Tantárgy adatlap

A tantárgy szakmai tartalma: The course examines the interaction between economics and politics, predominantly with the help of formal models. We seek answers to questions like: How do political institutions influence economic performance? Or: How do economic outcomes affect political power relations? It gives an overview of the most important concepts, models, and results of the newly emerging field of political economy. The course focuses on the political and institutional factors influencing development, the functioning of democracies and dictatorships, and the transition between the systems. The main goal of the course is to provide students with a solid foundation in political economy, which may be very useful both in academic, and professional careers.

Évközi tanulmányi követelmények: Homeworks related to the topics.

Vizsgakövetelmény: The material covered in the sessions.

Az értékelés módszere: Maximum of 60 points (30-30) from the midterm and the final written exam, 20 points from the homeworks, and a potential bonus of 5 points from seminar activity.
The grades are as follows:
70-80 points Excellent (5)
60-69 points Good (4)
50-59 points Satisfactory (3)
40-49 points Pass (2)
0-39 points Fail (1).

Tananyag leírása: Course schedule (subject to change):
Part I: Institutions and economic development
Week 1: The role of institutions in economic development
• North, D. C.: Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. pp. 3-10
• Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson & J. A. Robinson: Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth. In: Aghion, P. és S. N. Durlauf (ed.): Handbook of Economic Growth, Volume 1A. Elsevier, N.Y., 2005. pp. 385-472
Week 2: Democracy and dictatorship: the concepts
• Schumpeter, J. A.: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Harper Colophon Books, Harper&Row, New York, 1975. pp. 250-283
• Linz, J.: Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2000. pp. 49-75
• Przeworski, A.: Minimalist conception of democracy - a defense. In: Shapiro, I. & C. Hacker-Cordón: Democracy's value. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. pp. 23-55
Week 3: Democracy, dictatorship, and economic development
• Olson, Mancur: Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. The American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 3 (1993), pp. 567–76
• Bardhan, P.: Democracy and development: a complex relationship. In: Shapiro, I. & C. Hacker-Cordón: Democracy's value. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. pp. 93-111
• Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. A.: Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Crown Publishers, New York, 2012. pp. 70-95
Part II: Democracies
Week 4: Models of democratic politics I
• Shepsle, Chapters 4&5, pp. 49-136
Week 5: Models of democratic politics II
• Acemoglu, Chapter 4, pp. 89-117
• Downs, A.: An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Apr.), 1957, pp. 135-150
Week 6: Patrons, clients, and rent seeking
• Kitschelt, H. & S. I. Wilkinson (ed.): Patrons, Clients, and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007. pp. 1-50
• Murphy, K. M., A. Shleifer & R. W. Vishny: Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly To Growth? American Economic Review. Papers And Proceedings 83 (2), 1993. pp. 409-414
Week 7: Midterm exam
Part III: Dictatorships
Week 8: Political economy of dictatorships
• Wintrobe, R.: The political economy of dictatorship. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. pp. 20-42. and pp. 127-162
• Easterly, W.: Benevolent Autocrats. (PDF) 2011
Week 9: Models of politics in dictatorships
• Acemoglu, Chapter 5, pp. 118-172
Week 10: Corruption
• Shleifer, A. & R. W. Vishny: Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3. (1993), pp. 599-617
• Brough, W. T. & M. S. Kimenyi: On the Inefficient Extraction of Rents by Dictators. Public Choice, Vol. 48, 1986. pp. 37-48
• Mbaku, J. M.: Corruption and Rent-Seeking . In: Borner, S. & Paldam, M. (ed.): The Political Dimension of Economic Growth : Proceedings of the IEA Conference Held in San Jose, Costa Rica I.E.A. Conference Volume ; No. 119, pp. 193-211
Part IV: Transitions
Week 11: Models of political transition I
• Przeworski, A.: Democracy and the market: political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. pp. 51-99 & 136-187
Week 12: Models of political transition II
• Acemoglu, Chapter 6, pp. 173-220
Week 13: Transition traps
• Hellman, J. S.: Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions. World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1998, pp. 203-234
• Pei, M.: China's Trapped Transition. The Limits of Developmental Autocracy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 17-44
Week 14: Final exam.

Órarendi beosztás: According to Neptun.

Kompetencia leírása: To achieve a solid foundation in the concepts and models of political economy.

Félévközi ellenőrzések: 

A hallgató egyéni munkával megoldandó feladatai: Homeworks.

Szak neve: 

Irodalomjegyzék:
Kötelező irodalom:

• Shepsle, Kenneth A.: Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions. W. W. Norton & Company, N. Y., 2010. (Shepsle).
• Acemoglu, Daron & James A. Robinson: Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006. (Acemoglu).

Ajánlott irodalom: