membership in ethnic organizations. Tillie has focused, in several pieces of research (Fennema and Tillie 1999, Tillie 2004) on the effect of group membership based on ethnicity or nationality. Results indicated that this was likely to increase political participation; what is more, this effect prevailed at both individual and group level as well. In the 90s, one surprising outcome of research conducted on the Muslim community in the Netherlands was that even those organizations which were regarded by Dutch legislators as being

fundamentalist, authoritarian organizations recorded increased political participation. The efficiency of the functioning of democracy at a local level was thus improved.

Group membership may be studied through the concept of social capital but also from the perspective of personal identity and belonging (e.g. Martiniello 2006, Odman 2005). Identity (or rather, a complex and dynamic system of different identity components), may also be a decisive factor affecting the political participation of immigrants. Namely, a greater level of identification with the host society or a double identity may lead to more active political participation (Odman 2005, Klandermans et al. 2008).

Electoral vs. non-electoral forms of political participation

However, it is worth dividing political and civic participation into its electoral and non-electoral components. Indicators of the electoral type of political participation include participation in elections, appearance on electoral candidate lists, creation of separate political parties and consultative institutions. Research based on the electoral kinds of political participation rendered results (both European and international) proving that voter turnout is similar for migrants and members of the host society (Ramakrishnan et al. 2001). More precisely, there are differences between the host society and migrants but these observable differences are due to the lower level of resource availability for migrants. This was demonstrated by Tillie (2004) in his analysis of the social capital of different ethnic groups living in the Netherlands, and by Maxwell (2010) with regards to immigrant communities in France, the majority of whom lived in lower-quality urban environments than their French peers.

Non-electoral types of political activity comprise participation in trade unions, collective organizations of interest representation based on ethnicity, race, nationality, culture or religion (Martiniello 2006) but non-electoral kinds of civic participation may be apprehended through various other types of activities as well. Earlier research was based on measuring the extent of different political activities with different intensity of commitment levels, using an (usually additive) index in the analysis (e.g. Paskeviciute and Anderson 2007, Klandermans et al. 2008). Such activities may include the signing of a petition, attending a political meeting, contacting a politician or participation in a legal (or even illegal) demonstration. Besides political activities, membership in organizations and social embeddedness, just as with perceptions of civic activity and the sense of civic duty as a value, may also be important indicators of civic activity and allow the expression of individual interests. In effect, these aforementioned activities correspond to the concept of "voice" as form of action potential²; that is, the willingness or potential for protesting. When analyzing this concept, Bilodeau (2008) found that

² "Action potential" is the inclination of and abilities of individual and collective actors to improve their situations, or – if conditions deteriorate – to avoid further deteriorations. This research draws our attention to the fact that the conditionality of life situations is not only influenced by social circumstances and individual capacity but also by inclinations, intentions and aspirations (Lengyel 2002).

migrants were less active than members of the host society. Results also showed that immigrants who had migrated from oppressive countries took part in such activities in even lower proportions than other migrants, especially with regards to the signing of petitions, an activity that did not guarantee them anonymity.

When dealing with political activity, several other variables associated with the concept in a wider understanding must be taken into account. One such indicator is the “political micro-milieu”, employed by Angelusz and Tardos (Angelusz and Tardos 2009) in a similar way to Devine (1970), who emphasizes the role of media-use, political interest and discussions about political debates, information and knowledge about politics and active participation in various political initiatives in his theory about the politically “attentive public”. Thus, interest and information or knowledge may be correlated with political activity, alongside political “cynicism” or disillusion-driven acts against political and civic engagement for immigrants as well (Klandermans et al. 2008).

Henceforth, the above-described variables of political and civic activity are compared for Hungarian society and immigrants, while reference is given to factors discussed in the earlier sections of this book, including objective and subjective well-being, economic, cultural and social resources, dignity, a sense of procedural and distributive justice and identity.

INDICATORS OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Traditional forms of political activity – electoral participation

As mentioned before, it is worth differentiating between electoral and non-electoral forms of political activity. The electoral type of political participation was measured in our questionnaire by recording participation in national and local elections. According to Hungarian law, and similarly to other European countries, only Hungarian citizens may vote in national elections, therefore only members of the host society were asked about this activity. In contrast, participation in local elections is open to certain groups of immigrants.³

From the answers given it is visible that there is a slight but statistically significant difference regarding participation in national and local elections within the host society: slightly more people claimed that they would vote at local than at national elections; 37-38% would definitely vote, 20-22% would probably vote, while 30-32% would definitely not go and vote (see Table 1). This low level of interest in participation was underlined by another survey carried out in December 2011, which stated that “this year, the proportion of those who declared their intention to vote for sure dropped

³ Those persons from our sample with only a residence permit cannot vote, but those who have an immigration permit or a permanent residence permit (i.e. everybody except those with residence permits), have the right to vote (Article XXIII of the Basic Law).

to 40%, the lowest for 20 years"⁴ (whereas in 2010 before the elections this proportion was 60%⁵).

For migrants, results showed a different pattern: 48% said they had no right to vote; at the same time it is worth mentioning at this point that many did not know that they *could* in fact vote, or thought they had the right to vote when they did not. A higher proportion (58%) of migrants with a residence permit said that they did not have the right to vote, while the remaining 42% who also answered this question positively in fact did not have voting rights. Out of those migrants who, on the other hand, have the right to vote, (i.e. those with an immigration or a permanent residence permit), 37% thought that they could not vote. Upon examining only those who actually responded to the question (independently of whether they actually had the right to vote or not) treating the question only as an indicator of civic attitude, it is visible that immigrants would vote in significantly lower proportions than members of the host society – 15.5% said they would “definitely vote” and 64% stated that they would “probably” or “definitely” not go and vote. So far, the above-described results reflect those earlier international research results that found that the political activity of migrants was lower than that of the host society (e.g. Martiniello 2006).

Table 1 Willingness to participate in elections (%)

	General election	Local election		
	Host society	Host society	Immigrants	Immigrants
N =	960	960	459	238
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Would vote for sure (4)	36.8	38.1	8.1	15.5
Would probably vote (3)	20.1	21.7	10.5	20.2
Would probably not vote (2)	11.4	10.3	12.0	23.1
Would not vote for sure (1)	31.8	29.9	21.4	41.2
Does not have voting rights	–	–	48.1	–
Average (1-4)	2.62	2.68		2.10

Note: Host society (general vs. local): $t = -3.88^{****}$

Local election (host society vs. migrants): $t = 6.98^{****}$

The question was: “If there was a general/local election this Sunday, can you tell me if you would vote?”

At the same time, when looking at respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics and their disposition with cultural resources, there are differences observable between the intention to vote of the host society and of immigrants. For members of Hungarian society, both in the case of general and local elections, higher proportions of older people would vote (as is the case for more highly-educated people), while there are

⁴ Source: Medián; the survey was carried out in December 2011.

(<http://www.median.hu/object.52e79dc7-adcc-4f25-9ed4-4baabb89553b.ivy>)

⁵ Source: DKMKA Hungarian Election Research Programme 2010 survey (Kmetty and Tóth 2011).

large differences between regions: in the Transdanubia region, for instance, people are less willing to vote. It is also true that polarization is greater for the inactive than for the active population – a higher proportion of the inactive either say they would “definitely vote” or they would “definitely not vote” than the actives. In the case of migrants, their level of education also has a positive effect on inclination to participate, and there were fewer educated respondents who said they did not have the right to vote. Additionally, the period respondents have spent in Hungary has also had an effect: for those who had been in Hungary for longer than 9 years, the proportion who said they did not have a right to vote was lower, while inclination to participate was higher.

Non-electoral forms of political activity

Political activity, on the other hand, can take numerous non-electoral forms other than participation in elections, and for immigrants, focusing on these activities can lead to more meaningful results than focusing on electoral participation. In the present research, non-electoral political activity is measured by participation in different political activities, membership in non-profit organizations and in terms of how respondents evaluate their own ability to represent their interests.

Different political activities than voting correspond to what Hirschman called “voice”, and in this way this topic is directly related to the concept of the “exit” type of action potential (Hirschman 1978) that is discussed by György Lengyel in an earlier section of this book. The concept of action potential signifies that individuals and collective actors have different competences and abilities for improving their own situations, or for stopping them from deteriorating.

Table 2 contains a number of political activities that reflect political engagement and potential for voice. In general, the occurrence of each of these activities is quite infrequent but, at the same time, almost a quarter (24.5%) of Hungarians have taken part at least in one of these activities, while the same proportion for immigrants was only 13.8%. The most widespread form of protest is getting in contact with politicians or civil servants; within the last 5 years, 15% of members of the host society and 9% of immigrants had engaged in this form of action. A further 8% of the host society had signed a petition while again a significantly lower share of immigrants (5%) had. The above results correspond to earlier research findings; for instance, in 2010 similar research found that 30% of Hungarians had participated in such forms of political activity, and the proportions of people who took each action was very similar too (Kern–Szabó 2011).

Table 2 Participation in different political activities – potential for voice (%)

	Host society	Immigrants	
N =	1000	500	
	100.0	100.0	<i>T-test</i>
Contacted a politician or a civil servant	14.6	8.7	3.52****
Signed a petition	7.5	4.9	2.07**
Bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons	6.4	5.3	<i>n.s.</i>
Boycotted certain products	5.5	4.5	<i>n.s.</i>
Taken part in a public demonstration	4.8	4.3	<i>n.s.</i>
Attended a political meeting or a rally of a political party	4.1	3.3	<i>n.s.</i>
Worn or displayed a campaign badge or sticker	3.7	3.4	<i>n.s.</i>
Contacted or appeared in the press to express their views	2.6	1.3	1.78*
Donated money to a political organization or group	1.8	1.2	<i>n.s.</i>
Participated in the work of a political organization or movement	1.8	3.1	<i>n.s.</i>
At least one activity	24.5	13.8	5.14****

Note: The question was the following: “Here are some different forms of political and social action that people can take. Please indicate, for each one, whether you have done any of these things in the past five years.”

For the host society it is the age group of 30 to 59 years that showed higher voice potential; both younger and older members of society were less inclined to use these opportunities. Besides this, or maybe directly in connection with this, economic activity and cultural resources, such as level of education or knowledge of foreign languages, also have a positive impact. For immigrants, results showed a slightly different picture; namely, the older a person was, the less likely they were to take part in the above-described non-electoral kinds of political activity. At the same time, activity and cultural resources had a similar effect. Furthermore, voice potential was the highest for those who had been living in Hungary for a longer time (5–8 years).

Another indicator suitable for measuring potential for voice is the extent to which immigrants feel capable of protesting effectively when they find something problematic. As can be seen in Table 3., the question “Suppose a law were being considered by Parliament that you considered to be unjust or harmful. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you, acting alone or together with others, would be able to do something about it?” was answered by a significantly higher proportion of immigrants with the response “not at all likely” (70%) than members of Hungarian society (53%).

Table 3 Perception of interest representation (%)

	Host society	Immigrants
N =	941	465
	100.0	100.0
Very likely (4)	4.7	.6
Fairly likely (3)	9.0	6.7
Not very likely (2)	33.8	22.4
Not at all likely (1)	52.5	70.3
Average (1–4)	1.66	1.38

$t = 6.99^{****}$

Note: The question was: "Suppose a law were being considered by Parliament that you considered to be unjust or harmful. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you, acting alone or together with others, would be able to do something about it?"

Regarding this indicator, the economically active and those who dispose of more cultural resources report that they would be more likely to be able to do something about an unfavourable situation (this is characteristic of both the host society and migrants). For both sample groups, young people are more optimistic and so are those immigrants who have spent less time in Hungary. In their case (immigrants), country of origin plays a significant role; immigrants from the North-American region, presumably due to cultural characteristics and socialization, expressed more positive thoughts about the issue than the rest.

Membership in non-governmental organizations is also a widely-used indicator of civic activity which, at the same time, can also be interpreted as a manifestation of social capital, as already mentioned in the section on the theoretical framework of this chapter. In this regard there is, on the whole, no significant difference between Hungarians and the migrant population: one quarter of all respondents (25–28%) were members of at least one such organization. There was a difference, however, in the number of organizations that respondents were affiliated with; 14% of immigrants were members of one, and another 7% more than two organizations, whereas for the host society 20% were members of one organization or fewer while only an additional 4% were members of another one as well. At the same time, the difference lies with the types of organizations that respondents participate in. Members of the host society were typically more likely to have participated in organising local community events (7%) or be participants of religious or church organizations (7%) and in the activities of social movements or non-governmental organizations (3%). In contrast, immigrants were typically rather members of sports clubs (12%), cultural or leisure associations (9%) or organizations for environmental protection (4%). Findings about Hungarian society on this topic are very similar to the results of a 2010 survey in which 20% of respondents reported to participating in the work of non-profit organizations (cultural, leisure, sports clubs and religious or church organizations were among the most frequent ones) (Kern and Szabó 2011). Results of an earlier survey on immigrants from 2009 showed that

18% of them were members of an organization (Örkény and Székelyi 2010) – these former results are not significantly different from those of the present survey either.

Table 4 Membership in non-governmental organizations (%)

	Host society	Immigrants	
N =	1000	500	
	100.0	100.0	<i>T-test</i>
The organizations of a local community event	6.6	2.5	3.96****
A religious or church organization	6.6	4.1	2.14**
A sports club or club for outdoor activities (recreational organization)	5.9	11.9	-3.7****
The organization of a local sport event	4.9	3.5	<i>n.s.</i>
A cultural or leisure association	3.4	9.0	-3.99****
A social movement, NGO	3.2	.8	3.5****
A business or professional organization	2.9	3.1	<i>n.s.</i>
A political party or organization	2.4	.2	4.35****
A local organization, association for the local community	2.4	2.0	<i>n.s.</i>
A charity or social aid organization	2.2	3.3	<i>n.s.</i>
A trade union	2.2	.5	3.01***
An organization for environmental protection	1.5	4.3	-2.8***
A voluntary cooperative for house building	1.4	.8	<i>n.s.</i>
Membership in at least one organization	27.9	25.3	<i>n.s.</i>

Note: The question was: "Do you currently participate actively in or do voluntary work for one or more of the following organizations?"

Typically, those who were economically active or had more cultural resources at their disposal were more likely to be members of non-profit organizations. At the same time, some not-so-insignificant differences between the various regions could be observed. For members of Hungarian society, those living in the Transdanubian and the Northern Great Plain regions were less likely to be members of non-profit organizations, whereas in the case of the immigrant population, this is rather characteristic of those who live in Budapest. Younger migrants and those who come from Asia are more likely affiliated with an organization, while the opposite is true of European immigrants, most of whom are ethnic Hungarians who used to live in neighboring countries.

Interest in politics and the obtaining of information

When examining political activity and civic participation, it is worth taking political interest and use of information sources into account. As is observable from Table 5, immigrants are, to a statistically significant extent, less interested in politics than members of Hungarian society. While around one-third of each group said they were neither interested nor uninterested in politics, the proportion of those who were either fairly or very interested was 26% for the host society and only 11% for the immigrant

population. When one compares the level of political interest in Hungarian society to results from 2008 and 2010, it can also be seen that, whereas it remained fairly constant over the previous two dates (3.03-3.04 on average on a scale of 1 to 5) (Szabó 2011), this survey indicated a slight decrease in political interest since then, as the average of the different responses was only 2.74.

Table 5 Interest in politics (%)

	Host society	Immigrants
N =	997	492
	100.0	100.0
Not at all interested (1)	18.4	34.8
Not very interested (2)	20.6	23.2
Neither interested nor uninterested (3)	34.8	31.1
Fairly interested (4)	21.4	8.7
Very interested (5)	4.9	2.2
Average (1-5)	2.74	2.21

t = 8.642****

Note: The question was: "How interested would you say you personally are in politics?"

A significant difference, similar to the above, can be observed regarding the extent to which Hungarians and migrants follow political, social and economic events which are happening in Hungary. While 31% of Hungarian society follows these events quite a lot or very much, only 19% of the migrant population do so (see Table 6). In accordance with transnational theories of migration, it is hypothesised that immigrants maintain their connections to their country of origin, and continue to follow events in their countries of origin – sometimes with more intensity than those taking place in Hungary. Our data support this assumption, as immigrants are in fact significantly more interested in news from their countries of origin.

Interestingly, results of a 2009 survey on migrants indicated a slightly different tendency. Results of the research project "Immigrants in Hungary 2009" demonstrated that immigrants had a stronger interest in politics than members of Hungarian society – more than 70% of them showed an interest in public matters in Hungary, and 85% in public matters in their countries of origin (Örkény and Székelyi 2010). The difference between the results of these findings and the current research may partly be explained by the different wording of the question, as well as the different sampling method and sample composition.

Table 6 Keeping informed about political, economic and social events (%)

	Events in Hungary		Events in the country of origin
	Host society	Immigrants	Immigrants
N =	1000	498	500
	100.0	100.0	100.0
Not at all (1)	11.9	21.7	15.1
A little (2)	20.6	31.3	28.2
Somewhat (3)	36.3	28.1	30.1
Quite a lot (4)	24.4	14.7	17.6
Very much (5)	6.9	4.2	4.2
Average (1-5)	2.94	2.49	2.77

Note: Events in Hungary (host society vs. immigrants): $t = 7.46^{****}$

Immigrants (Hungary vs. country of origin): $t = -5.24^{****}$

The question was: "How much do you follow the political, social and economic news in Hungary / of your country of origin?"

With both political interest and the following of news, respondents with a higher level of education showed greater interest. Furthermore, in Hungarian society men are more interested in politics and follow politics more closely than women. Budapest-based respondents are also more politically interested, as are persons older than thirty years. Results for inactive people are less clear than those for active ones. For the migrant population, inactivity has a clearly positive effect on interest in politics. Immigrants from Europe and the North American region are also more likely to follow politics, while immigrants from Asia or Africa are less interested, and migrants who have spent a longer time in Hungary follow Hungarian news more closely. With regard to news from the country of origin it is also true that people with a higher level of education and those who have lived in Hungary for a longer period of time follow political news more intensely, but at the same time this is more characteristic of the older generation (between 50 and 59 years of age) and less typical of inactive migrants, who are probably typically younger people. It seems that inactive migrants are more interested in politics in general, however, they follow the news from their country of origin to a lesser extent.

With regard to political activity and civic participation, apart from having an interest in politics, usage of the media (i.e. how / how often one obtains information about political issues), is also an important indicator. There is similarly significant variation in the use of different news sources and media to the interest in politics indicator. While 55% of the host society obtains information from the television nearly every day, this proportion for immigrants is 19%, and a similar tendency can be observed with regard to radio, daily and weekly papers as well. In general it is true of both groups that the most frequent news source is television, followed by the radio, daily papers and, finally, weekly papers. Only the Internet does not fit into this trend: this medium is used by immigrants more often for the purpose of obtaining information about politics. While 61% of Hungarians "nearly never" or "never" use the Internet for obtaining information, the proportion for immigrants is only 40% – linguistic issues may underlies this, but this difference may also be caused by the different demographic composition of the two groups.

Table 7 Keeping informed about political news, media proximity (%)

	Television		Radio		Daily papers		The Internet		Weekly papers	
	Host society	Immigrants	Host society	Immigrants	Host society	Immigrants	Host society	Immigrants	Host society	Immigrants
N =	999	499	999	497	998	498	995	498	999	499
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never or nearly never (0)	5.8	24.0	24.9	51.1	30.9	56.0	61.0	39.8	46.2	64.3
Less often (0.5)	10.5	22.4	18.6	21.1	21.7	22.7	10.8	27.1	29.2	26.5
Once or twice a week (1,5)	9.8	16.2	12.6	10.5	13.2	10.8	8.2	10.8	14.5	6.8
Several times a week (3)	19.4	17.8	19.4	9.3	16.8	6.4	9.7	11.6	7.3	1.4
Every day or nearly every day (6)	54.5	19.4	24.4	8.0	17.3	4.0	10.3	10.6	2.7	1.0
Average	4.05	2.06	2.33	1.02	1.85	0.71	1.09	1.28	0.74	0.34
T-test	16.32****		12.21****		12.51****		-1.89*		7.86****	

Note: The question was: "On average, how often do you obtain political news or information through...?"

CONNECTIONS AND EXPLANATORY ASPECTS OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY

The approach

Based on the results of simple cross tabulation it can be seen that the different indicators of political activity and civic participation correlate in different ways for the host society and the immigrant population. Participation in different types of political activity (see Table 2) and membership in non-governmental organizations (see Table 4) are positively related to how much the respondent perceives that they could do something against a parliamentary decision that has a negative impact for them; that is, how much potential one has for protesting and validating one's interest. This correlation is valid both for Hungarian society and for migrants.

However, when examining other indicators for political participation, differences between the two groups arise. While a positive correlation is found for participation between different political activities and membership in organizations on the one hand, and intention to participate in national and local elections, interest in politics and following political, social and economic news on the other, for immigrants these variables are independent of each other. Only "following the political, social and economic news of the home country" positively correlates to organizational membership (i.e. the more closely one follows political news, the more likely they are to be a member of a non-profit organization, or vice versa).

Hereafter, political or civic activity will be examined using three variables: 1. by examining intention to participate in elections; and using two aspects of non-electoral participation: 2. participation in different political activities (potential for voice), and 3. membership in non-profit organizations. Intention to vote, as already mentioned above, only correlates with (the two variables for) non-electoral kinds of activity for Hungarians while both of these variables (as can be seen in Table 8), significantly positively correlate with each other both for the host society and for the immigrant sample. If a person is a member of a non-governmental organization, they are more likely to take part in political activities – this connection is of similar strength for both the host society and immigrants. For the Hungarian sample, 42% of members of organizations participate in some political activity, in contrast to 18% of those who are not members of any organization. For immigrants, 29% of members of organizations took part in some political activity as opposed to 8% of non-members.

Table 8 Connection between potential for voice and membership in a non-governmental organization (%)

	Voice potential	Membership in an organization		Altogether
		not a member of an organization	member of an organization	
Host society (Cramer's V: 0.249****)	did not participate	82.2	58.4	75.6
	participated in some activity	17.8	41.6	24.4
	N =	721	279	1000
		100.0	100.0	100.0
Immigrants (Cramer's V: 0.255****)	did not participate	91.2	70.9	86.0
	participated in some activity	8.8	29.1	14.0
	N =	374	127	501
		100.0	100.0	100.0

In order to gain deeper understanding about the issue, multivariate analysis was conducted, which was designed to reveal the factors which determine political and civic participation. The three dependent variables used for measuring political and civic participation were formulated as dichotomous variables. For the sake of comparability, intention to participate in local elections was chosen as an indicator of electoral participation (the question being what determines the chance of whether someone "would vote for sure" as opposed to all other responses). As almost half of all immigrants thought (rightly or wrongly) that they did not have the right to vote, they were not included in this analysis (see Table 1). Similarly, the analysis did not differentiate between those who really possessed voting rights and those who did not. Simply, if respondents expressed the intention to vote, this was considered to be an indicator of "civic" attitude and made them eligible for inclusion in the analysis.

As an indicator of non-electoral types of political participation, if respondents had taken part in any political activity included in Table 2, they were considered to be politically active. Accordingly, if someone was a member of any of the organizations included in Table 4, this was coded as being "active civic participation".

The main aim of the multivariate analysis was to reveal the characteristics and interconnections of political and civic participation of immigrants in comparison with Hungarian society. Therefore, separate models were formulated for members of the host society and for immigrants in which comparability featured as an important aspect. The analysis is primarily exploratory in its approach and examines whether there is a difference between Hungarian society and immigrants with regard to the following questions:

How do social, cultural and material resources and subjective well-being influence political and civic participation?

Material resources are partly represented by a variable which measures economic activity, and partly by a wealth index made up of different assets.⁶ Educational level is an indicator of cultural resources – however, other factors such as knowledge of a foreign language were not included in the models because of redundancy and a strong correlation between these variables. The effect of social capital was included in the model through the factors of trust in different institutions, personal trust and the frequency of discussions with friends about politics. Institutional trust was analysed in the form of a principal component that has been presented in more detailed in an earlier chapter by Dorottya Kisfalusi. The concept of subjective well-being has also been described and analysed in the book in the section written by Eleonóra Szanyi-F.; the results of that principal component analysis were used in this section.

How is political and civic participation influenced by the perception of procedural and distributive justice; that is, by how fair one perceives her own treatment to be, and the share one obtains of available resources?

Does identity and attachment play a determining role in political and civic participation?

The concept and components of distributive and procedural justice are detailed in this book in the section written by Lilla Tóth. The following regression models include the perception of how fair politicians are in their decision-making and the principal component of procedural justice. Furthermore, the models have been formulated to include the effect of identity and attachment to the new or the home country as well (Klandermans et al. 2008).

How does the exit component of the potential for action influence political and civic participation?

The concept of action potential and its exit aspect has been discussed by György Lengyel in this book in detail. The index formulated there measured whether the respondent was planning to move to a different settlement or settle in another country, or become an entrepreneur, and serves to measure exit potential. This index is included in the multivariate models. Hirschman, who introduced the concepts of exit and voice, mentions in a paper written about the connection of these concepts that these two forms of actions appear to be in opposition to each other. The less the possibility to exit (as an impersonal act which can be taken to avoid a problem or conflict) is, the more a person is motivated to voice their dissatisfaction in a non-anonymous way. Assuming that migration or leaving a country is such a form of exit action, Hirschman notes that migrants who arrived in the wave of migration before World War I. from Europe to

⁶ The standardized additive index contains: car younger than 3 years, holiday home, valuable art object, digital camera, automatic washing machine, mp3, personal computer, bank card, bank account and mobile phone.

America were characterised by having very low levels of protest activity in their new country as well. The frequency of their engagement in political protests decreased both for the source and host countries (Hirschman 1978). It is worth mentioning that in this regard there is a basic difference between the two groups under investigation: apart from with the responses to the questions which measured exit potential and intentions about the future, the group of immigrants have at least once *actually realized* the opportunity for exiting when they left their countries of origin and came to Hungary. In this regard, they have real experiences about this option.

Do cognitive mobilization capacities (that is, interest in politics and media proximity), have an effect on political and civic activity?

