Institute for Political Science

Understanding East Central European Politics

2ND UECEP Conference

17 May, 2019

CORVINUS
UNIVERSITY of
BUDAPEST

EDITED BY SÁNDOR GALLAI AND ÉVA VÁNYI

CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF BUDAPEST

BUDAPEST

2019.

PROGRAMME

Venue: New Building, Corvinus University of Budapest (4–6 Közraktár street**)**

8:00 AM – 8:45 AM Registration (*at Room 510*)
Registration desk is available during the conference.

8:45 AM – 8:50 AM Opening, welcome address (*Room 510*): Tamás Pesuth

8:50 AM – 9:30 AM Keynote lecture, followed by Q&A session
Aleksander Andrzej Szczerbiak
How is the European integration debate changing in post-communist states?

9:30 AM – 9:45 AM Coffee break (3rd floor Institute for Political Science)

Session 1: 9.45 AM – 11.15 AM

PANEL 1: VARIATIONS OF INTEGRATION IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (*ROOM 510*)

Chair: Loredana Vlasceanu

> **Loredana Vlasceanu:** The sovereignty debate in CEECs and the future of CEE-EU relations. Case study: Hungary and Romania

> **József Dúró:** Scepticism or Pragmatism? The European Policy of Fidesz

> **András Bánki:** Group loyalty among Visegradian Members of the European Parliament

> **Katalin Miklóssy:** Regional Integration in East Central Europe: Strategies in the In-Between Sphere

PANEL 2: ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (*ROOM 429*)

Chair: Mattia Collini

> **Mattia Collini:** Political Orientation and Electoral Volatility in Central and Eastern Europe. Is This an Issue or Are All Part(ie)s the Same?

> **Veronika Patkós – András Szántó:** Is political sophistication conducive to partisan bias?

> **Máté Harkányi:** Split-ticket voting in Hungary

> **Eszter Galgóczi:** Does socioeconomic status affect attitudes toward refugees in Hungary?

PANEL 3: POLITICAL ELITES IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (*ROOM 430*)

Chair: Klaudia Hanisch

> **Klaudia Hanisch:** Partisan Polarization and its Perception among the Elites in Poland

> **Réka Várnagy:** Protest and discipline in the Hungarian Parliament

> **Éva Ványi:** 'Cherchez la femme': Women in the cabinets in Hungary

> **Miklós Merényi:** Society Not Found – The Problem of Political Representation in the Political Science of Hungary's Post-Socialist Democratization

Session 2: 11:30 AM – 1:00 PM

PANEL 4: POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (*ROOM 510*)

Chair: Katalin Farkas Bede

Fruzsina Nábelek: Negative campaigning in the campaign strategy: a dynamic approach

Katalin Farkas Bede: 'Europe for the Europeans. The Orban Doctrine in a Comparative Context

Márton Bene: "Safe space" for disagreement? An experiment on the linkage between social media cross-cutting exposure and internal political efficacy

PANEL 5: POLITICS AND ECONOMY (*ROOM 429*)

Chair: Zoltán Török

Péter Krisztián Zachar: Political dynamics as catalyst of institutional change: the example of the Hungarian chambers of industry and commerce

Zoltán Török: Studying the different qualities of policy change – Hungarian tax reform 2009-2018

Gábor Molnár: The role of business associations in contractual governance: the case of a successful Hungarian industry

Mikhail Zabotkin: Democratic Backsliding in CEE as European Disintegration: a Qualitative Comparative Analysis

PANEL 6: POLICIES IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (*ROOM 430*)

Chair: Anna Sakson-Boulet

Anna Sakson-Boulet: Poland Environmental Policy Priorities by 2030

Iga Kender-Jeziorska: Public service co-production in illiberal democracies: A comparative case of drug policy in East-Central Europe

Melánia Ercsey-Orbán: Discourse and family policy in Hungary between 2010 and 2018

Sándor Gallai: Give way to children? The Context of Family Policy in Hungary

1.00 PM – 2.45 PM LUNCH BREAK (3RD FLOOR INSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE)

Session 3: 2:45 PM – 4:15 PM

PANEL 7: PARTY SYSTEMS (*ROOM 510*)

Chair: Csaba Molnár

Martin Mölder: Changing Political Landscapes in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Perceptions of Political Landscapes

András Hajdú: The reawakens of the urban-rural cleavage – The urban-rural cleavage and parties in the Hungarian Parliamentary Election 2018

Csaba Molnár: The Proof of Mainstreaming is the Winning? – The Moderation Strategy of Jobbik

PANEL 8: PROBLEMS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION (*ROOM 429*)

Chair: Hoppál Kál Bulcsú

Márton Ugrósdy: Where best practices come from? Preliminary evidence on policy transfer in the Hungarian central and local government context

Hoppál Kál Bulcsú: A Chapter of the Relation of State and Churches: The Statute IV of 1990 and CCVI of 2011.

Anna Ujlaki: Fear of refugees and immigrants – A theoretical approach

Prince Aian Villanueva: Pathways to corruption in Central Eastern Europe and Eurasia: A fuzzy-sets qualitative comparative analysis

4:15 PM – 4:30 PM Coffee break (3rd floor Institute for Political Science)

Session 4: 4:30 PM – 6:00 PM

PANEL 9: OPPOSITION AND RESISTANCE IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (*ROOM 510*)

Chair: András Körösényi

Igor Stipić: Esthetics of Order – Poetics of Resistance:
'Pravda za Davida' as new 'distribution of the sensible'?

Magdalena Solska: Political opposition in Poland – just weak or intentionally constrained?

Marcin Łukaszewski: Political techniques applied by the Law and Justice party since the 2015 elections

Balša Delibašić – Sara Nikolić: Rising of New Force: Core Values of New Social Movements in Serbia and Their Potential for Creating a New Political Front

6.00 PM – 6.30 PM CONFERENCE CLOSING AND FAREWELL DRINK

(3RD FLOOR INSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE)

FAREWELL ADDRESS, SÁNDOR GALLAI (INSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE, CUB)

PANEL 1: VARIATIONS OF INTEGRATION IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Loredana Vlasceanu

The sovereignty debate in CEECs and the future of CEE-EU relations. Case study: Hungary and Romania

The complex crises the European Union has been wrestling with these last years (refugees, Brexit, home-grown terrorism not to mention the very issues resulting from the Union's own evolution - legitimacy deficit, lack of accountability, focus on enlargement instead of deepening, Eurozone etc.) have paved the way for the current rise of nationalism in the newer EU Member States.

Our paper focuses on Hungary and Romania for they reflect certain similar realities - a PM/government/governing party with pro-Russian views and a radical discourse criticising the EU although not always for the right reasons, the perception that the respective State's sovereignty is being threatened by the EU (although not by Russia, despite its gas blackmail, cyberwarfare, manipulation and propaganda in the written press/on internet). On the other hand, these two countries, although they share a partial common history of Transylvania, present significant differences. For instance, they differ in terms of the Communist experience (the 1956 revolt - Hungary, no collective opposition - only individual protest - Romania) and legacy (no lustration process - Hungary, a lustration process in Romania but with the same result as the lack of formal vetting in Hungary since it only concerned the intelligence agencies, not the military and the other structures and because the decision-makers were themselves former Securitate agents). Hungary, on the other hand, decided in favour of strengthened ties with Russia while Romania is still hesitating on this issue (PM/government/governing party are in favour hereof, the Presidency supports EU) and, as part of the Visegrad Group (V4) has had the experience if not of solidarity, at least of belonging to a regional structure.

Our research on today's sovereignty debate in Hungary and Romania indicates a rather weakened wish to be part of the European family for mixed reasons[1], a certain ''small country'' syndrome and the fear of becoming the playground of bigger States, populism (before becoming Prime Minister, Viktor Orban used to criticise the former government exactly for the tight relations with the Russian Federation only to continue the cycle) as well as less attention from Brussels since the EU is struggling to put an end to its own structural crises.

While neither Hungary nor Romania will probably decide in the near future to leave the EU (and the EU is also not yet ready to give up a couple of national markets absorbing the German, French, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, Belgian surplus), these tensions and confrontations undermine EU's authority and capabilities, erode its prestige and turn it into an easier prey for Russia on its expansionist march, especially with the United States preparing for a withdrawal from Europe (a return to the Monroe doctrine and isolationism?). Learning to negotiate objectives and policies is indeed a highly difficult task but it might turn out to be the only way to help the EU survive or at least create a genuine regional convergence point especially given the current regional security threats and risks.

József Dúró

Scepticism or Pragmatism? The European Policy of Fidesz

The paper aims at re-thinking the concept of Euroscepticism via examining the European policy of the Hungarian governing party (Fidesz). The literature on Euroscepticism has not yet drawn attention to parties which are neither apparently committed to the European project, nor clearly Eurosceptic. The most cited classification of Euroscepticism (hard and soft) was carried out by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2000; 2002; 2008), nevertheless, soft Euroscepticism refers to every single criticism of the European Union, so this category is too broad as Kopecký and Mudde (2002) notes. On the other hand, the latter authors' concept on Euroscepticism is too narrow as it excludes parties which reject the whole idea of the European integration. Nonetheless, they introduce a not too logical category, the Europragmatist (rejecting the idea of the European integration but supporting it in its current form).

This paper concludes that Fidesz' European policy can be described as pragmatist. It argues that lots of conflicts have emerged between the Hungarian government and various European institutions (mainly the Commission) on the one hand. On the other hand, when it has come to the deepening of the European integration (Lisbon Treaty, EFSF) or to the question of common European army or the strengthening of the cooperation among ministers of the Interior in the Schengen Area, the party has shown a pro-European image as well. In this sense, Fidesz' relation to the European Union can be understood along two dimensions. In the first one, the party criticises the European Union ('Brussels') at the level of rhetoric but the government either withdraws/amends the controversial acts or simply supports the integration (e.g., in the case of treaties).

András Bánki

Group loyalty among Visegradian Members of the European Parliament

This research wants to unfold some characteristics of the voting patterns of Visegradian Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) cast in the European Parliament (EP) plenary sessions. The research includes data from three terms of the EP (2004-2009; 2009-2014; 2014-2019) and from MEPs of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland who were members of any political group of the EP. Through the voting patterns, we can examine the political group affiliations of the included MEPs and their voting loyalty to their political groups. The research use data from votewatch.eu and concentrate both the EP political groups and national party delegations within these EP political groups.

Katalin Miklóssy

Regional Integration in East Central Europe: Strategies in the In-Between Sphere

This study investigates European integration from some Eastern European countries' point of view. Challenging the master narrative of a consistent and committed policy to the EU-accession, this article discusses the complex maneuvering that took place in regional institutions, before and during the EU-enlargement process. Playing on different arenas simultaneously was to maximize the advantages gained from the obvious Western intention to enlarge to Eastern markets and secure a sphere of influence there. The fluctuating enthusiasm in engaging in different institutions reveal the changing evaluations of institutional potential in realizing national interests, which are articulated as socio-economic development interlinked with the idea of integrity. The focus is on the Visegrad union, introduced also from historical and spatial angles. The role of this alliance is examined from the perspectives of multileveled-multilateral interaction, analyzing the agency of national elites in regional and wider international arenas. The main questions to be answered in this article are: How was the role of the parallelly existing and partly overlapping organizations assessed in Poland and Hungary? How did these regional institutions interact with each other, and how did the regional level correlate with the evolution of the wider European framework?

PANEL 2: ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Mattia Collini

Political Orientation and Electoral Volatility in Central and Eastern Europe. Is This an Issue or Are All Part(ie)s the Same?

Party politics in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is generally considered characterized by instability, fragmentation and volatility, at least when compared with the traditionally more stable Western Europe. However, are these phenomena affecting all in the same way or can we see some differences among 'blocs' or 'political families'? Indeed, blocs are a key aspect of this research, which explores how much the concept of 'bloc' can be applicable, and what are the main characteristics of political families in CEE. This paper aims to be a comprehensive assessment of these phenomena, based on empirical evidence from the region.

Many works have been devoted to the study of electoral volatility in CEE, but the issue of political orientation has, up to now, been neglected: electoral volatility is a good indicator of (aggregate) electoral stability and change, but it does not distinguish between how political blocs behave in terms of vote transfers. Hence, it is important to disaggregate electoral volatility not only into vote share of new parties and established parties but also in relation to parties' political affiliations, as well as to assess the direction of electoral change over time. Moreover, another advantage of conducting this research is that – unlike many previous works – it is not limited to a systemic level, but also considers single parties and

the intermediate 'bloc' level. Confronting the main political blocs, and if and how they changed over almost two decades, the research contributes to the study the general structure of political competition in CEE. The paper covers six Central and Eastern European countries that have joined the EU between 2004 and 2007 (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary), from their democratic transition to 2018, analysing all elections rated as 'fully-free' by Freedom House. In the first part, it explores the applicability of the concept of blocs in CEE, assessing their characteristics and providing an updated map of electoral volatility in CEE related to each political bloc. The second part is dedicated to a statistical analysis of electoral volatility, (intra)bloc fragmentation, as well as the impact of governmental participation, which are considered among the main explanatory factors for the differences and recurring trends within the countries. In particular, regression analyses will be used to search for correlations looking at party level and aggregate blocs.

Veronika Patkós – András Szántó
Is political sophistication conducive to partisan bias?

Recently, considerable theoretical literature has emerged on voters' unsophistication and its effect on democratic functioning. Some of these works argue that the political choices of more sophisticated voters would lead to more favourable social outcomes (Brennan, 2017; Somin, 2016). However, the influential book of Achen and Bartels (2016) argues that sophistication is unlikely to lead to better democratic outcomes as sophisticated citizens are more biased than their unsophisticated counterparts. This paper aims to clarify the link between sophistication and partisan bias by investigating the role of its three most important elements, education, information acquisition, and interest. The research question is tested on a large repeated cross-sectional dataset of the European Social Survey, covering seven data rounds from 30 European democracies. The results show that the level of bias is independent of education and the amount of political newspaper reading, but is strongly related to political interest. The findings challenge both optimistic (Brennan, 2017; Somin, 2016) and pessimistic expectations (Achen & Bartels, 2016) on the effect of sophistication.

Máté Harkányi
Split-ticket voting in Hungary

In mixed election systems, voters have two votes, so they can split their votes between the individual candidates and party lists. In the research field of voting behavior, the analysis of split-ticket voting is becoming increasingly popular. There may be strategic and also non-strategic motivations behind it. While strategic motivations may appear in different forms of tactical voting, non-strategic motivations can often be related to the awareness and individual characteristics of the candidates, or simply the lack of a favorite party candidate or even a list.

The aim of my lecture is to demonstrate of possible motives for split-ticket voting in addition to mixed election systems, and to try to answer some of the related questions in the light of the results of the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary elections: Did the Hungarian voters split their votes in a higher proportion? Are there any signs of tactical voting? Is there a connection between the intensity of ticket-splitting and the closeness of race at constituency level? Did the incumbency of the representatives matter? What was the impact of the withdrawals of some candidates from relevant opposition parties?

Eszter Galgóczi

Does socioeconomic status affect attitudes toward refugees in Hungary?

Today, one of the most decisive and most divisive topics is the issue of immigration into the European region. The socio-cultural background, social position, political affiliation, media consumption habits all determine how individuals perceive immigrants coming to their home country in the last few years. This paper aims to test whether or not the individuals' socio economic status affects on how European citizens look at immigration. I hypothesise that people on low income are more likely to judge immigration negatively, since rejecting minority groups and xenophobic attitudes are rather occurring in lower social classes. The fear of social exclusion increases prejudice against "the others". The question arises along these assumptions; does the supply of labour in the individual's surroundings determine the individual's opinion on immigrants? The study seeks to find out how the opinions and attitudes on immigrants are influenced by the individual's economic situation, social status or unemployment.

PANEL 3: POLITICAL ELITES IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Klaudia Hanisch

Partisan Polarization and its Perception among the Elites in Poland

Since the general elections 2015 we have witnessed a new intensity of political mobilization in Poland. While hundred thousands of people gather regularly to express their discontent with the *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (PiS) government and defend the liberal democracy, just few days later demonstrations of similar magnitude take place, which aim to support the government. Also the analysis of quantitative electorate data from the past thirteen years indicates a deepening partisan division characterized by an electoral social sorting respectively a gradual political identity alignment (CBOS 2017). The framing of the *Polish-Polish War* between the *two tribes,* known from the media, simultaneously over-simplifies and inflames the conflict, while its quality is being hardly studied by social science scholars (Matyja 2018). Based on narrative elites interviews and following Charles Taylor's social imaginary theory, the dissertation examines the perception of processes of polarization and seeks to formulate key elements of the Polish social imaginary regarding political representation. One of the most important functions of an elite interview is to try to assist the political scientist in understanding the theoretical positions of the

interviewees, their perceptions, beliefs and ideologies (Dexter 2006). Which conceptions of the people, legitimate modes of party competition and democracy do they share? Are the party cleavages mirroring the cleavages in the society? Which specific attributes from the polish political culture do the two sides of the division try to evoke or reinterpret? What is their personal normative engagement with the processes and practices linked to political polarization? My research aims not only at the mere "ideas" but also at "modes of social relations" amongst members of the Polish elites. The motivation to conduct research on elites is not only due to their active role in shaping the social imaginary. In the new elite paradigm worked out by John Higley and his colleagues from the 1980s, he put stress on the social and political preconditions of the stability of liberal democracies (Field, Higley 1980; Higley, Burton 2012). They argued, that the basis of the stability of a democratic regime is the forming of an underlying consensus among elites rather than among voters. For the democratic transition Higley and Burton saw especially in the Polish *roundtable* an instance of contemporary *elite settlements*. Currently the intensity of political polarization calls into question the actual achievement of elite consensus (Baylis 2012), which following Taylor can also indicate a legitimation crisis as a clash of political self-interpretations. On the contrary, after the evaluation of 43 narrative interviews, the thesis of the unfolding of a new form of party in - the *Expanded Party* (Bernstein 1999) - can be drafted for the polish case. It's defined as networks of actors, who are formally independent from each other but cooperate in a close manner and share a common partisan identity. A set of two big networks of ideological teammates emerged from before existing and new installed NGOs, partisan media and Think Tanks with no institutionalized bridges to the other side. The battle for a national narrative has fuelled the discourse among the elites. Public intellectuals, journalists, film-makers, museum designers and even the technical intelligentsia have been engaged in a fierce fight over the shape of politics and the polish state. Built around a strong leader like Jarosław Kaczyński in case of PiS or Donald Tusk and later Grzegorz Schetyna in case of PO, the parties don't even try to increase regular party memberships but organise supporters in different civic organisations as interface organizations (*Vorfeldorganisation*).

Réka Várnagy

Protest and discipline in the Hungarian Parliament

The Hungarian parliamentary arena has witnessed major political scandals in the last few years with attempts at obstruction, the use of megaphones, whistles and provocative banners by the opposition and the application of a unique combo of parliamentary procedural rules including procedural decisions by the Committee on Justice and the line-up of the Parliamentary Guard by the government. Based on a neo-institutional approach, in my research I trace the causes and the consequences of the institutional reform by focusing on the latest reform of the rules of procedures in 2012 that clearly reframed the rules of the game in the parliamentary arena (Smuk, 2012).