The characteristics of cognitive mobilization capacities or of the “attentive public” in the sense used by Devine (1970); that is interest in politics, following the news or staying informed by the media, all have a connection with political and civic activity. This assumed relationship is examined on the basis of the variables presented in Tables 5 to 7, where media-usage is represented by a simple additive index (Table 7).

Finally: For migrants, to what extent do the previous socialization environment, the characteristics of a migrants’ life history and the way this is experienced determine political and civic participation?

The majority of scientific research about immigrants’ political and civic activities identifies the determining factors to be the socialization environment, the characteristics of the country of origin and the characteristics of the migration (e.g. Bauböck 2006). Accordingly, an analysis such as this one should not ignore individual factors such as the length of the respondent’s stay in Hungary, their country or continent of origin, how immigrants generally view migration, whether their living conditions have improved or deteriorated since they migrated, whether the respondent is of Hungarian ethnic origin and how well they speak Hungarian. Furthermore, the multivariate models used contain the usual control variables such as sex, age and the region where the respondent lives.

Some of the issues at hand have already been discussed in detail in the previous sections of the book. The aim of this analysis is to combine these factors and integrate them into a single explanatory model.

As all of the three dependent variables are bivariate, the analysis will use logistic regression techniques. Logistic regression, in contrast to linear regression, does not estimate regression coefficients using the method of least squares, but uses an estimation of maximum likelihood, which maximizes the value of the log-likelihood (LL) function in order to create the most suitable model. Logistic regression does not require that the requirements of homoscedasticity be met, and does not specify prerequisites about the distribution of variables. On the other hand, interpreting results is more complex and redundancy among the variables included in the model cannot

be measured in the same way as for linear regression (Székelyi–Barna 2003)⁷. Regression analysis, as used here, is thus rather of an exploratory character and is designed to provide an overview of the factors discussed in the book so far. Each explanatory variable was sequentially introduced into the model so that the models should have the greatest explanatory power possible (i.e. all correlations should be significant and parameters should remain robust); that is, the variables introduced did not modify the regression parameters of the previously-included variables.

Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that even though correlations are significant and robust, these models do not necessarily represent causal relationships. Therefore, reporting on causality is only partly possible. At the same time, the results of earlier theoretical and empirical research will serve as guidance for the interpretation of these results.

Results

In the following, a total of ten regression models will be presented. Results of models 1 to 3 (Table 9) refer to intent to participate in local elections, models 4 to 7 (Table 10) are related to political participation or involvement in various political activities, while the results of models 8 to 10 (Table 11) concern civic participation or membership in non-profit organizations. All of the models are significant but their explanatory power varies; the explanatory variables involved generally explain 9–41% of the dependent variables – included variables explain the most for “intent to vote” (particularly the model that includes the individual characteristics of migration for immigrants). Furthermore, the included variables explained political activity to a higher extent than civic participation (membership in organizations), especially for immigrants for whom the country of origin played a significant role in explaining political activity.

On the whole, examination of members of the host society supplied very similar models for participation in national and local elections, so in the following, for the sake of comparability, only the latter will be discussed. Regional differences can be observed within Hungarian society with regard to the inclination to vote in local elections (people in Western Transdanubia showed a lower level of willingness to vote), whereas such regional variation was less characteristic of the immigrant subsample (while most of the sample was concentrated in Budapest). Cognitive mobilization capacity (that is,

⁷ For the regression models the following measures were used to test the “goodness” of the model (Székelyi and Barna 2003):

1. The hit rate of the model: the percentage of the cases (dependent variable) correctly estimated by the model.
2. $R^2_L = ((-2LL_0) - (-2LL_M)) / (-2LL_0)$, where $-2LL_0$ log-likelihood function is a variable with an approximately Chi² shaped distribution and only has non-negative values. This shows that, without the involvement of explaining variables (i.e. only by involving the constant) how great the “error” is in the model. The $-2LL_M$ shows the value of this function after the respective explaining variables are included.
3. Adjusted R^2 – shows the explanatory power of the logistic regression model. This is calculated based on linear regression where the explaining variable is the original variable and the one explained is the predicted variable.

discussions about politics with friends), significantly determines electoral participation primarily for the host society: those who discuss politics with their friends "often" were 6 times more inclined to take part in local elections, while such a correlation was not found for migrants. At the same time, interest in politics had a positive influencing role for both groups. It was also true of both groups that those younger than 29 were less inclined to vote. Material resources (the possession of different assets) has an influence only for migrants; however, after the inclusion of variables which measure individual migratory parameters this effect ceases to exist. For migrants, after including these variables the explanatory power of the model considerably increases (from 26% to 41%). This is due mainly to the differences in their countries of origin. The Chinese are less inclined to vote, while migrants from other Asian countries are more so inclined to. Apart from this factor, the different legal grounds for their stay, the length of their stay and their knowledge of Hungarian does not have a significant effect.

It should be highlighted that other explanatory variables were not included in the models because they did not have a significant effect. Voting intent, active labour market status, the different indicators of cultural resources, subjective well-being satisfaction and sense of fairness and justice did not play an important part. In addition, there are certain factors whose effect is not robust and changes from model to model depending on the other variables involved so these were not included in the final models either. For Hungarians, such factors are trust in institutions and a sense of attachment to Hungary, while for immigrants, one such factor is exit potential.

Determining factors for participation in different political activities are, in the case of the host society (see models 4 and 6), material resources or possession of assets (the more valuables one owns, the more likely they are to participate in some kind of political activity). Furthermore, social capital also has a significant effect on political activity for the host society: the more often someone has political discussions, the more the probability of political activity increases (and it may be multiplied 4 times). Personal trust, on the other hand, has the opposite effect; those who think that people can almost always be trusted are less active politically. Moreover, interest in politics and use of various media have a positive effect on political activity.

In contrast, for immigrants the examined factors have a different effect on political activity – only material resources or the possession of assets and, to a lesser extent, political discussions with friends are factors that have similar effects as for Hungarian society (see models 5 and 7). Younger and more highly-educated migrants are more active politically. Unlike material and cultural resources, however, social capital does not have a significant effect in their case. When we examine individual factors (see model 7) it is observable that time spent in Hungary, following events in the country of origin, the perception of changes in living conditions, Hungarian ethnic origin or knowledge of Hungarian, in contrast to previous suppositions, do not determine political activity significantly, therefore they were not included in the model. Only two other factors, such as the attachment to the country of origin have an influence (very strong attachment works against political activity). Furthermore, place of origin was influential – migrants from countries with an Anglo-Saxon political culture (such as those who come from the

USA, Canada, Australia or New Zealand) are more active than others and, interestingly, the same can be said about those who have immigrated from Asian countries other than China.

In addition, economic activity, trust in institutions, subjective well-being, attachment to Hungary, exit inclination, settlement type and region have no significant effect on political activity either for the host society or for migrants. Additionally, a sense of justice does not influence the political activity of migrants significantly, while for Hungarians there is a negative correlation between thinking that politicians make fair decisions and levels of political activity. That is, a sense of injustice is more likely to increase the likelihood of political activity.

In the case of civic participation (membership in an organization) – similarly to political activity – material resources have a positive effect; that is the more assets someone possesses, the more likely it is that they are a member of an organization. Economic activity, another indicator of material resources, has a positive effect on membership in civic organization for members of the host society. Those who are economically active are more likely to be affiliated to an organization. Level of education as an indicator of cultural resources has an effect on both groups in this regard, although it is more significant for migrants. While, for Hungarian society, having a college or university degree doubles the chance of being a member of some organization, the same factor increases this likelihood for immigrants fourfold. In contrast, social capital has an influential role primarily on members of Hungarian society, in so far as those who have political discussions more often are more inclined to be members of organizations, as are those who stay informed about news through using the media more often. Age, on the other hand, only has an influence in the case of immigrants. Those who are 29 years old or younger have a higher rate of civic activity than those who are older – this may be linked to the fact that the proportion of immigrants who are members of sports associations is much higher than for the host society (see Table 4). When we look at the characteristics of migrants, as formerly, it is evident that being of Hungarian ethnic origin, having a knowledge of Hungarian, and the amount of time spent in Hungary do not, on their own (if the influence of other factors is controlled for) have a determining effect on civic participation; what is more, nor do close attachment to the home country and the country of origin itself have a significant effect in this case. At the same time, changes in living conditions due to migration influence organizational membership in that the more positive someone considers these changes to be, the more likely it is that they are a member of some organization. At this point, however, it is worth considering the direction of causality which may be just the reverse; that is, a higher level of social embeddedness may cause respondents to appraise the effects of migration and newly-found living conditions more positively.

Factors that are missing from the determination of civic participation, just for the case of political activity, are trust in institutions, a sense of justice or injustice, subjective well-being, attachment to Hungary and an interest in politics, and there are no significant differences according to types of settlement either. For the host

society, there is regional variation in civic organizational membership but the effect of regionality is not consistent for the case of individual models, so this was not included in the model in the end.

On the whole, to the question of whether, by taking the given factors into consideration, the inclination to vote of migrants is significantly different from that of members of the host society, the answer is yes. On the basis of the results of a joint regression model⁸ it can be seen that being a migrant has a significant effect, especially on inclination to vote and on different forms of political activities, in so far as the level of political participation of migrants is lower. For civic participation (organizational membership), a difference of similar direction but of smaller proportions and statistical significance can also be observed.

CONCLUSIONS

In this final chapter, the topic was civic and political integration of third country nationals who live in Hungary. This was addressed through an overview of the different indicators of civic participation and political activity for immigrants, and their comparison using similar variables for Hungarian society, as well as the exploration of the factors underlying civic participation by integrating those indicators that were addressed earlier in the book. Thus, both electoral, and non-electoral types of political activity have been discussed. These activities were examined in more detail with the help of multivariate analysis which was designed to aid examination of the concept of civic or political activity according to economic, social and cultural factors, indicators of subjective well-being, a sense of justice or injustice and a number of individual variables that measure integration and former socialization, primarily for migrants.

On the whole, results show that migrants are less active than members of the host society with regard to participation in both electoral and non-electoral forms of political activities. It is less likely that they would vote in local elections – although in this case it is not clear how much of a role a lack of information plays –, they participate in fewer political activities and slightly fewer of them are members of non-profit organizations. Furthermore, they are less likely to think that either alone or together with others they would be able to do something about a parliamentary decision that they found unacceptable; they are less interested in politics; they do not follow Hungarian news so much (they are somewhat more likely to follow the news from their countries of origin), and they follow news presented in the media with less intensity. Use of the Internet is the only exception among the media types but this finding may be explained by the demographic characteristics of this group. The tendencies shown by these results correspond with earlier international research findings (e.g. Martiniello

⁸ These models are not presented because of the methodological and interpretative problems that the joint treatment of the two subsamples cause. Results only serve to provide complementary information.

2006). However, even this research was unable to answer the question of whether the greater passivity of immigrants stems from short-term planning, the transnational and temporary character of migration or differences in political culture. At the same time, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that components of political and civic activity were not influenced by length of stay, so it is not clear whether it makes sense to talk about short-term goals when those who have stayed in the host country for longer behave in the same way. At the same time, what may be in the background of this issue is that immigration has a transnational character, so without any regard to the time immigrants spend in Hungary, they do not integrate into the Hungarian political scene. Political culture and former socialization are found to be influential, as there are differences in political activity according to country of origin. The passivity of the Chinese (regarding inclination to vote) is striking, while in terms of non-electoral kinds of political activity, migrants from Anglo-Saxon countries are more active than other nationals.

In this respect it is interesting that, if we take the Hochschild–Mollenkopf model as a basis (2009), migrants do not only take part in political and civic life to a lesser extent, but, because of a lack of interest, the political and civic systems only have a limited effect on them. Thus, they are (not totally, but somewhat) excluded from the political arena. Furthermore, behind the failure to politically integrate there may in fact be personal reasons: for instance, that the immigrant would like to maintain their own culture. This was proven by the results of our analysis as well, in so far as strong attachment to the country of origin contributes to greater political passivity.

When describing the determining factors of respondents' political and civic activity (or inactivity) in general, it is an especially interesting outcome of the survey that such activity appears to be independent from one's assessment of institutional and procedural justice. This is to say that inadequate functioning and a lack of trust derived from personal experiences or attitudes do not lead to the political articulation of opinions. Another noteworthy finding is that it is those who possess more material resources that more intensively participate in political and civic activity - although it is those who have less material resources for whom political articulation would be important.

Finally, another suggestive thought arises when we try to explain the situation of migrants who have a lower level of political activity than members of the host society. The results we presented here fit well with Hirschman's argument that states that an individual chooses the "voice" type of protest when there is (or it is perceived that there is), no opportunity to exit; i.e. leave one's country. According to this theory, migrants who have already chosen to exit once (over choosing the voice option), and who have left their countries of origin, more rarely choose the voice type of protest in the host country. It should be highlighted though, that if we do not look at historical exit but rather at exit *potential*, as examined by György Lengyel in this book, then the picture becomes more subtle – results show that, for immigrants, exit and voice potential, if only weakly, mutually strengthen each other.

Table 9 Factors determining electoral participation – “would vote for sure” in local elections (logistic regression models)

	Model 1: Host society			Model 2: Immigrants			Model 3: Immigrants		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Male	-0.08	0.17	0.92	-0.49	0.51	0.62	-0.89	0.69	0.41
-29	-0.50	0.28	*	-2.79	1.09	**	-2.23	1.25	*
30-39	-0.18	0.26		-1.53	0.84	*	-1.41	1.05	0.24
40-49	-0.13	0.26		-1.03	0.78		-0.12	0.97	0.89
50-59	0.12	0.25		-0.97	0.85		-0.50	1.07	0.61
60+									
Central Hungary	-0.22	0.27							
Central Transdanubia	0.23	0.33							
Western Transdanubia	-1.11	0.38	***						
Southern Transdanubia	-0.03	0.33							
Northern Hungary	0.46	0.32							
Northern Great Plain	-0.07	0.32							
<i>Southern Great Plain</i>									
Wealth index	-0.01	0.02		0.07	0.04	**	0.08	0.05	1.08
<i>Almost never discusses politics with friends, relatives or fellow workers</i>									
Rarely discusses politics with friends, relatives or fellow workers	0.20	0.19		-0.38	0.55		-0.55	0.65	0.57
Often discusses politics with friends, relatives or fellow workers	0.97	0.28	***	-1.29	0.89		-0.42	1.11	0.66
Subjective well-being/satisfaction main component	0.31	0.10	***	0.26	0.31		0.30	0.39	1.35
Exit potential	0.07	0.21		0.40	0.53		1.00	0.67	2.71
Politicians are fair in their decisions	0.02	0.04		-0.01	0.11		0.02	0.14	1.02
Fairly/very interested in politics	1.72	0.20	***	2.03	0.61	****	2.83	0.83	****
									16.89

Table 9 (continued) Factors determining electoral participation – “would vote for sure” in local elections (logistic regression models)

Media-usage	0.18	0.11	*	1.20	0.38	0.28	1.46	0.36	0.34	1.43
<i>Countries of the former Soviet Union</i>										
China								-3.33	1.63	**
Balkans								-1.74	0.97	*
USA/Canada/Australia/New Zealand								-0.04	1.21	0.96
Other Asian								-1.57	1.28	0.21
Other (Africa/Near East/South America)								0.86	1.05	2.37
Speaks perfect Hungarian								1.87	0.69	***
<i>With residence permit</i>										
With immigration permit								1.44	0.99	4.21
With permanent residence permit								1.21	0.81	3.35
With interim permanent residence permit								2.73	2.37	15.38
With national permanent residence permit								-1.12	1.08	0.33
With EC permanent residence permit								-0.48	1.15	0.62
Constant	-1.60	0.41	****	0.20	-1.86	1.25	0.16	-3.67	1.79	**
% of correct estimations	75.0%				90.0%					91.9%
R ² _L	0.20				0.26					0.41
Adj. R ²	0.25				0.281					0.473
N	893				205					204

Reference categories are in italics.

Statistical significance: **** < 0.001, *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1

Table 10 Factors determining potential for voice – taking part in political activities (logistic regression models)

	Model 4: Host society			Model 5: Immigrants			Model 6: Host society			Model 7: Immigrants		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Male	-0.26	0.17	0.77	-0.01	0.29	0.99	-0.23	0.18	0.79	-0.31	0.33	0.73
-29	-0.27	0.29	0.77	1.89	0.79	**	-0.34	0.30	0.71	1.75	0.84	**
30-39	0.40	0.27	1.50	1.52	0.81	*	0.30	0.28	1.35	1.50	0.84	*
40-49	0.36	0.28	1.43	1.00	0.84		0.29	0.28	1.34	0.91	0.87	2.49
50-59	0.29	0.26	1.33	0.70	0.89		0.19	0.27	1.21	0.76	0.92	2.13
60+												
Wealth index	0.08	0.02	****	0.09	0.02	****	0.09	0.02	****	0.07	0.02	***
<i>Less than 8 primary grades</i>												
Vocational training certificate	-0.44	0.27		1.58	1.20		-0.55	0.28	**	1.17	1.23	3.22
General or specialized secondary school certificate	0.03	0.24		1.92	1.14	*	0.03	0.25		1.27	1.18	3.56
College or university degree	-0.01	0.30		1.95	1.16	*	-0.03	0.31		1.10	1.20	3.00
<i>You almost always can't be too careful in dealing with people</i>												
People can almost always be trusted	-2.05	0.86	**	0.13	0.36	0.66	-1.88	0.88	**	0.15	-0.41	0.73
People can usually be trusted	-0.17	0.25		0.85	-0.34	0.64	0.03	0.27		-0.74	0.68	0.48
You usually can't be too careful in dealing with people	-0.30	0.24		0.74	-0.29	0.67	-0.24	0.25		-0.99	0.72	0.37
<i>Almost never discusses politics with friends, relatives or fellow workers</i>												
Rarely discusses politics with friends, relatives or fellow workers	0.48	0.20	**	1.61	0.48	0.33	0.55	0.21	***	1.73	0.37	**
Often discusses politics with friends, relatives or fellow workers	1.45	0.27	****	4.27	0.93	0.55	1.49	0.28	***	4.44	1.63	0.66
Fairly/very interested in politics	0.55	0.20	***	1.74	-0.40	0.54	0.56	0.21	***	1.74	-0.59	0.59
												0.56

Table 10 (continued) Factors determining potential for voice – taking part in political activities (logistic regression models)

Media-usage	0.25	0.11	**	1.28	0.09	0.19	1.09	0.27	0.11	**	1.31	0.10	0.21	1.11
Politicians are fair in their decisions								-0.10	0.04	**	0.90			
<i>Attachment to country of origin:</i>														
<i>Not at all</i>														
Attachment to country of origin: Not very much												-0.02	0.73	0.98
Attachment to country of origin: To a fair extent												-0.83	0.75	0.44
Attachment to country of origin: Very much												-2.12	0.78	***
<i>Countries of the former Soviet Union</i>														0.12
China												-0.29	0.65	0.75
Balkans												0.63	0.48	1.87
USA/Canada/Australia/New Zealand												1.22	0.65	**
Other Asian												1.28	0.53	**
Other (Africa/Near East/South America)												0.42	0.56	1.52
Constant	-2.16	0.40	****	0.12	-5.61	1.41	****	0.00	-1.95	0.42	****	0.14	-3.97	1.54
% of correct estimations	78.9%				85.9%				78.9%				88.8%	
R ² _L	0.16				0.15				0.17				0.25	
Adj. R ²	0.19				0.15				0.20				0.26	
N	976				478				911				474	

Reference categories are in *italics*.

Statistical significance: **** <

0.001, *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, *

< 0.1

Table 11 Factors determining membership in a non-profit organization (logistic regression models)

	Model 8: Host society			Model 9: Immigrants			Model 10: Immigrants		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Male	0.08	0.16	1.08	0.26	0.23	1.30	0.18	0.23	1.20
-29	-0.48	0.34	0.62	1.66	0.87	*	1.71	0.88	*
30-39	-0.42	0.34	0.66	1.13	0.88	3.10	1.11	0.89	3.03
40-49	-0.44	0.34	0.65	1.37	0.88	3.94	1.40	0.90	4.07
50-59	-0.45	0.31	0.64	0.95	0.90	2.60	0.98	0.92	2.67
60+									
Economically active	0.65	0.29	**	1.24	0.81	3.47	1.12	0.83	3.05
Wealth index	0.04	0.02	**	0.08	0.02	****	0.08	0.02	****
<i>Less than 8 primary grades</i>									
Vocational training certificate	0.23	0.24		0.40	0.69	1.49	0.49	0.69	1.63
General or specialized secondary school certificate	0.15	0.22		1.55	0.60	***	1.68	0.60	***
College or university degree	0.69	0.26	***	1.55	0.61	**	1.68	0.62	***
<i>Almost never discusses politics with friends, relatives or fellow workers</i>									
Rarely discusses politics with friends, relatives or fellow workers	0.35	0.18	**	-0.24	0.25	0.79	-0.20	0.26	0.82
Often discusses politics with friends, relatives or fellow workers	0.87	0.24	****	0.09	0.46	1.10	0.16	0.46	1.17
Media-usage	0.30	0.10	***	0.06	0.14	1.06	0.03	0.15	1.03
Change in living conditions							0.10	0.05	**
Constant	-2.43	0.33	****	-5.25	1.01	****	-5.39	1.01	****
% of correct estimations	74.0%			77.8%			77.8%		
R ² _L	0.09			0.15			0.16		
Adj. R ²	0.10			0.17			0.19		
N	987			482			473		

Reference categories are in italics.

Statistical significance: **** < 0.001, *** < 0.01, ** < 0.05, * < 0.1

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

REPORT ON THE SAMPLING AND SURVEY DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH

(Ipsos Media, Advertisement, Market, and Opinion Research Institute Plc.)

QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY – SUB-SAMPLE OF HUNGARIAN SOCIETY

Data collection was conducted under the framework of the Ipsos Omnibus survey. The block of questions utilised for Corvinus University formed a part of the first half of the omnibus research, which addressed multiple issues. It was preceded by groups of questions which concerned public life and economic issues; these questions form a stable and regular part of Ipsos Omnibus surveys. The second part of the omnibus survey featured questions related to market research topics and a list of questions about the interviewees' socio-demographic status. The latter is disseminated to all of the clients of Ipsos.

The sampling for the survey was done using a two-stage, proportionally stratified probability sample of 1000 randomly-selected persons. It was proportionally representative of Hungary's settlements, with 111 sampling units. The composition of the sample corresponded to the composition of the entire adult population according to the most important socio-demographic indicators (sex, age group, level of education and type of residence). Hungarian citizens of 18 years of age or older who live in Hungary provided the population for the survey sample. Based on the above information, it is possible to determine the probability of inclusion of an individual into the sample.

Primary sampling units were settlements – this was the first step in sample selection – whereas the final sampling units were defined in the second step of the sampling process using the population of the defined age group.

The source for the selection of settlements was partly the T-STAR database purchased from the Central Statistical Office and partly the latest updated database of the registered population according to settlement and age group, purchased from the Central Office for Administrative and Electronic Public Services (COAEPS).

For the two-stage sampling, the requirement that all members of the population should have an equal likelihood of featuring in the sample was best achieved by selecting the primary sampling units (settlements) with a frequency proportionate to their size, and then, within the chosen sampling units, selecting an equal number of persons with equal probability on a random basis.

The second phase of sampling concerns the selection of persons for the sample. This was done using the electronic COAEPS database which contains results from the

2000 census and which was updated with the results of the 2005 microcensus, thus ensuring that the selection took place randomly.

In the course of data collection it was considered a primary goal that the interviews should be conducted at the main addresses obtained from COAEPS. When the choice of main address needed to be changed, a new interviewee was sought in the closest possible vicinity to the originally chosen person, preferably in the next door house or flat. The sex and age group of the new interviewee had to correspond to the 'dropped' person's respective parameters which were featured on the address card. With these procedures it was ensured that the composition of the interviewees in terms of social and demographic parameters, and in terms of their opinions and attitudes as well, remained essentially similar.

The survey was managed jointly by the head of opinion research and the main sociologist on the research team at Ipsos. Data collection work was coordinated by so-called instructors (experienced members of staff working within the operative section of Ipsos). 9 of them worked on this survey; 2 in Budapest and 7 in the countryside. 124 interviewers worked on the survey in total.

Data collection was done with CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing) method; i.e. following programming of the questionnaire, answers were collected by employees of the research company with the use of laptop computers in the period between 29 June and 4 July 2011.

Data collection was verified at several levels. In the first round – by checking through telephone – it was examined whether the socio-demographic parameters of the interviewees matched the information provided on the address card. In the second control phase (still during data collection) a supervisory group from Ipsos phoned 175 randomly-selected interviewees, taking into account data related to the behaviour of the interviewers (e.g. the length of the interview, the sequence of questions and variance in the responses) that were significantly and persistently different from the average. Personal checks were undertaken in the case of 32 interviewees.

QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY – SUB-SAMPLE OF IMMIGRANTS

In the first phase, Ipsos ordered from COAEPS data about third country nationals who had immigrated to and settled down in Hungary, which included data on the immigrants' country of birth and place of residence in Hungary. The data reflected the situation on 1st January 2011. The managers of the project compared these data to a database derived from the Office of Immigration and Nationality and then structured the composition of the sample.

The database received from COAEPS contained persons who were living in Hungary with: 1. an immigration permit; 2. a permanent residence permit; or, 3. an interim permanent residence permit. Data about immigrants who were living in Hungary with: 1. a residence permit; 2. a national permanent residence permit; or 3. an EC permanent residence permit were available through the Office of Immigration and Nationality.

Ipsos Plc. asked for a randomly-selected address list from COAEPS calculating with four substitute addresses for each item. According to the submitted request, the list contained at least 18 year-old third-country nationals living in Hungary with an immigration or permanent residence permit – only one person per address was listed.

(Places of birth: Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Canada, China, Croatia, South Korea, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Moldova, Mongolia, Nigeria, Russia, Serbia, Serbia-Montenegro, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, former Yugoslavia.)