In the international literature there is increasing attention paid to parliamentary rules and institutional changes (see Sieberer-Müller, 2015; Garritzmann, 2017) especially because the direction and nature of these changes affect the strategy of parliamentary actors on the floor (Sieberer et al, 2016). This connection between the regulatory framework and the strategy of actors can be documented in Hungary where the protest-focused communication of the opposition is met by the strengthened disciplinary powers of the Speaker. Based on the theory of nested games (Tsebelis, 1990) that is used to describe to complexity of the parliamentary game, I argue that the structure of opportunity of the opposition is not only determined by the parliamentary rules and procedures but by their use (as in how the opposition can profit form the available resources) and application (as in how the government can apply the rules to limit these opportunities) so in my research I analyse the changing government-opposition dynamics in Hungary. This research was supported by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Éva Ványi

'Cherchez la femme': Women in the cabinets in Hungary

Politics in Central-Europe is the world of men. Especially it is true in Hungary whrere the representation of women in the political elite and in the decision-making process is very low. The rate of women among Members of Parliament's is approximately 10 % and among ministers is average only 8 %. The goal of this paper to present women's participation in Hungarian government decision-making but not only at ministerial level but also at state secretary level because political and bureaucratic state secretaries play important role in decision making process, too. The only place in the political decision making in Hungary where women can appear larger number is a deputy state secretary position. What is the background behind this phenomenon: the Hungarian political culture or political tradition, or is a special political recruiting pattern regarding women as political decision-maker.

Feminist theories assume a 'glass ceiling' for women as decision-maker. The aim of this paper to examine whether political reasons or another social sympthoms cause that women can be found in the second line within executives. The results come from a database that contains social-demographic and career data about all members of Hungarian cabinets including political and bureaucratic leaders from 1990 to 2015. The database is suitable for making comparative examination among cabinets in a long time period

Miklós Merényi

Society Not Found – The Problem of Political Representation in the Political Science of Hungary's Post-Socialist Democratization

The Hungarian democratic transition after 1989 put the problem of political representation in a different perspective. The post-totalitarian party-state and its representative claims were replaced by intrinsically different claims presented in the competitive political system. The emergent Hungarian political science rediscovered the issue of political representation. However, in contrast with the consensus over the liberal democratic model, it became an ambiguous field, full of explicit and implicit theoretical assumptions. The process of democratic transition that abruptly established liberal democratic institutions, faced an entangled social landscape of ruptures and continuities determined by an incomplete articulation of the post-socialist social order. It was impossible to take on board descriptive theoretical concepts (civil society, social cleavages etc.) accounting for the totality of the social foundations, that you just had to channel into politics. The interwovenness of political representation and democratization challenged the 'happy consensus' of democratic elitism and any general attempts to derive descriptive or normative accounts of representation simply from the electoral system or other features of the institutional-juridical order.

In my paper, I provide a general overlook of the main trends and concepts in the post-1989 Hungarian political science literature affecting the discourse related to political representation. My approach differs from other state-of-art articles in the topic in two ways. First, it neither confines itself to the principal-agent problem, nor takes as its starting point the divergencies between the main political theoretical paradigms targeting the problem of representation (deliberative democracy, mandate model, aggregative-pluralist theory, democratic elitism etc.). Second and consequently, it is a problem-oriented, historical approach informed by the 'constructivist turn' in representation theory. The perspective of my research builds on the conceptual and methodological insights of the prominent French political philosopher and historian, Pierre Rosanvallon. My main aim is to identify and expose the debates around representation that are closely linked to the essential antinomies of post-socialist democratization: the peculiar relationship between the social and the political, and between democracy and political representation.

PANEL 4: POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Nábelek Fruzsina

Negative campaigning in the campaign strategy: a dynamic approach

Negative campaigning became a prevalent method of the (post-)modern electoral campaigns. In the campaign strategy of parties and candidates it functions as a set of messages that aim to convince the voters that the opponent is not suitable for the position at stake by attacking her policy programme, records, ideology or character. Positive campaign messages, on the other hand, emphasize the party's or the candidate's own qualities. The strategic choice between a rather positive or a dominantly negative campaign is explained by several factors in the literature, such as the popularity of the party or the candidate, its incumbency status, party size or the party's or the candidate's place on the ideological spectrum. These explanations work for certain electoral campaigns of certain countries but in other contexts they fail to explain why a party or a candidate choses negative campaigning. I argue that these contradictory results stream from the fact that the mentioned factors mainly reflect on the current status of the party or the candidate and do not consider that the campaign strategy might adjust to the dynamics of the campaign such as the campaign messages of the opponents or of the potential allies. The presentation therefore examines both static and dynamic explanations of negative campaigning, using the approach of social network analysis in the case of Hungarian parliamentary election campaigns.

Katalin Farkas-Bede

'Europe for the Europeans. The Orban Doctrine in a Comparative Context

Much attention has been centred on Viktor Orban's role in the European Union and his interpretation of being European. Using the core principles of political research and discursive- and linguistic theory, here I provide a qualitative study on the European citizen using a content analysis of Orban's latest speeches as part of the campaign preparation for the 2019 European Parliament Elections in May. Later, a quantitative empirical research (by gaining qualitative data for corpus) will also be carried out on the attitude toward the meaning of Hungarians' national identity. I frame the study on the premise that Hungarians do feel second-class citizens in Europe and are still lost or disturbed in taste and faith. Orban's marking the course line in building the Hungarians' European identity and emerging from the Post-Soviet status are decisive as he has been a most influential politician to prescribe an agenda for Hungary since 1989. By interdisciplinary approach, I explore the tools of persuasion, walking the line between convincing and manipulation and the attitudes of various generations toward feeling Hungarian, coming from CEE, and declaring European. I also differentiate between the sense of national identity as a collective phenomenon (USA) and as that of Hungary, a European nation.