Ipsos' order also specified how many persons from a given settlement and a given country of origin should be randomly included in the sample. Based on the resulting list (containing the data, names, addresses and places of birth of 1115 persons), 223 main addresses and accompanying substitute addresses were compiled randomly, according to the individual's country of origin and settlement. However, the 1115-item address list received from COAEPS was not enough to allow the making of 223 interviews, as only 156 persons could be reached for the purpose of completing the questionnaire. Subsequently, the research coordinators together made the decision that for each invalid address, another person from the same country of origin should be found to complete the questionnaire. If no interviewee from that specific country could be found, the aim was to find a person from the same continent.

The number of persons per country of origin to be included in the remaining 277-item sub-sample was also defined in the case of the addresses available through the Office of Immigration and Nationality database. During negotiations with the OIN, the institution agreed to contact the immigrants based on the above-detailed information and, following their agreement, to hand to us such data as was relevant to our research efforts. In the end, OIN was only able to provide the necessary data – name, contact details in Hungary (address, telephone number and email address) and country of origin – of 13 persons.

As the two address lists we received were not sufficient to enable completion of 500 interviews, we decided to use the so-called snowball method, for which we identified potential respondents in the following way: we gathered data on organizations (associations, minority organizations, cultural centres, other countries' friendly societies in Hungary, etc.) and special locations (shops, restaurants, marketplaces, shopping centres – e.g. Asia Center – which are frequented by persons coming from the countries we specified) where we would have a high chance of finding potential interviewees. Using the snowball method, we identified 119 persons as starting points (so-called 'seeds'), out of whom 98 completed the questionnaire. 21 potential interviewees did not agree to take part in the interview.

In the following we describe the number of links followed from each seed in the snowball sample: the seed took part in the interview but could not provide another interviewee: 52 cases; the seed participated and suggested someone else but the effort to involve the suggested person was not successful: 24 cases; the seed participated and suggested another person who was successfully contacted: 41 cases (the total number – higher than 98 – was because some seeds started several snowballs which

resulted in both successful and unsuccessful follow-ups). Other *single-interview strings*: the seed did not take part in the interview but suggested another person who agreed to take part in the survey but s/he did not suggest anyone else: 4 cases; the seed did not participate but suggested another person who did participate and this person also made a suggestion for a potential interviewee, which, however, was unsuccessful: 3 cases; *two-interview strings*: the seed took part in the interview and suggested another interviewee who also agreed to participate; however, s/he did not recommend anybody else: 7 cases; the seed took part in the interview and the person suggested by them also successfully participated; however, the suggestion of the second person did not result in a successful interview: 7 cases; the seed did not participate in the research but recommended two other persons who did – but they did not recommend anyone else: 5 cases; the seed did not participate but suggested two other persons who did participate, they in turn suggested further potential interviewees; however, their suggestions did not prove fruitful: 5 cases; *three-interview strings*: the seed participated and suggested two persons who did as well but they did not suggest anyone else: 4 cases; the seed took part in the survey and recommended two more persons who also took part; their recommendations in turn did not prove successful: 3 cases; the seed did not participate in the research but suggested 3 persons with whom successful interviews were made; their recommendations in turn were unsuccessful: 2 cases; *four-interview strings*: the seed took part in the interview and recommended three persons who also did; their recommendations in turn were unsuccessful: 1 case; the seed did not participate in the interview but suggested four persons who did, but they in turn did not suggest anyone: 5 cases; the seed did not take part in the interview but recommended four persons who did; however, their recommendations in turn were unsuccessful: 1 case; *six-interview strings*: the seed took part in the interview and recommended five persons who also did; they, however, did not recommend anyone else: 1 case.

As a result, 156 persons out of the sub-sample of 500 immigrants were involved in the questionnaire survey based on the COAEPS list (following the multi-stage sampling method according to settlement), while the other part of the sample, 344 persons, was recruited using the snowball method.

Data from respondents were collected in face-to-face interviews in a paper-based format. The instructors responsible for data collection checked whether the questionnaires were completed and then handed them over for processing. Subsequent verification of the data through repeated meetings with the interviewees proved unviable after a few unsuccessful attempts. The reason for this was strong feelings of aversion from interviewees (we hypothesise that they refused to communicate with us any further as they thought that we were engaged in some sort of official follow-up in connection with their answers given in the earlier interview). They were alarmed and were not willing to take part in this phase of the research; we therefore stopped this type of checking procedure.

Based on our experience with the survey of immigrants, in general it can be said that the interviewees partly understood the purpose of the research but they basically

remained suspicious of our intentions. Many of them were afraid that the interviewers were employed by the Office of Immigration and Nationality. The main reasons for refusing to be interviewed were based on this suspicion, and communication (language) problems.

A basic problem with the address list provided by the COAEPS was a high number of invalid addresses; where the person who was registered at a certain place was not found to live there – either because they were just using the address as an official place of residence, or because they owned the place but did not actually live there. There were also a large number of addresses at which the assigned persons had never been seen, or whose inhabitants had already left Hungary. These persons were typically Serbian citizens (or citizens from the former Yugoslavia) who had either returned to their home countries or who had received Hungarian citizenship in the meantime.

WEIGHTING OF THE TWO SUB-SAMPLES

The differences of the composition of the population and the sample were corrected using the so-called iterative weighting method. We utilised this method by comparing the actual sample proportions and the sample composition according to certain characteristics (separately, one after the other). If, at the first stage, weighting only corrected the proportion of the 2 sexes, for instance, this could have changed the composition according to other characteristics and may have lead further away from representativity. Therefore, in the subsequent phases, weighting for other characteristics was carried out as well. The iteration process was continued until the distance in value of the weighting from 1 was minimized.

The sub-sample of migrants was weighted for age groups and sex, while the sub-sample of Hungarian citizens was weighted for sex, age grouping, education and type of settlement.

FOCUS GROUPS

Two focus group discussions were carried out within the frame of this research. The two, three-hour long, 8-member focus group discussions took place on 17–18 August 2011 and were organized by Ipsos Ltd. Participants of the discussions were recruited using the help of a filter questionnaire. Apart from the concrete filtering questions that were relevant to the research topic, some other standard filtering criteria were also used. For this research – just as in the case of any other similar research – we excluded those potential participants (or close family members living in the same household) – who have had experience with market research or who had personally taken part in any other focus group discussion or in-depth interview during the previous 12 months, or who had ever participated in any research related to social inclusion and integration. Furthermore, we did not recruit anyone for the group discussion who would have had the opportunity to publicize the content of the interviews in the media.

The filter questionnaire contained, apart from questions related to the filter criteria and demographic aspects, some questions about basic background information connected to the research. Apart from the use of the filter questionnaire, the standard quality of the sampling process was also guaranteed by use of a detailed quota for the composition of the groups.

Recruitment, filtering and verification happened in four stages:

1. Recruitment: selection of participants on the basis of the filter questionnaire.
2. Data verification: based on the completed questionnaire, selected participants were phoned and the data they provided were verified.
3. Checking of availability: on the day of the focus group discussion the recruited persons' participation in the discussion was checked.
4. Subsequent filtering: those who were present at the event were asked to fill in a questionnaire (to be self-completed) containing the same questions as the filter questionnaire, in order to verify the answers they had earlier given. As we intended to avoid including persons who may have known each other, this subsequent filtering phase also provided the opportunity to filter these people out. This proved necessary because two participants who were Serbian nationals knew each other from their early school days, so – although both of them fulfilled the requirements to participate– only one of them was asked to join the discussion. In order to be able to guarantee smoothly flowing focus group discussions and the representation of individuals from the required countries of origin, we recruited more participants. 'Over-recruitment' of 14 persons for each group discussion made it possible for us to conduct the group discussions and meet all of our criteria.

Each phase of the filtering process was carried out by a different member of the research team. All in all, recruiting the participants for the immigrant group proved to be a much more difficult task for our coordinators. Finding potential participants was not as problematic as 'convincing'/inviting them to participate. Our organizers had difficulties with recruiting participants from Far Eastern countries who were generally unwilling to participate (or/and who, on the agreed date, did not appear and who then could not be reached through telephone). Consequently, the previously decided-upon quota was slightly modified and no participants from the Far East were present during the group discussion.

Appendix 2

QUESTIONNAIRE

INTRODUCTION/ TITLE OF AND REASON FOR STAYING IN HUNGARY

Subsample¹

- 1 – host society
- 2 – immigrants

Immigrants

1. With what status (with what kind of permit) are you living in Hungary?

SHOW CARD. ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE

- 1 – residence permit,
- 2 – immigration permit,
- 3 – permanent residence permit,
- 4 – interim permanent residence permit
- 5 – national permanent residence permit, or
- 6 – EC permanent residence permit?
- 7 – other, namely:
- 8 – Hungarian citizen → FINISH THE INTERVIEW!
- 9 – DK → FINISH THE INTERVIEW!

Immigrants

2. Which year did you arrive to Hungary?

- year
- X –

Immigrants

3. From which country did you come to Hungary?

SHOW CARD. ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (NATIVE) IS TO BE GIVEN

- | | | |
|--------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| 01 – Croatia | 07 – Japan | 13 – Canada |
| 02 – Serbia | 08 – China | 14 – Libya |
| 03 – Russia | 09 – Mongolia | 15 – Other, namely: |
| 04 – Turkey | 10 – Syria | |
| 05 – Ukraine | 11 – Vietnam | X – |
| 06 – Israel | 12 – United States | |

¹ The questions apply to both sub-samples, unless otherwise indicated:

[Immigrants] >> question to be asked of immigrants only

[Host society] >> question to be asked of the host society sub-sample only

Immigrants

4. Which country are you a citizen of? SHOW CARD. IF THE INTERVIEWEE HAS DUAL CITIZENSHIP, BOTH SHOULD BE INDICATED. HUNGARIAN CITIZENSHIP

- | | |
|--------------|---------------------|
| 01 – Croatia | 09 – Mongolia |
| 02 – Serbia | 10 – Syria |
| 03 – Russia | 11 – Vietnam |
| 04 – Turkey | 12 – United States |
| 05 – Ukraine | 13 – Canada |
| 06 – Israel | 14 – Libya |
| 07 – Japan | 15 – Other, namely: |
| 08 – China | |
| | X – |

Immigrants

5. What is your mother tongue? SHOW CARD. MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE.

- | | |
|----------------|---------------------|
| 01 – Croatian | 09 – Mongolian |
| 02 – Serbian | 10 – Arabic |
| 03 – Russian | 11 – Vietnamese |
| 04 – Turkish | 12 – English |
| 05 – Ukrainian | 13 – Hungarian |
| 06 – Hebrew | 14 – Other, namely: |
| 07 – Japanese | |
| 08 – Chinese | X – |

Immigrants

6. Why did you decide to leave your native country?

Immigrants

7. What was the main reason that made you choose Hungary as your destination? ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE, NAME THE MOST IMPORTANT

- 1 – marriage
2 – family reunification
3 – permanent settlement for other than family reasons
4 – work
5 – study
6 – came with parents when still a minor
7 – other reason, namely:
9 – DK X –

Immigrants

8. Why did you choose Hungary as your destination?

ACTION POTENTIAL, INCLINATION FOR POLITICAL AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION

Host society

9. Do you live in the settlement in which you were born?

1 – yes 2 – no 9 – DK X –

10. Are you planning to move to another settlement?

1 – yes 2 – no 9 – DK X –

11. Have you been abroad (outside Hungary) in the past 5 years?

1 – yes 2 – no 9 – DK X –

12. Have you lived abroad (outside your native country and Hungary) for over three months?

1 – yes 2 – no 9 – DK X –

13. Can you imagine relocating to another country?

1 – yes 2 – no 9 – DK X –

14. Are you planning to live abroad (outside Hungary and your native country) in the near future (within 1-2 years)?

1 – yes 2 – no 9 – DK X –

Immigrants

15. Would you gladly move back to your native country?

1 – yes 2 – no 9 – DK X –

IF NOT AN ENTREPRENEUR:

16. Would you like to be an entrepreneur? DON'T OFFER OPTIONS!

1 – yes 2 – no 3 – it depends 4 – I am one 9 – DK X –

QUESTION TO EVERYONE:

17. (Putting the question in another way): if you had two options, which would you prefer?

- | | |
|---------------------------|------------|
| 1 – to be an employee, or | → GO TO 18 |
| 2 – to be an entrepreneur | → GO TO 19 |
| 3 – neither | → GO TO 20 |
| 9 – DK | → GO TO 20 |
| X – | |

18. If you would prefer to be an employee, why?

DON'T READ OUT, CODE THE SPONTANEOUS ANSWERS!

- | | |
|--|----|
| a) regular, fixed income/ stable job | 1 |
| b) fixed working time | 2 |
| c) social security | 3 |
| d) has no idea/possibility to go into business..... | 4 |
| e) has no financial resources | 5 |
| f) has no skills needed, doesn't know how to go about it | 6 |
| g) too difficult to change back, gets chained to the business | 7 |
| h) habits, customs, never thought of going into business..... | 8 |
| i) because of official, administrative difficulties. | 9 |
| j) if unsuccessful, he/she would be afraid of legal, social consequences | 10 |
| k) other reasons..... | 11 |
| l) DK/NA | 99 |

19. If you would prefer to be an entrepreneur, why?

DON'T READ OUT! CODE THE SPONTANEOUS ANSWERS

- | | |
|--|----|
| a) independence, self-realization, intriguing tasks..... | 1 |
| b) business opportunities | 2 |
| c) better income prospects..... | 3 |
| d) freedom to decide how and where to work | 4 |
| e) there are no good jobs | 5 |
| f) there are self-employed among friends/family | 6 |
| g) favourable economic climate..... | 7 |
| h) to avoid uncertainties implied by employment | 8 |
| i) other..... | 9 |
| j) DK/NA | 99 |

IF THE INTERVIEWEE IS NOT AN ENTREPRENEUR:

20. How attractive is the idea to you personally of becoming an entrepreneur in the next five years?

- 1. not attractive at all
- 2. not very attractive
- 3. rather attractive
- 4. very attractive
- 9. DK/NA

IF HE/SHE IS NOT AN ENTREPRENEUR:

21. Ignoring now your opinion about the attractiveness of being an entrepreneur, how feasible is it to become an entrepreneur?

- 1. not feasible at all
- 2. not very feasible
- 3. fairly feasible
- 4. perfectly feasible
- 9. DK/NA

22. Here are some different forms of political and social action that people can take. Please indicate, for each one, whether you have done any of these things in the past five years. SHOW CARD

	Have done	Haven't done	DK	
Contacted a politician or a civil servant	2	1	9	X
Attended a political meeting or a rally of a political party	2	1	9	X
Participated in the work of a political organization or movement	2	1	9	X
Worn or displayed a campaign badge or sticker	2	1	9	X
Signed a petition	2	1	9	X
Taken part in a public demonstration	2	1	9	X
Boycotted certain products	2	1	9	X
Bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons	2	1	9	X
Donated money to a political organization	2	1	9	X
Participated in illegal protest activities	2	1	9	X
Contacted or appeared in the press to express your views	2	1	9	X
Phoned into a radio programme	2	1	9	X

23. Suppose a law were being considered by the Parliament that you considered to be unjust or harmful. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you, acting alone or together with others, would be able to do something about it? SHOW CARD

- 1 – very likely,
- 2 – fairly likely,
- 3 – not very likely, or
- 4 – not at all likely?
- 9 – DK
- X –

24. Do you currently participate actively in or do voluntary work for one or more of the following organizations? SHOW CARD. MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE

	Mentioned	Not mentioned	
A sports club or club for outdoor activities (recreational organization)	1	0	X
A cultural or leisure association	1	0	X
A trade union	1	0	X
A business or professional organization	1	0	X
A political party or organization	1	0	X
A social movement, NGO	1	0	X
A religious or church organization	1	0	X
A local organization, association for the local community	1	0	X
A charity or social aid organization	1	0	X
A voluntary cooperative for house building	1	0	X
An organization for environmental protection	1	0	X
The organization of a local community event	1	0	X
The organization of a local sport event	1	0	X

Host society

25. If there was a general election this Sunday, can you tell me if you would vote?

SHOW CARD

- 1 – would vote for sure,
- 2 – would probably vote,
- 3 – would probably not vote, or
- 4 – would not vote for sure
- 9 – DK X –

vote? SHOW CARD

- 9 - DK X -

do not trust an institution at all" and '10' means "you have complete trust".

ROTATED!	No trust at all	Complete trust	Don't know the institution	DK	
the Hungarian Parliament	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10		88	99	X
the Police	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10		88	99	X
the Hungarian Government	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10		88	99	X
the Hungarian Office of Immigration and Nationality	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10		88	99	X
The local government	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10		88	99	X

left" and '10' means "the right"? SHOW CARD

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
left										right
99 - DK		X -								

SHOW CARD

- 9 - DK X -

30. On average, how often do you obtain political news or information through...

SHOW CARD

	Every day or nearly every day	Several times a week	Once or twice a week	Less often	Never or nearly never	DK	
1. the Internet?	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
2. daily papers?	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
3. weekly papers?	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
4. radio?	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
5. television?	5	4	3	2	1	9	X

31. How much do you follow the political, social and economic news in Hungary?

SHOW CARD

5 – very much,

4 – quite a lot

3 – somewhat,

2 – a little, or

1 – not at all

9 – DK X –

Immigrants

32. How much do you follow the political, social and economic news of your country of origin? SHOW CARD

5 – very much,

4 – quite a lot,

3 – somewhat,

2 – a little, or

1 – not at all → GO TO 34

9 – DK X – → GO TO 34

Immigrants

33. How do you stay informed of events? MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE

1 – through the media of my country

2 – through the media in Hungary

3 – through the international media, or

4 – through personal contacts?

5 – through other channels, namely:

9 – DK X –

IDENTITY

34. We are all a part of different groups. Some are more important to us than others when we think of ourselves. In general, which from the following list is most important to you in describing who you are? And the second most important? And the third most important? SHOW CARD

	Most important	Second most important	Third most important	Not mentioned	DK	
Your occupation	1	2	3	8	9	X
Your nationality	1	2	3	8	9	X
Your gender (that is, being a man or a woman)	1	2	3	8	9	X
Your age group (that is, being young or old)	1	2	3	8	9	X
Your religion	1	2	3	8	9	X
Your preferred political party	1	2	3	8	9	X
Your ethnic background	1	2	3	8	9	X
Your social class	1	2	3	8	9	X
The town or city where you live	1	2	3	8	9	X
Being European	1	2	3	8	9	X

35. How close do you feel to ... SHOW CARD

	Very close	Close	Not very close	Not close at all	DK	
1. Your town or city	4	3	2	1	9	X
2. Hungary	4	3	2	1	9	X
[Immigrants]						
3. Your country of origin	4	3	2	1	9	X
4. Europe	4	3	2	1	9	X

OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING, SOCIAL RESOURCES

36. How satisfied are you with the following things: if not at all, say 0, if you are perfectly satisfied, say 10. How satisfied are you with ... SHOW CARD

ROTATED!	Not satisfied at all	Perfectly satisfied	DK
your standard of living?	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	99	X
your housing situation?	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	99	X
the surroundings of your housing?	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	99	X
IF DOESN'T WORK= X your work?	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	99	X
IF DOESN'T WORK= X your career?	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	99	X
your household income?	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	99	X
your financial situation?	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	99	X
your state of health?	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	99	X
public order and security?	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	99	X
your friendships?	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	99	X
your family life?	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	99	X
your future prospects?	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	99	X
your social recognition, prestige?	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10	99	X

Immigrants

37. Do you think you'd be better or worse off if you had remained in your country of origin, or you'd be in the same situation as regards your... ROTATED!

	better	worse	the same	DK	
a. financial situation?	1	2	3	9	X
b. housing?	1	2	3	9	X
c. work career?	1	2	3	9	X
d. friends?	1	2	3	9	X
e. family life?	1	2	3	9	X
f. social recognition, prestige?	1	2	3	9	X
g. feeling of being at home?	1	2	3	9	X
h. health?	1	2	3	9	X

38. Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? SHOW CARD

- 1 – People can almost always be trusted.
- 2 – People can usually be trusted.
- 3 – You usually can't be too careful in dealing with people.
- 4 – You almost always can't be too careful in dealing with people.
- 9 – DK X –

39. Some people are often afraid, some never. How often are you afraid?

SHOW CARD

- 1 – never,
- 2 – rarely
- 3 – often, or
- 4 – very often?
- 9 – DK X –

40. When you get together with your friends, relatives or fellow workers, how often do you discuss politics?...

- 3 – Often,
- 2 – rarely, or
- 1 – never?
- 9 – DK X –

41. Altogether, how many friends do you have at home (in Hungary) or abroad?

-friends
- 00 – have no friends
- X –

42. Are there foreigners (non-Hungarians) among your friends?

- 1 – there are 2 – there aren't 9 – DK X –

Immigrants

43. Are there Hungarians among your friends?

- 1 – there are 2 – there aren't 9 – DK X –

44. If you had to choose, who would you befriend:

- 1 – someone from your own social stratum, or
- 2 – someone of your own nationality?
- 3 – other answer:
- 9 – DK X –

45. Please think of a seven-step ladder. On the top step stand the happiest people (7), on the bottom the most unhappy people (1). On which step do you stand on this seven-step ladder? SHOW CARD

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 most unhappy happiest
 people people
 9 – DK X –

46. How true of you are the statements below: SHOW CARD

ROTATED!	Perfectly true	Partly true	Not really true	Not true at all	DK	
You often feel tired, exhausted.	4	3	2	1	9	X
You often feel lonely.	4	3	2	1	9	X
If you want to achieve something, you are forced to break some rules.	4	3	2	1	9	X
Things are too complicated nowadays to see clearly.	4	3	2	1	9	X
You can hardly influence the course of your life.	4	3	2	1	9	X

47. In Hungary some people have high social status, some have low. Please define your place on a scale where 0 marks the lowest social status and 10 marks the highest. SHOW CARD

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
 lowest highest
 social status social status
 99 – DK X –

DISTRIBUTIVE AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

48. With which of the following statements do you most agree? SHOW CARD.

ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE

- 1 – Everyone should get from society as much as he/she contributes to its functioning.
- 2 – Everyone should partake equally of goods produced.
- 3 – Everyone should contribute to the running of society as best as they can, and should get as much as they need.

9 – DK

X –

49. What do you think of your own situation? Do you think on the whole you get more from society than you contribute to common expenditure, or do you contribute more than you get? "0" means you get much more than you contribute, "10" means you contribute much more than you get. SHOW CARD

gets much more than contributes												contributes much more than gets	doesn't know	refuses to answer
00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10			88	77

50. How true is the statement that "politicians are fair to people like you in their decisions?" "0" means you don't agree with this statement at all, and "10" means you fully agree with it. SHOW CARD

Not true at all												Perfectly true	doesn't know	refuses to answer
00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10			88	77

51. We would like to know what your general impression was of the administration processes of Hungarian offices when you had to arrange something. How true are the statements below? SHOW CARD

NOT ROTATED		Perfectly true	Partly true	Neither true nor untrue	Rather not true	Not true at all	DK	
a	The office explained its decisions adequately.	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
b	It was clear what the rules were in the situation and what you had to do.	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
c	On the whole your matter was dealt with according to the rules.	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
d	A client in a similar situation would have been treated similarly.	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
e	The office did its best to solve your situation.	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
f	You were treated with due respect.	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
g	The matter was solved favourably for you.	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
h	The solution was acceptable to you.	5	4	3	2	1	9	X

HUMAN DIGNITY

52. How true are the following statements of you? SHOW CARD

ROTATED		Perfectly true	Partly true	Neither true nor untrue	Rather not true	Not true at all	DK	
a	When I am suffering physically, people (other than my family) around me usually do not know it	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
b	When things go wrong around me I usually do not blame others.	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
c	I have control over life decisions and choices, such as where to work or when I can leave home	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
d	I treat people the same way I like to be treated by them	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
e	Until now, I have been pleased with what I have accomplished so far	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
f	I make an important contribution to my community	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
g	I am free to act on my beliefs	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
h	I have a high sense of self-respect	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
i	Other people treat me with respect	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
j	I do not feel I need to depend on other people around me to get things done	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
k	I feel that I am not a burden on my friends/family members	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
l	I try to overcome adversity	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
m	I have the freedom to exercise my rights as a human being	5	4	3	2	1	9	X
n	I respect other people	5	4	3	2	1	9	X

CULTURAL / MATERIAL RESOURCES

53. Do you know a foreign language at least at intermediate level, beside your mother tongue?

1 – yes----- > Which language?

SHOW CARD. MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE

01 – Romani 06 – Russian 11 – Ukrainian
02 – Czech 07 – Romanian 12 – English
03 – Croatian 08 – Serbian 13 – French
04 – Hungarian 09 – Slovakian 14 – Italian
05 – German 10 – Slovenian 15 – Spanish
16 – other:

2 – no

X – refused to answer

54. Which of the following statements applies to you most? SHOW CARD

1 – I am religious, I follow the teachings of the church

2 – I am religious in my own way

3 – I can't say if I am religious or not

4 – I am not religious

→ GO TO 56

5 – I have a different conviction, I am definitely not religious

→ GO TO 56

6 – other, namely:.....