Márton Bene

"Safe space" for disagreement? An experiment on the linkage between social media cross-cutting exposure and internal political efficacy

This research investigates whether cross-cutting and mixed exposure to political information on social media is associated with users' internal political efficacy using an online survey experiment (N = 300). Social media has significantly changed citizens' patterns of political information consumption. Before the emergence of social media, news consumption was strongly dominated by selective exposure: in the high-choice media environment citizens predominantly tried to find like-minded information; cross-cutting media exposure was rather exceptional (Bennett – Iyengar, 2008, Mutz, 2006). However, on social media platforms, citizens are often exposed political information accidently, and due to the preponderance of heterogeneous weak ties, exposure to cross-cutting political contents are more frequent than in other contexts (Bakshy et al, 2015; Barnidge, 2017). Existing research has demonstrated several benefits of cross-cutting exposure, but they also showed its dark side. In her seminal work, Diana Mutz (2006) found that political ambivalence is significantly associated with cross-cutting political talk as disagreement makes people more uncertain in their political capacities. However, political talk and exposure on social media differs from its offline counterpart. Our research question is whether this detrimental effect can be detected on social media context, too, or it is a "safe space" where the harmful effects of cross-cutting exposure do not prevail. To capture this uncertainty, we used participants' internal political efficacy as a dependent variable that is a well-established measure of people' political confidence and ambivalence. Participants were divided into three groups: these groups were exposed to a set of like-minded, mixed, and cross-cutting opinions on the state of Hungarian healthcare system. The findings show that respondents' internal political efficacy is not significantly shaped by the type of exposure. Consequently, cross-cutting exposure on social media does not make people more uncertain politically, it is more of a "safe space" for political disagreement than offline context.

PANEL 5: POLITICS AND ECONOMY

Péter Krisztián Zachar

Political dynamics as catalyst of institutional change: the example of the Hungarian chambers of industry and commerce

The presentation deals with the development of the chambers of commerce and industry in Hungary from an organisational-historical perspective. After a short description of the historical background and the development of the chambers of commerce the presentation concentrates on the institutional change after the political turn of 1989/1990. The case of the Hungarian chambers in the last three decades is presented as an example of strong changes that occurred primarily through a politically influenced dynamic. Although – as a result of far-reaching debates – a public chamber system with compulsory membership was introduced in Hungary after the political change (1994) an institutional change could be observed already after 5 years. On the one hand the chambers of crafts were abolished as independent organisations and integrated into the chambers of industry and commerce, besides the compulsory membership in these was abolished (1999). After a further decade, compulsory registration was introduced for all companies in Hungary (2012), without, however, linking it to real membership rights of the chamber organisation. In this presentation I will primarily focuse on political considerations as an explanation for institutional change. In the post-socialist transformation country, the political actors were and are endeavouring to maximise their positions of power and to secure the maintenance of power in the long term through various measures. This also includes institutional changes in organisations located in the mezzosphere between state and citizen. At first, the idea of abolishing compulsory membership allowed voters to be mobilized at the elections and then political-ideological opponents could be removed from the leadership of the weakened chamber structure. The institutional change naturally also had an influence on the activities of the chamber organisation and affected the changing tasks, financing bases and internal structures of the Hungarian chambers until today.

Zoltán Török

Studying the different qualities of policy change – Hungarian tax reform 2009-2018

The objective of the paper is to investigate the causal mechanisms of large shifts in public policy and therefore it aims to contribute to the emerging stream of public administration applied-research agendas on public sector reform. The case under investigation is the major change of tax policy that took place in the past decade in Hungary (2009-2018). This time period comprised of three consecutive governments operating under qualitatively different economic environment and political setting. Despite of these dissimilarities, the direction of tax policy changes went into the same direction. The policy change

included radical income tax cuts, large increase of consumption related taxes and other measures. While some tax policy changes happened in other European Union (EU) member states as well, Hungary clearly stands out with regards to the magnitude of the changes implemented. This is a puzzle the paper aims to explain by exploring the influence of the dominant domestic cleavage structures and supranational institutions on domestic policy design. The research is organized in an embedded case study design purporting within-case analysis. In doing so, three data sources were consulted (media sources; official public documents; semi-structured interviews with relevant actors). The article argues that it is worthwhile to amend and refine policy transfer theories with the findings of this study: key political decision makers' reform ownership is crucial in the explanation of the public sector reform trajectories.

Gábor Molnár

The role of business associations in contractual governance: the case of a successful Hungarian industry

How do business associations contribute to the governance of contractual relations? I set out to answer this question by connecting the study of contractual governance with the debate on the functionality of business associations.

I define contractual governance as the set of governance mechanisms and institutions intended to solve the issues of finding suitable business partners and making credible contractual commitments (Greif 2008). Recent results on contractual governance point to the parallel relevance of spontaneous (reputation-, norm-, or relationship-based) and public-order (courts, regulatory agencies) mechanisms in developed economies. (Mike & Kiss 2018) Our knowledge of the relations between different governance levels and the elements of governance in-between is lacking. I intend to contribute to this gap by analysing one of the most prevalent of those institutions in-between.

Business associations, understood as private, formalised, not-for-profit organisations intended to further the shared interests of a business community, are traditionally theorised as rent-seeking interest groups (Olson 1965 & 1997). Recent contributions to new-institutional economics have highlighted their role in governance through knowledge sharing (Luna & Tirado 2008), the protection of property-rights (Greif et al. 1994, Pyle 2009) and contract enforcement (Doner & Schneider 2000, McMillan & Woodruff 2000, Knack 2003, Prüfer 2015). The theoretical base behind these results is still fragmented, calling for theory building on how business associations fulfil their role in contractual governance.

I utilise congruence analysis (Blatter & Haverland 2012) as I first develop propositions on governance mechanisms related to business associations and the way they fit into systems of contractual governance, and then contrast those with an empirical case to derive propositions on the underlying principles. I propose four consistent forms of business associations' involvement in contractual governance, based on the level of institutionalised collective action in information sharing, rulemaking

and sanctioning: association as information-intermediary, community governance by association, self-regulation and co-regulation.

The case of the Hungarian seed industry provides a most-likely case for the emergence of complex contractual governance institutions, as it is a traditionally well-institutionalised industry successfully meeting recent regulatory and contractual challenges arising from the transition to a market-economy, large-scale entry and major technological developments. I conducted twenty semi-structured interviews with private and public stakeholders within the industry community, uncovering their perception of business challenges, their contractual strategies, their reliance on different governance mechanisms and their view of the industry's associations.

Business associations as information intermediaries can connect to and enable all other governance levels to improve their effectiveness, which, combined with the simple institutional requirements of this function, could explain their prevalence. Self-regulation of contentious issues such as product quality requires extraordinary challenges in order to institutionalise. Overall, as all forms of governance by association rely on other levels to function or to emerge, simpler and more flexible complementary mechanisms are more likely to institutionalise. Complex associational governance, which substitutes for other levels, requires powerful selective incentives. A more feasible alternative is co-regulation driven by government actors recognising their informational limitations, which can be successful in meeting emerging regulatory challenges without enabling rent-seeking activities.