→ GO TO 56

X –

55. Which religion or denomination do you feel you belong to? SHOW CARD

1 – Roman Catholic

2 – Calvinist

3 – Lutheran

4 – Greek Catholic

5 – Jewish

6 – Baptist, Adventist, other minor denominations

7 – Muslim

8 – Buddhist

9 – other religion, namely:

10 – belongs to no denomination

88 – doesn't answer

99 – DK

X –

56. By which right do you live at your current residence?

- 01 – as owner
- 02 – as usufructuary
- 03 – as tenant, partner of tenant
- 04 – apartment sharer
- 05 – as supporter on a support-for-life contract
- 06 – as family member
- 07 – as occupant without title
- 08 – by courtesy (e.g. for work)
- 09 – as subtenant
- 10 – other
- 99 – DK
- X –

57. How many people live in the apartment/part of the apartment/house?

- people
- 99 – doesn't know
- X –

58. In your flat/part of flat/house is there.... THAT YOU ARE ABLE TO USE!

	there is	there isn't	DK	
1. ... electricity?	1	0	9	X
2. ... running water?	1	0	9	X
3. ... permanent hot water?	1	0	9	X
4. ... a bathroom?	1	0	9	X
5. ... mains sewerage system (no cesspit)?	1	0	9	X
6. ... local sewerage system (e.g. cesspit)?	1	0	9	X
7. ... water closet?	1	0	9	X
8. ... central or district heating?	1	0	9	X
9. ... piped gas?	1	0	9	X
10. ... gas cylinder?	1	0	9	X
11. ... electric or gas heating?	1	0	9	X
12. ... a telephone?	1	0	9	X

Immigrants

59. Before you came to Hungary was there.... in your flat/part of flat/house?

	yes	no	DK	
1. ... electricity?	1	0	9	X
2. ... running water?	1	0	9	X
3. ... permanent hot water?	1	0	9	X
4. ... a bathroom?	1	0	9	X
5. ... mains sewerage system (no cesspit)?	1	0	9	X
6. ... local sewerage system (e.g. cesspit)?	1	0	9	X
7. ... water closet?	1	0	9	X
8. ... central or district heating?	1	0	9	X
9. ... piped gas?	1	0	9	X
10. ... gas cylinder?	1	0	9	X
11. ... electric or gas heating?	1	0	9	X
12. ... a telephone?	1	0	9	X

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND (OMNIBUS)

CHECK USING DATA ON ADDRESS CARD!

D1. GENDER OF RESPONDENT:

- 1 – Male
- 2 – Female

CHECK USING DATA ON ADDRESS CARD!

D2. Finally, I would like to ask you a few questions about your household that are necessary for processing of the data. Which year were you born?

IF HE/SHE IS BELOW TWENTY, HE/SHE CAN'T HAVE OBTAINED A TERTIARY DIPLOMA (CODES 10, 11). IF HE/SHE IS BELOW 21, HE/SHE CAN'T HAVE OBTAINED A UNIVERSITY DIPLOMA (CODE 11).

D3. Finally, I should like to ask you a few questions about your household that are necessary for the processing of the data.

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

COURSES, MARXIST UNIVERSITY DOESN'T COUNT!

- 01 – didn't go to school
- 02 – finished grades 1-5 (elementary)
- 03 – grades 6-7 (elementary)
- 04 – less than 8 grades
- 05 – 8 primary grades (before WW2: 4 common school or 4 lower secondary grades, now: also 9th-10th grades, untermiated secondary school)
- 06 – vocational training certificate, certificate of mastership or apprenticeship
- 07 – specialized secondary school certificate (unfinished tertiary education)
- 08 – general secondary school certificate (unfinished higher education)
- 09 – vocational training conditional upon secondary school certificate (not trade exam!), industrial technical school, higher training not accredited to give diploma
- 10 – college diploma, higher technical school
- 11 – university diploma
- N – doesn't know
- V – refuses to answer

D4. Do you work, do you undertake regular-income earning activity?

- 2 – Yes
- 1 – No
- N – DK
- V – NA

D5. At present are you:

- 1 – an active earner (assistant family member, too),
 - 2 – on pregnancy, maternity or parental leave,
 - 3 – retired, an old-age pensioner (by own right), widow's pensioner,
 - 4 – disability pensioner (before retirement age),
 - 5 – unemployed,
 - 6 – student or
 - 7 – housewife, other inactive earner (you live on your wealth; let out property, flat; only have contract of support for life or annuity), other dependent (living on social aid, in an institution, supported by children only, disabled)?
- V – refused to answer

D6. Your (last) place of work is (was):

- 1 – in the private sector (self-employed, at a partnership, Ltd., Plc., cooperative, etc.),
- 2 – government, local government, budgetary organ, institution,
- 3 – civil organization (foundation, association, non-profit company) or ——— 8.
- 9 – never had a job? ——— 11.

N – DK

V – NA

D7. Regarding your occupation, do/did you mainly work(ed) as an:

ONLY ONE POSSIBLE ANSWER, INDICATE THE MORE TYPICAL!

- 1 – employee, or
- 2 – entrepreneur, owner?

N – DK

V – NA

D8. You will see occupational categories on the screen.

D9. What is (was) your (last) job, position? Please read the categories on the screen and help me to classify your occupation. If you have (had) several jobs, choose the one that is (was) the source of your highest permanent income!

- 01 – high-prestige independent intellectual work in own enterprise (e.g. freelance journalist, private doctor, lawyer, architect, accountant, software specialist, etc.)
- 02 – have agricultural undertaking, producer, self-employed farmer, primary producer
- 03 – owner of other enterprise without employees
- 04 – owner of other enterprise with 1-5 employees
- 05 – owner of other enterprise with 6 or more employees
- 11 – senior manager with a staff of 6 or more
- 12 – senior manager with a staff of 5 or fewer
- 13 – mid-level manager with a staff of 5 or more
- 14 – mid-level manager with a staff of 5 or fewer
- 15 – diploma-holder employed in the public sphere (civil servant, state employee with diploma)
- 16 – diploma-holder employed in the competitive sphere
- 17 – office worker in the public sphere (civil servant, state employee)
- 18 – office worker in the competitive sphere
- 19 – neither blue collar nor white collar worker (travel, services, customer-visiting, teleworking)
- 20 – skilled employee doing light physical work (nurse, manual assistant)
- 21 – skilled worker doing physical labour
- 22 – semi-skilled and unskilled worker, physical assistant, household employee
- 77 – never had a job (e.g. unemployed from the beginning) ——— 11.

N – DK

V – NA

D10. Which sector of the economy does your (past) workplace belong to? Please read the sectors on the screen that will help you classify your workplace.

- 01 – agriculture (game management, forestry, fisheries, crop production, livestock)
- 02 – industry (mining, manufacturing, engineering, chemical industry, heavy industry, food industry)
- 03 – energy industry (electricity, gas, steam, hydroelectricity)
- 04 – construction
- 05 – retail and wholesale trade
- 06 – catering, tourism (accommodation)
- 07 – transport (people and goods), newscasting, telecommunication, postal services, storage, water management
- 08 – financial services (banking, insurance)
- 09 – economic services (rent, real estate, information technologies, research-development, market research, legal and security activity)
- 10 – government, administration, public services, protection (army, fire brigades), compulsory social insurance
- 11 – education, culture
- 12 – health care, welfare services
- 13 – other community, personal services (churches, representative bodies, entertainment, sport, hairdresser, shoemaker, waste treatment, etc.)

N – DK

V – NA

D11. What is your net income (that you actually receive) (work salary/pension/scholarship) per month? Please add all extra income (from part/time work, occasional income, etc.)

_____ HUF

000 – no income

N – doesn't know

V – refuses to answer

D12. Now I turn the screen to you again. You will see income categories. I would like to ask you to select and mark the category that best describes your monthly income. Sign the circle next to the right category by moving the blue highlight to the right answer and pressing the widest (space) key.

TURN THE SCREEN TO THE INTERVIEWEE!

**TO THOSE WHO COULDN'T GIVE AN ANSWER TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION
(ANY OF CODES V, N, X)!**

**D13. You can see income categories on the screen. I would like to ask you to select
and mark the one to which your monthly income belongs!**

**PLEASE TURN THE SCREEN BACK TO THE INTERVIEWER WHEN YOU HAVE
ANSWERED THE QUESTION!**

- 01 – less than 30,000 HUF
- 02 – 30,001 – 45,000 HUF
- 03 – 45,001 – 60,000 HUF
- 04 – 60,001 – 75,000 HUF
- 05 – 75,001 – 90,000 HUF
- 06 – 90,001 – 110,000 HUF
- 07 – 110,001 – 150,000 HUF
- 08 – 150,001 – 200,000 HUF
- 09 – 200,001 – 250,000 HUF
- 10 – 250,001 – 300,000 HUF
- 11 – 300,001 – 350,000 HUF
- 12 – 350,001 – 400,000 HUF
- 13 – 400,001 – 450,000 HUF
- 14 – 450,001 – 500,000 HUF
- 15 – 500,001 – 750,000 HUF
- 16 – 750,001 – 1,000,000 HUF
- 17 – 1,000,001 – 1,500,000 HUF
- 18 – 1,500,001 – 2,000,000 HUF
- 19 – Above 2 million HUF
- 0 – no income
- N – DK
- V – NA

D14. What is your marital status?

REGISTER THE ACTUAL STATUS, NOT THE LEGAL STATUS!

- 1 – single, unmarried
- 2 – married, living alone
- 3 – divorced, living alone
- 4 – widowed, living alone
- 5 – unmarried, living with partner
- 6 – married, living with spouse
- 7 – married, living with partner
- 8 – divorced, living with partner
- 9 – widowed, living with partner
- V – refused to answer

D15. How many people live in your household (sharing costs) including you?

1 – lives alone ——— 33.

2 – 2

3 – 3

4 – 4

5 – 5

6 – 6

7 – 7

8 – 8

9 – 9 or more

V – refused to answer

THOSE PERSONS UNDER 18 MUST NUMBER FEWER THAN THE SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD.

D16. How many of them are under 18?

V – refused to answer

D18. Please tell me how your family is composed. Which category describes best the form of household you live in?

1 – married (unmarried) couple

2 – married/unmarried couple + child(ren)

3 – single parent + child(ren)

4 – grandparent(s) + grandchild(ren)

5 – grandparent(s) + parent(s) + child(ren)

6 – other composition

N – DK

V – NA

D19. How much is the net income of your household per month? Please include your own net income, too. Please add each income: family allowance, child support, market garden sales, second job, etc.!

_____ HUF

N – doesn't know

V – refused to answer

D20. Now I turn the screen to you again. You will see income categories. I would like to ask you to select and mark the category that best describes your monthly income. Mark the circle next to the correct category by moving the blue highlight to the right answer and pressing the widest (space) key.

D21. On the screen you can see income categories. Please classify and indicate your household's net income per month using the right category!

AFTER MARKING THE ANSWER PLEASE TURN THE SCREEN TO THE INTERVIEWER!

- 01 – less than 30,000 HUF
- 02 – 30,001 – 45,000 HUF
- 03 – 45,001 – 60,000 HUF
- 04 – 60,001 – 75,000 HUF
- 05 – 75,001 – 90,000 HUF
- 06 – 90,001 – 110,000 HUF
- 07 – 110,001 – 150,000 HUF
- 08 – 150,001 – 200,000 HUF
- 09 – 200,001 – 250,000 HUF
- 10 – 250,001 – 300,000 HUF
- 11 – 300,001 – 350,000 HUF
- 12 – 350,001 – 400,000 HUF
- 13 – 400,001 – 450,000 HUF
- 14 – 450,001 – 500,000 HUF
- 15 – 500,001 – 750,000 HUF
- 16 – 750,001 – 1,000,000 HUF
- 17 – 1,000,001 – 1,500,000 HUF
- 18 – 1,500,001 – 2,000,000 HUF
- 19 – more than 2 million HUF
- 00 – no income

N – DK

V – NA

**D33. Now I would like to ask you about your household equipment.
How many do you have/use of the following items:**

**ALSO TO BE MENTIONED ARE ITEMS OWNED BY FIRM BUT ALSO USED
PRIVATELY!**

	0-9 pcs
	N – DK
	V – NA
01. personal computer (PC)/laptop?	61
02. regular camera?	62
03. camcorder?	63
04. colour TV?	64
05. electric stir fryer?	65
06. VCR?	66
07 radio alarm clock?	67
08. electric drill?	68
09. car that is less than 3 years old?	69
10. car that is more than 3 years old?	70
11. holiday cottage, weekend house, piece of land?	71
12. bank-/credit card?	72
13. CD-player?	73
14. digital camera?	74
15. DVD-player?	75
16. Discman?	76
17. valuable art object?	

**D34. I would like to ask a few more questions about your household's equipment.
How many do you have/use of the following items:**

ISDN TELEPHONE LINE COUNTS AS TWO LINES!

	0-9 PCS
	N – DK
	V – NA
01. automatic washing machine?	77
02. bank account?	78
03. HI-FI stereo equipment?	79
04. cable TV?	80
05. cassette player?	81
06. freezer?	82
07. MP3 player?	83
08. mobile phone?	84
09. TV with remote control?	85
10. landline telephone?	86
11. TV with teletext?	87
12. walkman?	88
13. gaming console (wii, xbox, playstation, Nintendo DS)	89
14. GPS navigation system	90
15. home movie system	91
16. TV set apt for digital broadcasting (hdtv)	92
17. adapter for digital broadcasting (set top box)	93
18. plasma TV	94
19. LCD TV	95
20. LED TV	96
21. 3D TV	97
22. blue ray player	98

Immigrants

D33b. Before you came to Hungary, did you have the following items in your household:

ALSO TO BE MENTIONED ARE ITEMS OWNED BY FIRM BUT ALSO USED PRIVATELY!

	1 yes
	2 no
	9 DK
01. personal computer (PC)/laptop?	61
02. regular camera?	62
03. camcorder?	63
04. colour TV?	64
05. electric stir fryer?	65
06. VCR?	66
07. radio alarm clock?	67
08. electric drill?	68
09. car that is younger than 3 years?	69
10. car that is older than 3 years?	70
11. holiday cottage, piece of land?	71
12. bank/ credit card?	72
13. CD-player?	73
14. digital camera?	74
15. DVD-player?	75
16. Discman?	76
17. valuable art object?	

Immigrants

D34b. Just a few more questions: before you came to Hungary, did you have in your household any of the following:

ISDN TELEPHONE LINE COUNTS AS TWO LINES!

	1 yes
	2 no
	9 DK
01. automatic washing machine?	77
02. bank account?	78
03. HI-FI stereo equipment?	79
04. cable TV?	80
05. cassette player?	81
06. freezer?	82
07. MP3 player?	83
08. mobile phone?	84
09. TV with remote control?	85
10. landline telephone?	86
11. TV with teletext?	87
12. walkman?	88
13. gaming console (wii, xbox, playstation, Nintendo DS)	89
14. GPS navigation system	90
15. home movie system	91
16. TV set suitable for digital broadcasting (HDTV)	92
17. adapter for digital broadcasting (set top box)	93
18. plasma TV	94
19. LCD TV	95
20. LED TV	96
21. 3D TV	97
22. blue ray player	98

Immigrants

60. Please assess again your current and earlier living conditions. Where would you place them on a scale where 0 means the worst and 10 means the best living conditions? SHOW CARD

	worst										best										DK
a. current living conditions?	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	99	X								
b. living conditions before relocation?	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	99	X								

IT1. Now I'd like to ask you about another thing

Do you personally have access to the Internet:

2 – yes

1 – no

N – DK

V – NA

1. at home?	9
2. at work?	10
7. at home?	11
3. at a friends, acquaintances?	12
4. at a relation's place, family member?	13
5. in a public place, e.g. café, library?	14
6. at another place?	15
8. and do you have access to mobile internet?	16

IT2. How often do you use the Internet:

7 – every day, almost every day,

6 – several times a week,

5 – once a week,

4 – several times a month,

3 – once a month,

2 – less frequently

1 – never?

N – DK

V – NA

QUESTIONS TO THE INTERVIEWER

K 6. DON'T ASK, JUST RECORD! Type of house/apartment in which the interviewee lives:

Village:

- 01 – village emergency housing
- 02 – solitary homestead
- 03 – traditional farmhouse
- 04 – Modernized renovated traditional farmhouse
- 05 – village family residence with a garden
- 06 – house with several flats (city type)
- 07 – multi-storied new house
- 08 – cottage with garden in a city
- 09 – other house in village, i.e.:

City:

- 10 – small-garden house (with one home) in small town/suburb
- 11 – small-garden house (with several homes) in small town/suburb
- 12 – city emergency housing (temporary dwelling, hovel, premises of a shop)
- 13 – old apartment house flat looking onto a yard
- 14 – old apartment house flat looking onto the street
- 15 – flat in an old apartment house (place is not defined)
- 16 – old (built in 1930s, 40s), but more modern apartment house, condominium
- 17 – flat in housing estate, not block of flats
- 18 – flat in a block of flats (in housing estate)
- 19 – condominium with garden that seems old
- 20 – condominium with garden that seems new
- 21 – cottage with garden (new and old)
- 22 – family residence with garden in city
- 23 – newly built condominium (without garden)
- 24 – housing park
- 25 – other in city
- NN – DK
- VV – NA

Immigrants

61. How well did the respondent speak Hungarian?

- 5 – perfectly
- 4 –
- 3 –
- 2 –
- 1 – very poorly

Immigrants

62. How well did the respondent understand the questions?

- 5 – perfectly
- 4 –
- 3 –
- 2 –
- 1 – very poorly

Immigrants

63. Did the respondent use any external help?

- 1 – yes----- > What help was used?
 - 01 – dictionary
 - 02 – family member/ acquaintance
 - 03 – other, namely:
- 2 – no

Appendix 3

RECOMMENDATIONS FORMULATED BY THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE CIVIC DISCUSSIONS – HOST SOCIETY

PRECONDITIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The following ideas and recommendations for programmes cannot be implemented without the cooperation, active involvement of, or acceptance by, the host society, and they cannot be effective without substantively addressing those areas which are connected with the topics that affect the host society (such as the taxation system, education, healthcare, the situation of employment, administrative matters, etc.).
2. One general recommendation is that it is necessary to develop a Hungarian Demographic Strategy that addresses immigration and integration of immigrants.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Provision of information

1. Local NGOs whose activities are connected with migrants should be encouraged to implement programmes which present the culture and problems of locally resident migrants to the local population or host society (through cultural programmes or sports events, etc.). The necessary resources could be provided by the local governments through project calls.
2. Within the curricula of citizenship and social studies, migrant-related topics should be introduced both at primary and at secondary school level. It is recommended that time is spent on informing students about migrants' rights and their status and on dispelling stereotypes about them. At such lessons, guest speakers from the respective cultural community could help by providing information to the children.
3. There is a need to conduct further research that focuses on the employment situation of migrants and the results of this research should be made available to society on a regular basis (e.g. through the Metropol newspaper or other widely-available media).

In order to help dispel myths and promote a clearer view of the issue of migration, the following questions need to be addressed:

- How many people are immigrating/have immigrated to the country?
- How many of them work legally? How many pay taxes?
- During their stay, for what period do they have legal employment?
- To what extent are they “useful” members of society? To what extent does society have a need for them?

Research could be financed by the European Integration Fund.

4. The following subjects should be introduced within teacher training courses: introduction to foreign cultures and how to deal with immigrants.

Administration

5. Instructions in other languages than Hungarian should be created to assist migrants with filling out the forms required to apply for different types of residence permits.
6. During the process of recognising the qualifications of migrants, equivalence rules should be simplified in a systematic way. The making of exceptions (or/and allowing further consideration) should be made possible for:
- teachers who are foreign nationals and who teach in a foreign language;
 - simplifying the process key professions or professions with a shortage of workers;
 - allowing temporary accreditation of migrants for a limited period, when justified.
7. Hungarian authorities should support preparation for the “equivalency examination” in the process of recognising qualifications obtained abroad.. This may be financed through the following means:
- Offering discounted/preferential loans;
 - Providing state-subsidized loans, similar to how student loans are provided.
8. It is necessary to support the development and maintenance of preparation programmes for the above-mentioned equivalency examination. They may be financed by:
- the state;
 - local governments;
 - EU projects;
 - involving foreign embassies in Hungary.
9. There is a need to support the activities and strengthen the project application competencies of non-profit organizations for migrants (or those whose work is connected to migrants), and to help and encourage employment of volunteers from the same cultural community.
10. Foreign students who have completed their education in Hungary in Hungarian within the formal educational system should be enabled to obtain a permanent residence permit more quickly. Time spent living in the country (with a residence permit) for educational purposes should be recognized.

11. In the case of persons with Hungarian ethnic origins who live in neighbouring countries, the administrative process of obtaining a permanent residence permit and citizenship status needs to be simplified (not by shortening the waiting period but by rethinking and simplifying the conditions for obtaining the requisite documents).

Knowledge of the language

12. School age: Before a child starts going to a school class for their own age group, they should have the opportunity to learn Hungarian. After obtaining some basic linguistic competence, they should start going to an integrated school in order to be with other children.

The realization of this recommendation could be achieved through the cooperation of schools and cultural centres, as described below.

13. Adults: It is necessary to disseminate information about available language courses to the widest possible audience. There is a need to support the acquisition of basic Hungarian language skills. Possible financial sources include:
 - student loan type credit for immigrants;
 - migrants' own financial sources.

The above-mentioned recommendations could be brought to fruition within an integrated structure:

It is necessary to establish cultural centres where there is a possibility to treat the problems of immigrants in an integrated way. The centres' profile for integrated activities could be established according to the different needs of different regions.

Possible services to be provided:

- language courses;
- transmission of culture; "Get to know our country" trips;
- assistance with administrative tasks;
- help with obtaining information;
- interest representation, legal assistance;
- focused "cultural encounters", forums and roundtables.

RECOMMENDATIONS FORMULATED BY THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE CIVIC DISCUSSIONS – MIGRANTS

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We recommend adopting good practices from other countries.
2. We suggest that new research methods should be tested and that research methodology should be further developed (using both immigrants and members of the host society).
3. We recommend ensuring that children are consulted about this topic.

LAWS AND LEGAL AWARENESS

We recommend that:

4. The understanding of laws should be aided by the compiling and publishing of simplified versions of legal texts (by creating multilingual brochures and employing migrants as counsellors).
5. Laws should be simplified.
6. Instead of “patching up” relevant laws, they should be reformulated entirely (in order to make them more easily comprehensible).
7. Jurisdictional matters should be made coherent.
8. It should be compulsory to consult with migrants when legislation that concerns them is prepared.
9. There should be real equality before the law. If someone has “immigrant” status, their rights should not be limited – if an immigrant loses their job, they should be entitled to unemployment benefits and protection (so that they are not so exposed to blackmail).
10. Children of “immigrants” should not be limited in their rights (they should not be interrogated about where their parents work).
11. The “head quota” system should be applied to every child who goes to school.¹
12. A monitoring system should be introduced to check if regulations are observed and what the effects of those regulations are.

¹ Hungarian public education is mainly financed by the central budget through a normative support known as the “head quota” provided after each student.

13. The directives of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum of 18th October 2008 should be incorporated into Hungarian legislation.
14. The 8-year waiting period necessary for acquiring citizenship should include the years spent at university – graduates of Hungarian universities should be entitled to special consideration.
15. The monopoly of the National Office for Translation and Attestation should be curtailed.
16. The required length of residency for a permanent residence permits should be shortened from 5 years to 3 years.
17. Laws which concern professional chambers should allow “immigrant” non-citizens to become members of professional organizations under certain conditions.

ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

We recommend that:

18. Specific, tailored information about available services should be provided (e.g. posters and leaflets about non-profit organizations and links to the organizations on the website).
19. A multilingual counselling service should be set up at the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN), where competent employees of the Office are able to provide information that is in accordance with official procedures and to provide personalized assistance as well.
20. Information should be available with regard to who can lodge complaints and under what conditions. There should be an evaluation system for the work of administrators, and their salaries should be performance-based. Client satisfaction should be measurable, and made more important.
21. OIN should have on-line access to the databases of the other administrative authorities.
22. It should be possible to manage administrative issues on-line.
23. OIN's human resource capacity should be increased; more clerks should be employed.
24. The client's need for comfort should be taken into account by OIN: at least one toilet should be provided for each sex, there should be suitable waiting rooms (with a snack bar and internet access) and information points. A happier client is a better client :).
25. Suitable selection, motivation and the continuous training of administrators who work at the office should be ensured.
26. Administrators should receive intercultural training at certain intervals (they should meet with “immigrants” in other settings as well).

27. There should be a quota system for the administrative staff of OIN to ensure representation of each larger migrant group. These individuals should receive culture-specific training, as necessary.
28. There should be opportunities (at least once or twice per week) for migrants to deal with administrative issues personally, including outside regular working hours.
29. OIN should operate a "green number" that can be called after working hours, manned by selected employee(s) who are competent in a wide range of relevant issues and speak several languages.
30. Every client of OIN should have a single administrator designated to them personally so that they can talk to the same person every occasion (and clients should be able to meet with the administrator at an arranged time).

EDUCATION, CULTURE, TOLERANCE

We recommend that:

31. Media in the host society should take a bigger role in increasing the host society's tolerance of immigrants. They should present more migrant communities, show balanced images of them and should not enhance negative stereotypes.
32. The introduction of a migrant child to a new school class should follow a certain "ritual" (or given order: e.g. personal introduction, presentation of the cultural background, etc.)
33. "Getting to know foreign cultures" should be integrated into the compulsory school curriculum in the framework of multicultural lessons; cultural and leisure school activities together with members of immigrant communities should be organized from primary school level onwards.
34. Members of the police force should receive intercultural training so that they can efficiently and effectively deal with different situations concerning immigrants. This type of training could be integrated into the core curriculum of Hungarian as a foreign language, where police officers could meet with immigrants in person so that they in turn could also become informed about the competencies of the police force.
35. The legal environment should be permissive, and legislation concerning associations should be simplified so that migrant communities can form and operate associations easily.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE LANGUAGE

We recommend that:

36. Children of migrant backgrounds, when entering a Hungarian school for the first time, should not be allowed to study a foreign language as well as Hungarian simultaneously, but to study only Hungarian. There should be specially-assigned

schools in each district for this, where all the migrant children in the district could go to “Hungarian as a foreign language” classes. Course books suitable for various age groups should be provided for this purpose.

37. Professionally-trained immigrant and Hungarian volunteers should be involved in the teaching of Hungarian as a foreign language and of the native languages of migrant communities, both for children and for adults.
38. Further professional training opportunities for teachers of Hungarian as a foreign language should be provided.
39. Information about language learning and language teacher training should be made accessible to everybody (both recently arrived immigrants and those who have been resident for longer).

EMPLOYMENT

We recommend that:

40. A website should be created with information about employers who are known to welcome immigrant employees.
41. A (private or state) intermediary company should be established which can take the burden of arranging paperwork for the immigrant workforce off the shoulders of the employer.
42. Administrative burdens connected to the employment of immigrant persons should be made lighter.
43. Immigrants who lose their jobs and hold only an interim permanent residence permit should not automatically lose their residence status, but there should be a period of tolerance (of at least three months).
44. The equivalency conditions for degrees obtained in foreign countries and the framework for professional training courses should be simplified.