Mikhail Zabotkin

Democratic Backsliding in CEE as European Disintegration: a Qualitative Comparative Analysis

This paper strives to contribute to the discussion on the causes of democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe. It does so by combining perspectives from two theories of European integration – federalism and postfunctionalism – on the rule of law crisis of the European Union. Democratic backsliding is conceptualized as an instance of disintegration which could be explained by reversing the causal logic of the theories of European integration. Both national-level and international-level factors are considered. These hypotheses derived from the literature are tested using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The following discussion of the results highlights the limitations of European integration theories in explaining democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as possibilities of theoretical synthesis.

Anna Sakson-Boulet

Poland Environmental Policy Priorities by 2030

The aim of the paper is to present priorities of polish environmental policy regarding "Poland Environmental Policy by 2030" - document providing strategic plan of action in the field of environment management. Document should be adopted in the first quarter of 2019 (https://bip.kprm.gov.pl/kpr/form/r9356511228,Projekt-uchwaly-Rady-Ministrow-w-sprawieprzyjecia-Polityki-ekologicznej-panstwa.html, Public Information Bulletin website, 28.02.2019). Four main goals can be identified:

1) improving water quality;

2) improving air quality;

3) reducing greenhouse gas emissions and accommodation to climate change;

4) wildlife conservation.

Analysis will focus on the state of the air, which is a problem getting the most social attention due to its severe public health consequences. Pollution from air has a negative influence on the respiratory tract, circulation, nervous and reproductive systems. The estimated number of premature deaths in Poland, in 2014, resulting from exposure to fine dust, ozone and carbon dioxide amounted to 48,6902 (European Environment Agency, *Air Quality in Europe – 2017 report*, Publication Office of the European Union, Luxembourg 2017, p. 57).

Iga Kender-Jeziorska

Public service co-production in illiberal democracies: A comparative case of drug policy in East-Central Europe

Context. Over the last few decades, the literature on public policy making experienced a shift of the focus from the state as a policy-maker to more participatory forms. One of the concepts grasping this shift is collaborative governance. It involves the application of mechanisms of involving non-state actors in the policy process. In the context of developed polities an increasing number of services are provided within the framework of co-production with non-profit sector. However, when it comes to NGOs' involvement in collaborative governance in East-Central Europe (ECE), the body of literature is scarce. Moreover, some of the most recent accounts on participatory policy making in the ECE region highlight what seems to be a more global trend: that in certain ECE countries government policy on NGOs and their involvement in public policy shifted from disregard to outright hostility Aims. The aim of this paper is to understand

the key features and consequences of illiberal governance reforms for NGOs' role in the context of intersectoral partnerships and public service co-production. We ask how intersectoral partnerships arrangements and processes differ in illiberal democracies compared with their non-(or less) illiberal counterparts in the ECE region? In the final analysis we wish to inquire whether there is an identifiable illiberal governance paradigm relating to intersectoral partnerships, and if so what are its features?

Data and method. In this research we apply qualitative comparative case study design combined with a pattern matching approach. The unit of analysis is drug policy in a country. Specifically, we focus on harm reduction responses (low-threshold services) for injecting drug users. Based on the available literature, we developed own analytical framework including dimensions allowing for differentiating between various levels of inter-sectoral partnerships. The data was collected in two rounds in spring 2015 and spring 2018. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with sixteen employees of harm reduction NGOs working locally, recorded and transcribed verbatim. The data was coded using MaxQDA software for qualitative data analysis.

Results. Firstly, we seem to have managed to identify an intersectoral partnership regime that is distinctly different from the customary "no-intersectoral-partnership" characteristic for many ECE (and other) countries. This "illiberal ISP regime" predominantly differs from earlier ones in that it openly and deliberately debilitates harm reduction NGOs on ideological basis. Secondly, this IISP appears not in both of our illiberal cases, but only one of them: Hungary. Although not covered in our empirical research, it seems justified to mention that an IISP regime very similar to the one identified in Hungary is present in Poland too, however is different policy area.

Discussion. In sum, it seems that the specifically illiberal element of ECE intersectoral partnership regimes – where they exist at all – does not appear uniformly across different policy areas. To the opposite: large segments of the NGO community and of the corresponding ISP arrangements operate in a way practically untouched by illiberalism. The illiberal doctrine materializes only in a few policy areas: those that embody, ideologically and politically, an antithesis of the governing leading political parties' worldviews.

Ercsey-Orbán Melánia

Discourse and family policy in Hungary between 2010 and 2018

The research adopts a discursive institutionalist framework to identify ideas behind the construction of the family policy agenda of the Fidesz-KDNP government between 2010 and 2018. There have been several conclusions regarding the ideology of the Orbán government, these include: 'right-wing populism', 'transnational populism', 'transnational fundamentalism', 'nationalist fundamentalism', 'nationalist neo-conservatism', 'post-socialist traditionalism'. Many of these concepts capture East Central European modification of already existing ideologies. The research would like to reflect on the

role of ideas and discourse that has shaped the public policy agenda, more specifically family policies as a subfield of welfare policies. In order to highlight the effect of the ideational process, the central problem involves the discursive legitimization in a contradiction between idea and implementation. While there is an explicit governmental communication about conservative family values and a strong denial of the gender perspective, measures do not seem to be in line with these ideas: measures support employed mothers' work-life balance, the nursery network is expanded, fathers are encouraged to take part in home care activities.

Sándor Gallai

Give way to children? The Context of Family Policy in Hungary

Since 2010 the second, third and fourth Orbán governments have increased government spending on families considerably. This paper outlines the most important policy tools and objectives of post-2010 family policy mix. It observes a shift within family policy objectives from social to population policy considerations, and explores the underlying political motivations behind the changes. In the context of international experiences it also examines whether increased family policy expenditures can lead to higher fertility.

PANEL 7: PARTY SYSTEMS

Martin Mölder

Changing Political Landscapes in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Perceptions of Political Landscapes

In the context of low or decreasing political trust and participation, and higher levels of voters that are willing to cast their votes for newcomers that are promising something very different, it is evident that there are crucial unfulfilled needs in many European party systems. Indeed, on the eve of the European Parliament elections, party systems across Europe have changed more than over the previous decades. More and more parties in Eastern and Western Europe are challenging the status quo, both domestically and with regard to the European Union. How do people perceive these challenger parties and how do they differentiate them from the "mainstream"? Understanding the perceived political profiles of such parties is key to understanding the electoral demand that they are meeting and through that some of the fundamental problems that current European party systems are struggling with.

The current paper focusses on the changing political landscapes in three Eastern European party systems – the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia – and the parties within these systems, that have in one way or another challenged the status quo. Drawing on the theory of conceptual spaces by Peter Gärdenfors, the analysis relies on a seldom-applied method for uncovering people's perceptions of politics. Across four surveys in these three counties, carried out at the end of 2017 and in 2018, people

were asked to evaluate the overall political differences between all major parties in pairs as well as subsequently rank these parties on salient political issues. Analyzing such pairwise comparisons using multidimensional scaling enables to uncover two-dimensional perceptual spaces of party politics without forcing the respondents to judge parties on pre-given and assumed ideological dimensions, like left-right or liberal-conservative, which might not be relevant in these turbulent circumstances. The analysis provides a picture of how the party landscapes in these three countries are structured in the minds of the voters and how they differentiate the parties that have challenged the "mainstream". Through that the analysis helps to understand better in which direction Eastern European party politics of the present is heading.

András Hajdú

The reawakens of the urban-rural cleavage – The urban-rural cleavage and parties in the Hungarian Parliamentary Election 2018

The urban-rural cleavage was one of the four cleavages of Lipset and Rokkan's classical work (Lipset-Rokkan, 1967). In the past this cleavage focused on the contrast between interests of rural, agricultural areas and that of the industrial ones. The cleavage later was reinforced by cultural differences between countryside and urban centres and was expressed through agrarian parties. During the second half of the 20th century we witnessed both the decline and transformation of these parties. On the one hand, these parties disappeared, on the other hand, they abandoned their agrarian profile and changed into various characters. We can find nowadays both centre parties (for example in Scandinavia) and radical right ones (for example the Swiss People's Party and The Finns party), which have agrarian origins.

In the previous years the urban-rural division reappeared slightly in the election results again. The victory of Donald Trump in 2016 (Johnston et al., 2018b), the result of the Brexit referendum (Johnston et al., 2018a) and European elections, for example the Austrian presidential election in 2016 (Plasser-Sommer, 2017), or the French presidential election in 2017 (Gougou-Persico, 2017) were all explained with the urban-rural cleavage by political commentators and analysts. In the political science a new political division appeared already 10 years ago, which contains not only the four classical cleavages, but several other conflicts as well. Kriesi et al. labelled this political division as the Green, Alternative, Libertarian vs. Traditionalist, Nationalist, Authoritarian (GAL-TAN) cleavage (Kriesi et al., 2008). This political division contains also the reawakens of the urban-rural cleavage, which has both cultural and economic elements.

In the Hungarian political science it was common sense that the urban-rural cleavage was significant in the Hungarian party system after the regime change (Körösényi et al., 2007:258-264), which had the empirical, normative and organizational aspects, as Bartolini and Mair (Bartolini-Mair, 1990) defined the cleavage. The presentation focuses on this political division in the case of the Hungarian parliamentary elections in 2018, especially the empirical (voters and election results of the parties) and organizational aspects (socio-demographic characteristics of the elected MPs).

Csaba Molnár

The Proof of Mainstreaming is the Winning? – The Moderation Strategy of Jobbik

The moderation strategy of the main opposition party of Hungary, the radical right-wing Jobbik has become a crucial topic of the Hungarian politics since 2013. Its move to the centre (or even to the left-wing) significantly restructures the party competition of Hungary. In this presentation, I will investigate the manifestos and press releases of the Jobbik published between 2010 and 2018 to understand the main characteristics of this moderation process. I will investigate the policy domain of these documents, the change of proportions of socio-cultural and socio-economical policy fields. I complement this by a dictionary-based text mining method focusing on the usage of 'populist' expressions in these texts. Finally, I examine the initiations of the party reflecting to some important policy questions of the Hungarian policy agenda during the investigated period. Due to the fact that any kind of moderation can be best understood from the perspective of the political competition as a whole, I compare these results to other parties.

PANEL 8: PROBLEMS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Márton Ugrósdy

Where best practices come from? Preliminary evidence on policy transfer in the Hungarian central and local government context

Policy transfer has been a main way to reform both public administrations and public management practices in the last decades. Various international organizations, supranational bodies and advisory groups have been lobbying for the adoptions of "best practices", and the wave of European Union enlargement served as a large-scale natural experiment for policy transfer as well. The literature still debates however, whether policy transfer can be successful across different public administration traditions and cultures, and whether international, state-to-state transfer is the most prevalent, or other methods can be more effective and appear more often. This paper treats policy transfer as an independent variable of two comparative case studies, while it differentiates between domestic and international transfer. The research objective is to look at preliminary evidence from Hungary to determine whether performance management, a policy instrument rooted in the public interest tradition can be transferred to the Hungarian administrative context. The main puzzle of the research is that how performance management can take root in Hungary, a context alien to managerial innovations, and whether international or domestic best practices have the best chances of survival in the ever-changing Hungarian central and local government arena.

Bulcsú Kál Hoppál

A Chapter of the Relation of State and Churches: The Statute IV of 1990 and CCVI of 2011.

In the midst of the political change in Hungary the act IV of 1990 on religions and religious communities was a significant step toward the liberalisation of the relation of church(es) and the state. This initiative, interestingly, was the latest statute introduced by the Socialist government before the first free elections held in 1990. The result of this statute was that in a few months more than 400 religious groups applied for registration.

In my paper I will investigate, from the point of view of religious studies (Religionswissenschaften), the understanding of religion of the statute IV of 1990 and I will compare it to the definition of religion and religious freedom of the act CCVI of 2011. I will argue that though there is no significant difference in the definitions of religion in these understandings, we call the statute IV of 1990 liberal and the statute CCVI of 2011 conservative only because of their different views on the application procedure.

Anna Ujlaki

Fear of refugees and immigrants – A theoretical approach

According to 'fear maps' and empirical studies, migration in the past few years steadily ranks among the most important fears of individuals in ECE countries, especially in Hungary. Empirical data indicates that, in these countries, citizens are excessively suspicious against both real and potential attendance-seekers, be them either refugees or immigrants. Parallel to this phenomenon, in the level of public opinion and media, a more and more popular idea is that refugees and immigrants are posing a threat to target countries. My aim is to examine this tendency from a theoretical perspective, and argue for the unjustifiability of regarding attendance-seekers as a threat. Building on one of the most influential contemporary political theoretical streams, namely Rawlsian liberalism, I make an attempt to argue that, from a liberal perspective, the danger in which potential aliens put target societies, is not a different one from that of threatening citizens. In the first part of my presentation, I demonstrate the way Rawls himself fails to approach the question of migrants in his works. In the second part I argue that his works provide enough materials to reconstruct three convincing arguments about the unjustifiability of regarding aliens a threat. However, I shall show that, in elaborating those ideas, we must reject some of Rawls's explicit ideas about migration, and turn to his original theories of domestic social justice.

Prince Aian Villanueva

Pathways to corruption in Central Eastern Europe and Eurasia: A fuzzy-sets qualitative comparative analysis

Informed by the literature on civil society-corruption nexus and the larger democracy-corruption linkage, the paper is an attempt to describe the conditions or configurations thereof for the presence of high perceived corruption in Central Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Following from the belief that civil society cannot constitute a single, independent force in the anticorruption movement and reform, I argue that civil society's (as indicated by the sustainability of civil society organizations (CSO)) anticorruption effect is conditional upon the presence or absence of three important factors surveyed from the extant literature: free media, social and political integration, and stability of democratic institutions. Using secondary data culled from various sources, the paper employs fuzzy sets Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to probe into the above objective. Findings suggest that the pathways to high perceived corruption in Central Eastern Europe and Eurasia are multiple and configurational. The paper concludes with some partial insights and notes some recommendations for further research.

PANEL 9: OPPOSITION AND RESISTANCE IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Igor Stipić

Esthetics of Order – Poetics of Resistance: 'Pravda za Davida' as new 'distribution of the sensible'?

The article studies civic mobilization concentrated around the social movement 'Pravda za Davida' ('Justice for David') in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian entity of Republika Srpska. Emerging in February of 2018 as a result of yet another unresolved youth homicide in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 'Istina i Pravda' ('Truth and Justice', another name of the group) has become the strongest social movement since the double transition of the nineties. While questioning rising authoritarianism of present political regime in Republika Srpska led by Milorad Dodik and his political party SNSD (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats), the movement has likewise opened a variety of questions relating the processes of political and national transitions realized in the aftermath of Yugoslavia. By interrupting the closure of ethno-national populism as a final form of politics in this area, the demands for 'Truth and Justice', pointing towards unrealized transitional dreams of ethno-national community of unity, justice, prosperity and equality, directs us towards an analysis of polemical nature of politics and constitutive friction present at the very core of any regime. Thus, while analyzing the cracks appearing in the well-established esthetics of dominant order held together by the narrative of Serb unity and defense from threats up and beyond, this article investigates the Rancières paradigm of politics as the 'distribution of the sensible' - exploring relations between established 'police order' and 'politics' as its underside. By mapping, understanding

and conceptualizing development of social mobilization, its repertoire of actions, advances and obstacles, this study aims to understand the potential lying in the 'Pravda za Davida' social movement to produce popular "noise" and question the specific esthetic parameters of legitimacy that define accepted and unaccepted, visible and invisible, heard and silenced, permitted and prohibited. In this sense, while trying to question the very legitimacy of the established regime, 'Pravda za Davida', by demanding 'justice', produces new antithesis that impedes gentrification of ethno-nationalism as political normalcy in Republika Srpska, thus rebutting its hegemony and revealing the 'truth' of authoritarian political structures hiding behind the harmonious image of homogenous ethno-national community.

Magdalena Solska

Political opposition in Poland – just weak or intentionally constrained?

The precondition for a functioning parliamentary democracy is the presence of political opposition with its permanent and credible claim to govern. Through its core functions – control, criticism and proposing an alternative programme – the political opposition becomes a driving force for the learning process of a democratic system. Conversely, a weak opposition undermines the effective parliamentary control over government. Despite its decisive role in the democratisation process, the consistent research on the scope of activity and effectiveness of political opposition in the post-communist democracies has been scarce so far. In Poland, for instance, the opposition won almost every new election. Since 2015, however, a one-party government under the national conservative "Law and Justice" (PiS) has conducted several controversial legislative changes that allow the party take a firmer grip on the Constitutional Tribunal, state media, civil service and judiciary. The respective legislative process has been remarkably fast and one-sided, rendering the control function of the opposition impossible.

Because the freedom of exercising opposition determines the political freedom in a country, the question appears how the political opposition functions and fulfils its relevant functions under these new circumstances in Poland. Is it purposefully hindered by the ruling party, or is it its own weakness that contributes to the high popularity of PiS? This qualitative research aims to explore how political opposition currently works, what kind of strategy it has resorted to in response to the overwhelming dominance of one party within the political process.

Given that the main characteristics of an authoritarian regime is the "limited pluralism" (Juan J. Linz), it is exactly the state of political opposition, the attitude and actions of PiS towards their political opponents that can unveil the nascent development of an authoritarian rule.

Marcin Łukaszewski

Political techniques applied by the Law and Justice party since the 2015 elections

In 2015 in Poland there was a double victory of Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - PiS): first presidential elections were won by Andrzej Duda, a candidate from the PiS nomination, and a few weeks later the victory was confirmed by parliamentary elections - PiS won an independent majority in both houses of parliament. It was important because for the first time since 1989, one political group has gained an independent majority in the parliament.

An important element of the change that led to the persistence of relatively high support for the ruling party was the breach of unwritten rules related to public media pluralism or consensus on foreign (European) policy.

The subject of the speech will be an attempt to determine how Law and Justice party implements the election program. At the same time, the author will undertake to assess to what extent the use of specific political mechanisms leads to the implementation of political postulates that do not find broad support.

Delibašić Balša – Nikolić Sara

Rising of New Force: Core Values of New Social Movements in Serbia and Their Potential for Creating a New Political Front

This paper is the result of field research conducted in 2018, and the sample includes 12 social movements in Serbia. Understanding that, progressive social movement in Serbia, by their engagement, oppose authoritarian, centralized power, as well as centralized, mainstream political parties. Such positioning and branding of movements as horizontal, non-aligned, anti-establishment and fluidly organized, could be interpreted as a political strategy. Following this strategy, social movements position themselves as an alternative to governing political structures, not just with a political program that offers both the values and goals they advocate, but also with the organization and principles of unity they practically execute. The overriding impression is that the readiness and probability of cooperation among the social movements are in close relationship with the ideological position and shared goals. However, the perception of the achieved cooperation can vary considerably. Our goal is to answer the question whether the ideological position and goals are sufficient cause to create a new political actor at the national level. This research shows that there are several key challenges in this journey. Challenges relate not only to the strategies of participation in the political arena but also to diametrically opposed understandings of other political entities.